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Epistemology is true as long as it recognizes the inadequacy of its own
approach and lets itself be propelled forward by the impossibility of
the task itself. It becomes untrue by pretending it is successful.
—Adorno, Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie 331
Question and Answer, or Aesthetics Revisited
This study examines the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and
the visual media around 1900. More specifically, it focuses on questions of
aesthetic mediation in the poetic works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Rainer
Maria Rilke, and Stefan George. The question of mediation, of course, is
central not only to German Aestheticist poetry, but also to literary scholar-
ship and philosophical inquiries in general, which, as Jean-François Lyotard
has recently argued, is characterized by its condemnation of all possible an-
swers in favor of ever new and unanswerable questions.2 If a question can
be answered, Lyotard caricatures the philosophical position, it was either
not adequately formulated or merely a technical question, meaning that it
should not have been asked at all.
Unlike Lyotard, I am inclined to take the issue more seriously. Since the
investigation into the essence of things and the concomitant notion of abso-
lute truth is, by definition, located beyond the dichotomy of question and
answer, it follows that a true question cannot be answered, or, put differ-
ently: its answer would be superfluous, because it would already be inherent
within the question itself. ‘‘[I]n philosophy,’’ Theodor W. Adorno remarks,
‘‘any authentic question almost always in a certain way includes its answer’’
(Sondern in Philosophie schließt stets fast die authentische Frage in gewisser
Weise ihre Antwort ein) (Negative Dialektik 71).3 Adorno’s cautious formu-
lation (‘‘almost,’’ ‘‘in a certain way’’) betrays a critical distance toward the
metaphysical history of this kind of thinking, which he sees exemplified in







































































nent, as Walter Benjamin’s opening remarks in the Origin of German Tragic
Drama may serve to illustrate. Writing before his serious engagement with
and commitment to Marxism, he argues that the unity of truth is ‘‘out of ’’ or
‘‘beyond all question’’ (außer Frage), as he puts it, since otherwise onewould
necessarily become trapped in an infinite regress of question and answer:
‘‘For if the integral unity in the essence of truth were open to question, then
the question would have to be: how far is the answer to the question already
given in any conceivable reply which truth might give to questions. And
the answer to this question would necessarily provoke the same question
again, so that the unity of truth would defy all questioning’’ (Wäre nämlich
die integrale Einheit im Wesen der Wahrheit erfragbar, so müßte die Frage
lauten, inwiefern auf sie die Antwort selbst schon gegeben sei in jeder denk-
baren Antwort, mit derWahrheit Fragen entspräche. Und wieder müßte vor
der Antwort auf diese Frage die gleiche sich wiederholen, dergestalt, daß
die Einheit der Frage jeder Fragestellung entginge) (Ursprung; Gesammelte
Schriften I/1: 210).4
To a certain degree, Benjamin accepts the epistemological dilemma con-
stitutive of philosophical thought, whose eternal quest for primordialmean-
ing cannot succeed lest it were to lose its reason for being, and thus, para-
doxically, its proper meaning. An answer found signifies truth lost, which
is why Lyotard’s mockery of the entire philosophical tradition sells the real
issue short. At stake is less the paradoxical (or tautological) nature of human
thought, but the question of how to come to terms with it. This problem of
presentation (Darstellung) is crucial to the history of philosophy, and both
its formulation and its aesthetic ‘‘solution’’ take on a peculiar shape in mod-
ernist poetry around 1900.The Look of Things focuses on precisely this shape
in works by Hofmannsthal, Rilke, and George. I realize, of course, that my
topic may seem questionable to those readers for whom the poetic search
for truth and beauty epitomizes the very ideological perils of bourgeois Aes-
theticism.5 Why, indeed, should contemporary scholarship be interested in
what traditionally has been dismissed as a decadent and conservative, if not
openly reactionary, aesthetic paradigm?
To answer this question, wemust recall how recent scholarship has sought
to salvage the aesthetic, namely by expanding its traditional scope from the
realm of high art to that of popular and mass culture. By means of this
shift, the relevance of cultural artifacts could be reasserted without recourse







































































tivity, or truth.To the contrary, aesthetic criticism became synonymouswith
designing a critical apparatus with which to analyze contemporary society
and culture as the overdetermined result of economic, political, and ideo-
logical factors. One of the earliest and most sophisticated proponents of this
approach, Fredric Jameson, argued in 1979 ‘‘that we must rethink the oppo-
sition high culture/mass culture in such a way that the emphasis on evalua-
tion to which it has traditionally given rise . . . is replaced by a genuinely
historical and dialectical approach to these phenomena. Such an approach
demands that we read high and mass culture as objectively related and dia-
lectically interdependent phenomena, as twin and inseparable forms of the
fission of aesthetic production under capitalism’’ (Signatures 14). Whereas
Jameson still argues with reference to particular works of art (films, novels,
painting, etc.), the rise of cultural studies during the 1980s and 1990s pre-
cipitated the inclusion of everyday phenomena such as sports events, TV
shows, and political campaigns into the debate.
While I am sympathetic to this expansion of critical inquiry to the realm
of popular culture—a move that bridges the gap between academia and
other social institutions and thus enables an overall critique of contempo-
raryWestern culture—I also recognize the potential loss of an aesthetic per-
spective and the insights it yields. For once traditional aesthetic categories
are cut off from the specific art-objects and the ideal realm to which they
originally referred and instead are projected onto a wide variety of cultural
phenomena, they cannot but undergo a crucial transformation that funda-
mentally alters their analytical value and critical potential. If everything in
today’s culture can be subjected to a critique that vehemently rejects the very
ideal of aesthetic autonomy, then the difference between art and reality, the
aesthetic and the sociopolitical realm becomes completely blurred, if not ef-
faced.This loss of distinctions, however, impedes and ultimatelydisables our
inquiry into the various modes of mediation and representation that shape
society. Rilke’s famous thing-poems are simply not the same as the mun-
dane, everyday objects they describe, but instead enable us to reflect upon
and critique the difference between words and things. Art mediates reality,
and it is precisely in and through this process of mediation that a social or
cultural critique becomes possible at all.
It follows that the current trend toward obliterating the cultural divide
between high and low art, or, more drastically, between aesthetics and poli-







































































allows critics to expand their traditionally limited purview and to engage
contemporary culture with a clear sense of social responsibility and pur-
pose in mind, while, at the same time, exposing this discourse to the danger
of itself falling prey to the very commercialization it seeks to critique (the
various fashion trends in today’s academic market being only one symp-
tom among many). In order to maintain its analytical potential, the realm of
the aesthetic certainly must respond to, yet also remain different from, that
of economics, politics, or ethics so as to enable the very possibility of their
critique. This is precisely why the later Adorno insisted on the paradoxical
definition of the work of art as both autonomous and a fait social, meaning
that art must be conceptualized as both independent from and contingent
upon the social world. Any effort to hypostatize one of the two poles is to
lose the crucial tension between them, a loss that literally results in the col-
lapse not only of the aesthetic realm and the very notion of the work of art,
but also of the critical discourse that refers to it.6
To side with Adorno against academic popularism (understood in the
sense of discussing popular culture in a vernacular or popular language in
order to be received by as large an audience as possible) is not to subscribe
uncritically to his mandarin elitism nor is it to endorse his misguided de-
nunciation of jazz and other forms of popular entertainment as the epitome
of the culture industry, which are, therefore, unworthy of intellectual criti-
cism. As Andreas Huyssen has argued, Adorno himself was quite aware of
the interdependency between modernism and mass culture in spite of the
fact that he failed to examine the overall effect and emancipatory potential
of this relationship by means of a comprehensive study of popular art.7 In
other words, Adorno’s polemics against mass culture should not obscure
the fact that his aesthetic theory nonetheless remains pertinent and offers an
important venue of critique even in the context of postmodern culture. One
of the major achievements of Fredric Jameson is to have continued Adorno’s
project precisely along these lines. Jameson’s incisive analysis of Hollywood
blockbuster movies as well as his discussion of postmodern art clearly shows
the degree to which these artifacts are significant in their own right and can
serve to illuminate the very mode of production they seek to obscure.
The lesson to be learned from Adorno, then, concerns the peculiar kind
of personal investment that links literary and cultural critics to the subject
matter they scrutinize. I am not referring to the traditional notion that one







































































with a particular purpose and interest in mind, namely that of using it as
a vantage point from which to gain critical perspective. Whatever the pri-
mary focus of the investigation—be it the realm of popular culture or that of
high modernist art—the goal of the critic must be to unveil the underlying
tension between ideology and its critique, between the utopian promise in-
herent in art and the frustration it suffers once called upon to realize itself.
In Jameson’s words, even cultural critics investigating popular art must seek
to unveil the ‘‘cultural revolution’’ (Political Unconscious 95) that underlies
and inadvertently reconfigures capitalist society such that ‘‘theworks ofmass
culture cannot be ideological without at one and the same time being im-
plicitly or explicitly Utopian as well’’ (Signatures 29). It is precisely this ten-
sion that I propose to reexamine in this study on modernist poetry and its
relation to visual perception around 1900.
Hence, themajor reason forwriting a book onGermanhigh literarymod-
ernism is not to claim that some aesthetic objects are simply more suited for
this kind of critical engagement than others. Although Aestheticist poetry
does indeed reflect and comment upon the relationship between art and
life, word and world, this metareflexivity is not enough to grant these works
some exceptional status, if only for the reason that this view all too easily
leads back to the essentializing perspective on art, beauty, and truth that
conservative critics have advocated for decades. Nor is it sufficient to argue
that the utopian dimension of modernism has become shortchanged and al-
most forgotten in much of recent scholarship about postmodernity, which
I think is true, but hardly constitutes a unique case in cultural history. Yet it
is equally obvious that one cannot discuss the contemporary dystopian af-
fect of postmodern culture without reference to and analysis of the modern
paradigm it allegedly supersedes, and this conjunction certainly provides
some justification for my own revisiting of modernist poetry.
In the end, however, this return to the works of German Aestheticism
and their recognition as cultural artifacts still worthy of intellectual analysis
cannot be justified outside of my actual engagement with them. This state-
ment implies that critics cannot but invest particular works of art with the
power to speak ‘‘truthfully’’ about the world or to facilitate insights that
could not be attained otherwise.Without this investment and the belief that
there is something out there to be discovered in and through aesthetic dis-
course, critics are left with only two options: either to return to a simplis-







































































brace the postmodern loss of critical distance altogether, which, from the
very beginning, undermines any attempt to engage postmodernism or to
conceive of viable alternatives to the depthlessness and lack of historicity
in contemporary culture. Hence, cultural criticism must retain some notion
of ‘‘relative autonomy’’ with reference to the cultural sphere lest it loses the
theoretical-methodological ground on which to base its own critique. Re-
gardless of one’s evaluative position vis-à-vis the postmodern paradigm, the
crucial point is that both advocates and adversaries cannot but reflect upon
and thus ‘‘objectify’’ cultural artifacts in order to examine retroactively the
contradictory forces that influenced both their own insights and the cultural
realm they inhabit. The critical engagement of this necessity is both a dis-
tinguishing characteristic of high literary modernism and a central concern
of this book.
If the critic needs to account for and recuperate her own subjective invest-
ment into cultural objects during the course of her critique, then questions
of methodology become primary. Particularly in his earlier work, Jameson
reflects productively upon how to bridge the gap between the aesthetic sur-
face (the text or film under investigation) and the underlying ‘‘mode of pro-
duction’’ he aims to comprehend in all its complexity.8 For Jameson, this
complexity spells out history as such, and the cultural object is crucial in this
regard since ‘‘history is inaccessible to us except in textual form, or in other
words, . . . it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization’’ (Po-
litical Unconscious 82)—which is to say that the work of art is not simply
an ideological symptom or the mere effect of the economic base, as ortho-
dox Marxism would have us believe, but has always already reconfigured
and thus altered the situation to which it responds. Hence, the subject in
question is both the cause and the effect of its own critique. The strength of
Jameson’s readings lies precisely in his reluctance to dissolve this paradox.
Instead, he recognizes it as the only means to gain access to what cannot be
referred to or seized otherwise than through the mode of its mediation.
Unlike Jameson’s, however, my analysis of German poetry around 1900
is more concerned with exploring this process of mediation than with the
discovery of what lurks behind it. Since I discuss my own methodology at
length in the excursus entitled ‘‘Methods of Reading,’’ suffice it to say here
that notions such as aesthetic mediation and self-reflexivity are central to
my argument. This, however, is not to endorse the Baudrillardian notion







































































referent behind signs. One need not deny that books can burn and bodies
matter in order to pursue the question of how the turn of the century tried
to come to terms with notions such as materiality, truth, or subjectivity in
the first place. Instead, what ensues from this shift of emphasis are readings
less interested in judging high modernism’s views on the social function of
art—for such judgments are themselves subject to historical change—than
in raising questions about how and why Aestheticism emerged at that par-
ticular point in time and what lessons might be learned from studying its
cultural artifacts today. Hence, I want to know what aesthetic strategies Ger-
man poets mobilized around 1900 in order to resist both the epistemological
power of philosophy on the one hand and the increasing cultural appeal of
photography and film on the other. Why does Edmund Husserl assume that
it is possible to translate the essence of things into the prose of the concept?
How are words and things related in his eyes or in those of his contempo-
raries? And how do these questions of representation shape the pervasive
‘‘language-crisis’’ that allegedly haunted the aesthetic, philosophical, and
scientific discourse about subjectivity at the time?
Particularly the last question points to the pivotal role of language in Aes-
theticist poetry and thus highlights a fundamental methodological dilemma
in studies of aestheticmediation around 1900. For literarycriticism implicitly
relies upon and thus presupposes the very representational function of lan-
guage modernist poetry explicitly sets out to critique. This contradiction is,
of course, as vexing as it is ultimately inevitable, but its critical engagement
is nonetheless essential for the discursive strategies that sustain high liter-
ary modernism. Since philosophical discourse increasingly acknowledged
this predicament in the course of its own history, my reading of Aestheti-
cist poetry must come to terms with this history as well. Particularly since
the end of the eighteenth century, philosophy began to shift emphasis from
ideas to words and thus recognized the constitutive function of language
for the question of meaning or truth. For most contemporary thinkers, the
‘‘linguistic turn’’ in modern philosophy was one ‘‘for the better,’’ as W. V.
Quine argues, for it led to the ‘‘abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy
prior to natural science’’ (Theories andThings 67). According toQuine, ‘‘lan-
guage is a social art’’ (Word and Object ix) and hence severed from the ideal
realm of primordial truth to which it lays claim. There is no transcendental
point of view, no position that remains completely unaffected by its object







































































nent, and there is no higher.We must speak from within a theory, albeit any
of various’’ (Theories and Things 21f.), Quine concludes.
Using Quine’s terminology, one might say that Jameson must speak from
within a Marxist theoretical framework insofar as he insists on economics as
the ultimately determining instance and asserts that one ‘‘does not have to
argue the reality of history: necessity . . . does that for us’’ (Political Uncon-
scious 82). Jameson, therefore, conceives of the political perspective ‘‘as the
absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation’’ (Political Unconscious
17), and much of today’s cultural studies is indeed based on the same prem-
ise. The integrity of their and Jameson’s analysis notwithstanding, my own
study of the Look of Things around 1900 relies more strongly on the her-
meneutic tradition that spans from Schleiermacher and German Romanti-
cism up to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Giorgio Agamben, and
Gianni Vattimo. Indeed, twentieth-century hermeneutics regards language
as that which cannot not be presupposed in philosophical or aesthetic dis-
course and thus insists on the primacyof language much like Jameson insists
on the primacy of history for the reading of literary texts. Needless to say,
these two notions are not mutually exclusive but rather inform and supple-
ment each other, since history sediments into language, as Adorno argued in
response to Heidegger’s ‘‘Jargon of Authenticity.’’ In the excursus, I discuss
the relationship between Adorno and Heidegger at length. Here, I would
like to hint briefly at Heidegger’s own lifelong ‘‘journey toward language’’ in
order to outline the basic premise of the hermeneutic preoccupation with
language.
In a lengthy footnote that, in my eyes, represents the dislocated center
of his reflections on Heidegger, Jacques Derrida reveals the unquestionable
foundation of Heidegger’s philosophical inquiry in the affirmative gesture—
the ‘‘Zusage’’—of language. According to Derrida, the fact that ‘‘there is’’
language is ‘‘an affirmation anterior to any question and more proper to
thought than any question’’ (Of Spirit 131).Which is to say that the ‘‘linguistic
turn’’ of philosophy does not necessarily abort the search for the primordial
ground of thinking or the thing itself, as Quine suggests. Rather, it simply
redefines the playing field of modern thought. In a crucial reversal, the goal
now becomes to ‘‘make language itself speak,’’ since ‘‘the being of language,’’
Heidegger suggests, might also be understood as ‘‘the language of being’’
(Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens) (Unterwegs zur Sprache







































































through language. The word that lets language speak itself simultaneously
voices the essence of Being. Once language finds its proper voice, things
will express themselves in their own language since words and things are in-
extricably intertwined: ‘‘The thing itself,’’ the Italian philosopher Giorgio
Agamben recently concluded, ‘‘is not a thing: it is the very sayability, the very
openness at issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and
forget, perhaps because it is at bottom its own oblivion and abandonment’’
(Potentialities 35).
It is one of the central theses of this book that the philosophical effort to
voice the potentiality of language to speak itself is located at the heart of the
so-called ‘‘language-crisis’’ and German high literary modernism around
1900. My goal is not simply to demonstrate the imaginative play with lan-
guage that traditionally has been associated with both Aestheticist poetry
and deconstructive criticism, but to reexamine its utopian aspirations as a
direct response to particular sociohistorical circumstances. Hence, I criti-
cally engage the tradition of the hermeneutic inquiry into language in order
to review the linguistic turn in philosophy as it is reflected in and modified
by Aestheticist poetry. I argue that modernist poetry both inherits and de-
molishes the philosophical search for absolute truth. On the one hand, truth
is said to reside exclusively within language, while, on the other hand, the
realm of language is being expanded to comprise an entire universe of its
own. Language no longer merely describes the world, but literally situates
it as such. Although this elevation and the concomitant reification of poetic
language to the very ground level of Being aims to dehistoricize language,
it simultaneously cannot but highlight the epistemological and social crisis
it seeks to solve. This dilemma is responsible for the highly ambivalent rela-
tionship between art and life around 1900. Aestheticism objectifies language
and thus liberates it from its traditional role of representation. Words are
being stripped bare of their historical meaning in order to serve as purified
building blocks with which to recreate an uncontaminated world and a new
reality. This purification, however, can only be achieved in and through a
gesture of radical annihilation aimed toward established values and norms,
traditional linguistic means of signification, and, ultimately, reality itself,
which is regarded as the inferior opposite to art and the nascent world it
allegedly carries within.
Given this belief in the evocative power of language, I think it is mislead-







































































first part of the book. One of the most popular catchwords in scholarly dis-
cussions of German modernism, the ‘‘language-crisis’’ promotes a predomi-
nately negative and limited perspective on modernist poetry as inherently
decadent or irrational. In order to contextualize and contest this perspec-
tive, the first two chapters situate the aestheticization of reality around 1900
in a broader historical and philosophical context. I ask which cultural de-
velopments made it plausible or feasible for artists and intellectuals at the
time to regard poetry as the privileged medium that determines the look of
things. Simply put, I contest that there ever really was a ‘‘language-crisis.’’
Instead, there existed a much more profound and universal crisis in percep-
tion and representation that affected language as well as the visual media at
the time. In support of my claim, I provide a historical survey regarding dif-
ferent philosophical theories of vision and language from the Renaissance to
the arrival of film, discussing texts that range from Galileo and Berkeley to
Husserl and Bergson. My goal is to trace the two major ‘‘scopic regimes’’ of
modernity: the Cartesian model of a disembodied eye, typified in the cam-
era obscura and photography on the one hand, and a physiological model
of corporal vision evident in Baroque culture and nineteenth-century mod-
ernism on the other.
The conflict between these two paradigms reached its zenith around 1900,
meaning that the turn of the century witnessed a clash between the objective
and subjective models of vision. This clash led to serious doubts about the
accuracy of visual perception and modern science, a doubt that haunted all
media and forms of representation at the time. Contrary to language, how-
ever, film and photography were able to redeem themselves in the eyes of a
mass audience as a cultural novelty seemingly unconcernedwith the truthful
representation of reality. Language, on the other hand, still appeared to be
at the center of the epistemological ‘‘crisis,’’ and modernist poetry came to
be regarded as the major symptom for the modern dilemma of representa-
tion. I want to emphasize, however, that the poetry of Hofmannsthal, Rilke,
and George does not simply reflect the period’s lost faith in the represen-
tational power of language to gain access to either truth or external reality.
Rather, language around 1900 ceased to function as a dependable means of
signification because it was being charged with the impossible task of unveil-
ing its own essence and the world it carries within. The goal of Aestheticism
was to render present the mode of representation itself in order to reveal the







































































is to say that the traditional perspective on the ‘‘language-crisis’’ obscures a
more positive and constructive vision of modernism’s attempt to objectify
and reempower language.
Obviously, Aestheticism’s idealization of poetry appears problematic and
even dangerous given the rise of twentieth-century totalitarianism, which
also sought to abolish the tension between art and reality by subjecting the
latter to the former.However, the often reductionist comparison of Aestheti-
cism and Nazism overlooks the fact that many of the best poems around
1900 labor to keep that tension intact in spite of their explicit exhortation to
the contrary. In other words, there is still something to be learned from this
period’s (over)investment in the aesthetic, and the widespread belief to the
contrary rests upon several interrelated misconceptions about the nature of
Aestheticism. Since I have already discussed the problematic aspects of the
so-called ‘‘language-crisis,’’ let me continue with some clarifying remarks
on the l’art pour l’artmovement around 1900. Scholars’ reference to the ‘‘au-
tonomyof art’’ is troublesome not only in the Marxist sense that this concept
owes its very existence to the socioeconomic structure it disavows. More im-
portant, it often suggests a total disinterest in real life that fundamentally
skews the true objectives of many of its advocates. For modernism’s strong
emphasis on the complex interplay of autonomous aesthetic particles is cer-
tainly directed against the existing status quo, but not against social life as
such, which, on the contrary, it seeks to rejuvenate. Art is declared autono-
mous in order to provide an autonomous viewpoint from which to criticize
and overcome the alienation in modern society. The goal is not to eternally
separate the two, but to allow one to adapt to and ultimately inhabit the
utopian space opened by the other.
To acknowledge the underlying sociopolitical aspirations ofGermanAes-
theticism is not to disregard its escapist tendencies or its reactionary poten-
tial. On the contrary, it means that the eventual failure of high literary mod-
ernism to change society can only properly be evaluated on the basis of its
utopian claims. Without taking the latter seriously, one is bound to mis-
understand the enigmatic self-referentiality of modernist poetry as a mere
wordplay or a kind of negative inversion of the Romantic longing for the
Absolute. The entire l’art pour l’artmovement thus appears as the decadent
exploration of aesthetic autonomy bereft of the sociopolitical dimension
that actually informed it. In the eyes of Aestheticism, however, the investiga-







































































ern culture, meaning that the withdrawal from everyday life into the poetic
realm of pure language signifies, on a different level, a decisive turn toward
the sociopolitical reality it seems to disavow. Language is thus understood
both as the symptom of and the remedy for the pervasive sense of social and
cultural alienation around 1900.
This leads me to a second point, namely that Aestheticism must not
simply be equated with early German Romanticism or German Idealism.
As I argue at length in the fourth chapter, Aestheticism is an imploded ver-
sion of Romanticism. It does not project its aesthetic visions outward into
an infinite world of eternal becoming, nor does it seek refuge in the poetic
imagination of the reader. Instead,modernist poetry claims to be completely
self-authenticating and thus autonomous from all external forces. At the
same time, however, Aestheticism cannot entirely free itself from the scien-
tific heritage of the nineteenth century that resists all forms of metaphysical
speculation and demands positive proof for everything it sees. In order to
legitimate its alleged insights into ‘‘life,’’ poetry around 1900 focuses on the
materiality of language. It looks upon words as things in their own right.
Writing a poem becomes synonymous with building a world, not only in
the hermeneutic sense of producing meaning, but also in the material sense
of constructing a visual object in space.
Aestheticism’s emphasis on both vision and materiality is crucial because
it proves that German high literary modernism is not simply opposed to
modern science or popular culture, but also shaped by it, which is my third
argument. Adorno, for one, astutely recognized this interdependency as the
symptom of a pervasive sociohistorical crisis at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century: ‘‘Both [modernist art and mass culture] bear the scar of capital-
ism, both contain elements of change. . . . Both are torn halves of freedom, to
which however, theydonot add up’’ (Beide [moderneKunst undMassenkul-
tur] tragen die Wundmale des Kapitalismus, beide enthalten Elemente der
Veränderung . . . beide sind die auseinandergerissenen Hälften der ganzen
Freiheit, die doch aus ihnen nicht sich zusammenaddieren läßt) (Adorno,
qtd. in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften I/3: 1003). In spite of their rhetoric,
the poeticworks of Rilke, Hofmannsthal, and George indeed reflect the vari-
ous ties connecting high and low art that contemporary scholarship today
is so eager to demonstrate. Hofmannsthal, for example, was fascinated by







































































took a lively interest in the development of new technologies as well as the
fashion trends at the time.9
Indeed, Aestheticism acknowledges and visualizes the cultural shift from
words to images and the concomitant importance of ‘‘seeing’’ as a form
of knowledge in the twentieth century. Poetry around 1900 focuses on the
visible Gestalt of language as a means to compete aesthetically with the in-
creasing popularity and ‘‘reality effect’’ of photographic images. Modernist
poetry self-reflectively celebrates its own words as both transparent signs
and material entities, meaning that words and things become inextricably
intertwined. This aesthetic self-referentiality accounts for the enigmatic na-
ture of Aestheticism. It asks the reader to accept the visible appearance of
mere letters on the page as incontestable evidence for the primordial materi-
ality of language. As a printed medium, poetry cannot but acquire a ‘‘face’’
of its own. In the eyes of Aestheticism, this means that the text functions as a
mediator betweenword and image. It is both something to look at and some-
thing that informs and guides our vision. Hence, poetic language around
1900 does more than just describe or picture the physical experience of look-
ing, as is commonly held by secondary critics. Rather, modernist poetry
claims to enable a more profound kind of perception that grants intuitive in-
sights into the very texture of the natural world. Aestheticism tries to shape
the look of things in and through poetic language.
In the last two chapters, I address the implications of Aestheticism’s at-
tempt to merge language and vision in light of more recent discussions re-
garding the relationship between literary texts and mass media. If language
indeed possesses a ‘‘face’’ in the twofold sense of the term as that which sees
and is being seen, this also means that language cannot simply be replaced
by visual imagery. Put differently, it means that the very opposition between
text and image, between literature and the new media is ill conceived be-
cause the two are essentially interdependent and presuppose each other. I
shall, indeed, argue this thesis throughout the book. At present, however, I
would like to redeem my earlier premise that one cannot adequately discuss







































































Of Circles and Riddles
Let me turn to the introductory poem of Stefan George’s collection Der
Teppich des Lebens (1900) to examine the formal and methodological con-
sequences that result once modernist poetry rejects the ‘‘shackles of refer-
entiality,’’ as Rilke put it.
Der Teppich
Hier schlingen menschen mit gewächsen tieren
Sich fremd zum bund umrahmt von seidner franze
Und blaue sicheln weisse sterne zieren
Und queren sie in dem erstarrten tanze.
Und kahle linien ziehn in reich-gestickten
Und teil um teil ist wirr und gegenwendig
Und keiner ahnt das rätsel der verstrickten. .
Da eines abends wird das werk lebendig.
Da regen schauernd sich die toten äste
Die wesen eng von strich und kreis umspannet
Und treten klar vor die geknüpften quäste
Die lösung bringend über die ihr sannet!
Sie ist nach willen nicht: ist nicht für jede
Gewohnte stunde: ist kein schatz der gilde.
Sie wird den vielen nie und nie durch rede
Sie wird den seltnen selten im gebilde.
(Werke I: 190)
The Tapestry
Here men are oddly meshed with beasts and plants
Which silken fringes frame to harmonies,
Cerulean crescents in arrested dance
Are scored and trimmed with silver galaxies.
The arabesque is crossed with barren lines,







































































Figure 1. Title page of the first edition of Der Teppich des Lebens by Stefan
George, 1900. Courtesy of the Stefan George-Archiv, Stuttgart.
And the enigma of the snared remains
Until, one night, the fabric leaps to life.
The patterned boughs begin to stir and veer,
The creatures locked in arc and square come out
Before the knotted tassels, limned and clear,
And bring the answer that dissolves your doubt.
It is not at your beck, is not for each







































































Figure 2. Editorial commentary on the first edition of Der Teppich des Lebens
by Stefan George, 1900. Courtesy of the Stefan George-Archiv, Stuttgart.
And never for the many, nor through speech
It comes incarnate rarely to the rare.
(The Works of Stefan George 185)
The self-referentiality of the poem—the interdependencyof word and thing,
sign and object—is emphasized from its very beginning, for the demonstra-
tive ‘‘Hier’’ refers as much to the verses that follow as to the carpet they de-
scribe. Similarly, the ‘‘wesen eng von strich und kreis umspannet’’ are meant







































































Figure 3. Two poems from the first edition of Der Teppich des Lebens by Stefan
George, 1900. Courtesy of the Stefan George-Archiv, Stuttgart.
geometrical shapes we have learned to identify as letters and words—liter-
ally the q’s, d’s, b’s, and p’s in words like ‘‘queren,’’ ‘‘lebendig,’’ and ‘‘gebilde.’’
Etymologically speaking, theword ‘‘text’’ (from the Latin textus) refers to the
fabric or composition of written language. During the eighteenth century,
the arabesque, much like Egyptian hieroglyphs, was itself considered to be
a form of writing, a correspondence that further elucidates the self-reflexive
structure of George’s poem.
The reader is invited to visualize the confusing disarray of the carpet’s
arabesque patterns in the form of the poem’s own language, particularly in







































































phasizes the obscure strangeness of written words. The St-G print-type, de-
veloped by Melchior Lechter, shows no capitalization except at the begin-
ning of the line, hardly uses any punctuation, and replaces commas with
dots at medium height of the line. The innovative Gestalt of George’s lan-
guage—its mere appearance in the form of writing—serves to authenticate
the actual presence of the object it depicts. Both realms, the surface of the
carpet and that of the paper displaying the poem, are intertwined: one can-
not become alive or meaningful without the other. The words refer to the
carpet, which refers back to the words—a self-contained circle of two com-
plementary beings consumed in the ‘‘rigid dance’’ of presence and absence,
nonsense and meaning.
The carpet, however, is ‘‘the carpet of life,’’ whose obscure chaos it rep-
resents. The being-together of humans, animals, and plants interlaced with
the moon and the stars above unites heaven and earth, immanence and tran-
scendence. Heidegger’s ‘‘Geviert’’ comes to mind—the interrelated coexis-
tence of mortals and gods, earth and world—as well as Hofmannsthal’s life-
philosophical insight regarding the interconnectedness of life: ‘‘Through us
Being weaves its tremendous web’’ ([D]urch uns hindurch webt das Sein sein
ungeheures Gewebe) (‘‘Nachlass,’’ RA; GW 3: 379). Hence, the reader must
distinguish between three different levels on which the poem operates, the
first being the verses themselves, the second the pattern of the carpet they
describe, and the last the mysterious realm of life towhich the carpet alludes.
All three levels are literally and visually presented in the shape of words such
that any reference to either of these realms immediately echoes on the others
as well. For example, the beginning of the poem emphasizes the strangeness
and intricacy of the carpet’s pattern, which appears to be both self-absorbed
and impenetrable to the gaze of the beholder. The poem mirrors this design
by means of a continuous string of words that stretches over the first four
lines. Most of these words are not separated by the syntactically required
conjunctions and commas, creating an amalgamation of figures and sounds
that cannot but evoke the ‘‘strange,’’ ‘‘rigid,’’ and ‘‘convoluted’’ pattern of the
carpet.
A look at the first edition of Der Teppich des Lebens from 1900 cor-
roborates this reading. The collection includes three parts with twenty-four
poems each, and every poem consists of four stanzas with four verses to each
stanza. This rigid and highly regulated structure points to the interconnect-







































































presence. They are not only part of the larger collection, but literally consti-
tute the book as a whole. The poems are the architectural inside, the inner
skeleton of an outer shell that is commonly called a book. George’s Teppich
des Lebens, in other words, must be conceived as a living entity. The rich
ornamentation and different colors that embellished the first limited edi-
tion of only 300 copies was meant to visualize the life both contained within
and called forth by the poems (see illustrations).10 As in medieval manu-
scripts, George’s letters merge with the surrounding space, and his words
literally find their place between other objects, such as the two candelabras
on the title page, or they form a square whose surface resembles the carpet
described in the title poem. George’s ‘‘work’’ is alive, but it is also caught or
contained within a formal structure that does not allow for actual movement
in space.
This aesthetic confinement and its possible transcendence are the central
theme of George’s ‘‘Teppich.’’ The end of the second stanza introduces a sud-
den change within the ‘‘work’’ understood as both the carpet and the poem.
They are said to come alive, and this transformation is presented as an in-
ternal movement from intricacy to clarity that ‘‘brings the solution that you
have sought.’’ Ironically, this line is the most puzzling of the entire poem,
since it blatantly contradicts the previous stanza. Not only did ‘‘we’’ not seek
an answer, but we are told that literally ‘‘nobody’’ is even aware of there
being a riddle to begin with: ‘‘Und keiner ahnt das rätsel der verstrickten.’’
It follows that the coming alive of the work must be understood as an au-
tonomous, self-initiating process that retrospectively creates the very riddle
to which it provides a solution. It is only after the enlivening of movement
(and the movement of life) within the work that we become aware of having
pondered an answer to the riddle it allegedly poses. This paradox is consti-
tutive of George’s poem. The solution sought by the ‘‘you’’ (i.e., the readers
of George’s poem and/or the beholder of the carpet) is to unveil the secret
of life during the act of reading since the carpet is said to become alive in the
very words describing it. The poem, however, much like the arabesque pat-
tern of the carpet, infinitely recoils from such interpretative efforts, which
immediately become ensnared in the loop of endless referral from signifier
to signified, from words to patterns and patterns to words. And yet, apart
from this playfulness, the poem nonetheless triumphantly declares to have
given us the solution we sought.







































































revocation at work in the poem, readers face a fundamental choice: they can
either consider the promise unkept, the circle empty, and the poem mere
humbug—there is no solution, there are only words—or they can accept
this play itself as the solution sought and found. For the latter is said to ma-
terialize in a particular movement of the arabesque, a ‘‘stepping out of ’’ and
away from the surface within which it had hitherto been arrested. The solu-
tion literally steps into being. It is said to take shape in the transition from
the ‘‘Hier’’ to the ‘‘Da’’ (Freud’s ‘‘Fort-Da’’ comes to mind) that connects the
first and the second half of the poem. The ‘‘answer we sought’’ requires this
process of distancing to become alive, since it is constituted by the space that
both detaches it from and binds it to the object it has left behind. The nature
of this space harbors the solution to the riddle of life.
What kind of space is it? Not a geographical space, at least not in the
sense that it would become manifest within the structure of the work itself.
The formal composition of the poem does not reflect any change whatso-
ever between the second and the third stanza. Everything remains constant
throughout, starting with the four equal stanzas of four lines each, the regu-
lar pentameter and the alternating rhyme. The many anaphers and the re-
dundant sentence structures further highlight the formal stasis of the poem
from beginning to end. The space in question seems of a temporal nature.
It is suddenly ‘‘there one evening’’ and is characterized by a kind of move-
ment that is merely stipulated without being represented at all. It is a literal
nonspace, a space simultaneously opened and closed by the repetition of the
verses proclaiming it. It does not emerge because of a rupture, but, on the
contrary, because of a lack of rupture. It originates in and through the mo-
notony and redundancy of the words following one another, and it is this
redundancy that endows the poem with its incantatory quality. The solu-
tion is the work of magic. It designates the very moment at which the carpet
and the poem acquire a meaning for ‘‘us’’ that cannot be named without
immediately being lost. This meaning materializes in a space that is both
present and absent, revealed and concealed in the movement of poetic lan-
guage activated during the process of reading.
Heidegger revered this dynamic process of revelation and concealment as
characteristic of the work of art (i.e., his notion of ‘‘aletheia’’ in his lectures
on Parmeneides and Heraklit). Indeed, some of his later reflections on lan-
guage appear to have been written with George’s poem in mind, although he







































































Heidegger refers to the textual ‘‘Geflecht’’ whose movements the thinker has
to follow. Stepping into language and guided by it, the poet is able to call
forth what otherwise would remain invisible: ‘‘What looks like a confused
tangle becomes untangled when we see it in the light of the way-making
movement, and resolves into the release brought about by the way-making
movement disclosed in Saying.Thatmovement delivers Saying to speech. . . .
The way-making of Saying into spoken language is the delivering bond that
binds by appropriating. Language, thus delivered into its own freedom, can
be concerned solely with itself ’’ (Way to Language 131) (Was wie ein wirres
Geflecht aussieht, löst sich, aus der Bewëgung erblickt, in das Befreiende, das
die in der Sage ereignete Be-wëgung erbringt. Sie entbindet die Sage zum
Sprechen. . . . Die Bewëgung der Sage zur Sprache ist das entbindende Band,
das verbindet, indemes er-eignet. Also in ihr eigenes Freies entbunden, kann
die Sprache sich einzig um sich selbst bekümmern) (Unterwegs zur Sprache
262). Heidegger’s reflections on and in language skirt the ineffable thresh-
old separating word and thing. ‘‘Saying,’’ for Heidegger, ‘‘means: showing,
making apparent’’ (Sagen heißt: Zeigen, Erscheinen lassen) (UzS 214); it is
a ‘‘saying which, in showing, lets beings appear in their ‘it is’ ’’ (die Sage,
die zeigend Seiendes in sein es ist erscheinen läßt) (UzS 237). Things re-
veal themselves in and through speech, calling them into the open. Outside
of language, there is neither something nor nothing, neither presence nor
absence. We literally cannot say what remains outside of language—a tau-
tology, to be sure, but one that emphasizes the circuity of Heidegger’s own
reflections, which he himself explicitly endorsed. If things step into being
and are only within the realm of language (i.e., ‘‘Language is the house of
Being’’ [Sprache ist das Haus des Seins] [‘‘Brief ’’ 313]), then thought cannot
avoid performing the circular movement outlined above. Since there is no
Archimedean point of view outside of language, the issue is not to escape
the hermeneutic circle, Heidegger argues in Sein und Zeit, but ‘‘to enter it
adequately and in a meaningful way’’ (Sein und Zeit 153).11 Once one moves
within this circle, however, the apparent chaos of being subsides. Life be-
comes both sayable and visible and gains a meaning of its own.
Heidegger’s journey through language describes philosophically what
George asserts poetically: the truth of life cannot be wrested from its con-
stitutive relationship with language and presented as if it were an autono-
mous, tangible object in the material world. Rather, it remains interwoven







































































‘‘steps’’ into being as what it is) only within the movement away from the
object toward the word that calls it. This movement is the signifying game
of language that also sustains the poem as a whole. The ‘‘solution’’ consists
in the existence of discourse: it is but the very words that announce it. The
poem keeps its promise of revealing the truth precisely by refusing to speak
of anything but the ability of language itself to speak.
‘‘Die Sprache verspricht (sich),’’ Paul de Man would argue later with ref-
erence to Rousseau (Allegories of Reading 277), and it is the nature of this
promise that constitutes the enigma of art. George’s poem claims to become
alive because the meaning and being of life is always already inherent in
the very language it speaks. The truth about ‘‘stepping out’’ of life’s chaos
is to step back into language. The poem thus relocates the relationship be-
tween linguistic sign and material referent within the interior of the sign
itself where it figures as the movement of presence and absence, signifier and
signified. Truth (about the carpet, the poem, about life) materializes only
after the reader understands that there is no-thing beyond language: ‘‘With-
out theword no thing can be’’ (Kein Ding sei, wo dasWort gebricht), George
ends his famous poem ‘‘EinWort’’ from 1928. The reader must finally regard
language itself to be the truth both the poem and the carpet promised to re-
veal. Language is Being, Being is meaning, meaning is language. The circle
closes.
The readers of George’s poem, however,must determinewhether they are
in or out. A difficult decision, it may account for the highly polarized debate
about the ‘‘quality’’ of modernist poetry now and then. George’s poem, for
one, does not tolerate any ambiguity on this point since the solution shall
forever remain concealed from the many and revealed only to the chosen
few—a stipulation that repeats the familiar gesture of inclusion and exclu-
sion constitutive of the George circle. The reader either believes in the prom-
ise of art and accepts George as its prophet or she does not. At issue, in
other words, is the paradoxical ‘‘enigmaticalness’’ (Rätselcharakter) of art
(Adorno), that is, the ‘‘enigma that art itself is,’’ as Heidegger puts it (‘‘Der
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’; Holzwege 67). Art promises a solution it can-
not provide yet claims to keep nonetheless by virtue of the promise as such:
‘‘Whether the promise is a deception—that constitutes the enigma’’ (Ob die
VerheißungTäuschung ist, das ist das Rätsel), Adornomurmurs (Ästhetische
Theorie 193), since ‘‘to solve the enigma is equal to determining the reason







































































barkeit angeben) (ÄT 185). Adorno, of course, endorsed the promise of art
only to the degree that it remained conscious of its own unreality, meaning
that any attempt to realize the utopian visions of modernism in the empiri-
cal world necessarily gives rise to their undoing. With reference to George’s
‘‘The Carpet,’’ for example, Adorno argued that the aestheticist stance of the
George circle as well as George’s poetic technique merely served to obfus-
cate the emptiness of the secret they allegedly harbor. Since ‘‘the stated secret
itself does not exist’’ (‘‘George und Hofmannsthal’’ 199), Adorno ultimately
concludes: ‘‘The more empty the secret, the more important the stance of its
keeper becomes’’ (Je leerer das Geheimnis, um so mehr bedarf sein Wahrer
der Haltung) (‘‘George und Hofmannsthal’’ 200).
By contrast, I believe that Adorno’s own rigid stance concerning the al-
legedly lacking quality and self-serving nature of German Aestheticism at
times forecloses the more balanced and open approach he later outlined in
his Aesthetic Theory. Adorno’s often problematic (mis)readings of Heideg-
ger are the philosophical counterpart to his own difficulties in finding a bal-
anced, that is, appreciative, yet also critical approach to modernist poetry
around 1900. The problem is that scholars cannot simply rely upon the al-
ready established and seemingly objective terminological apparatus of lit-
erary analysis since modernist poetry consciously refuses to be relegated to
an object of study in the academic sense. It is based upon the exact opposite
premise, namely the enigmatic and infinite potential for meaning inherent
in language that can never be fully ‘‘grasped’’ either literally or figuratively.
And yet, critics cannot simply relinquish their external perspective and lose
themselves in the textual universe, as Heidegger all too often does. Aestheti-
cism’s faith in the magical power of language hence gives rise to the crucial
methodological question of how best to approach the enigmatic character of
these texts, from the inside or the outside of their own hermeneutic ‘‘circle’’?
The only possible ‘‘solution’’ for this predicament consists in the self-
reflexivity of literary criticism envisioned in both Heidegger’s and Adorno’s
approach. At their best, they practice a kind of reading that reflects upon
its own technique as a means to respond to the poetic technique it seeks to
comprehend.Without this self-reflexivity, the scholarly search for truth nec-
essarily gets lost in a poetic universe that claims to provide the primordial
ground for the very notion of truth as such. Therefore, both my theoreti-
cal interests and my perspective on poetry are informed by Adorno’s and







































































to stage a more productive encounter between the two philosophers than
is apparent in most studies. Given my focus on the interpretation of Aes-
theticist poetry, this encounter will have to take place with reference to their
various commentaries on literary texts. Overall, I believe that Adorno tends
to be too suspicious and Heidegger too gullible vis-à-vis the poetic ideals of
Aestheticism. For the political dimension of modernist poetry resides not
exclusively in theworks themselves, as both philosophers imply at times, but
materializes within the particular cultural practices and ideological frame-
works to which they are subjected.
These various contexts within which a work is situated are created and
activated in the course of reading, meaning that critics must learn to accept
that, to some degree, they inevitably shape the truth they claim to perceive
in the text. Literary criticism inheres within reading and unfolds during the
process. This ideal of a critical discourse taking shape in and through the
process of its application remains the only meaningful approach to provid-
ing an adequate critique of high literary modernism. Ultimately, no doubt,
it is doomed to fail, but this failure will prove more productive than the ap-
parent success of an ‘‘objective’’ critique. The academic fear of losing critical
distance and being seduced by the object of study is itself based upon the sci-
entific (and ideologically suspect) premise that distance alone guarantees a
certain sense of objectivity, whereas close contact contaminates the results of
the entire investigation. By contrast, I believe this kind of contamination to
be inevitable: the critics’s own language is always already tainted by the very
problem Aestheticism seeks to address, and my primary cause for concern
lies in the scholarly call for a method allegedly able to avoid this ‘‘affliction’’
altogether.
This concern was shared by most writers around 1900 who sought to
undermine the entire scientific model of question and answer, hypothesis
and verification/falsification. Similar to the messianic ideals alive in Benja-
min’s pre-Marxist texts, truth, by definition, was sensed to be ‘‘out of ques-
tion’’ (außer Frage) (Ursprung; GS I/1: 210) precisely because it was claimed
to inherewithin the language that asked for it. The excursus of this book will
take a closer look at what exactly this means by examining these method-
ological concerns in the context of the contemporary debate on (post)her-
meneutic studies and deconstruction. In short, I argue that the critic must
both be seduced by the text and resist it at the same time. To get at the text,







































































that sustain it. Staying with the metaphor of the (hermeneutic) circle, the
goal of a successful reading would be to remain neither inside nor outside,
but to approach and finally tarry on its perimeter in an effort to investigate
the borderline that both separates and unites text and world, meaning and
materiality.
Such a reading differs from what is commonly called the deconstructive
model in that it regards the material presence of language not simply as a
subversive force forever undermining the work of art. Rather, it is constitu-
tive of art in a positive and genuinely con-structive rather than de-structive
sense. Aestheticism projects forth a more positive vision of language than
deconstruction or nonhermeneutic methods of reading have given it credit
for so far. Similar to George’s poem that keeps its promise to solve the riddle
of life by providing insights into the reasons why it cannot be solved, Aes-
theticism in general identifies itself with the gesture of renunciation as a
means of finding itself. Although it carries its own undoing within, mod-
ernist poetry accepts and builds upon this self-negation as a basis for a new,
utopian reconstruction of an aestheticized world. Emphasizing the visual
dimension of the ‘‘solution’’ it proclaims, George’s poem ‘‘The Carpet’’ is
exemplary in this regard: ‘‘Sie wird den vielen nie und nie durch rede / Sie
wird den seltnen selten im gebilde.’’ The last line specifies the particular
kind of language meant to speak and be spoken: it is neither the idle talk of
the masses (Heidegger’s ‘‘Gerede’’ of the ‘‘man’’) nor the everyday discourse
against which the Blätter für die Kunst rage. It is, rather, the formed language
of a particular aesthetic ‘‘discipline’’ in the twofold meaning of the word,
the skillful mastery of the poetic genre. The riddle of life is thus solved in
the ‘‘Gestalt’’ of poetry by means of the enigmatic look it bestows upon and
reveals within language.
The constructive and critical potential of this Aestheticist stance is as im-
portant for cultural modernity as the real danger of it being reabsorbed into
the very reification it sought to escape. In saying this, one need not be apolo-
getic for the latent and often manifest collaboration of the George-circle
and its members with ultraconservative and totalitarian forces during the
first half of the twentieth century. But one also cannot identify high literary
modernism solely with its dangerous political implications while ignoring
or rendering suspect its utopian promise of liberation. In doing so, critics
such as Georg Lukács have divested the aesthetic realm of an inherent am-







































































The Look of Things
My comparative reading of works by Hofmannsthal, Rilke, and George
in the second part of the book literally spells out this ambivalence at work
within Aestheticism’s peculiar perspective on language. Recognized as the
major poets of their time, their work yields insight into the attempt of
high literary culture to protect itself against the fundamental social and cul-
tural changes that characterize the period around 1900. If indeed ‘‘all neo-
Romantic words are last ones,’’ as Adorno claims (‘‘George und Hofmanns-
thal’’ 235), onemight regard the poetic effort to ‘‘speak the things’’ as the final
and most desperate defense of high modernism to use words rather than
pictures to render the modern world intelligible and whole.The distinct em-
phasis on the figurative power of language around 1900 can thus be read
both as a concession to and a rejection of the scopic nature of modernity.
The title of this book tries to capture this interdependency of language
and vision. The ‘‘look of things’’ is a central theme in German Aestheti-
cism, where it resonates within a complex network of interrelated social and
philosophical topics at the time. It not only refers to the—possibly decep-
tive—visual appearance of external objects, but also evokes the power of
everything to look back at us oncewe have learned to look at it. According to
Heidegger, this reciprocal gaze and its relationship to language distinguished
the premodern world: ‘‘Saying was in itself the allowing to appear of that
which the saying ones saw because it had already looked at them’’ (‘‘Words’’;
Way to Language 139) (Das Sagen war in sich das Erscheinenlassen dessen,
was die Sagenden erblickten, weil es sie zuvor schon angeblickt hatte) (‘‘Das
Wort’’; Unterwegs zur Sprache 219). The turn of the century is trying to re-
discover this lost language. It struggles to express a way of looking at things
that saves them from the mere functionality and use-value to which they
have been relegated in themodern era. Rilke’s work is exemplary in revitaliz-
ing this allegedly lost relationship between vision, language, and the world.
For him, the poet must literally ‘‘speak’’ a different vision of life into exis-
tence. The ninth Duino elegy emphasizes how all things in life are endowed
with a soul of their own—what Rilke elsewhere refers to as a ‘‘thing-soul’’
(Dingseele) (‘‘Puppen’’; Werke VI: 1073)—that becomes alive in the gaze of
the beholder, but dies in a ‘‘Tun ohne Bild.’’ The latter denounces human
negligence as it overlooks the essence of things and thus violates not only







































































For Rilke, to see is to be seen in return. All things, common use objects
and works of art alike, not only are known to us, but ‘‘know us as well,’’
as Rilke states in a letter to a friend (Rilke, Briefe aus Muzot 335f.). Things
look back at us once we have learned to look at them, enabling a mutual
recognition process that gives way to human self-awareness: ‘‘denn da ist
keine Stelle, / die dich nicht sieht. Du mußt dein Leben ändern’’ (I: 557).
Rilke’s famous poem ‘‘Archaïscher Torso Apollos’’ from the New Poems is
paradigmatic in that it evokes the comprehensive power of a returned gaze
rarely engendered, but nonetheless inherent in all things. In his ‘‘Erlebnis’’
(1913), to provide another example, Rilke describes a mythical experience
he attributes to the ‘‘other side of nature.’’ Once the artist is able to enter
this ‘‘uninterrupted realm’’ of pure being, he becomes onewith a nature that
looks back at him: ‘‘A flower that grew next to him and whose blue gaze he
had known several times before now touched him from a more spiritual dis-
tance, but with such an impenetrable meaning as if nothing could be hidden
anymore’’ (Eine Vinca, die in seiner Nähe stand, und deren blauem Blick er
wohl auch sonst zuweilen begegnet war, berührte ihn jetzt aus geistigerem
Abstand, abermit so unerschöpflicher Bedeutung, als ob nun nichtsmehr zu
verbergen sei) (‘‘Erlebnis’’; VI: 1037ff.; my emphasis). In the purified realm
of poetic perception, the gaze again achieves a tactile quality that physically
connects and thus merges subject and object into the ‘‘Weltinnenraum.’’
Rilke’s oxymoron evokes a form of immanent transcendence or subjective
objectivity that posits the identity of nonidentities without, however, eradi-
cating their difference. Rather, these paradoxes are (dis)solved in the recip-
rocal gaze that not only captures the essence of life, but is life itself:
Siehe, ich lebe. Woraus? Weder Kindheit noch Zukunft
werden weniger. . . . Überzähliges Dasein
entspringt mir im Herzen.
(Werke I: 720)
Look, I am alive. How is it done? Neither my childhood
nor my future grows less. . . . More life than I can hold
springs up in my heart.12
What survives in Rilke’s poetic vision is the eternal fullness of Being sum-







































































and object, all within the linguistic parameters of a lifewell looked at: ‘‘Siehe,
ich lebe.’’
Rilke’s attempt to engender a different kind of vision that truly captures
the look of things is central to modernist poetry and art around 1900. The
New Poems, for example, reflect the strong influence of Cézanne’s paintings,
about which critics said ‘‘that every brushstroke has its own perspective . . .
its own point of view’’ (Köhnen 86). Similarly, Rodin’s often fragmentary
sculptures are usually assembled from a varietyof different parts, each repre-
senting a distinct point of view—which is to say that art and aesthetics at the
turn of the century call upon the reciprocity of the gaze in order to replace
the superficiality of scientific knowledge with the deeper truth silently spo-
ken by the things themselves. If ‘‘being and the world can only be justified
as an aesthetic phenomenon,’’ as Nietzsche claimed in his Birth of Tragedy
from 1871 (‘‘Die Geburt derTragödie’’;Werke I: 40), then the artist’s ability to
register the look of things is modernity’s last hope for cultural renewal. The
often evoked myth about the inspirational, divine origin of Rilke’s poetic
work clearly characterizes him as the embodiment of Nietzsche’s ideal art-
ist, the poet, whom he characterized as a subject-less aesthetic force trans-
formed into the ‘‘pure, clear eye of the sun’’ (‘‘Die Geburt der Tragödie’’ 43).
This metaphor is ubiquitous around 1900 and once again emphasizes the
intertwinement of language and vision. Praised as the one who first gave
the world the very Gestalt it needed to appear, Stefan George is likened by
his disciple Wolters to a divine presence whose gaze gives life: the eye of the
poet ‘‘looks at what appears, yet that which is looked upon actually creates
the gaze’’ (Es schaut das erscheinende an, aber das angeschaute erzeugt erst
den Blick. Alles was ist, wurde so als besonderes sein, als Gestalt) (Wolters
145f.). The entire world is said to gain shape in and through this poetic gaze.
It is literally contained within George’s circle since his poetry is theGestalt of
being and his eye is ‘‘the only eye of the world’’ (145). Similarly, Hofmanns-
thal’s early work centers on the power of the poetic Augenblick to restore
the mythical ‘‘pre-existence’’ of unalienated life characterized by the look of
things. His texts, paradoxically, seek to describe ‘‘something that looks at
us out of all things with an expression beyond all words’’ ([E]twas das aus
den Dingen uns mit Liebesblick anschaut, mit einem Ausdruck über allen
Worten) (RA; GW III: 387).13 Life, for Hofmannsthal, must be mastered visu-
ally, both in the sense of the physical sensation of seeing images and by ex-







































































experience things visually’’ (Ich bin ein Dichter, weil ich bildlich erlebe), he
claimed (‘‘Nachlass’’; RA III: 382).
In short, German modernist poetry claims to perceive the voice of a pure
and unalienated language still alive within the look of things. Given the im-
portance of this motif throughout the modern era, it is hardly surprising
to find the idyllic scenario of the ‘‘seen seer’’ also among the most popu-
lar in twentieth-century philosophy. Besides Husserl and Bergson, whose
work will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this book, one
might also point to Benjamin, for whom the return of the gaze defines the
auratic experience of nature and art: ‘‘To perceive the aura of an object
we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return’’ (Die
Aura einer Erscheinung erfahren, heißt, sie mit dem Vermögen belehnen,
den Blick aufzuschlagen) (‘‘Motifs’’; Illuminations 188). For Sartre, Lacan,
and Merleau-Ponty, the ‘‘Other’s look’’ decenters human vision and sub-
verts its inherent power structure: no longer the sole bearer of the look,
the subject becomes the object of a gaze that relegates it to the periphery
of a visual network it does not control.14 Heidegger, too, regarded the re-
turn of the gaze as indicative of a different kind of being in the world that,
like Greek antiquity, still regarded inanimate objects as subjects in their own
right, partaking of the spirit of life: ‘‘Being looked at by beings, integrated
into their openness and thus sustained by it, moved back and forth within
his oppositions and distinguished by his own discord: this is the essence
of man during the time of the great Greeks’’ (Vom Seienden angeschaut,
in dessen Offenes einbezogen und einbehalten und so von ihm getragen,
in seinen Gegensätzen umgetrieben und von seinem Zwiespalt gezeichnet
sein: das ist dasWesen des Menschen in der großen griechischen Zeit) (‘‘Die
Zeit des Weltbildes’’; Holzwege 91). For Heidegger, this ‘‘discord’’ (Zwiespalt
or Riß) by no means signifies an alienation among self and world. On the
contrary, it structures a harmonious being-together as nonidentical entities
commanding each other’s presence: ‘‘The conflict is not a rift [Riß] as a mere
cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong
to each other’’ (Poetry 63) (Der Streit ist kein Riß als das Aufreißen einer
bloßen Kluft, sondern der Streit ist die Innigkeit des Sichzugehörens der
Streitenden) (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’ 51). Adorno, finally, links
the motif back to the enigmatic nature of works of art, which he identifies
as their gaze ‘‘looking back at the beholder’’ (Ästhetische Theorie 185).







































































cal gaze and the story it tells. As a literary topos around 1900, the look of
things is a symptom of an unfulfilled longing at the heart of modernity that
still seeks to establish an immediate, unalienated, and nonsignifying con-
tact among every-thing in theworld. And yet, although evoked as the image
of a quasi-mythical sense that transcends language and reveals the primor-
dial bond between subject and object, self and other, the ‘‘look of things’’
bespeaks deception nonetheless. For the double genitive operating under-
neath has always already undermined the presence of meaning and opened
up another scene of signification that, once again, opposes appearance and
essence, surface and depth, reality and representation. Aestheticism’s central
metaphor of visual immediacy immediately deconstructs itself and remains
trapped in the prisonhouse of language from which it had hoped to escape.
The best poems at the time, however, reflect that knowledge, too. They
lament their inevitable failure to realize their utopian visions, yet simulta-
neously celebrate this failure as their ultimate success. For it is only by failing
to re-present the things themselves that language can provide the primordial
ground for their very being. In other words, the magical power of language
to call forth the presence of things hinges upon its mimetic weakness and its
proper self-destruction. Only a nonfunctional language can function as the
basis for the rejuvenation of life. This paradox regarding the relationship of
Being and language causes critics to focus on either the negative (Adorno)
or the positive (Heidegger) aspects of modernist poetry, when, in fact, both
facets are inextricably intertwined. The strength of Aestheticism consists in
exploring this paradox, that is, the simultaneity of success and failure, mean-
ing and nonsense inherent in language. In order to authenticate its (lost)
insight into things, poetry around 1900 not only focuses on the Gestalt of
language, but often leaves a tangible imprint of this self-reflective process
that materializes in the form of punctuation signs (ellipses, colons, periods,
etc.). My readings will show that these signs bear significantly upon the in-
herent meaning-potential of the poem, without, however, making sense in
and of themselves. Rather, they indicate the precise moment at which lan-
guage ‘‘matters’’ and finds its ownmeans of expression beyond the epistemo-
logical divide of signifier and signified, question and answer. To read these
signs is to look into the face of language.
Or so it seems—at least if one is willing to be duped by the mere ‘‘look of
things’’ instead of examining the discursive strategies that sustain it. Given







































































the embodiment of meaning might be compared to the astounding tricks
of professional magicians aiming to convince us of their ability to trans-
form magical language and a gesture of their hand into the fluttering dove
it releases. And indeed, around 1900, mysteries abound: all things, you see,
have eyes of their own while language is said to speak itself, and signs are
identified with material objects, much like cinema’s empty screen is some-
how believed to magically present the things it depicts. Of course we all
know better, but, as Christian Metz points out, the ‘‘credulous person is . . .
still seated beneath the incredulous one, or in his heart, it is he who con-
tinues to believe, who disavows what he knows’’ (The Imaginary Signifier
72). This suspension of disbelief is the operative paradigm of the culture
around 1900, epitomized by the anecdote about the credulous spectator wit-
nessing the birth of cinema in 1895 who, nonetheless, had good reasons to
remain gullible vis-à-vis the cultural and scientific novelties of the time, as
I argue in the following chapter. Yet there are reasons to maintain such a
naivete even today, since whoever plainly calls a playful illusion by its name
somewhat identifies himself both as an enlightened philistine and a kind of
‘‘spoil-sport with whom one does not want to have anything to do,’’ as Hans-
Georg Gadamer once phrased it.15 Indeed, the point is not just to denounce
poetic magic by pounding one’s fist on the table as a crude means to insist
on the indisputable matter of fact. As with all magicians, the pleasure for
the spellbound spectator (or reader) lies in witnessing the process as such
while trying to figure out how they did it. Such is the goal of this book, a
critical look at a time period obsessed with the nature and interdependency






















































































































































































































































































1 The Speaking Gaze of Modernity
Sometimes, I think what we are lacking is not learned prose,
but learned poetry.
—Niklas Luhmann1
The Breakthrough of Modern Media
Let me begin with a look. A look, that is, at a particular photograph.
Dated October 1895, it depicts an almost intact locomotive that smashed
through the glass facade of the Gare Montparnasse in Paris and crashed onto
the street below. A rather curious event, the accident prompted headlines in
the daily newspaper Le Figaro, according to which the train was running at
full throttle when it arrived at the station. Unable to activate the brakes, the
engineer had jumped from the locomotive, leaving the train to lunge beyond
the end of the tracks and onto the street. Eyewitnesses recalled ‘‘an unbear-
able sound, similar to an explosion, which suddenly occurred. Part of the
[station’s] facadewall was pushed forward and a locomotive, emerging from
out of the hole, fell onto the ‘Place de Rennes,’ in the midst of a crowd of
horrified pedestrians,’’ killing onewoman instantly (Le Figaro, 23 Oct. 1895).
The connection between this accident and the emergence of film becomes
obvious if one remembers Lumière’s first public presentation of L’Arrivée
d’un train à la Ciotat only a couple of months later in Paris. Lumière’s film,
showing a train slowly approaching the camera, is generally regarded as the
literal arrival of motion pictures.2 Rumors have it that during its first show-
ing, the spectators dodged aside for fear of being run over by the train. The
accuracy of this anecdote has been subjected to doubt ever since, as the spec-
tator’s terror seems inconsistent with both their overall level of education
and their familiarity with photography in particular.3 The relevance of the
anecdote, according to most critics, lies in the way it emphasizes the abso-
lute novelty of film aesthetics, particularly the unprecedented power of the













































































































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 37
often desperate search of historiography to identify the ‘‘real’’ and proper
beginning of particular developments, to capture the presence of its original
moment of departure.4
Nonetheless, the aesthetic rupture caused by the violent ‘‘breakthrough’’
of motion pictures is strikingly exemplified by the actual train accident at
the Gare Montparnasse. The latter lends new credibility to the anxious fan-
tasy of the ‘‘incredulous spectator,’’ for it proves, in the most literal sense
imaginable, that Lumière’s vision was far from fictional after all. The ‘‘real’’
locomotive smashing through the facade of Gare Montparnasse—its vio-
lent penetration through the flat surface that delineates the interior space
to which the train belongs—signifies the violent and disastrous intrusion of
aesthetic representation into reality that nineteenth-century bourgeois aes-
thetics had declared intolerable since it would destroy the educational and
cathartic essence of art. The ‘‘false’’ story about the frightened reaction of
Lumière’s audience somewhat authenticates the physical violence inherent
in modern means of representation. Read in conjunction with each other,
the ‘‘images’’ of Lumière’s train and the wrecked locomotive at Gare Mont-
parnasse are symptomatic of an aesthetic and technological revolution that
literally shattered the closed intérieur of autonomous art into pieces, bury-
ing the ‘‘incredulous spectator’’ underneath the rubble it left behind. ‘‘Media
define what is real,’’ media theorist Friedrich Kittler claims; ‘‘they are always
already beyond aesthetics’’ (Grammophon, Film, Typewriter 10).
Kittler’s point is aptly illustrated by the fact thatmost descriptions and in-
formation regarding the surreal sight of the accident at Gare Montparnasse
were from the very beginning drawn from the photograph rather than the
actual scene itself. Le Figaro, for example, provided a drawing of the curi-
ous sight at Gare Montparnasse, claiming that it was ‘‘very exact, because
this drawing does not rely on some fashionable inspiration, but is done after
a splendid photograph, a true masterpiece’’ (Le Figaro, 24 Oct. 1895). This
belief in the authenticity of photography and its ‘‘message without a code’’
(Barthes) again attests to the aforementioned invasion of modern represen-
tation into the real. It is also reminiscent of the widespread and publically
voiced fear that the former might actually define or even begin to replace the
latter. Such anxieties had already dominated nineteenth-century discourse
on photography and later echoed throughout the history of film criticism.5






































































38 : part i
machine less concerned with the mimesis of visual reality than with its inde-
pendent production,6 and Siegfried Kracauer argued in 1927 that the photo-
graphic image rearranged fragmented parts of reality into a new whole, thus
replacing reality with its own representation.7
All of these concerns serve as an important reminder that today’s worries
about ‘‘the liquidation of the real’’ (Jean Baudrillard) in a fully simulated
and hyperreal society are as old as the invention of photography itself. In
fact, they are even older than that. The debate concerning the rivalry be-
tween representation and reality refers back at least to the printing press and
the increasing competition between ‘‘book experience’’ and ‘‘world experi-
ence,’’ as Hans Blumenberg argues. The Renaissance’s attempt to ‘‘read the
book of nature’’ already presupposed the successful transformation of things
into signs. The latter are seen as the sine qua non for a meaningful experi-
ence of being in the world, and the twentieth-century discussion regarding
the influence of modern media upon our perception of reality simply re-
visits the tedious and seemingly endless debate of what it means to represent
objects through the use of signs. For every sign, be it iconic, linguistic, sym-
bolic, or other, must supplant the referent and usurp its place. The sign is a
fetish. It cannot but disclose the absence of what it claims to render present.
Inevitably, the process of signification has always already lost the primor-
dial contact with things it seeks to establish: ‘‘Spricht die Seele, so spricht,
ach, die Seele schon nicht mehr,’’ Schiller had already lamented, and Lacan’s
more recent definition of the real as that which cannot be symbolized merely
restates the same issue.
My excuse for recapitulating the basics of semiotic theory lies in the dan-
ger of losing sight of them when discussing modernist culture at the turn
of the century. Given the proliferation of distinct forms of representation
around 1900, critics now and then have been prone to exaggerate the differ-
ences between them in a way that neglected their shared ground of signifi-
cation. For the difference between traditional aesthetics and modern media
is not absolute, but refers instead to different ‘‘ways of worldmaking,’’ to use
Nelson Goodman’s terminology. My overall claim is that there has been too
much emphasis in recent academic discussion on the domain of the visual
over and against the verbal, of the media over and against traditional art. As
a consequence, modernist poetry becomes identified with a conventional,
culturally obsolete, and, most important, inherently conservative aesthetics






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 39
1900. The problem is not to advance these distinctions as such, but to polar-
ize them in such a way that they appear to be factual rather than fictitious,
necessary rather than arbitrary.
In order to counterbalance this impression, this chapter emphasizes the
discursive foundation that gives rise to the entire debate in the first place.
In spite of their ‘‘more than real’’ appearance, the magical power of modern
media to ‘‘define’’ reality (Friedrich Kittler) remains precisely that: an arbi-
trary definition dependent upon the discourse network that determines the
epistemological parameters of what we are able or willing to see. The field of
the visible is not simply given as such, but subject to profound changes de-
pending upon a varietyof interrelated sociopolitical, economic, and cultural
forces. The history of film and media criticism—what has aptly been called
‘‘cinema’s third machine’’ (Sabine Hake)—reveals the degree to which every
time period literally writes its own theory of the modern media. Trying to
understand film, early discourse on film in the 1910s and 1920s shaped the
meaning of the moving pictures it claimed merely to describe: ‘‘[T]heorists
analyzed the mechanisms by which film was constituted as a cultural and
artistic practice and, on the basis of its formal characteristics, tried to articu-
late the relationship between narrative, representation, and visual pleasure,’’
claims Hake (Hake x). If the combined pictures of Lumière’s train and the
fateful accident at Gare Montparnasse can be said to illustrate the destruc-
tion of traditional bourgeois art, they are assigned this meaning primarily
through the plethora ofmetaphorical descriptions portraying both train and
cinema as icons of the technological and scientific achievements of the nine-
teenth century.8 Both have been invented and circumscribed within this dis-
cursive field of modernity. Indeed, the breakthrough of film remains one of
the favorite metaphors of twentieth-century art and aesthetic theory, from
Kurt Pinthus and René Margritte to Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno,
and beyond.9
This chapter presents an overview of the history of modern perception
in order to situate the media competition around 1900 within a broader
context regarding the ‘‘nature’’ of linguistic representation and its relation
to the visual. My overall goal is to put into perspective Kittler’s stark and
one-sided juxtaposition of traditional aesthetics and modern media. I want
to begin with a brief look at the famous ‘‘Kino-Debatte’’ between 1909 and
1929. As Anton Kaes has shown, the early discussion about the rise and status
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(elitist) versus low (popular) art or the emancipatory versus the impover-
ishing power of aesthetic experience. Much of the polemics surrounding
these distinctions, however, was driven by particular socioeconomic inter-
ests completely unrelated to aesthetic concerns. Given its broad popular ap-
peal, cinema not only threatened to undermine the traditional distinction
between art and entertainment, which was still of crucial importance to the
bourgeois middle class in order to uphold its own self-image of refined taste
and higher education. More important, film threatened to expose the eco-
nomic basis of all art, including literature: ‘‘Cinema functioned as a kind
of catalyst in the quarrel about the commodification of art’’ (Kaes, ‘‘Kino-
Debatte’’ 13; my translation). Cinema laid to rest the bourgeois notion of
autonomous art not primarily in an aesthetic sense, but in an economic
one. Although the two aspects cannot easily be disentangled, one should be
mindful of the often biased and self-interested perspective of many cultural
critics and writers lamenting the demise of language around 1900. Exploit-
ing bourgeois anxieties and raising the specter of a brainless and illiterate
world of images, their comments also served the function to increase public
awareness about the economic plight of writers.
In this sense, the popular sentiment of the famous ‘‘language-crisis’’
around 1900 is the ‘‘product’’ of a much broader cultural shift from word
to image that upset the social status quo and threatened the livelihood of
those dealing in words, so to speak. At the same time, it testifies to the
social ambitions of others trying to break free from previous market con-
straints by embracing mass culture. At the turn of the century, reference to
the ‘‘language-crisis’’ is both fashionable and lucrative, and this is one of the
reasons why it ought to be applied prudently. Indeed, I regard the term itself
as a misnomer. It promotes a predominately negative and limited perspec-
tive on modernist literature and implies that there was a crisis with regard
to language, but not with regard to the media, a crisis in the arts, but not
in the sciences. That view, however, fundamentally distorts the picture. For
neither is the crisis of language unique for this particular time period (the
history of philosophy particularly after the eighteenth century testifies to
that, and Romantic poetry already objectifies language and thus prefigures
a ‘‘language-crisis’’), nor does the crisis around 1900 apply exclusively to
language. On the contrary, the entire nineteenth century was haunted by
an overall ambiguity of ‘‘meaning,’’ since positivism had to come to terms






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 41
crisis’’ must not be seen as the cause of this epistemological dilemma, but
merely represents one of its many symptoms.
In support of this claim, the remainder of this chapter will focus on
nineteenth-century science and philosophy and advance two interrelated
theses. First, I argue that the epistemological distinction between vision
and language became increasingly unstable since physiological research dur-
ing the nineteenth century proved the arbitrary nature of perception and
its interdependency with language. From a scientific perspective, there was
absolutely no reason to trust images any more than words. My second ar-
gument contends that the ensuing need to interpret every-thing affected
all means of representation, including the modern media. Film ‘‘defines’’
reality, to be sure, yet one must keep in mind that this reality itself had be-
come too fragmented to make immediate sense of anymore, and this is why
it was in need of a definition in the first place. At the turn of the century, the
question of what exactly constitutes reality had become a matter of debate,
because all things were seen in a constant state of flux. Film certainly was the
most adequate aesthetic expression of this phenomenon, but this does not
mean that the medium remained unaffected by the profound ambiguities
at the heart of modernity. Cinema is symptomatic of a real crisis of repre-
sentation for which it can only offer an imaginary solution in the form of
projected images on the screen.
By contrast, Kittler’s rigid distinction between traditional aesthetics and
modern media not only presupposes a stable frame of reference that had
ceased to exist or had become dissolved within what Henri Bergson called
the ‘‘élan vital’’ of life itself. Kittler also prioritizes a particular cultural divide
during a time period that increasingly undermined and questioned such
categorical distinctions. And finally, he regards the rise of modern media
as more or less responsible for the pervasive epistemological crisis around
1900, and this leads him to exaggerate their influence upon art and science
alike. For Kittler, modern technology and media are primary for the devel-
opment of culturalmodernity, whereas I would claim theyare enveloped in a
dialectical process in which they function simultaneously as both symptoms
and causes. The media are constitutive of and constituted by the modern in-
dustrialization of space and time, at the center of which looms the dilemma
regarding the nature of reality and representation around 1900 that affects
language as well as other media. The latter, however, were able to redeem






































































42 : part i
guage was not. Intellectuals at the time simply singled out and focused on
language as the center of the crisis because it had fallen prey to its own philo-
sophical history and its entanglement with objective knowledge. Through-
out the modern era, it had helped to voice promises it was unable to keep,
meaning that a broad epistemological crisis was immediately reconfigured
and understood as a ‘‘language-crisis.’’
And indeed, once faced with the media’s spectacular power of mimetic
representation, modernist poetry seemed outdated and hence prompted
to question its own right to exist. However, if one situates the deliberate
self-referentiality of modernist poetry within the larger context of the self-
destructive tendencies haunting nineteenth-century positivism, the tradi-
tional emphasis of the nihilistic, ‘‘corpse’’-like (Barthes,Writing Degree Zero
5ff.), ‘‘negative’’ (Eric B. Williams 72, 77), and ‘‘decadent’’ (Wolfdietrich
Rasch) nature of high modernism must be reevaluated. The media competi-
tion also had an emancipatory effect on modernism since it helped liberate
poetry from the ‘‘shackles of representation,’’ as Rilke put it. Which is to
say that those who took an earnest interest in the ‘‘crisis’’ of language apart
from its popularized appeal and seriously began investigating the nature of
verbal representation were soon to focus on its constructive potential. For
the ‘‘language-crisis’’ allowed literary modernism to explore the materiality
of language and its constitutive role for the visual presentation of things.
Aestheticism, in other words, is not any more ‘‘negative’’ or ‘‘decadent’’
than German Romanticism, and the actual difference—up and beyond such
catchwords—between these two periods will be discussed at length in the
third chapter.
The Art of Reading the Book of Nature
The search for a reliable foundation on which to ground objective knowl-
edge characterizes the modern era since the Renaissance. Once the hier-
archically ordered structure of medieval society had broken down and been
replaced by humanist ideals, the overall goal became to establish an original
worldview based not on antiquated tradition and scholastic arguments, but
on individual studies and self-guided reason. This new perspective focused
on the scientific ideal of the immediate observation of nature. Looking at






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 43
tures, Galileo, the founder of modern physics, is able to read the universe
like the medieval scholar studied an old manuscript, for ‘‘this grand book,
the universe, . . . is written in the language of mathematics, and its char-
acters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is
humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one
wanders in a dark labyrinth’’ (Galileo 328).
Galileo’s idealized concept of reading remains operative throughout the
history of modern science and philosophy. According to Hans Blumenberg,
the metaphor of the ‘‘book of nature’’ was alien to Greek philosophy and
gained currency only in the sociohistorical context of a popular reaction
against the medieval emphasis on sacred scriptures. As the increasingly in-
fluential, yet illiterate class of urban laymen sought to gain access to divine
truths, they were forced to look beyond the universe of written texts and
turn toward nature instead. This search for a total coincidence between
meaning and matter both inspires and haunts modern science. On the one
hand, it allowed thinkers to presuppose and identify the presence of mean-
ing as always already given within nature itself. Renaissance scholars, for
example, turned toward hieroglyphs and emblematic forms of writing in the
vain hope to find traces of a historical ‘‘thing-writing’’ encrypted therein
(Assmann 242), and much of nineteenth-century empiricism was built upon
the same premise.
On the other hand, however, truth proper remained forever out of reach
since it inevitably got caught in the web of signification surrounding it. In
spite of the seemingly egalitarian nature of the new Galilean perspective on
things, the book of nature ‘‘cannot be read by everyone,’’ Blumenberg con-
tends (77), since the ‘‘emerging science of the modern age has its own rheto-
ric’’ (Blumenberg 68). Whatever sign system is believed to hold the secrets
of nature, be it mathematical symbols or philosophical concepts, the ob-
server still needed to be initiated into the art of reading before hewas able to
truly ‘‘see’’ anything at all. Moreover, although Galileo’s general goal was to
decipher the code of nature solely on the basis of simple observation, there
always remained the necessity to translate one’s insights into some kind of
language in order to authenticate the result. This need to translate or repre-
sent truth continuously threatened to expose the contingencyof all scientific
knowledge. The problem is that truth is held to be self-evident when in fact
it only emerges within a particular context or a specific frame of reference.






































































44 : part i
themselves known in their own language, this can only be revealed through
the various structures of representation that undermine it.
Throughout the rise ofmodern science, this dilemmawas simply ‘‘solved’’
by presupposing the possibility of merging vision and language into a har-
monious, self-effacing system of signification. Modernity, in other words, is
predicated upon the ideal notion of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ able to read the book
of nature. The term is Foucault’s. In his discussion of medical perception
around 1800, he introduces the scientific ideal of a speaking gaze as the cen-
tral premise in clinical discourse during the age of empiricism. This gaze,
Foucault maintains, is full of language, a true, unalienated language not its
own, but spoken by the object it perceives. In the empiricist’s view, matter
carries its own language within. The clinical eye not only sees the object,
but also reads it, lighting up its essence: ‘‘The paradoxical ability to hear a
language as soon as it perceives a spectacle’’ (Birth of the Clinic 108) allows
the medical gaze around 1800 to bring to light ‘‘the syntax of the language
spoken by things themselves in an original silence’’ (Birth 109).
According to Foucault, the notion of the speaking gaze represented ‘‘no
more than a brief period of euphoria’’ around 1800 (Birth 117). By contrast,
this chapter argues that the ideal of a total equilibrium between vision and
language remains operative throughout the modern history of scientific and
philosophical discourse. This is not to deny some epistemological changes
or ‘‘breaks,’’ such as Foucault himself diagnosed in his other writings. But
these ruptures do not fundamentally alter the modern belief in a self-evident
truth written into the heart of matter. The historical changes concern less
this ideal itself than the ways in which it is being discussed, acknowledged,
or disavowed in scientific discourse.
Foucault’s own analysis of the speaking gaze around 1800 provides a case
in point. He argues that the clinical gaze marks the transition from a purely
rational to an empirical science, or, to use Foucault’s terminology, from the
classical to the modern episteme. Whereas the former had primarily been
interested in the geometrical distribution of all objects in space, the latter
attempts to simply read the visible structure of an individual object. None-
theless, the central task of positivist research still lies in determining the
universal syntax of a scientific discourse whose authenticity is beyond ques-
tion. Although the nature of this discourse has changed, its actual goal has
not. For Galileo or Descartes, the ‘‘natural’’ language promising objective
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however, this natural language had become identified with an ideal or pure
language underlying everyday speech. According to this view, one is able to
express the inherent truth of things not because God has written the gran-
diose book of nature—for we forever fail to comprehend His language—
but because the absolute grammar informing everyday speech guarantees
meaning, if only we are ‘‘initiated into true speech’’ and learn to understand
its constitutive syntax. As Foucault put it: ‘‘One now sees the visible only be-
cause one knows the language; things are offered to him who has penetrated
the closed world of words, and if these words communicate with things, it
is because they obey a rule that is intrinsic to their grammar’’ (Birth 115).
For nineteenth-century positivism, this initiation into a pure, nonrhetorical
language seems possible, and with it ‘‘a moment of balance between speech
and spectacle. A precarious balance, for it rests on a formidable postulate:
that all that is visible is expressible, and that it is wholly visible because it is
wholly expressible’’ (Birth 115).
This idealized balance between language and vision is constitutive of the
modern project at large and moves into the center of philosophical and aes-
thetic discourse around 1900. Foucault’s metaphor of the ‘‘speaking gaze’’
conjuring the nonmetaphorical realm of language and being—of being as
language—is echoed, for example, in Husserl’s poignant summary of the
phenomenological enterprise, according to which ‘‘the entire art consists in
letting the seeing eye speak’’ (Idee der Phänomenologie 62). This similarity
is hardly surprising, given that the Western tradition has continuously re-
garded visual perception as the privileged means of access to the real world.
Sight provides a bridge between the interior realm of the mind and the ex-
terior realm of matter: to see is to know. However, since theories regarding
the ‘‘nature’’ of vision and its relationship to knowledge must be analyzed
via the linguistic structure of their interrelating discourses, the history of
vision is intertwined with that of language. Discourse defines vision, and
words construct images. ‘‘Perception does not exist,’’ Derrida provocatively
states in his discussion of Husserl (Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 45). This
is not to deny that visual perception really takes place and that we actually
‘‘see’’ images, but to insist that any attempt to simply say what we see in-
evitably becomes entangled in the arduous process of translating data from
one medium to the other, from vision to language.
Of course it remains legitimate to distinguish between different kinds of
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trinsic characteristics of each. According to Lessing’s Laokoon, for example,
language operates in time through the trail of signification. It defers mean-
ing. The image, by contrast, is bound to space and identifies meaning, ren-
ders it present momentarily. However, although Lessing’s perspective re-
garding the classical opposition betweenword and image seems self-evident,
his observations are nonetheless based upon a comprehensive set of unques-
tioned norms and idealized concepts, asW. J.T.Mitchell has demonstrated.10
Most art historians today agree about the essentially mixed ‘‘nature’’ of
media, arguing that there is not and never was a ‘‘pure’’ form of representa-
tion. Perception, and vision in particular, has a history that must be studied
by reference to the various discourses constituting it, as Benjamin, Foucault,
Merleau-Ponty, and others have done—which is to say that ‘‘sight cannot be
divorced from the discourses that we use to interpret both what and how we
have seen,’’ as another critic phrases it (Burnett 31). The nineteenth-century
belief in the ‘‘innocent eye’’ is based on a ‘‘myth’’ since ‘‘seeing is never just
registering’’ (Gombrich 116, 298), the art historian E.H.Gombrich contends.
Instead, seeing requires the active interpretation and reshaping of raw infor-
mation into a coherent image. Critics’ references to the ‘‘nature’’ of words
or images are either convenient labels for the highly complex nexus exist-
ing between them or are indicative of certain value judgments (such as mass
vs. elitist culture) informing the entire discussion as such. Given the nor-
mative basis of any attempt to discover the nature of perception, it is hardly
surprising to find huge discrepancies with regard to how different epochs
and individual artists conceptualized and evaluated the word-image rela-
tionship. As W. J. T. Mitchell points out, the scale ranges from the naive
equation of iconic forms of representation with reality itself all the way to
denouncing images precisely for their attempted imitation of a reality they
necessarily fail to apprehend. The discrepancy between these views attests to
the seemingly trivial insight that neither images nor words ever measure up
to the real thing each signifies, and that language and vision cannot entirely
be separated from each other.
This is to say that the basic problem of ‘‘media transposition,’’ which ac-
cording to Kittler specifically characterizes the discourse network around
1900 (Discourse Networks 265), is central to the ocularcentrism of Western
philosophy in general. The overall goal throughout was to sustain the integ-
rity of visual perception within language, to communicate the natural clarity
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ing not to lose touch with the immediate sensual experience that was said
to distinguish vision. And yet there always remained an irreducible linguis-
tic element that undermined the seemingly truthful account of vision. As
David Michael Levin put it, ‘‘[T]he accounts of vision that figure in philo-
sophical discourse more often than not seem to be not so much faithful phe-
nomenological descriptions or objectively accurate empirical descriptions
but, rather, ideal models with a distinctively normative rhetorical function’’
(Sites of Vision 8). In philosophical discourse on sensory perception, lan-
guage thus emerges as both the enabler and inhibitor of visual truth. On the
one hand, it literally allows us to come to terms with intuitive insights that
otherwise would remain ineffable and essentially foreign to those who do
not experience them.Yet, on the other hand, it is also responsible for the dis-
tortion and falsification of vision, whose sensual immediacy gets lost within
the symbolic universe of arbitrary signs. Vision, properly speaking, takes
place neither within the text nor outside of it. Perceptual intuition is born
and dies in discourse, and the truth about vision comes alive only within
the very language that ostracizes it.
And yet, modern philosophical and scientificwritings on perception des-
perately seek to reconcile both poles, trying to capture sight in and through
language and to (ad)dress their insights in a word. The philosophical and
scientific dream of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ conjures a language that does not sig-
nify, but coincides with the things themselves. It envisions an authentic mo-
ment that captures meaning beyond the flow of time without succumb-
ing to a mere illustration of the world as it appears to be. More than an
image, yet less than a word, the speaking gaze lives in that impossible space
in between—Rilke’s ‘‘Zwischenräume der Zeit’’—where immediate knowl-
edge and instantaneous meaning is imagined to materialize in the form of
a purified sign unbound by the laws of signification. The ideal itself seems
caught in a ‘‘dialectics at a standstill,’’ one might say, a metaphor that, for
Walter Benjamin, defines the nature of ‘‘true images’’ inherent in language
(‘‘Passagenwerk’’; Gesammelte Schriften V/1: 577; N 2a, 3). It is crucial to re-
member that the ‘‘dialectical image,’’ for Benjamin, does not refer to actual
pictures (i.e., painting, photography, film), but is meant entirely metaphori-
cally: ‘‘Only dialectical images are true (i.e., not archaic) images; and the
place, where one encounters them, is language’’ (Nurdialektische Bilder sind
echte [d.h.: nicht archaische] Bilder; und der Ort, an dem man sie antrifft,






































































48 : part i
speaking gaze able to ‘‘express the linguistic essence of things’’ (‘‘Sprache’’;
GS II/1: 142) would expose, in the flash of a moment, the commodification
and reification at the heart of capitalist society and open a gateway toward
a different, more authentic world buried underneath.
In short, the speaking gaze of modernity does not translate vision into
language, but identifies one in and through the other. As such, it epitomizes
the ultimate goal of hermeneutics because it signifies a kind of epiphany
that transcends the realm of signification. However, since the speaking gaze
defines an ideal art of reading that cannot be redeemed in any particular in-
stance, this discrepancy will sooner or later have to be addressed and some-
how ‘‘solved’’ if the ideal itself is to be sustained.This is exactly what happens
during the course of the nineteenth century, which increasingly acknowl-
edged and tried to account for the interdependency of language and vision.
The rise of physiological research and experimental studies began to ascer-
tain the complexity of our visual apparatus. Scientists discovered that what
we see is both predetermined by our biological makeup and informed by
culturally acquired codes that are, at least to some degree, arbitrary. Once
the subjective dimension of visual perception had become recognized, it was
no longer possible to believe in the objective, pregiven congruence of mat-
ter and meaning written into the book of nature since empirical observation
might disclose the world not as it is, but as it appears to us given our physio-
logical and cultural limitations.The newlydiscovered facts about vision thus
necessitated new models of explanation. However, I argue that these expla-
nations, too, remained caught in the same aporias that prompted them, and
that much of nineteenth-century scientific discourse both inherits and per-
petuates modernity’s dilemma regarding the allegedly ideal nature of visual
perception.
Nineteenth-Century Theories of Vision
Martin Jay has argued that the modern era from its very beginning was
characterized by a variety of competing ‘‘scopic regimes.’’ The most influ-
ential among these were the normative model of monocular perspectival-
ism discovered during the Renaissance and typified by the camera obscura
and its modern successor in the form of photography on the one hand,






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 49
ral and erratic nature of vision on the other hand. During the Renaissance
and the age of rationalism, the former clearly triumphed over the latter in
the realms of science, philosophy, and art. With the rise of British empiri-
cism in the eighteenth century, however, the conflict between the objective
and subjective model of vision became ever more pronounced. British phi-
losophers opened up an epistemological gap between the perceiving subject
and the perceived world of objects. Given the subjective foundation of sci-
entific observation, the very notion of objective knowledge represented ‘‘an
immense puzzle’’ for the eighteenth century, as Edmund Husserl contends
(Krisis 91): ‘‘What a paradox! Nothing could cripple the peculiar force of the
rapidly growing and, in their own accomplishments, unassailable exact sci-
ences or the belief in their truth. And yet, as soon as one took into account
that they are the accomplishments of the consciousness of knowing subjects,
their self-evidence and clarity were transformed into incomprehensible ab-
surdity’’ (Krisis 92).11
The disembodied eye of consciousness favored by Descartes increasingly
had to come to terms with the subjective and physiological constraints that
literally shaped the visual field of the human eye. In fact, recent critics have
pointed out that this conflict is already latent in Descartes’s own treatise on
optics and visual perception.12 The rise of positivism finally brings about
a full-blown perceptual crisis that affects science, culture, and philosophy
alike. The gap between the normative ideal of disembodied vision and the
multitude of subjective viewpoints emanating from the human body can-
not be bridged anymore. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the
culmination of the smoldering conflict between the two basic, yet opposed,
models of vision developed in the modern era: one objective and the guar-
antor of scientific truth, the other subjective and untrustworthy.
Obviously, the debate about the subjective versus the objective under-
standing of vision stands in close proximity to the Kantian dilemma re-
garding the a priori categories of the human mind. Contrary to Kant, how-
ever, the nineteenth-century discussion is no longer confined to the realm
of speculative metaphysics, but takes place in the context of modern sci-
ence. Most of the advocators of visual subjectivism were scientists who re-
lied on empirical facts rather than philosophical arguments. Yet, ironically,
their own research helped to undermine the very ideal of an objective under-
standing of theworld they sought to uphold. A primary example for the self-
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attention undertaken by Wilhelm Wundt in the 1870s and 1880s. Accord-
ing to Jonathan Crary, Wundt was able to prove that the attentive observa-
tion of an object resulted from the simultaneous repression of other stimuli
that might distract the mind—which is to say that ‘‘[a]ttention always con-
tainedwithin itself the condition for its owndisintegration. . . . Attention and
distraction were not two essentially different states but existed on a single
continuum’’ (Crary, ‘‘Unbinding Vision’’ 50f.). If attention was not simply
a preestablished norm structuring human consciousness, but instead was
constituted upon an arbitrary process governed by ‘‘an indeterminate set
of variables’’ (Crary, ‘‘Unbinding Vision’’ 51), it follows that the positivist
notion of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ reading the essence of things is exposed as an
idealist construction at odds with the facts of vision.To perceive theworld in
a certain way simply means to focus attention on particular characteristics
while excluding others. Any attempt to see things for what they are is sub-
ject to their active reconstruction by the attentive observer. Empiricism thus
undermined its own premise regarding the ability to observe and analyze
objectively the material world beyond the realm of human consciousness.
Once physiological research had scientifically proven the subjectivity of
human feelings and the unreliability of our senses, it became increasingly
difficult to suture the positivist worldview in the face of these facts. Follow-
ing the groundbreaking work of Johannes Müller, Hermann von Helmholtz,
to cite another example, was able to prove that the content of human per-
ception is independent from its external cause. According to Helmholtz, the
human eye functions like a camera obscura, except that we perceive visual
images regardless of the specific nature of the stimulus that affects the eye,
be it light from the outside or physical pressure exerted on the eyeball with a
finger. Rather, the nerves connected to the visual apparatus necessarily and
without fail relate any external input in terms of visual images: ‘‘Physio-
logical studies now teach that the more fundamental differences [among the
senses] are completely independent of the kind of external agent by which
the sensations are excited,’’ Helmholtz argued (‘‘The Facts of Perception’’
370).
This, in turn, meant that the same external stimulus produces different
sensations on our body: the same light rays that our eyes perceive as visual
images are experienced as heat once they hit the surface of our skin, simply
because the affected nerves are programmed to translate or interpret these






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 51
follows that there are no immediate or motivated connections between out-
side reality and internal sensation. Helmholtz emphasized that we cannot
deduce from the content of our perceptions the specific nature of the exter-
nal stimuli that caused the sensation to appear. Rather, these connections
are arbitrary and have to be learned or established through experience alone
because our perceptions function as mere signs and not as mimetic images
of the outside world. There is, however, according to Helmholtz, a corre-
lation between the structures of the real world and the internal processes
governing our perceptual apparatus, a kind of parallel that allows us to for-
mulate concepts or laws of human perceptions linked to the outside: ‘‘The
excitations of the nerves in the brain and the ideas in our consciousness can
be considered images of processes in the external world insofar as the former
parallel the latter, that is, insofar as they represent the similarity of objects
by a similarity of signs and thus represent a lawful order by a lawful order’’
(‘‘Recent Progress’’ 186). In other words, while there is no inherent connec-
tion between single elements of the external and internal world, there is
a parallel between the structural makeup and the internal laws governing
both systems: ‘‘If the same kinds of things in the world of experience are in-
dicated by the same signs, then the lawful succession of equal effects from
equal causes will be related to a similar regular succession in the realm of
our sensations’’ (‘‘Facts’’ 372).
This structural parallel is the sine qua non of visual perception. According
to Helmholtz, it allows us to make meaningful inferences from one system to
the other, which in turn gives rise to the laws governing either: ‘‘What we can
attain . . . is knowledge of lawful order in the realm of reality, since this can
actually be presented in the sign system of our sense impressions’’ (‘‘Facts’’
388). Helmholtz thus explicitly refuted the ‘‘nativistic’’ theory of perception
in favorof his own ‘‘empirical’’ theory.Whereas the former stipulates a direct
correspondence between each sign and its referent, the latter relocates this
correspondence on a purely structural level such that changes in the exter-
nal world give rise to different perceptions within. ‘‘Learning to see’’ hence
means to create a consistent system of signs that interprets incoming stimuli
according to certain empirical laws that enable us to infer hypotheses about
the external world. These beliefs in turn are subject to empirical verification
or falsification through physical action or moving about in space.
The one philosopher whom Helmholtz hardly ever fails to mention in his
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and its reflections on the transcendental status of time and space. Helm-
holtz agrees with Kant in regarding space as an a priori form of intuition. By
force of the analogy that he draws in his own theory between internal sign
system and outside world, Helmholtz is forced to recognize the law of cau-
sality as ‘‘a transcendental law, a law which is given a priori’’ (‘‘Facts’’ 390),
for, ‘‘if we give it up, we give up all claim to be able to think about these
or any other matters’’ (‘‘Facts’’ 405). Contrary to Kant, however, Helmholtz
regards the axioms or geometrical laws that structure space not as transcen-
dental, but as conventional, since they are ‘‘based upon a large number of
random experiences’’ (‘‘Facts’’ 407). It is with the help of these conventional
laws of geometry and space that ‘‘the correspondence between the psychic
and physical equivalence of spatial magnitudes’’ can be established (‘‘Facts’’
407).13
The reason for Helmholtz’s deliberate and rather detailed discussion of
Kant lies in his effort to acknowledge the irrefutable validity of Kant’s doc-
trine of theDing an sichwithout, however, conceding that we have no means
at all to understand or analyze the external world since this would frustrate
his own ambitions as an empirical scientist. Yet if the laws of geometry origi-
nate with experience, Helmholtz is justified in using visual perception as a
means to gain access, if not to the Ding an sich, then at least to the struc-
tural laws governing real spatial relations as outlined above. This, in turn,
allows Helmholtz to explore different reasons other than the Kantian laws of
human consciousness to be held accountable for our limited understanding
of the outsideworld. For Helmholtz, the major force inhibiting knowledge is
nothing but language, and it is precisely this reductionist effort to find a cul-
prit for the larger epistemological crisis haunting the nineteenth century that
leads to the emergence of a ‘‘language-crisis’’ around 1900. Faced with a true
dilemma in scientific research, Helmholtz scapegoats language as that which
stands in the way of scientific progress and cultural renewal. To be sure, the
difference between vision and language does not lie in their empirical na-
ture, for both are arbitrary sign systems based upon a series of experiments
that in the course of time have become completely naturalized and hence
function as ‘‘unconscious inferences.’’ Rather, what separates language and
vision concerns theway in which information is being processed. Helmholtz
contrasts the lengthy descriptions of objects via words with the comprehen-
sive immediacy provided by sensory intuition: ‘‘Language is much too poor
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object, especiallyone of somewhat irregularor complicated form, affords the
eye and the hand. To describe such impressions in words, moreover, would
be an enormously lengthy, time-consuming occupation’’ (‘‘The Origin and
Interpretation of Our Sense Impressions’’; Selected Writings 503).
Helmholtz regards language as a secondary sign-system derived retro-
spectively from the visual and tactile experiences which themselves form
primary or original sign-systems. From his early lectures to his late works,
Helmholtz continues to uphold theview that sensible impressions are at least
equal, if not superior to language as far as knowledge is concerned.14 More-
over, since ‘‘our senses speak to us in language which can express far more
delicate distinctions and richer varieties than can be conveyed by words’’
(‘‘Progress’’ 222), Helmholtz maintains that it requires the eye and sensi-
tivity of an artist to ‘‘understand’’ and ‘‘know’’ the external world beyond
the realm of language. Art functions as a training manual for consciously
experiencing and interpreting our immediate physical sensations in order
to gain a more meaningful and broader access to reality than language alone
can provide. Hence, art is not the ‘‘other’’ of science, but its proper voca-
tion: ‘‘The true scientist,’’ Helmholtz exclaims in 1878, ‘‘must always have
something of the vision of an artist’’ (‘‘Facts’’ 392).
Helmholtz’s theory of perception provides a first cornerstone from which
to explore the major poetic, philosophical, and artistic developments
around 1900, among them Rilke’s poetic ideal of ‘‘sehen lernen’’ (learning
to see) and Bergson’s concern with matter and memory, but also Husserl’s
phenomenology and Stefan George’s celebration of a radical Aestheticism.
Central to both scientific discourse and aesthetic practice at the time is not
only the attempt to better ‘‘understand’’ the relationship between ‘‘I’’ and the
world, inside and outside, but equally as important are some of the specific
issues raised in Helmholtz’s scientific experiments regarding the subjective
nature of visual perception, the relationship between vision and language,
and the crucial role of art for human knowledge.
The Disintegration of Matter and Meaning around 1900
Helmholtz’s writings are paradigmatic for nineteenth-century scientists
trying to come to terms with the self-contradictory tendencies of empiri-
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‘‘seeing’’ and ‘‘knowing’’ in Western culture, the destabilizing effects of the
conventional nature of vision needed to be contained and the gap between
mind and matter bridged, without, however, abandoning the ideal of a rig-
orous science able to mediate between them, as Kant’s dictum of the ‘‘thing
in itself ’’ had done. Helmholtz’s denunciation of language and his empha-
sis on the intuitive vision of the artist must be seen as one such attempt of
reconciliation. The rise of psychophysics represented another, yet similar,
effort. The solution, offered by psychophysics, to the dilemma was to deter-
mine the essence of things, not in opposition to, but in coordination with,
the physical sensation of the human body, using language as a guiding meta-
phor. For Gustav Theodor Fechner, one of the leading psychophysicists at
the time, ‘‘the physical is like a kind of writing, while the spiritual, psychical
side represents its corresponding meaning’’ (Zend-Avesta II: 313). Meaning,
it follows, is immanent in all things, the material body itself functioning like
a language that silently reveals its own secrets to those able to look at things
objectively.
Psychophysics thus testifies to the significant comeback of the Galilean
metaphor of the ‘‘book of nature’’ and its concomitant idea of a speaking
gaze as the foundation of modern science in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Once again, material things were regarded as both signifier and sig-
nified at once, speaking a language of their own clearly audible (and visible)
to those initiated into the true speech of nature, that is, the purified system
of scientific discourse. To be sure, positivism differed from Galileo’s endeav-
ors insofar as it strictly refrained from all metaphysical speculation regard-
ing the transcendental order of things as such, turning its gaze exclusively
toward the physical reality instead. It shifted perspective from the universal
cosmos to the particular thing. Yet, within the clearly defined parameters
of individual objects, it nonetheless rediscovered the presence of meaning
inscribed upon their very surface. In psychophysical research during the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century,matter itself came to be seen as a language
of its own.
Psychophysics’ belief regarding the immanence of meaning is symptom-
atic for nineteenth-century efforts to ‘‘solve’’ the Cartesian mind-body di-
chotomy and its ensuing epistemological problems. Fechner’s theory is but
one of many typical attempts both to acknowledge the discrepancy between
sensuous experience and transcendental matter on the one hand and yet
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Hermann Lotze, for example, in his monumental essay Microcosmus simi-
larly renounces the simple identity of soul and body (i.e., mind and mat-
ter), insisting that physical bodies exist independently from each other. Yet
he also holds that the human mind and external nature are essentially and
necessarily oriented toward one another:
Let us therefore cease to lament as if the reality of things escaped our ap-
prehension; on the contrary, it consists in that as which they appear to
us, and all that they are before they are made manifest to us is the mediat-
ing preparation for this final realization of their very being. The beauty of
colors and tones, warmth and fragrance, are what Nature in itself strives
to produce and express, but cannot do so by itself; for this it needs, as
its last and noblest instrument, the sentient mind that alone can put into
words its mute strivings, and in the glory of sentient intuition set forth
in luminous actuality what all the motions and gestures of the external
world were vainly endeavoring to express. (Lotze 353)
The quote shows Lotze’s monistic belief in the fundamental coordination
of mind and matter as well as his effort to both acknowledge and overcome
the traditional mind-bodydichotomy. Like Fechner, Lotze points to the ease
with which the translation of scientific insights into language can be accom-
plished given this parallelism and interdependency between the physical and
the psychical. Onemight even question if ‘‘translation’’ is at all the right term
for what Lotze has in mind. For to let nature come into its own is to simply
‘‘express’’ its essence and to ‘‘put intowords its mute strivings,’’ meaning that
‘‘the sentient mind’’ literally lets all things speak for themselves. Without
this help, nature is considered incomplete and deprived of its proper mode
of being. For Lotze, scientific discourse is but the genuine voice of nature
proper, and his analysis still depends upon the ideal notion of a speaking
gaze I discussed above.
It is hardly surprising to find that Lotze’s celebration of the ideal collab-
oration between the physical and the mental rarely succeeds in hiding the
insecurity and defensiveness that informs it. Empiricism tried to solve an
epistemological crisis in modern perception it had helped to instigate and
continued to perpetuate by means of its own research. The advances in
physics and biology in particular frustrated the positivist optimism of nine-
teenth-century science and its belief in linear scientific progress toward ob-
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rational universe whose laws appeared ever more incomprehensible. The
general erosion of meaning around 1900 included even the most basic of
facts, leading to the ‘‘slowdisintegration ofmatter’’ itself, as ChristophAsen-
dorf phrases it. For once the materiality of things started to slip through
scientists’ fingers in the form of exceedingly small particles whose location
and velocity could no longer be measured independently from the posi-
tion of the observer, and once a fundamental relativity had to be granted to
the seemingly most objective categories like space and time, the world was
plunged into a sea of uncertainty and instability. Ludwig Wittgenstein aptly
summarized the pervasive feeling of insecurity and arbitrariness that per-
vaded modern culture: ‘‘All we see could also be different. All that we can
describe at all could also be different. There is no a priori order of things’’
(Tractatus 68; 5–634).
This lack of a necessary structure of the universe ultimately affected the
individual self as well. According to Georg Simmel, many inhabitants of
the metropolis developed a ‘‘mental nervousness’’ as the typical response
to ‘‘the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the
grasp of a single glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions’’
that distinguished modern life (Simmel 410). Sigmund Freud, too, discerned
a particular defense mechanism called ‘‘preparedness for anxiety,’’ which,
he claimed, was meant to simulate and cope with the heightened level of
stimulation caused by themodern age.15 Around 1900, the human individual
emerged as a site of conflict, a battleground of contradictory forces and un-
controllable powers originating from both inside and outside the human
body. In a world of moving images, all stable boundaries and demarcation
lines were undermined by the steady flow of visual stimuli. Henri Bergson,
in his highly influential book Matter and Memory (1899), regards matter as
nothing but an ‘‘aggregate of images’’ in relation to ‘‘one particular image,
my body’’ (MM 22). Both subject and object are revealed as imaginary con-
structs rooted in the élan vital, that is, the incessant movement of intercon-
nected particles lacking any consistent shape, order, or direction.
Similarly, Ernst Mach’sAnalyse der Empfindungen unveils the fundamen-
tally fictional nature of all spatially demarcated bodies: ‘‘Thing, body, mat-
ter, are nothing apart from the combinations of the elements,—the colors,
sounds, and so forth—nothing apart from their so-called attributes,’’ which
means ‘‘that spaces and times may just as appropriately be called sensations
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dismissed earlier psychophysical theory regarding the parallelism between
mind and matter as ‘‘metaphysical.’’ In his eyes, there remains absolutely
‘‘no opposition of physical and psychical,’’ no difference between appear-
ance and reality, sensation and thing, ego and world. The reason for this
amalgamation of the world is that ‘‘the elements given in experience, whose
connexion we are investigating, are always the same, and are of only one na-
ture, though they appear, according to the nature of the connexion, at one
moment as physical and at another as psychical elements’’ (Mach 61). Not
only is the ego ‘‘a poor thing,’’ subjected to various internal and external
threats, as Freud had argued (‘‘Das Ich und das Es’’ 322). For Mach, it never
existed to begin with, leading him to conclude that the ‘‘ego must be given
up’’ (Das Ich ist unrettbar) (24), a slogan that echoed throughout a whole
generation of writers and artists at the beginning of the twentieth century,
among them Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Jünger, and Döblin, to name but a few:
‘‘We are one with all that is and all that ever was,’’ Hofmannsthal noted in
1894 (RA; GW III: 376).
If all things were seen to be interconnected around 1900, this was due to
the absence of any privileged point of view from which to survey the visual
world. Given the relativity of various perspectives, individual observers had
to come to terms with the contingency of their insights into things. For the
purpose of this overview, the academic debate about when exactly the sub-
jective model of vision began to gain popular appeal—whether it already
started in the 1820s, as Jonathan Crary contends in his Techniques of the Ob-
server, or rather began with French impressionist painting during the latter
half of the century, as most art historians insist—appears less relevant than
the overriding sense of epistemological uncertainty caused by the prolifera-
tion of heterogeneous perspectives toward the end of the century. At that
time both the subjective and the objective model of vision existed side by
side, and the increasing fascinationwith the supernatural and the occult rep-
resents but the uncanny flip side of modernity’s belief in rationalism. The
latter thus gives rise to its own undoing. Since the progress of the natural
sciences encountered little, if any, resistance in a world subjected to rational
analysis, it was finally slowed down by its interior contradictions and the
normativevacuum that ensued from its reign.The ‘‘poetryof life’’ was simply
missing in a positivist universe exclusively built upon scientific knowledge,
as Lotze himself readily admitted.
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tion with mysterious and scientifically inexplicable phenomena at the end
of the century. Telepathy and telekinetic experiments throughout the nine-
teenth century—exemplified in the enormous appeal of Blavatsky’s ‘‘Theo-
sophic Society’’ founded in 1875—betrayed the waning faith in rational
models of explanation and the growing readiness to regard all ‘‘things’’ in
life (and life itself ) as mysterious entities that cannot simply be ‘‘known’’ or
rationally understood. And yet, the paradoxical goal of nineteenth-century
mysticism was to ‘‘prove’’ that nothing can be proven. During 1905 and 1908,
for example, the famous medium Eusapia Paladino was observed during as
many as forty-three séances under the supervision of the Institut Général
Psychologique in Paris. Some of the members of the institute included Henri
Bergson, Pierre and Marie Curie, and Jean-Baptiste Perrin. Although they
used cameras as well as other technological instruments in order to observe
and measure Eusapia’s abilities, they were unable to provide any conclusive
evidence or explanation in their final report of over 260 pages.16
The increasing renown of the phantasmagoria and the history of spirit-
photographyduring the nineteenth century provides evenmore evidence for
this strange entanglement of science and the occult during the nineteenth
century. Originally invented as a spectacle for urban mass entertainment to
verify that ghosts do not really exist, the translucent images projected by
the magic lantern and similar protocinematic devices produced the exact
opposite effect. They were widely regarded as empirical proof for the un-
reliability of visual perception, which failed to distinguish between the real
presence of material substance and the ephemeral appearance of mere phan-
toms. As Terry Castle argues, the phantasmagoria came to be identified with
the human mind itself, which similarly seemed to project hallucinatory pic-
tures onto the real world. Reduced to a complex array of arbitrary images
emanating from individual observers, reality itself degenerated into an opti-
cal illusion about which no objective facts could be ascertained anymore.17
Nineteenth-century spirit-photography took this process one step further,
merging the scientific objectivity of the apparatus with the supernatural
event that defies it. Showing bodies of dead people, spirit-photography tes-
tified to the fact ‘‘that the photographic image has persistently occupied an
uneasy space between the worlds of science and magic’’ (West 172). In other
words, the new technology was being used to materialize the immaterial:
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may have resided less in offering its members ‘proof ’ of an afterlife, as in
casting their frightful memories into a magical technology’’ (West 201).
Aestheticist poetry partakes of a similar ideal of magic as does spirit-
photography. It tries to materialize the primordial vision of the ever-
changing life that sustains matter. In so doing, it inherits a dual legacy from
Romantic metaphysics and nineteenth-century positivism. The latter has
left its mark on the Romantic imagination and forced it to come to terms
with the illusory and specular nature of its visions of transcendence.18 Aes-
theticist poets are skeptical, self-doubting Romanticists. They need veri-
fiable proof in the form of physical evidence to authenticate their poetic
efforts of world creation. Hence, the Romantic absolute is no longer pro-
jected into a transcendent realm of infinite expansion, but is being com-
pressed back into the matter of every-thing we see: ‘‘Every thing can become
God,’’ one reads in one of Rilke’s stories; ‘‘[i]t must only be told’’ (Ein jedes
Ding kann der liebe Gott sein. Man muß es ihm nur sagen) (‘‘Geschichten’’;
Werke IV: 355). The Absolute implodes into things and resides therein; this
is why poetry around 1900 emphasizes the materiality of language. Words,
like all things, literally carry a different world inside themselves. Looking at
language, one sees the face of another universe.
As I shall argue at length in the fifth chapter, Rilke’s poetry of the middle
period both thematizes and rhetorically performs this search for the materi-
ality of language in an effort to combat its increasing commodification. Try-
ing to come to terms with the ephemeral quality of linguistic meaning (i.e.,
the constitutive gap of signifier and signified), Rilke’s New Poems labor to
enrich poetry with the palpable substance of the spatial arts. Drawing from
the explicit analogy between poetry and sculpture, Rilke’s effort participates
in the ekphrastic tradition that extends from Horace’s ‘‘Ut Pictura Poesis’’
to today’s ‘‘visual poetics’’ (Mieke Bal). Notwithstanding the opacity of the
term, the ekphrastic principle can most generally be defined as literature’s
attempt to describe, or, using a more narrow definition, actually to imitate
visual imagery, be it a person, an object, or a place. Ekphrastic language tries
to ‘‘freeze’’ its own temporality so that it can achieve corporal existence and
‘‘take on the still elements of plastic form’’ (Krieger 107). It is an attempt
to paint or sculpt things with words. Indeed, some scholars, such as James
A.W. Heffernan and W. J. T. Mitchell, argue that ekphrasis specifically refers
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it from iconicity and pictorialism encountered in almost every literary text.
‘‘What ekphrasis represents in words,’’ Heffernan argues, ‘‘must itself be rep-
resentational’’ (Heffernan 300), that is, it must be another referential work
of art.
Manyof Rilke’sNewPoems are ekphrastic inHeffernan’s sense of the term
since they focus on a linguistic process of assimilation meant to inscribe the
differences of the spatial arts into the chronology of literary discourse. My
point here is not simply to demonstrate that Rilke’s New Poems never quite
succeed in their attempt to freeze temporality, but rather to argue that they
reflect their own failure, which is precisely part of their aesthetic appeal.
Suspended somewhere between the transitoriness of Hofmannsthal’s poetic
performances and the rigid Gestalt of George’s poetry, Rilke’s New Poems
are characterized by their effort to emulate the spatial coherence of the arts
without, however, forsaking the temporal dimension of language. The re-
sulting tension gives rise to a kind of interior vibration that both interrupts
and sustains Rilke’s poems. The prevalent use of the sonnet form in theNew
Poems is indicative of this ideal of dynamic stasis towhich Rilke aspires. Crit-
ics have often pointed out that the sonnet mediates within its very structure
the conflict between the dynamic movement it describes and the petrified
or standardized form that contains it.19 On a strictly formal level, Rilke’s
thing-poems are thus characterized by the same conflict between stasis and
movement that he claimed to perceive in Rodin’s sculptures and Cézanne’s
paintings.
However, if ekphrasis names the aesthetic process by which language imi-
tates the spatial arts, then this imitation must be evident not only on the
structural but also on the content level of the poems. Rilke’s words must
describe their subject of reference as ‘‘other,’’ while, at the same time, they
construct the poem in order to function as its surrogate. Rilke must recon-
cile the visual immediacy of images with the narrative unfolding of language
such that one can be fused with the other. Since this fusion can never be
completely successful—otherwise we would have a material object in front
of us and not a written text—the poem instead self-reflectively comments
upon the ideal itself. Poetic ‘‘failure,’’ in other words, is built into the process,
and this allows Rilke to state programmatically a specific poetic objective
interlaced within the actual aesthetic effort to enact it. The former always ac-
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can nonetheless be said to successfully enact or embody the poetics they
enunciate. This means that his poems leave it up to the reader to finish the
aesthetic process of transformation they claim to have unleashed. For the
reader can either focus on the ‘‘failure’’ or the ‘‘success’’ enabled by these
poems, depending on whether or not she is willing to ‘‘play’’ along and com-
plete the work or withdraw from it and let it stand unfinished on its own.
Written in the characteristic form of the sonnet, the first of the new
poems, ‘‘Früher Apollo,’’ is paradigmatic in this regard. It highlights the role
of mediator played by the spatial arts as it attributes to poetic language a
kind of material presence. At the same time, it also emphasizes the temporal
dimension of art. Rilke’s poem gives shape to an aesthetic development that
mirrors the forces of life.
Früher Apollo
Wie manches Mal durch das noch unbelaubte
Gezweig ein Morgen durchsieht, der schon ganz
im Frühling ist: so ist in seinem Haupte
nichts was verhindern könnte, daß der Glanz
aller Gedichte uns fast tödlich träfe;
denn noch kein Schatten ist in seinem Schaun,
zu kühl für Lorbeer sind noch seine Schläfe
und später erst wird aus den Augenbraun
hochstämmig sich der Rosengarten heben,
aus welchem Blätter, einzeln, ausgelöst
hintreiben werden auf des Mundes Beben,
der jetzt noch still ist, niegebraucht und blinkend
und nur mit seinem Lächeln etwas trinkend
als würde ihm sein Singen eingeflößt.
(Werke I: 481)
Early Apollo
As when sometimes through branches, leafless still,
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so there is is nothing in his head that could
prevent the radiant power of all poems
to strike us almost deadly with its light.
For there is yet no shadow in his gaze,
too cool for laurel are his temples still,
and round the eyebrows only later will
come climbing long-stemmed roses from his garden,
and petals, separating from their blooms,
will drift and rest upon his trembling mouth
that yet is silent, sparkling and unused,
and only hinting with a smile as if
a song were soon to reach his open lips.20
The poem clearly possesses a programmatic character. It operates on two
interrelated levels, describing a material object of art while simultaneously
reflecting upon its own power of signification. The beginning of the second
stanza reveals the interdependency between these levels as it suddenly shifts
focus from the external object to poetry itself. The particular appeal of the
statue is said to reside in its openness, which allows the ‘‘brilliance of all
poetry’’ to break through to ‘‘us.’’ This abrupt switch from art to language
is baffling, particularly since ‘‘brilliance’’ attributes to poetry a spatial di-
mension that language commonly lacks. The major quality of poetry is not
‘‘brilliance,’’ but sound, as Rilke’s poem itself convincingly demonstrates if
read out loud. Poetry primarily addresses the ear and not the eye—unless,
of course, one were to focus on its visual appearance in the form of writing.
This, however, is precisely what ‘‘Früher Apollo’’ demands of its reader.
For the fifth line only makes sense if we assume that poetry is as intimately
connected to the marble figure as one season to the next. The first stanza
explicitly likens the statue’s susceptibility to the openness of a winter land-
scape unable to ward off the coming of a spring morning. Poetry, in other
words, ‘‘shines forth’’ in and through the statue much like spring is already
announced in winter. Hence, the surface of the statue and that of the poem
must be seen as intertwined, meaning that the words on the page literally
re-present the sculpted material of the statue. ‘‘We’’ are thus addressed as
both the onlookers of the statue and the readers of Rilke’s poem: looking






































































the speaking gaze of modernity : 63
language is undermined as soon as it is stated. For the aesthetic achieve-
ment of the statue consists precisely not in its own impenetrable substance,
but rather in the lack thereof since it poses hardly any resistance against the
poetic description at work in Rilke’s poem.
The metaphor of the seasons in the first stanza thus resonates on two
opposite levels at once. It evokes both the reification of language into words
as well as the statue’s dissolution into the temporal flux of signification. The
notion of poetry ‘‘looking through’’ (durchsieht) the sculpture first serves
as a reminder about the physical attributes and the ‘‘body’’ of poetry in the
form of writing. At the same time, however, the comparison also hints at the
irreducible polyvalence of poetic language, which always already contains
the seed for another world literally hidden behind its manifest presence—
which is to say that poetry only breaks through and starts to ‘‘bloom’’ if we
look behind the appearance of the written word. This relationship between
matter and temporality is presented as the central theme of the statue and
the poem alike. Their confluence seeks to endow each one with the inherent
qualities of the other such that the sound of Rilke’s poem is attributed to the
singing Apollo at the end, while the statue’s proper ‘‘brilliance’’ is ascribed
to poetry. Put differently, one might say that the poem gains shape by means
of describing the statue, while the statue comes to life during the temporal
unfolding of poetic language.
Indeed, it is crucial to note the spatiotemporal unity of Rilke’s ‘‘Früher
Apollo,’’ which links together past, present, and future. The poem describes
an ancient sculpture, yet also emphasizes the early stage of artistic develop-
ment it represents (‘‘Morgen,’’ ‘‘Frühling,’’ etc.). The statue projects forth a
time still to come (‘‘. . . noch kein’’; ‘‘. . . sind noch’’; ‘‘. . . und später erst’’)
and yet already present in the form of a gaze that is ‘‘without shadow.’’ The
shadow, of course, would result from the laurels crowning the head of the
statue, a symbol for artistic perfection that adorns most representations of
Apollo, the god of the arts. Being without laurels is equivalent to being un-
finished, much like the spring being not completely present in winter or the
Greek sculpture ‘‘shining through’’ thewords that evoke it. The present state
of the statue is thus characterized as a passing stage in an ongoing process
of incessant change that pertains to the historical development of Greek art
and nature as well as to Rilke’s poem itself. Read in the context of Nietz-
sche’s Birth of Tragedy (1871), which Rilke had studied carefully,21 one might
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forces of life lurking behind the protective shield of artistic form. The ‘‘al-
most lethal’’ power said to linger behind both the barren landscape and the
unfinished Greek statue alludes to the dissolution of the individual within
the universal forces of life, as Nietzsche had prophesied. Art is not only dan-
gerous, but might be lethal, because its light of truth destroys the illusion of
autonomous subjectivity upon which modern society is built.
Indeed, Rilke’s use of the season metaphor not only echoes Nietzsche’s
notion of the eternal recurrence of the same, but also indicates the circular
logic that sustains the poem as a whole. Behind the poem stands the statue,
behind the statue lurks the primordial power of life, which in turn is re-
vealed in and through the ‘‘brilliance’’ of poetry. Poetic language, therefore,
must be endowed with a material presence of its own in order to protect ‘‘us’’
from the all consuming and deadly insights of art. The poem, like the statue,
has solidified into physical elements (using words like marble) to allow the
reader a glimpse of the mercurial power of life ‘‘shining through’’ behind
it. For Rilke, this materialization of language is both indispensable and de-
bilitating at the same time. It must be overcome precisely so that it can be
repeated over and over again.
However, my claim that Rilke’s poetry literally figures its own decon-
struction does not simply defer to Paul de Man’s well-known argument
about the self-deconstructive nature of language. The difference lies in
Rilke’s and Aestheticism’s deliberate attempt to recuperate this deconstruc-
tive dimension of poetry for the active construction of an aesthetic world
whose strength resides in its ability to endure and maintain this interior ten-
sion that threatens to burst the poem apart. For Rilke, the authenticity of
poetry hinges on this endurance. It opens up a space in between words and
things that pictures the potentiality of language to transcend its own laws
of signification toward the real.
Film and the ‘‘Language-Crisis’’
In the fifth chapter, I shall discuss Rilke’s poetics in greater detail. For
now, I want to argue that the ambivalence regarding the nineteenth-century
metaphysics of visual ‘‘proof ’’ is most evident in the ultimate modern phan-
tasmagoria, namely film. In fact, the cinematic apparatus functions accord-
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a film consists of distinct and isolated units, its visual effect relies upon the
disavowal of that difference as it transforms static imagery into moving pic-
tures. The aesthetics of film thus epitomizes the period’s ambivalence be-
tween rationalism and spiritualism, the objective and the subjective model
of vision. On the one hand, film, like photography, relies on monocular
perspective and thus continues the Renaissance tradition that privileges a
divine, disembodied, and thus seemingly objective, point of view. Strongly
influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis and the Althusserian critique of ide-
ology, an entire period of film studies during the 1970s was mainly con-
cerned with exposing the interpellative qualities of the cinematic apparatus
and the ideological effects of cinematic suture (scholars like Christian Metz,
Jean-Louis Baudry, Jean-Luc Comolli, and other contributors to the Cahiers
du Cinéma). In their view, the major achievement of film, regardless of its
particular content, was to produce a ‘‘subject-effect’’ among its audience as
the viewers identified with the ubiquitous gaze of the camera in order to
regain control over the plethora of moving images.22 One might conclude
that film’s technological reinauguration of visual supremacy was one of the
major reasons for the increasing popular appeal of cinema around 1900.
On the other hand, however, mainstream films soon began to develop the
equally characteristic technique of cinematic montage that challenged the
Cartesian ideal of centralized vision.While the historical beginnings of edit-
ing remains a matter of dispute—Edwin S. Potter’s Life of an American Fire-
man from 1902 being the most prominent case in point23—there can be no
doubt that within ten to fifteen years of its arrival, the new medium had de-
veloped a clear sense of what was soon to be regarded as its most distinctive
trait, namely the successive arrangement of heterogeneous images known as
montage. Given that film exerted a decisive influence on most avant-garde
practices during the beginning of the twentieth century, it appears one-sided
to consider cinema an ideological means to reinstall the Cartesian subject
of vision, as argued by the proponents of cinematic suture. Rather, film
emerges as a fundamentally ambiguous phenomenon around 1900, a tech-
nological invention that simultaneously strengthened and undermined the
rationalist notion of visual objectivity and its efforts to adequately represent
the world in the form of moving pictures.
The inherent ambivalence of film regarding its epistemological mean-
ing is symptomatic for a time period itself suspended between the binary
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ditionalism, and elitist versus mass culture, yet equally characterized by the
concomitant and often desperate attempt to bridge the gaps and to rec-
oncile these oppositions. ‘‘Sensation’’ or ‘‘life experience’’ was the appro-
priate name for what appeared to be this reuniting principle.24 The vari-
ous notions of monism, phenomenology, life philosophy, etc., in circulation
around 1900 all lauded themselves for having shattered the reified doctrines
of previous systems of knowledge and exorcised the specter of meaning-
less words that haunted them. Theirs, by contrast, was a theory beyond all
theory, a philosophical nonphilosophy based on the simple and unmedi-
ated observation of life as such. John Ruskin’s call for the ‘‘innocence of the
eye; that is to say, of a sort of childish perception’’ (Ruskin; qtd. in Gom-
brich,Art and Illusion 296), not only anticipates the aesthetic ideal of French
Impressionism, but also captures these contradictory impulses of the later
nineteenth century. In the eyes of many artists at the time, truth and objec-
tive knowledge of theworld gain shape only in and through a radical form of
individual subjectivism that recognizes the self not as a superior subject, but
as an integral part of the world surrounding it. He who wants to know and
see all things for what they truly are must liberate himself from the urge to
knowand surrender instead to themysterious playof different colors, forms,
and movement that constitute both reality and one-self. He must be open
to the world and must regard himself as a permeable surface that sees and is
being seen all at once. A time witnessing a ‘‘perceptual revolution’’25 in the
arts and sciences that fundamentally changed the face of the world, the turn
of the century is mesmerized by this ‘‘look of things’’ and the organismic
idea of ever-changing ‘‘life,’’ seeking to unravel the interplay of deceiving
appearances and revealing essences that constitute it.
And again, film might be said to be the aesthetic correlative to this mysti-
fied understanding of the world, not only because the ‘‘imaginary signifier’’
actually seems to present ‘‘life’’ itself on the screen, but also because the cine-
matic apparatus is built upon amechanism that reunites separate images into
a coherent whole. Owing its genesis to the scientific experiments of Marey
and Muybridge, among others, while, at the same time, developing into one
of the most popular entertainment media of the entire century, film both
literally and figuratively epitomizes the fundamental problem of modernity:
fragmentation and the utopian dream for a new totality. The cinema thus
provided the opportunity formass audiences to both rehearsemodern shock
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a destabilized modern world into the imaginary realm of beautiful pictures.
As Anton Kaes points out, film was simultaneously attacked and defended
both as a symptom of and the remedy for the alienation and fragmentation
of the modern world.
In retrospect, it seems questionable if there was any aspect of modern
life that was not in some way affected by or reflected in the arrival of mo-
tion pictures, meaning that ‘‘modern culturewas ‘cinematic’ before the fact’’
(Charney, Cinema 1). Language, on the other hand, was stigmatized by art-
ists and intellectuals as the antiquated and dysfunctional system of significa-
tion unable to keep pace with modernity. The traditionally assumed mean-
ing of words literally became blurred right in front of the reader’s eyes: ‘‘Stop
these words,’’ Hofmannsthal’s heroine Sobeide exclaims in one of his early
plays. ‘‘I am dizzy and they glitter before my eyes’’ (Laß solche Worte, mir
ist schwindlig und sie flimmern vor den Augen) (Gedichte; GW I: 442f.).
‘‘Truth’’ had became a highly relative ‘‘thing’’ in its own right, either located
within the individual body or within life as such, but certainly not at home
in an academic discourse ultimately consisting of nothing but ‘‘a mobile
army of metaphors, metonomies, anthropomorphisms, in short: a sum of
human relations’’ (Nietzsche III: 314), as Nietzsche’s diagnostic gaze had al-
ready realized in 1873. Having lost currency as the universal medium of ex-
change between all other objects, this kind of language had become self-
absorbed and was separated from the world surrounding it: ‘‘Because words
have placed themselves in front of the things’’ (Denn die Worte haben sich
vor die Dinge gestellt) (RA; GW I: 479), Hofmannsthal lamented in 1895,
and Rilke similarly stated in 1902 that ‘‘language has nothing to do with the
things anymore’’ ([D]ie Sprache [hat] nichts mehr mit den Dingen gemein)
(Werke V: 20).
However, in spite of this seemingly universal denigration of language
around 1900, it exhibited an array of ambivalent characteristics not unlike
those of the new medium film and vision in general. Language, too, was
judged both responsible for and victimized by the modern process of alien-
ation and fragmentation. Poets and philosophers alike juxtaposed two dif-
ferent kinds of language, one which had succumbed to rationalist forms
of exchange and (ab)used words like ‘‘gambling-chips’’ (Fritz Mauthner),
whereas the other created ‘‘live words’’ whose intuitive power enabled them
to speak some primordial truth that appeared out of sight at the time. Rilke’s
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word that proves itself useless to capture the Absolute during dialogue be-
comes truthful as soon as it is not directed toward anybodyanymore’’ (Merk-
würdig: das Wort. Ebendasselbe Wort, welches im Dialog sich unbrauchbar
erweist, das Letzte zu umfassen, wird, sobald es sich an niemanden mehr
wenden muß, aller Wahrheit mächtig) (Werke V: 435).
Like in German Romanticism one hundred years earlier, this exemplary
languagewas said to be expressed in poetry since poetry transcends the nar-
row boundaries of philosophical and scientific knowledge. If the meaning
of life is nothing but life itself, philosophy once again required the art of aes-
thetic mediation in order to intuit ‘‘life as it is.’’ The reader’s aesthetic experi-
ence is called upon as a kind of superior perception of theworld that helps to
solve the crisis caused by the self-destructive tendencies of empiricism and
the philosophical problem of how to best approach ‘‘life.’’ Poetry served as a
training manual for consciously experiencing and interpreting our immedi-
ate physical sensations since it affords a more meaningful and intuitively
‘‘true’’ perception of everyday reality. Like Helmholtz, many scientists and
philosophers regarded art not as the ‘‘other’’ of science, but as its proper
vocation: ‘‘The true scientist must always have something of the vision of an
artist,’’ Helmholtz concluded (‘‘Facts of Perception’’ 392). Likewise, Henri
Bergson praises the visionary power of the artist, notably the poet, to ‘‘make
us see what we do not naturally perceive’’ (Introduction to Metaphysics 135).
It follows that ‘‘true’’ speech in the form of poetry is of a visionary power
that far exceeds that of technological instruments and scientific observa-
tion. This speechless speech still lives somewherewithin the reified facade of
everyday commodities and language alike, the task of poetry being to give
voice to this silence and to provide insights into the truth of things. Adorno’s
comments are exemplary in this regard because they capture this aesthetic
ideal of the silent language of art: ‘‘Etruscan vases in the Villa Giulia are
eloquent in the highest degree and incommensurable with all communica-
tive language. The true language of art is mute. . . .’’ (Aesthetic Theory 112)
(Etruskische Krüge in derVilla Guilia sind sprechend im höchsten Maß und
aller mitteilenden Sprache inkommensurabel. Die wahre Sprache der Kunst
ist sprachlos. . . .) (ÄT 171). Just as medical research around 1800 relied on
a speaking gaze to authenticate the objective knowledge encrypted upon
the surface of material objects, modernist poetry one hundred years later
called upon the same metaphysical concept in order to vanquish the scien-
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goal no longer is to know things, but to feel them and to become one with
them. And yet, the definitive objectives of art and science are not that far
apart, since both are concerned with a higher truth that escapes ordinary
vision and common language alike. At the turn of the century, the conflict
between art and science had finally reached its zenith and thus a point at
which it converted into a total confluence. Ultimately, the utopian dream of
modernism remained the same as that of positivist science: to look at things
and let them speak for themselves.
Mass audiences at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, in-
creasingly lacked both Adorno’s aesthetic education and taste as well as the
necessary leisure time to further explore and develop these elitist ideals of
the speaking gaze at work in modernist art. But neither were they able to
comprehend the scientific revolutions proclaimed by quantum physics and
microbiology at the time. If modernist art is understood as nothing but a
symptom of a severe ‘‘language-crisis,’’ so should modern science since both
pursued the same objective by different means. Poetry simply explored the
same crisis and inherent ambivalence ofmeaning that affected the entire cul-
ture around 1900, including film. The latter, however, was able to redeem
itself in the eyes of mass audiences as a form of entertainment whereas lan-
guage was not. The rapid succession of individual photographs, originally
conceived by Marey and Muybridge for the sake of scientific knowledge, was
quickly transformed into a source for mass entertainment. Film’s scientific
value became virtually irrelevant; this, however, does not mean that film was
not also a symptom of the very epistemological crisis it seemed to express
and ‘‘solve’’ on the screen.
Hence, the exclusive emphasis of literary criticism on the so-called
‘‘language-crisis’’ at the turn of the century fundamentally distorts the pic-
ture. Intellectuals at the time simply singled out language because it had
fallen prey to its own philosophical history. Throughout the modern era,
it had made promises it was unable to keep. The same, of course, could be
said about film and the visual media around 1900, except that they were
not measured in these terms any more. Although language was widely re-
garded as themajor, if not only, culprit for the erosion of truth it had hitherto
been said to represent, scholars today must, therefore, be careful not simply
to perpetuate the earlier misperception in their own research. The art his-
torian Konrad Fiedler already anticipated this dilemma in 1887, claiming
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in the human spirit’’ and expressed in language ‘‘can easily appear trans-
formed into contempt. At first one thought to possess everything through
knowledge, now one believes to lose everything because of it’’ (Schriften zur
Kunst I: 208). I believe that Kittler and other contemporary media theorists
fortify this distorted view of things by overemphasizing the aesthetic oppo-
sition between art and modern media at the time. Modernist poetry is char-
acterized not by a ‘‘language-crisis,’’ but by the aesthetic ideal of merging
language and vision into one, an ideal that also informed the rise of mod-
ern science and philosophy. It follows that in spite of its own insistence on
total autonomy, Aestheticism is literally circumscribed within this multi-
faceted force field of cultural modernity. Like the photographic image of the
wrecked locomotive at the Gare Montparnasse, poetry around 1900 tries to
provide objective proof for its surreal visions of modern life. The alleged
crisis of language actually testifies to its apotheosis.
Focusing on this potential of language to provide insight into the essence
of things, the following chapter seeks to further undermine the tradition-
ally emphasized opposition between art and science, between aesthetics and
modern media, between language and vision around 1900. It explores the
speaking gaze of modernity by contrasting Edmund Husserl’s phenome-
nology with Henri Bergson’s philosophy of life. This juxtaposition of two
major philosophers epitomizes and brings to light many of the ambiguities
and contradictory tendencies inherent in late nineteenth-century culture.
First, their texts either implicitly or explicitly mobilize a variety of visual
metaphors derived from the newmedia, testifying to the increasing influence
of popular culture in the realm of philosophy. Second, reading their philoso-
phies side by side reveals the stark competition between the objective and the
subjective model of perception around 1900. Husserl’s Logical Investigations
(1899) and his subsequent Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology (1913) represent an
important attempt to halt the erosion of philosophical knowledge and sci-
entific certainty that characterizes the turn of the century. Husserl continues
the Cartesian philosophical tradition to advance a unified theory of percep-
tion and modern science, whereas Bergson, like Helmholtz, relies strongly
on physiological and biological evidence to support his theories. Moreover,
Bergson severely criticizes the confinements of analytical philosophy since
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Finally, both philosophers acknowledge and seek to overcome the self-
destructive tendencies evident in nineteenth-century empiricism. Their
shared emphasis on intuition is meant to guide human knowledge beyond
the frontiers of the positivist universe toward the realm of pure logic (Hus-
serl) or pure metaphysics (Bergson). Although Husserl claims to turn his
gaze to the things themselves (Zu den Sachen), his phenomenological
method after 1907 operates by means of a complete withdrawal from the
transcendental world into the secure immanence of the mind. His ‘‘tran-
scendental reduction’’ categorically brackets the question of whether there
even exists a material world outside the mind. In Husserl, the speaking
gaze survives only as the explicit negation of what appeared to be the most
basic positivist assumption: the unquestioned being-there of a real world
untouched by those who look at it. And yet, in spite of his antiempiri-
cist stance, Husserl’s phenomenology nonetheless continues the scientific-
philosophical tradition to read the essence of things and to provide insight
into the universal grammar of absolute logic that sustains the world at large.
Bergson’s highly influential intuitivism and ‘‘life philosophy’’ (Lebens-
philosophie) represents another and fundamentally different response to the
modern process of fragmentation. Bergson shares with Husserl a profound
disinterest in the material world since, in his eyes, the very notion of matter
is nothing but an artificial construct of the humanmind. It follows that Berg-
son does not trust the power of logic to advance a more profound under-
standing of the world, but rather turns toward a metaphysical theory of
intuition to unveil the truth allegedly hidden behind our highly subjective
perception of things. For Bergson, this truth of life consists of an incessant
stream of interconnected particles, the élan vital, of which every-thing par-
takes and which must not be intellectually analyzed lest it disappear from
sight. Whereas Husserl logically dissects the human act of perception in
order to understand what it means to see, Bergson regards this analysis itself
as responsible for our inability to grasp the look of things. This important
difference between the two philosophers is best conceptualized by their dif-
ferent notions of language. Life, for Bergson, exists in a realm far beyond the
ability of words to capture it. The art of intuition remains the only means
to catch a glimpse of the ever-fleeting presence of life, which cannot but
appear distorted in the mirror of language. For Husserl, by contrast, lan-
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ties and the world we perceive. Husserl’s phenomenology can be described
as a final effort to come to terms with the essence of things. Husserl and
Bergson thus define the most extreme parameters of the early twentieth-
century discussion regarding the representational power of language, and
their views strongly influenced the poetry of German Aestheticism, as will






































































2 Intuition and Language
And the entire art consists in letting the seeing eye speak.
—Husserl 1907
The Speaking Gaze in Husserl’s Phenomenology
This section traces the relationship between language and vision in
Husserl’s Göttingen period from 1900 to 1916.1 Husserl’s philosophy is of
particular relevance for this study because it centers on the subject-object
dichotomy and provides one of the most sophisticated theories regarding
the nature and use of linguistic signs at its time. Moreover, Husserl is widely
regarded as a ‘‘seminal figure in the evolution of modern philosophy,’’ asThe
Cambridge Companion to Husserl asserts, and represents, in Jacques Der-
rida’s view, both the epitome and the eclipse of the history of Western meta-
physics. It follows that Husserl’s understanding of self-evident perception
and its relation to language must not be relegated to just one perspective
among many. Rather, his views are symptomatic for the traditional valoriza-
tion of intuitive presence over linguistic difference, which his philosophy,
much like poetry around 1900, explicitly espouses and unwittingly chal-
lenges at the same time.
My goal is to reveal the discursive strategies that sustain Husserl’s analy-
sis of pure perception as well as his valorization of intuitive presence over
linguistic difference. Phenomenology is built upon the metaphysical ideal
of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ that seeks to capture sight in and through language.
As Husserl himself stated in his lectures from 1907, the goal of the philoso-
pher is to (ad)dress one’s insights in a word: ‘‘And the entire art consists in
letting the seeing eye speak . . .’’ (Und die ganze Kunst besteht darin, rein
dem schauenden Auge das Wort zu lassen . . .) (Idee der Phänomenologie
62). Husserl’s formulation is telling, for his ideal of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ in-
deed requires a particular ‘‘art’’ of reading ‘‘the things themselves.’’ This art
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ally coincides, with the eidos of the phenomenological world, giving things
a voice of their own literally awakened by the touch of the philosopher’s
gaze. The speaking gaze thus constitutes the fundamental principle of the
phenomenological analysis. It allows Husserl to divide the world into inside
and outside, us and them, meaning and nonsense: ‘‘Whoever does not see or
will not see, who talks and argues, yet always remains at the place where he
accepts all conflicting points of view and at the same time denies them all,
there is nothing we can do with him’’ (The Idea of Phenomenology 49) (Wer
nicht sieht oder nicht sehen mag, wer redet und selbst argumentiert, aber
immerfort dabei bleibt, alleWidersprüche auf sich zu nehmen und zugleich
alle Widersprüche zu leugnen, mit dem können wir nichts anfangen) (Idee
61). Phenomenology, according toHusserl, does not arguewith the facts, but
describes them exactly as they present themselves: the phenomenological
gaze literally speaks for itself.
With the help of this gaze, Husserl seeks to transform philosophical con-
cepts into the essence of things, a transformation that ultimately allows him
to disregard the analysis of matter in favor of an analysis of signs. In his
Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy from
1913, Husserl redirects the gaze from external reality toward the inner sanc-
tuary of the mind. The discovery and increasing significance of the epoché
or ‘‘transcendental reduction’’ represents the necessary and inevitable con-
sequence of Husserl’s failure to bridge the abyss between inside and outside,
mind and world. Yet, already in his lectures on The Idea of Phenomenology
from 1907, Husserl explicitly ‘‘brackets’’ questions of empirical existence and
thus at least deemphasizes if not abandons the transcendental realm out-
side consciousness. This crucial shift of focus enables him to fully equate
inner and outer perception without affecting the nature of the phenome-
nological gaze: ‘‘Perception and imagination are of equal importance for an
eidetic analysis. . . .’’ (Für die Wesensbetrachtung rangiert Wahrnehmung
und Phantasievorstellung ganz gleich. . . .) (Idee 68).
In the following, I argue that Husserl does not so much shift attention
from outer to inner perception as intermix the two realms, a conflation that
haunts his entire phenomenological enterprise. I shall support this assertion
by means of a close reading of selected passages of Husserl’s texts. For only
from within Husserl’s phenomenological universe—the actual words them-
selves—will it become obvious what it means to look at things and intuit
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can be stated as follows. First, I contend that Husserl’s ideal of a speaking
gaze is constituted by a contradictory definition of language as both analo-
gous to and fundamentally different from perception. Second, I regard pho-
tography and the process of ‘‘development’’ as an apt metaphorical descrip-
tion of Husserl’s concept of intentionality.
One of Husserl’s major goals in the Logische Untersuchungen (hereafter
cited as LU ) and the later Ideen was to explain how objective knowledge is
possible given the necessity to ground it in subjective experience. Phenome-
nology can be envisioned as a quest to reveal and identify the unshakable
foundation on which to erect absolute truth, and this is why the LU concen-
trate on the question of meaning in linguistic statements. If phenomenology
is to describe the essence of things themselves, linguistic meaning must be
proven to be the adequate expression of truth. Based on the crucial dis-
tinction between expression and indication (‘‘Ausdruck’’ and ‘‘Anzeige’’),2
Husserl, therefore, asserts that every statement expresses an absolute mean-
ing that is irreducible to the mental act or the physical signs that constitute
it. Meaning exists independently of the communicative aspect of language,
as Husserl tries to prove by reference to internal soliloquy as meaningful by
itself: ‘‘The word only ceases to be a word once our exclusive interest is di-
rected toward the sensual part, that is, toward the word as a mere sound.
However, wherever we live in its understanding, it expresses something that
does not change whether or not it is directed toward somebody’’ (Nur da
hört das Wort auf, Wort zu sein, wo sich unser ausschließliches Interesse
auf das Sinnliche richtet, auf das Wort als bloßes Lautgebilde. Wo wir aber
in seinem Verständnis leben, da drückt es aus und dasselbe aus, ob es an
jemanden gerichtet ist oder nicht) (LU II/1, § 8, 41–42).
Husserl’s project remains primarily concerned with this ideal and self-
identical meaning of statements rather than the ‘‘mere expression’’ carrying
it. In the first investigation, he distinguishes between the physical expression
on the one hand and the mental acts that either bestow meaning upon this
expression or intuitively fulfill that meaning on the other. In other words,
Husserl transforms the traditional twofold distinction between expression
and its intended meaning into a three-part structure that again splits the
second part into two separate acts: a meaning-intention and a meaning-
fulfillment. This further distinction allows him to ‘‘solve’’ the problem of in-
tentionality he inherited from Brentano, who claimed that every mental act
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specify whether this intentional object was a real physical entity or a mere
‘‘something’’ in our mind.3 Husserl introduces ‘‘meaning’’ as a third, inter-
mediary notion located in between subject and object. This ideal meaning
or ‘‘sense’’ of statements—the LU do not distinguish between Sinn and Be-
deutung—connects the physical expression (i.e., theword) with the physical
object (i.e., the real thing) towhich the sign refers.Meanings are act-essences
or ‘‘species’’ instantiated by linguistic utterances, while at the same time,
given their ideal nature, they remain independent of these acts. It follows
that every expression intends a meaning that need not necessarily corre-
spond to an external object that fulfills this meaning, since such fulfillment
(i.e., the demonstrated correlation between meaning and its referent) con-
stitutes a separate act distinct from the meaning-intention itself.
As most critics argue, Husserl’s linguistic theory is not unique at the time
and closely resembles Frege’s differentiation between idea, sense, and ref-
erent in his essay ‘‘On Sense and Reference.’’4 One could, however, also re-
late it to Saussure’s much later distinction of signifier, signified, and referent
of 1922, except, of course, that Saussure emphasizes the differential play of
semiotic values that constitutes meaning.5 According to Saussure, the sig-
nified, or meaning, of a linguistic signifier is defined negatively through a
process of differentiation from all other signifiers. The temporal dimension
at work in Saussure’s theory is completely alien to Husserl’s understanding
of language, which insists on the ideal self-presence of linguistic meaning.
It follows that his concept of intentionality must somehow account for
the relationship between acts of meaning-intention and acts of fulfillment.
For although fulfillment does not need to be demonstrated for every single
utterance, the meaningful use of language nonetheless depends upon suc-
cessful fulfillment in at least some cases. Otherwise, languagewould become
completely solipsistic and cease to function as ameans of signification at all.6
In other words, Husserl must explicate how meaning-fulfillment is possible
at all within the context of his theory. According to the first investigation,
meaning-intentions are fulfilled if the meaning of the two respective acts
coincides.7 This certainly seems plausible at first, but actually poses a cen-
tral problem for Husserl throughout the LU. For if the meaning-intention
of one act can only be fulfilled by means of another act whose expressed
meaning in turn requires fulfillment through a third act and so on, Husserl
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The question of methodology thus becomes central to Husserl’s project.
On what grounds can this process of fulfillment take place? What principle
allows phenomenology to perceive the self-identical origin of meaning it
claims to unveil? Husserl’s answer to these questions is ‘‘intuition.’’ His en-
tire philosophy rests on the philosopher’s ability to ‘‘see’’ the self-evident,
originally given truth. The Ideen, for example, specify intuition as the ‘‘prin-
ciple of principles’’ and the ‘‘legal source of knowledge’’ (Ideen I/1, § 24,
51), and the LU had already defined intuitive evidence as ‘‘nothing else but
the ‘experience’ of truth itself ’’ (Evidenz ist vielmehr nichts anderes als das
‘‘Erlebnis’’ der Wahrheit) (LU I, § 51, 193).8 Such evidence, in Husserl’s view,
grounds and enables phenomenology.
It is crucial to recognize the primary importance of the gaze in this con-
text. Husserl’s ideal of Schauen does not simply provide access to a field of
knowledge outside itself, but remains inextricably linked to it and contains
the very truth it reveals. Rather than accessing truth, Husserl’s gaze is truth
itself since his notion of evidence, understood as a certain, apodictic, and
adequate form of intuition, cannot even be conceived in separation from the
knowledge it engenders. In light of its self-evident nature, Husserl, particu-
larly after 1907, repeatedly insists that the ‘‘art’’ of looking cannot be further
explained or taught since it is simply absurd to try to provide proof for proof
itself: ‘‘The possibility of eidetic insights cannot be proven, butmust be intu-
ited. It is itself an eidetic insight. To ask for proof would already amount to
a contradiction, since the proof would have to presuppose what needs to be
proven and so ad infinitum’’ (Die Möglichkeit einerWesenserkenntnis kann
nicht erwiesen, sie kann nur eingesehen werden. Sie ist selbst eine Wesens-
erkenntnis. Nach einem Beweis fragen, das hieße schon, einen Widersinn
begehen, da der Beweis das zu Beweisende voraussetzen würde und so in in-
finitum) (Ideen I/2, ‘‘Beilage’’ 23, 572).9 In other words, eidetic vision in the
phenomenological sense is the proof we are looking for in order to ascer-
tain the objectivity of what we perceive. Husserl’s aspiration to focus on the
things themselves (Zu den Sachen) insists on there being no higher form of
truth than the intuitive evidence of how things present themselves in actual
experience.
In the context of the LU, this means that Husserl must turn toward the
realm of perception as the primordial act of fulfillment able to reveal and
thus guarantee the self-identity of meaning. If intuitive acts, contrary to sig-
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re-presenting it within consciousness, Husserl’s analysis is once again an-
chored and reestablished on the firm ground of objective knowledge. It fol-
lows that Husserl needs to address two crucial issues to support his theory of
self-identical meaning: first, he must provide further evidence for his claim
that intuitive acts actually do present the object itself rather than re-present
it within the mind. And second, he must distinguish carefully between inner
and outer perception since only the former provides intuitive evidence in
the strict sense of the term. Outer (empirical) perception, by contrast, pos-
sesses both a signifying and an intuitive component, both of which require
fulfillment, leading his analysis back to the infinite regress already discussed
above. For, as one critic notes, this regress could only be avoided if Husserl
were to ‘‘introduce an incarnate meaning, a meaning which cannot be sub-
tracted from the intuitive content which it informs’’ (Dreyfus 105). The LU
do indeed recognize such an ‘‘incarnate’’ meaning, yet they locate it exclu-
sively in acts of inner, as opposed to outer, perception: ‘‘But I cannot doubt
the adequate, purely immanent form of perception, since there remains no
trace of an intention that still seeks fulfillment . . . : in perception, the ob-
ject is not merely believed to exist, but it is itself and really given therein
exactly as that which it is believed to be’’ (An der adäquaten, rein imma-
nentenWahrnehmung kann ich andererseits nicht zweifeln, eben weil in ihr
kein Rest von Intention übrig ist, der erst nach Erfüllung langen müßte. . . . :
das Objekt ist in der Wahrnehmung nicht bloß als daseiend vermeint, son-
dern zugleich auch in ihr selbst und wirklich gegeben und genau als das, als
was es vermeint ist) (LU II/2: ‘‘Beilage’’ 770). Inner perception is adequate
because ‘‘its content is identical to its object’’ (ibid.), Husserl claims. The
intentional object is fully given in its entire ‘‘physicality’’: inner perception
both intends an object and fulfills this intention.10 By contrast, external per-
ception cannot fulfill the meaning-intentions of signitive acts because it is
in dire need of such fulfillment itself.
Husserl’s notion of Schauen or intuition must hence be understood not
only in terms of actual sensory perception, but rather in the much broader
and metaphorical sense of recognition (both anschauen and einsehen): to
intellectually perceive or realize the logical coherence and validity of a cer-
tain state of affairs. This crucial distinction between inner and outer per-
ception is continuously emphasized by today’s commentators, who cau-
tion their readers against the fatal equation of phenomenological experience
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however, are themselves nothing but symptomatic of Husserl’s own diffi-
culty to clearly distinguish his phenomenological ideal of Schauen from em-
pirical vision. For example, when Husserl argues in 1907 that ‘‘ ‘seeing’ does
not lend itself to demonstration or deduction’’ (Idee 38), his assertion seems
all the more convincing to readers precisely because it not only implicitly
refers to the—highly complex—phenomenological analysis of mental acts,
but also connotes the much more accessible realm of everyday visual ex-
periences. In spite of Husserl’s disavowal, the phenomenological gaze con-
tinues to exploit the abundance of ‘‘evidence’’ provided by both sensory and
reflective intuition. Therefore, his later concepts of ‘‘intuitive evidence’’ or
‘‘intellectual intuition’’ both suffer and profit from the kind of linguistic un-
certainty they allegedly rectify. Husserl’s argument, in other words, is built
upon and rhetorically exploits the very metaphorical quality of language it
claims to have left behind.
I shall argue throughout this essay that this ambiguity of ‘‘intuitive evi-
dence’’ and its dual citizenship to inner and outer perception constitutes
and structures Husserl’s phenomenology on several levels: First, on the ar-
gumentative level, it betrays the fundamental uncertainty as to phenome-
nology’s primary field of study, which, at various times, seems to be either
restricted to the realm of pure consciousness (particularly in the Ideen from
1913) or, quite the contrary, to the transcendental world and the ‘‘things
themselves,’’ or concerns the relationship between both realms. This un-
certainty accounts for the continual debates among secondary critics as to
whether Husserl was a Realist or an Idealist,12 whether the perceptual noema
discussed in the Ideen from 1913 is a concept or a percept,13 and whether
the transcendental reduction brackets only the factual existence of empirical
objects or includes the entire relationship between consciousness and such
objects.14
Second, Husserl’s gaze rhetorically oscillates between the two poles of
actual vision and mental introspection, combining the strength of both
while eschewing their individual weaknesses. Once intellectual intuition has
been declared as ‘‘original’’ and ‘‘physically given,’’ as the real perception
intimately known and continuously experienced byeverybody,Husserl’s de-
scription can safely ground adequate knowledge on the former and disre-
gard the latter. Critical questions as to the transcendental applicability of the
phenomenological analysis are implicitly referred to and answered by the
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cal concerns regarding the adequacy of ‘‘meaning-fulfillment’’ or the nature
of intentionality are dealt with by means of the secure method of mental
introspection.
Finally, the ambiguityof Husserl’s concept of intuition is symptomatic for
the irreducible difference inherent in language. Contrary to Husserl’s asser-
tion in both the LU and the Ideen, language does not merely reflect the pre-
expressive meaning of a self-identical logos. The phenomenological ideal of
an adequate description revealing the essence of all things (be they empirical
objects or mental acts) must seek to repress the fundamental difference that
constitutes language, an effort doomed to fail the very moment it is stated.
Husserl’s project is haunted by the return of the repressed, which strikes
back from inside the original presence phenomenology claims to occupy. In
Jacques Derrida’s words: ‘‘Even while repressing difference by assigning it to
the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl could not fail to recognize its work at
the origin of sense and presence’’ (Speech and Phenomena 82). For Derrida,
phenomenology is an exercise in exorcism that denounces linguistic differ-
ence in favor of the alleged immediacy of intuitive evidence. To paraphrase
Derrida, one might say that the absolute, objective ground upon which phe-
nomenology claims to stand is groundless, a search for no reason beyond
language.
Husserl’s ideal of a ‘‘speaking gaze’’ is thus constituted upon two ambigui-
ties: first, the conflation of inner and outer perception, and second, his para-
doxical understanding of language as both fundamentally different from,
yet adequately descriptive of, perception. On the one hand, linguistic signs
are said to be derivative and nonparticipatory in the exegesis of a primor-
dial meaning that precedes them. This meaning must, therefore, be intu-
ited rather than signified since intuition directly presents the object itself,
whereas language merely re-presents it. The sixth investigation dedicates
some length to the decisive gap that separates signitive and intuitive inten-
tions.15 And the Ideen, too, continue to insist on this ‘‘irreducible, essen-
tial difference’’ (unüberbrückbarer Wesensunterschied) (Ideen I/1, § 43, 90)
between self-giving perception and the signifying symbolism of words be-
cause this difference is absolutely crucial for the phenomenological descrip-
tion of ‘‘things as they are.’’ On the other hand, however, Husserl entrusts
language with the nondistortive translation or expression of a prelinguistic
meaning, which is provided by a pure phenomenological description that
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of a nondistortive language is explicitly stated throughout his writings of the
Göttingen period.16 It expresses Husserl’s belief that language, by its very na-
ture, does not add or subtract anything from the self-evident truth it seeks
to describe. Rather, it is the intellectual carelessness of those who speak and
have spoken in the past that causes language to undermine the scientific
effort to picture the things themselves.
Phenomenology is literally an attempt to come to terms with how things
truly are. This process, however, implicitly denies the fundamental differ-
ence that allegedly separates vision and language. Similar to the contrast
between inner and outer perception, Husserl first stipulates a major dis-
tinction between language and perception and then undermines his own
stipulation. The question remains as to how language could ever adequately
express a primordial, self-identical presence defined precisely as that which
escapes language. This can only be possible if this presence (i.e., meaning)
were always already inherent in language, and this ultimately means that
words define essences rather than express them. Husserl’s theory of language
is thus caught in a double bind. If linguistic signs are truly able to present
intuitive evidence, the latter would lose its privileged status of objective self-
presentation and succumb to the nonoriginary play of difference. Yet if they
are not, then the phenomenological ideal of the speaking gaze breaks down
and words cannot be said to provide a ‘‘pure,’’ nondistortive description of
intuitive insights.
It follows thatHusserl’s denunciation of linguistic re-presentation in favor
of intuition is purely rhetorical since both the assertion of intuition and the
denunciation of language necessarily refer back, and hence remain bound,
to the very discourse intuition is said to transcend. The phenomenological
enterprise begins and ends in discourse, an insight that simply eradicates
the very possibility of a self-given intuitive evidence of absolute presence.
Phenomenology does not stand on its own, but is constituted by the refer-
ential play of presence and absence inherent in language; this is the true and
only ‘‘object’’ it ever analyzes. For Adorno, the self-evident truths phenome-
nology claims to see are either tautological by nature, and thus unworthy
of critical analysis, or they are self-constructed ‘‘things’’ devoid of meaning
altogether: ‘‘Phenomenology might be described as the paradoxical attempt
of a theory without theory. That is why it becomes subject to the revenge:
all the things it declares to be self-sufficient are only for itself; what it claims
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perceives anything at all’’ (Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie 131). One
might specify Adorno’s claim by focusing on the central relationship be-
tween vision and language in Husserl’s texts. The various ‘‘species,’’ ‘‘ideas,’’
‘‘noemata,’’ and ‘‘intentional objects’’ Husserl claims to intuit intellectually
are but linguistic constructs inherent in and confined to the very text that
claims to reveal them as autonomous entities. They are born and die in dis-
course. Intellectual intuition does not actually present eidetic entities and
thus prove their ideal existence, but instead simply reveals the constitutive
mechanism of language and the differential play of presence and absence
that engenders meaning. There is no preexpressive meaning, no ahistorical
pure grammar of logic.
Adorno’s critique thus ultimately coincides with Derrida’s in rejecting
a purely logical understanding of language, which, in turn, could only be
sustained in conjunction with Husserl’s notion of self-evident intuition. In
Husserl’s view, vision and language stand and fall together since the iden-
tity of each is defined in collaboration with, yet also in opposition to, the
other. If, as argued above, his ideal of self-given and adequate ‘‘intuitive
evidence’’ is a rhetorical construct based on the phenomenologically inad-
missible fusion of sensory perception and mental introspection (i.e., inner
and outer perception), then the alleged juxtaposition between language and
vision breaks down and each will reveal a primordial hybridity at its core.
This problem is most apparent in the context of the ‘‘perceptual noema’’
Husserl discusses in his later phenomenology.
In the Ideen from 1913, Husserl introduces new ideas and a different ter-
minology in order to enable a more poignant description of intentionality
and the eidetic principle. Husserl now refers to intentional acts as ‘‘noeses’’
and calls the intentional correlate to such act (i.e., what was formerly called
the intentional object) the ‘‘noema.’’ Moreover, since real perception does
not adequately present its object, he needs to account for the process of rec-
ognition that enables us to perceive an object as what it is. Therefore, he
further distinguishes between the hyle that describes the content or raw ma-
terial taken up in a sensation, and the morphe as the interpretative sense
that bestows meaning upon this material and determines it.17 The morphe
informing the hyle is also called the noetic phase, and the two together de-
note the proper components of intentional experiences or ‘‘noeses.’’ This
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both the content and the interpretative sense of intentional acts in Husserl’s
earlier discussion of intentionality.18
Fortified with this new terminology, the Ideen directly state at the very
beginning what hitherto had remained the focus of contention: the ‘‘exis-
tence’’ of intellectual intuition and its ‘‘not merely external, but fundamen-
tal relation’’ to the ‘‘physical’’ originality of empirical vision (Ideen I/1, § 3,
14). ‘‘Thus essential insight is intuition, and if it is an insight in the precise
sense of the term and not merely a vague representation, it follows that it
provides a primordial intuition, grasping the essence in its ‘corporal’ self-
hood’’ (Wesenserschauung ist also Anschauung, und ist sie Erschauung im
prägnanten Sinn und nicht eine bloße und vielleicht vage Vergegenwärti-
gung, so ist sie originär gebende Anschauung, das Wesen in seiner ‘‘leib-
haften’’ Selbstheit erfassend) (Ideen I/1, § 1, 15). Byendowing an eidetic entity
with a ‘‘corporal reality, so to speak’’ (Ideen I/1, § 24, 51) that can literally
be ‘‘grasped’’ in an act of intuition, Husserl (deliberately or unwittingly) ex-
ploits a rhetoric that implicitly denies what it explicitly affirms: the ideal,
transcendental nature of pure species and essences that are fully evident only
in virtual acts of perception, yet are also said to essentially coincide with
actual visual experience.
Given Husserl’s equivocal understanding of the perceptual noema, it is
hardly surprising to find commentators strongly disagreeing on the subject
as well. Of the many differing views,19 two in particular are worth discussing
at length: Anton Gurwitsch’s understanding of the noema as a percept, that
is, a perspectival aspect of a real object outside of consciousness, and the
opposing view represented by members of the California school (Dagfinn
Føllesdal, Hubert Dreyfus, et al.), who regard the noema as a concept com-
pletely severed from transcendental materiality. The controversy is located
at the very heart of Husserl’s phenomenology, for it concerns the relation-
ship between ‘‘I’’ and the world, mind and reality.
Gurwitsch identifies the perceptual noema with the material object in its
particular mode of sensual appearance.20 It follows that the relationship be-
tween this material object (the thing itself ) and the single noema is compa-
rable to that of the entire group of possible noemata (the system as a whole)
and one single element of that system. In other words: the thing itself out-
side consciousness is nothing but the combination of all possible modes of
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tical to the thing itself, it nonetheless grants a partial ‘‘look’’ at it. Transcen-
dental reality, according to Gurwitsch’s reading of Husserl, is not severed
from consciousness because the noema provides a reliable bridge between
them. For Føllesdal and Dreyfus, on the other hand, the noema is an abstract
entity, a mental concept that, by definition, cannot be perceived through the
senses.21 Noemata are known exclusively through the mode of phenomeno-
logical reflection and not by means of actual sensory experience, which, in
their view, would violate the principle of transcendental reduction that sus-
tains Husserl’s analysis. Similar to the ideal meaning expressed in linguistic
utterances, the perceptual noema constitutes an abstract sense rather than
a concrete object or even an aspect thereof.
Since both sides present abundant textual evidence to support their views,
the following remarks are not intended to introduce yet more material in an
attempt to settle the dispute. In fact, I believe any such effort to be funda-
mentally misguided since it disregards the more crucial insight that critics’
opposing views are merely symptomatic of Husserl’s own indeterminacy
regarding this question. The conflict literally bespeaks the constitutive am-
biguity of the phenomenological gaze oscillating between inner and outer
perception. Gurwitsch’s reading clearly emphasizes the latter, whereas the
members of the California school focus on the former. Both must pay a price
fordissolving the ambiguity that pervadesHusserl’s entire project: as his crit-
ics show, Gurwitsch cannot but at times explicitly argue against the stated
meaning of Husserl’s text in order to assimilate phenomenology to the ideals
of later Gestalt theory. Given his understanding of the perceptual noema as
an incarnate sense, which he justifies by reference to the self-givenness of
objects in acts of perception, Gurwitsch violates Husserl’s central exhorta-
tion that sensory perception never provides adequate, that is, full intuitive
evidence of its object, meaning that acts of external perception still require a
separate act of fulfillment.22 Only inner perception (i.e., phenomenological
reflection) can lay claim to fully and ‘‘physically’’ seize its object during an
act in which intention and fulfillment coincide—an act, however, that also
leaves the material object in the real world completely out of the picture.
Føllesdal and Dreyfus, on the other hand, certainly remain truthful to
Husserl’s understanding of mental reflection, yet in doing so are forced to
abandon the idea that phenomenology could ever reach beyond the limits
of human consciousness, as Dreyfus readily admits. In his opinion, Husserl






































































intuition and language : 85
we take there to be rather than what is given. He can study the conditions of
the possibility of evidence, confirmation, etc., but never its actuality’’ (Drey-
fus 108). This restriction, however, causes problems on the opposite end of
Husserl’s argument since it not only contradicts his overall concern for pro-
viding an absolute foundation for objective knowledge, but also disregards
his claim that sensory perception does indeed provide immediate access to
external objects, albeit in a mode of adumbration. In identifying the noema
with a concept, the California school seems to reinstall the very picture-
(or sign-) theory of perception Husserl so vehemently rejected through-
out his career.23 Explicitly building on the analogy between linguistic and
perceptual acts espoused by Husserl himself,24 these critics tend to identify
noematic sense and linguistic meaning, and this slights the epistemological
difference separating signitive and intuitive acts.
Like his understanding of language, Husserl’s notion of the perceptual
noema thus remains highly ambiguous since there is ample evidence for
it being both a concept and a percept at once. Rejecting either option as
insufficient, Jeffrey Bell recently argued that the perceptual noema repre-
sents Husserl’s final attempt to solve the paradox of infinite regress and must
hence be regarded as ‘‘the neutral and non-productive ‘quasi-being’ which
is neither a proposition nor a thing’’ (Bell 85), yet it can be ‘‘understood’’
as both at once (Bell 78). Fully aware of the paradox himself, Bell identifies
the noema as the unidentifiable fault line that both separates the sense of
an act from, and connects it to, the real object intended by that sense: ‘‘As a
boundary, it is not to be identified, or posited, with either side, yet it is the
condition for differentiating and identifying each side’’ (Bell 86).
Bell’s understanding of the perceptual noema indeed ‘‘solves’’ the para-
dox simply by embracing it. Whether or not this solution represents what
Husserl himself intended is ultimately less interesting a question than the
new possibilities of understanding opened up by this interpretation. One
of them is to situate Husserl’s perceptual noema within the context of the
visual media at the time. The indexical nature of photography, for example,
actually registers the ‘‘corporal reality’’ of its object by means of a physical
process that imprints light upon a receptive surface, a surface,moreover, that
can be said to both reflect and shape the data it receives. As Roland Barthes
noted, the photograph is ‘‘somehow co-natural with its referent’’ (Barthes,
Camera Lucida 76) and thus provides an appropriate model or discursive
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ing gaze,’’ the photograph is ‘‘a message without a code’’ whose meaning
nonetheless hinges on a particular ‘‘art’’ of reading and writing. In Barthes’s
words, the ‘‘photographic paradox can . . . be seen as the co-existence of two
messages, the one without a code (the photographic analogue), the other
with a code (the ‘art,’ or the treatment, or the ‘writing,’ or the rhetoric, of
the photograph)’’ (Barthes, Image, Music, Text 19).
As I have argued throughout this essay, this very paradox of an ‘‘unful-
filled fulfillment’’ (Jeffrey Bell) sustainsHusserl’s phenomenological project,
meaning that the perceptual noema might best be conceptualized as the
pure potential to develop a photographic image of external reality within
the human mind. The phenomenological ‘‘art of looking’’ is to transform
the human mind into a camera able to take pictures of the world. While the
history of philosophy has painted life in various colors, Husserl sets out to
shoot it once and for all. Regarding material things as transparent signs for
themselves, phenomenology ultimately replaces one for the other. Similar to
photography, which preserves the illusion of an ideal presence irredeemably
lost, the language of phenomenology is the memento mori of philosophical
thought—which is to say that the eidetic essence of things might be nothing
but a word, a notion that leads directly to my discussion of Rilke’s poetry in
the fifth chapter. For now, let me turn to the other important philosophical
impulse around 1900.
Bergson’s Intuition of Life
In contrast to Husserl, Bergson categorically rejects language, and his
charge that discourse kills rather than presents life is crucial to his ‘‘philoso-
phy of life.’’ Although today almost forgotten, Bergson’s work was extremely
popular not only in France, but all over Europe during the first two decades
of the twentieth century. His two major books, Matter and Memory from
1899 and Creative Evolution from 1907, to a large extent shaped the popular
vitalist movement in both academic and public circles. It not only gave rise
to the organicist ideals of the surging nationalism in France, but also influ-
enced much of European modernism and the historical avant-garde.25 The
following remarks are bifocal in their attempt to provide a coherent intro-
duction into Bergson’s major concepts as well as an analysis regarding the







































































intuition and language : 87
aspects are inseparable, for what Bergson wants to say is inextricably linked
to how he says it. Advocating the ability of philosophical intuition to present
life ‘‘as it really is’’ without being able to do so himself in his own writing,
Bergson is forced to denounce the linguistic foundation on which his own
thought is built. Thus, his texts are sustained by an oscillatory process of
affirmation and disavowal similar to modernism’s reflections on poetry and
language in general.
‘‘[I]ntellectualized time is space’’ (Introduction to Metaphysics 31), asserts
Bergson. His entire philosophy might be understood as the effort to disen-
tangle these two concepts and to recognize the primordial importance of
time. In Bergson’s eyes, the utterdisregard for the real duration ofmovement
emerges as the central philosophical problem from which all others can be
deduced. Operating under the auspices of modern science, the human intel-
lect artificiallydissects a continuousmovement into a series of immobile sec-
tions so as to be able to measure, predict, and ultimately manipulate it. Real
movement survives only in the truncated form of a meaningless abstrac-
tion posited retroactively after its completion. It is only after movement has
ceased to be movement, that is, after it has come to an end, that its real tem-
poral duration can be translated into and equated with the physical space it
traversed. Knowledge thus attained is based on a partial acquaintance with
its subject of reference, while ‘‘real,’’ ‘‘pure’’ duration itself eludes science,
which contents itself with the ‘‘phantom of duration, not [with] duration
itself ’’ (Intro 31).
In order to illustrate this spatialization of time affected by science, Berg-
son repeatedly refers to theworking of the cinematic apparatus, which simi-
larly provides the impression of movement based on the continuous suc-
cession of immobile pictures. In his later work Creative Evolution, Bergson
contends that ‘‘[m]odern, like ancient, science, proceeds according to the
cinematographicalmethod’’ (CE 357). Science extracts all specificmovement
inherent within individual figures or things, thereby reducing them to mere
abstract forms or static ‘‘snapshots’’ of reality. In a second step, science en-
dows these lifeless forms with an abstract movement, a ‘‘movement in gen-
eral,’’ that no longer resides within the things themselves, but emanates from
a thought process that operates like the cinematic apparatus: ‘‘Such is the
contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge.
. . . We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are char-
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uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge,
in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself ’’
(CE 332).26
Bergson’s critique of modern science exemplified in the cinematic appa-
ratus coincides with Hofmannsthal’s rejection of the modern separation of
art and life, body and meaning. Both thinkers charge modernity with dis-
secting a primordial Whole into distinct units that subsequently are recon-
nected again as if nothing had happened. However, instead of regaining
access to the Whole as such, modern science merely recreates the artificial
impression of life, much like language succumbs to a mere tool of signifi-
cation once it has been severed from the breathing body that sustains it.
The incessant movement of life, in other words, cannot retroactively be imi-
tated either technologically or linguistically, but must be immediately ex-
perienced in and through a direct gesture of the body such as raising one’s
arm, which serves as one of Bergson’s favorite examples in his texts.
For Bergson, the invention of the cinematic apparatus was further proof
that modern science operates within a self-made phantom universe of ab-
stract space that does not correspond to the real. Contrary to the assump-
tions of contemporary physics, Bergson argued that time does not constitute
the fourth dimension of space, but, quite the opposite, that space is an illu-
sion based upon themisunderstanding of time. Bergson’s reversal rests upon
whatMatter and Memory calls the commonsense perception of the material
world that appears as an infinite number of images since ‘‘[m]atter, in our
view, is an aggregate of images’’ (MM 9). Images are inherent in the ob-
ject and hence exist independently of the human eye: ‘‘the object is, in itself,
pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image’’ (MM 10).
Matter reveals itself in perception as what it is, even though this revelation is
specific and not total because our vision does not significantly alter matter,
but isolates it from its surroundings and looks at it with a particular interest
in mind, that of action. Only those aspects of matter are perceived that are
of interest to our ability to act upon them; the rest is literally overlooked
and vanishes from sight. They are still ‘‘there,’’ but not for us, only for them-
selves. Perception is an instrument for human action, Bergson maintained,
and, hence, it is selective, subjective, and partial: ‘‘[B]etween this percep-
tion of matter and matter itself there is but a difference of degree and not of
kind, pure perception standing toward matter in the relation of the part to







































































intuition and language : 89
Bergson again sought to clarify his theory of perception with reference to
modern media, arguing that perception does not consist in taking a subjec-
tive photograph of things that subsequently is being developed in the brain.
Rather, ‘‘the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already
developed in the very heart of things and at all the points of space’’ (MM
38). In other words, to perceive an object is to acknowledge the autonomous
existence of an image that fully corresponds with the object itself. During the
act of perception, matter indeed persists in the form of phenomena rather
than material substances, a crucial distinction that underlines the strong
phenomenological dimension of Bergson’s philosophy. In Bergson’s eyes,
however, phenomenology as well as modern science distort the picture be-
cause both fail to distinguish between the pure virtuality of matter and its
diverse manifestations that result from interacting with it. There is no abso-
lute essence or Husserlian eidos inherent in matter except for its ability to
take on a variety of different shapes, as, for example, that of a picture or a
photograph during the moment of pure perception. Images are not extrin-
sic to matter, yet neither do they identify its essence. Matter has no proper
essence, but consists of nothing but the continuous movement of intercon-
nected particles.
Modern science, however, arbitrarily interrupts this movement and
falsely identifies the various manifestations of matter with matter itself. The
phantom truth derived through this spatialization of time also accounts for
the apparent congruency between matter and intellectual ideas in the natu-
ral sciences. Since science has literally shaped the object it investigates, the
latter naturally fits the categories provided by the mind, a circular relation-
ship reminiscent of Kant’s crucial insight in his Critique of Pure Reason.
Space, in Bergson’s view, is nothing but a useful construct invented by the
mind to better manipulate and control the external world. It functions as
a practical schematization of an otherwise chaotic and constantly chang-
ing universe of interconnected particles more or less expanded in time.28
Bergson’s analysis hence differs from the Kantian position in that he does
not regard space as a transcendental category innate to human perception.
Space is neither objectively given in nature nor constitutive of our ability to
reason, but an ingenious construct aiming ‘‘above all at making us masters
of matter’’ (Intro 38).
It follows that, according to Bergson, absolute or true knowledge is not
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of the human intellect in its normal mode of operation, but that does not
mean it could not be provided by what exceeds science, that is, an intuitive
method of inquiry called metaphysics that consciously resists the spatializa-
tion of time. ‘‘To philosophize means to reverse the normal direction of the
working of thought’’ (Intro 190). Metaphysics thus appears in Bergson as an
ally rather than an opponent of modern science. Its field of inquiry is the
human mind itself, giving rise to a form of self-investigation that, accord-
ing to Bergson, necessarily remains alien to the intellect since it is oriented
toward interacting with the material world outside. Intuitive metaphysics,
by contrast, provides a ‘‘direct vision of the mind by the mind’’ (Intro 42),
and thus, by extension, a ‘‘direct vision of its object’’ as well as ‘‘a vision
of life complete’’ (CE xxiii). True knowledge of the material world emerges
once we are able to recognize and correct the spatiotemporal distortions of
the intellect’s perception of reality. Intuition defines Bergson’s philosophical
method, as Gilles Deleuze argues, because it renounces the primacyof action
over contemplation and hence begins to see the Truth: ‘‘We must strive to
see in order to see, and no longer to see in order to act. Then the Absolute
is revealed very near us and, in a certain measure, in us’’ (CE 324). It is ‘‘in
us’’ because we, too, participate in the incessant movement that constitutes
the real.
In his later book Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson argued that literally
everything in the world results from what he called a ‘‘vital impetus’’ (élan
vital ), a primordial movement of gigantic force thrusting itself forward. The
release of its internal tension through movement has led to the extension of
matter and the formation of life. Due to the expenditure of its power dur-
ing the course of its expansion—for this ‘‘impetus is finite, and it has been
given once for all’’ (CE 277)—the impetus is threatened by inertia as the
natural result of the loss of energy it suffers. Those ‘‘parts’’29 of the original
movement that lose velocity and tend toward an extended state of solid im-
mobility—which, to be sure, will never be reached completely—is matter
in the form of inorganic objects. Contrary to matter and opposed to it as a
difference in kind, Bergson posits life. Life is the ‘‘part’’ of the impetus that
seeks to prolong the freedom of its expansive movement by continuously di-
viding itself, giving rise to plants and animal life as contingent effects of this
effort. It follows that, once properly looked at, all ‘‘[m]atter thus resolves
itself into numberless vibrations, all linked together in uninterrupted con-







































































intuition and language : 91
shivers through an immense body’’ (MM 208). Within this gigantic meta-
body called reality, our own body functions merely as ‘‘the place of passage
of the movements received and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link
between the things which act upon me and the things upon which I act—
the seat, in a word, of the sensori-motor phenomena’’ (MM 151f.). In Berg-
son’s universe, there is no space, only time; there are no solid, differentiated
bodies, only a continuous flowof vibrating energy; and there is no ‘‘formless
ego, indifferent and unchangeable,’’ because an ego ‘‘which does not change
does not endure’’ (CE 5, 6).30
Bergson’s intuition of the human body as a ‘‘hyphen’’ that receives and
passes on movement brings up the question of language in his philosophy.
If the body is neither a subject nor an object in the grammatical sense, but
a mere syntactical marker devoid of a proper meaning outside the flow of
things, one must ask what kind of languagewould be adequate in represent-
ing this body, particularly since Bergson’s entire philosophy obviously rests
upon this translation of intuition into language. Trying to explain what the
initial impulsion or vital impetus ‘‘really is’’ or originally must have looked
like, Bergson encounters various problems, for ‘‘the comparison of life to an
impetus . . . is only an image’’ (CE 280). In order to avoid the mispercep-
tions inherent in his central metaphor, Bergson enlists the service of a whole
army of metaphors that compare the élan vital, among others, to ‘‘a shell,
which suddenly bursts into fragments’’ (CE 109) or to ‘‘a center from which
worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display’’ (CE 271). Seeking to
present life ‘‘as it really is,’’ metaphysical intuition must not only work its
way back toward a disinterested vision of life not bent toward action, but it
is also forced to express this vision indirectly, that is, symbolically, with the
help of those artificial constructs called words.
Indeed, in Bergson’s universe, language, and not rationality as such,
emerges as the single, most dangerous enemy of a true philosophy of life.
For contrary to Bergson’s alleged ‘‘irrationalism’’ repeatedly denounced by
his critics, Bergson regards thought as absolutely crucial to philosophical
intuition and its vision of life.31 The real problem consists in the reification of
thought in and through language: ‘‘The most living thought becomes frigid
in the formula that expresses it. The word turns against the idea. The let-
ter kills the spirit’’ (CE 141).32 According to Bergson, words distort mean-
ing since they only describe the superficial look of things instead of their







































































92 : part i
movement and tendencies, whereas the words used to describe them, Berg-
son argued, are modeled after the intellect’s preference for spatial abstrac-
tion.
In spite of his urge to get ‘‘into closer contact with life’’ (Intro 126), Berg-
son fully realized that one cannot escape the distortions engendered by lan-
guage, which is bound up with ideas and the process of meaning.33 His texts,
it follows, are literally haunted from the inside by this evil spirit of language,
a demon he seeks to outwit metaphorically, yet which, in doing so, entangles
him deeper and deeper into the fabrics of discourse rather than providing
access to a reality allegedly located behind language. Bergson’s metaphors,
scarcely born, are orphaned by their creator, denounced as imprecise and
misleading appropriations for a movement that cannot be ‘‘shown’’ as it
really is. Consider the following image that likens the process of life first to
the mechanism of a steam engine and then to the movement of raising one’s
arm:
Let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there
in its sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a jet. . . . So,
from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly,
of which each, falling back, is a world. . . . But let us not carry too far this
comparison. It gives us but a feeble and even deceptive image of reality.
. . . Let us think rather of an action like that of raising the arm; then let us
suppose that the arm, left to itself, falls back, and yet that there subsists in
it, striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates it. In
this image of a creative action which unmakes itselfwe have already a more
exact representation of matter. In vital activity we see, then, that which
subsists of the direct movement in the inverted movement, a reality which
is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself. (CE 269f.)
The paradox expressed in the last sentence lingers at the heart of Bergson’s
intuition of reality. The élan vital is never fully present as such, or, to put it
differently: it presents itself only as that which it is not, because the ‘‘present’’
instantaneously falls prey to the passage of time. Presence slips into the past
as soon as it is realized, and it is gone the very moment it becomes present.
In the renunciatory tone typical for the period around 1900 and the philo-
sophical self-understanding of modernity, Bergson declares that ‘‘[n]othing
is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible







































































intuition and language : 93
unattainable and untenable, a mere point in time that serves a speculative
rather than practical purpose: ‘‘in truth, every perception is already mem-
ory. Practically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being the in-
visible progress of the past gnawing into the future’’ (MM 150). Paradoxi-
cally, then, it is the past that ‘‘is,’’ because it remains identical to itself and
survives precisely as what it is, whereas the present ‘‘is not’’ and cannot en-
dure but as that which it is not, the past.34
Similarly, the Whole is given exclusively in the form of its own self-
cancellation. The metabody of interconnected vibrations and movement
that sustains everything never ‘‘is’’ except within various arbitrary manifes-
tations of its infinite ‘‘states’’ with which it both coincides and from which
it nonetheless, in its pure state as virtuality, remains distinct. For the Whole
is its own virtuality that can only become actual by losing itself. As Deleuze
comments in his book on Bergson: ‘‘In short, the characteristic of virtu-
ality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated and
is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order
to be actualized’’ (Bergsonism 97). One might say that Bergson’s Whole is
everything and nothing at the same time, too full to be properly represented
and too lacking to become actual in and for itself. Since the virtuality of the
Whole cannot be expressed as such, it follows that intuition, too, ‘‘is fugitive
and incomplete’’ and cannot be sustained. If it could, Bergson asserted, the
‘‘object of philosophy would be reached.’’ However, since intuition, like life
itself, can never, by definition, be rendered permanent, the ‘‘philosopher is
obliged to abandon intuition, once he has received from it the impetus, and
to rely on himself to carry on the movement by pushing the concepts one
after another’’ (CE 260). In other words, the philosopher must surrender
himself to language in spite of its obvious insufficiency, because once he has
intuited the Whole, he can only try to speak after it in a desperate attempt
to represent the unrepresentable.
Bergson’s own analysis is thus forced to oscillate between the description
of the manifest pluralism of reality and the underlying unity perceived by
philosophical intuition alone. In his eyes, monism is the truth about plural-
ism, yet the latter needs to be fully developed before it enables any philo-
sophical investigation to intuit the first in its pure virtuality. This aporia is
symptomatic of a philosophy that claims to investigate the absolute, yet ulti-
mately fails to present it outside of the very same mode of linguistic repre-







































































94 : part i
established within this monistic reality (a reality consisting of the incessant
vibrations of interconnected ‘‘movement,’’ ‘‘images,’’ ‘‘matter,’’ ‘‘memory,’’
‘‘life,’’ ‘‘consciousness’’—name it what you will—for, ‘‘in reality,’’ they are all
the same) rather than looking at it from the outside as does the human intel-
lect, intuition reveals all distinctions between matter and memory, subject
and object, between differences in degree and differences in kind to be obso-
lete since literally everything is united within a single Whole as the absolute
of being and the real duration of time.
A fundamental criticism of Bergson’s philosophy of life is as self-evident
as it is, virtually, impossible. It consists in exposing the Whole allegedly re-
vealed by metaphysical intuition as precisely that which Bergson denounced
the most: a convenient linguistic symbol devoid of any substance whatso-
ever, an empty word that lacks the very life it claims to present. Bergson
himself, in turn, implicitly argued that such criticism pertains not to his idea
of the Whole as such, but merely to the intellectual perspective of life that,
naturally, refuses to accept that which cannot be posited as a fixed concept
towork with. As a philosophy, that is, an intellectual enterprise to positively
reflect or represent the virtuality of the Whole as a given ‘‘thing’’ in the real
world, Bergson must fail and knows he does. Yet, this failure, in Bergson’s
view, does not falsify his claims, but, on the contrary, functions as indirect
proof for the validity of his philosophy, which, like the Whole it seeks to
present, must contradict itself in order to remain true to its intuitive nature.
This is also the reason why Bergson explicitly rejected the attempt to
solve the problem of intuition dialectically since even a negative dialectics in
Adorno’s sense presupposes a fundamental disjunction rather than an essen-
tial connection between things.35 For Bergson, dissonance is not the truth
about harmony, as Adorno claims, but the reverse: harmony is the truth
about dissonance. In order to escape the aporias of philosophical thought,
Bergson turned his gaze toward what he perceives as empirical evidence for
his theory—physical action: ‘‘[I]n theory, there is a kind of absurdity in
trying to know otherwise than by intelligence; but if the risk be frankly ac-
cepted, action will perhaps cut the knot that reasoning has tied and will not
unloose’’ (CE 211). A simple movement in space, Bergson maintained, re-
veals the entire secret of life, and the simple experience of raising one’s arm
already contains all the wisdom and knowledge to which modern science
still aspires. The most potent kind of action, however, is that of artistic cre-







































































intuition and language : 95
naturally perceive’’ (Intro 135). A poem, for example, still harbors a trace of
the pure intuition to which it owes its existence, in spite of the fact that dur-
ing the process of its linguistic unfolding, the poem, too, suffers the same
kind of extension and alienation that distinguishes theWhole of life: ‘‘Thus,
a poetic sentiment, which bursts into distinct verses, lines and words, may
be said to have already contained this multiplicity of individuated elements,
and yet, in fact, it is the materiality of language that creates it. But through
the words, lines and verses runs the simple inspiration which is the whole
poem. So, among the dissociated individuals, one life goes on moving’’ (CE
282). As a consequence, Bergson is left with a kind of neo-Romantic belief
in art as the only true allusion to the real, since for him the intuitive wisdom
of art begins where philosophical and scientific knowledge ends.
This belief was radicalized inGermanAestheticist poetry, in which poetic
language appears not only to provide a direct access to life, but to sustain
life itself. Aestheticism identifies Bergson’s élan vital with the seamless flow
of poetic words that constitute a material world of its own. Trying to bridge
the objective and subjective perspective on reality, it simultaneously draws
from both the metaphysical and the positivist legacy of the nineteenth cen-
tury and thus represents a kind of fusion of phenomenological and life-
philosophical impulses at the turn of the century. On the one hand, Aes-
theticismdisavows Bergson’s radical denunciation of language, yet embraces
his metaphysical insights into the interconnectedness of life that cannot be
rationally understood, but must be intuited in and through the senses. On
the other hand, Aestheticism rejects Husserl’s logical-analytical method of
investigation, yet nonetheless draws fromHusserl’s phenomenological effort
to merge language and vision. Like Husserl, the poet seeks to find the right
word for the essence of things and the nature of language. A brief discussion
of Hofmannsthal’s early reflections on poetic language may help to elucidate
this dual legacy of Aestheticism.
The Magic Potentiality of Language
For the young Hofmannsthal, the term ‘‘magic’’ defines the inherent
power or potentiality of poetic words to transcend the limits of represen-
tation and to render present what ordinary language can merely signify.
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to force an artificial connection between them. Once left alone and freed
from the burden of signification, language is believed to miraculously per-
form on its own accord the very task to which it was forcefully subjected
beforehand. Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Gespräch über Gedichte’’ (1903) is exemplary
in this regard. It not only advocates the being of language as meaningful in
itself, but also insists on the redemptive power inherent in poetry. Gabriel,
one of the fictional protagonists in the dialogue, defines the symbol as the
‘‘magical power’’ of poetic words capable of ‘‘touching our body and trans-
forming us continuously’’ (UmdermagischenKraft willen, welche dieWorte
haben, unseren Leib zu rühren, und uns unaufhörlich zu verwandeln) (503).
The expression once again conjures a physical, indeed corporal, connec-
tion between language and body, meaning and flesh. Poetry does not sig-
nify a thing, but literally posits the thing itself, Gabriel argues, since poetry
‘‘sees every thing for the first time’’ and supplies it with ‘‘the miracle of its
Being’’ (‘‘Gespräch’’; Erzählungen; GW 503).36 The eucharistic context that
surrounds this evocation of symbolic language is as obvious as the nagging
doubt underlying it: asked about the ‘‘reality’’ of this ideal of symbolic sub-
stitution, Gabriel remains silent at first and then concedes that all depends
on the enchanting powerof the symbols themselves—a believer’s concession
to lack any positive proof whatsoever for his belief.37
Being uttered by one of the protagonists in a fictional context, this senti-
ment cannot simply be read as the author’s personal perspective. Nonethe-
less, Gabriel’s assertions in the ‘‘Gespräch’’ strikingly resemble similar asser-
tions made by Hofmannsthal himself, for whom poetic language is neither
representational nor exclusively self-referential by nature, but a ‘‘potenti-
ality’’ able to call forth the things themselves as what they always already
are. And yet, this potentiality cannot be redeemed without forfeiting its in-
herent power. This leads to a reverse formulation: successful poetry is im-
possible, a contradiction in terms. Successful poetry is doomed to fail, yet
it succeeds by means of its necessary failure. This can only make sense if we
recognize a dual function at work in poetry: language (i.e., poetic speech)
dies the very moment it is born, itself giving birth to the things it says by
means of words that have no meaning other than expressing their potential
to name. After this originary moment of poetic self-expression has passed,
both words and things alike are doomed to linger in a state of alienation
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herent in Hofmannsthal’s reflections on language: words present the things
they signify only because and if they refuse to signify at all, by remaining
pure symbols.
On the basis of this primordial interdependency of things and words,
Hofmannsthal both demands and rejects the fundamental distinction be-
tween art and life. He argues that both realms are inextricably intertwined,
but need to be separated from each other precisely in order to be once again
perceived as one.38 Poetic language must not be forced to create a bond be-
tween its own realm and theworld of phenomena sincewords are not simply
empty vessels charged with the mere transportation of referential mean-
ing—this being, rather, the ‘‘modern’’ (i.e., scientific, positivist, etc.) disfigu-
ration of language caused by the proliferation of quasi-mathematical con-
cepts throughout the nineteenth century.39 Rather, words are beings in their
own right and things are meaningful in themselves since being and meaning
are coextensive: ‘‘All that is, is, Being and Meaning are one, hence all beings
are symbols’’ (Alles was ist, ist, Sein und Bedeuten ist eins, folglich ist alles
Seiende Symbol) (‘‘Nachlass’’; RA III: 391).40
This understanding of the relationship between being and meaning is
not only striking, it is at the philosophical forefront of its time. If all things
really functioned as ‘‘symbols’’ (in Hofmannsthal’s sense) for one another or
for themselves, then there would be no need for symbols or language at all.
Meaning would already be inherent or inscribed within the things as such.
Being would be its own meaning, and that meaning would be the simple
fact that things are the way they are. All things would be revealed as signs
for themselves, and this, in fact, is a formulation that Edmund Husserl ad-
vanced in his Ideen from 1913: ‘‘The sensually appearing thing possessing the
sensuous qualities of Gestalt, color, smell, and taste, is anything but a sign
for something else; it is, rather, in a certain sense, a sign for itself ’’ (Das sinn-
lich erscheinende Ding, das die sinnlichen Gestalten, Farben, Geruchs- und
Geschmackseigenschaften hat, ist also nichts weniger als ein Zeichen für ein
anderes, sondern gewissermaßen Zeichen für sich selbst) (Ideen I/1, § 52,
113). The logical absurdity of this formulation poignantly captures the con-
stitutive paradox of Hofmannsthal’s early poetics: the nonidentical identity
of material things and linguistic signs. Obviously, a sign is, by definition,
different from what it signifies, and for a material object to function as a sign
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ment that it is claimed to present itself. Husserl’s formulation implies that
the phenomenological gaze is able to identify difference as the difference of
identity.
Hofmannsthal’s own reflections on life and poetry center on precisely this
paradox since the poetic word is said to present the transcendental thing as
both other and same simultaneously. His comments, therefore, at different
times concentrate on either side of an identity that really is not: ‘‘There is
no direct path leading from poetry to life, and none from life to poetry,’’
Hofmannsthal categorically declares in 1902 during a public lecture on life
and poetry’’ (Es führt von der Poesie kein direkter Weg ins Leben, aus dem
Leben keiner in die Poesie) (‘‘Poesie und Leben,’’ Reden und Aufsätze I: 16),
whereas four years later he argues the exact opposite: ‘‘There is no antithesis
between book and life, between poems and life’’ (Es gibt keine Antithese von
Buch und Leben, von Gedichten und Leben) (‘‘Dichter und Zeit’’;RA; GW I:
79), and two years before he had already noted: ‘‘Wrong all defining; wrong:
all cheap antitheses between ‘art’ and ‘life’ . . .’’ (Falsch das Definitive; falsch:
alle billigen Antithesen wie ‘Kunst’ und ‘Leben’ . . .) (‘‘Nachlaß’’;RA; GW III:
451). It is precisely becauseword and thing (poetry and life) are said to be in-
extricably linked, yet fundamentally different nonetheless, that Hofmanns-
thal can play off one side against the other. If there ‘‘leads no direct path
from life to poetry, from poetry into life,’’ this can only mean that any at-
tempt at mediation between them is fundamentally misguided. Poetry is life
since words enable all things to come forward and present themselves in the
purity of their proper name. Language can only matter once the meaning of
words is simultaneously identified with and separated from their referents.
As I have argued in the first chapter of this book, this nonidentical identity
of sign and referent is at the core of the modern project and its inauguration
of the speaking gaze. The goal is to decipher the inherent meaning and the
look of things without recourse to the rationalist mode of signification.
Hence, what Hofmannsthal—and Aestheticism in general—envisions as
the ‘‘potentiality’’ (Agamben) of language, Bergson discusses in terms of
the ‘‘virtuality’’ of an ever-changing ‘‘Whole.’’ Similar to the pure voice of
poetry, thisWhole must differentiate itself in order to pass into actuality and
become ‘‘real,’’ yet it paradoxically loses itself (i.e., its virtuality) precisely
in and through this process of self-realization. The exploration of this para-
dox characterizes both the poetic and philosophical reflections on language
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symbolic language as calling forth the things themselves sounds less fantastic
within a philosophical framework that rejects the idea of autonomous indi-
viduality in favor of an interrelated network of all things. If ‘‘we are nothing
different in the world’’ (dass wir und die Welt nichts Verschiedenes sind)
(‘‘Gespräch,’’ Erzählungen 503) such that ‘‘the universe is condensed within
our body’’ (In unserem Leib ist das All dumpf zusammengedrückt) (‘‘Ge-
spräch,’’ Erzählungen 504), then poetry emerges as the adequate medium to
express this underlying interconnectedness of life.
Indeed, Bergson’s intuition of the élan vital as an ‘‘immense body’’ (MM
208) and his metaphor of the individual as a ‘‘hyphen’’ or ‘‘connecting link’’
(MM 151f.) receiving and passing on movement within this body is crucial
to the intellectual debate of life around 1900. Moreover, it directly links to
Hofmannsthal’s own visions about poetry and the human body. In a public
lecture from 1906, Hofmannsthal likens the poet to a seismographic instru-
ment recording the intricate vibrations of the élan vital:
Er [der Dichter] ist der Ort, an dem die Kräfte der Zeit einander aus-
zugleichen verlangen. Er gleicht dem Seismographen, den jedes Beben,
und wäre es auf Tausende von Meilen, in Vibrationen versetzt. . . . Seine
dumpfen Stunden selbst, seine Depressionen, seine Verworrenheiten
sind unpersönliche Zustände, sie gleichen den Zuckungen des Seismo-
graphen, und ein Blick, der tief genug wäre, könnte in ihnen Geheim-
nisvolleres lesen als in seinen Gedichten. Seine Schmerzen sind innere
Konstellationen, Konfigurationen der Dinge in ihm, die er nicht die Kraft
hat zu entziffern. (‘‘Der Dichter und diese Zeit’’; RA; GW I: 72)
He [the poet] is the placewhere the forces of time demand to be equalized.
He resembles the seismograph whose vibrations register every tremor
even if thousands of miles away. . . . Even his darker hours, his depres-
sion, his confusion and unpersonal states resemble the twitches of the
seismograph, and a profound gaze could discover in them more secrets
than in his poems. His pains are inner constellations and configurations
of things within himself which he does not have the strength to decipher.
Once again, the poet is configured as the topographic locus of intersecting
forces emanating from everything that exists. His body is not except in act-
ing out the inner vibrations of the world at large, meaning that his actions
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is, the kind of gaze Bergson attributes to metaphysical intuition—as the im-
mediate and unalienated self-expression of life. The poet’s very existence is a
kind of language spoken by the things themselves in which he functions as a
mere punctuation sign—the hyphen—that literally embodies meaning. The
words of the poet express a message whose meaning cannot be understood
rationally, but must be experienced as a part of one’s own body. And yet,
Hofmannsthal’s ideal of an organic language in the corporal sense(s)—the
‘‘language of the real,’’ as Friedrich Kittler calls it with reference to Rilke’s
acoustic experiments with the gramophone (Gramophone 74f.)—is based on
a common metaphor that died the moment it was conceived, for it cannot
sustain the intuition it evokes. Acting out the vibrations of the élan vital,
the poet’s body has always already translated and hence distorted the funda-
mental truth of life it records. Like Bergson, Hofmannsthal’s comparison of
the poet to a seismograph mobilizes the scientific ideal of measurable accu-
racy only in order to reject and replace it with his own magical vision of
things. But his metaphor nonetheless remains indebted to the very process
of translation it seeks to overcome.
Trying to intuit life, the (scientific, philosophical, poetic) translation of
movement into signs is inevitable since the primordial ‘‘language of the real’’
is nothing but gibberish noise, as Kittler rightly insists. The real has no lan-
guage, no voice, no meaning because it is strictly opposed to the symbolic.
‘‘The real is the impossible,’’ says Lacan, and unlike the never ending trace
of signifiers, ‘‘the real is that which always comes back to the same place’’
(Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts 49). It only makes sense to speak of
an ‘‘embodied meaning’’ and to identify it with the real as the extreme and
indeed ineffable limit of signification if one concomitantly recognizes that
this notion itself is but a signified and projected ideal from within the sym-
bolic realm of language. Linguistic difference has always already affected
and distorted the language of the body Hofmannsthal envisions. But it shel-
ters it as well since only in and through language can the body be said
to speak at all. The simultaneous inevitability and impossibility of trans-
lation haunts Husserl’s phenomenology as well as Bergson’s philosophy of
life and Hofmannsthal’s reflections on poetic language alike. All of them
seek to reveal a primordial truth that cannot be revealed without getting lost
in the process. The contradictory nature of Bergson’s Whole, which loses
itself in the very moment it passes from virtuality into actuality, is simi-
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cial difference between Hofmannsthal and Bergson, however, consists in the
latter’s utter disregard for the performative power of language, which is ex-
plored and acknowledged in Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic and metaphysical re-
flections. Whereas Bergson turns away from language toward intuition, the
young Hofmannsthal turns from intuition toward language and hence em-
braces the paradox of merging meaning and materiality, art and life.
Still, the question remains what exactly distinguished the Aestheticist
gaze around 1900 from its theological, scientific, or philosophical precur-
sors throughout the modern era that similarly claimed to read God’s (or
Nature’s or the Logos’s) indecipherable writing within the human soul or in
the Book of Nature? As Jacques Derrida points out, however, all rational-
ist models of reading were firmly anchored in an absolute logos that alone
endowed them with meaning.41 The speaking gaze before 1900 presupposed
a tertium quid or a common ground (God, mathematics, grammar) that
allowed for the translation of vision into language in order to make sense
of the various signs encountered in the world. As I argued in this chapter,
the chiastic relationship between vision and language around 1900 literally
seeks to uproot this triangular scheme in an attempt to break through to the
immediacyof life. All eyes at the timewere focused on the things themselves,
and all theories were built upon the explicit rejection of theory altogether. If
nineteenth-century empiricism and psychophysics had still assumed a fun-
damental parallelism between the world of the mind and that of reality, the
constitutive paradox of the speaking gaze around 1900 consisted in presup-
posing an utter lack of presuppositions.
Unlike science or philosophyat the time, however,modernist poetrydoes
not advance verifiable truth claims about individual things or the world at
large. Rather, it sought to create a newworld in and as poetry whose purpose
for being is to prove nothing beyond the possibility of its own existence.
Solely based on the premise of its autopoietic originality, the speaking gaze
of Aestheticism is born of the poetic ideal of poverty rather than the posi-
tivist objective of plenitude. Another paradox ensued, for it is on the basis
of this self-sufficient gaze that the ultimate truth about life could be seen,
read, felt: namely that there is no higher truth, no absolute spirit, which, in
turn, liberates all things simply to be in and for themselves. Things are what
they are and exist in an autonomous mode of self-sufficiency, much like the
speaking gaze is its own cause and its own reason for being.What remains is
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life other than life itself. For the entireworld is present at each and every mo-
ment in all of its parts, and towrite a poemabout this insight is tomaterialize
all of its secrets at once. Modernist poetry thus replaces the representational
model of truth (i.e., truth as correspondence) with one founded on artistic
creation alone: ‘‘Prior to thought there must have been poetry’’ (Bevor ‘‘ge-
dacht’’ wird, muß schon ‘‘gedichtet’’ worden sein), Nietzsche had argued in
hisWill to Power.42 Aestheticism rehearses the paradox of a gaze that speaks
an original truth for which no criteria of truthfulness are adequate anymore.
The speaking gaze around 1900 reads a message without a code that cannot
and must not be rationally ‘‘understood’’ in the mind, but literally experi-
enced in and through the senses, because it emanates from no particular
source and is directed toward no particular addressee. The opacity of these
metaphorical exercises in (non)reading calls forth the poetic experience of
a meaningful world liberated from the burden of identifiable meaning.
What, then, is the role of the reader during this process, and howare these
poems to be read? Indeed, given the proclaimed self-sufficiency of Aestheti-
cist poetry and the speaking gaze that informs it, the process of reception
seems irrelevant and the reader utterly superfluous. And yet, all art implies
and addresses an audience since its whole purpose consists in conveying an
original message that must arrive somewhere for somebody lest it be irre-
trievably lost. In other words, it is precisely Aestheticism’s enigmatic nature
and its autopoietic stance that engenders the need for some form of valida-
tion from an outside agent. Although modernist poetry denounces this au-
thentication process as trivial, it cannot but simultaneously call upon readers
to acknowledge this triviality and hence concede their own superfluousness.
Both on the level of production and on the level of reception, Aestheticist
poetry is built upon this paradox of a contingent autonomy that simulta-
neously recognizes and disavows its dependency upon individual poets and
readers alike.
The following excursus examines Aestheticism’s inherent ambivalence
vis-à-vis the reader in the context of contemporary methods of reading.
Obviously, my remarks are not meant to provide a comprehensive overview,
let alone an in-depth analysis of the different models of interpretation I dis-
cuss. Rather, I want to situate my own readings within an important debate
that seems particularly pertinent with regard to Aestheticist poetry. More
precisely, I contrast the recent rise of a posthermeneutic criticism with tra-
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mostly on text-immanent readings of individual texts, the former exam-
ines modernism mainly with regard to the institutional and sociohistorical
processes said to control the production of meaning around 1900. One fo-
cuses on language as matter, the other on language as meaning, yet neither
method gives sufficient attention to the crucial interplay between both poles
at work in high literary modernism, for Aestheticism reverses the Romantic
perspective on poetic language. It continues the hermeneutic search for the
essence of things not on the level of the signified and the power of poetic
imagination, as Novalis and Schlegel had suggested, but on the level of the
material presence of the signifier visualized in the form of a poem. This re-
versal of the Romantic paradigm requires the reader of Aestheticist texts to
draw simultaneously from the hermeneutic and posthermeneutic approach
toward literature since both perspectives are already operative within the
poems themselves. The poem, in other words, opens up a material world of
its own, and the reader, much like the modern poet, scientist, or philoso-
pher, is charged with developing a kind of cross-eyed view of language as
both matter and meaning. In the eyes of this ideal reader, modernist poetry
not only signifies the embodiment of meaning, but literally is embodied
meaning, and this superimposition of words and/as things epitomizes the
scientific and philosophical ideal of a speaking gaze able to read the look of



























































































































































































































































































Those who lament the demise of criticism are fools. For its time has long




Literary criticism has finally bid ‘‘A Farewell to Interpretation.’’2 For
some critics, the dismissal of hermeneutics has been long overdue. Susan
Sontag spoke out ‘‘Against Interpretation’’ already in the sixties, arguing that
‘‘[i]n place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art’’ (‘‘Against Interpre-
tation’’ 104). Although today her visions might appear somewhat tainted by
the overall spirit at the time, Sontag rightly anticipated the demise of her-
meneutic methods of reading at the end of the twentieth century. In the
wake of French poststructuralism and the waning hope to ‘‘learn from his-
tory’’ by thinking and representing it ‘‘as a narrative’’ (In 1926 xi), Hans
Ulrich Gumbrecht recently recognized the rise of a ‘‘nonhermeneutics’’ that
dispenses with the confining paradigm of traditional interpretation. The
latter is charged with an inherently idealist agenda unable—or unwilling—
to pay attention to the ‘‘materialities of communication’’ that actually sus-
tain the signifying process. In his foreword to Friedrich Kittler’sAufschreibe-
systeme, David Wellbery similarly argues ‘‘that a literary criticism informed
by post-structuralism is, in fact, a post-hermeneutic criticism,’’ which, ‘‘to
put the matter briefly, stops making sense’’ (‘‘Foreword’’ ix). Of course one
is tempted to ask what exactly that is supposed to mean were it not for the
obvious fact that this very question itself is precisely what is being ques-
tioned and put on trial in Wellbery’s statement, namely the hermeneutic
effort to give meaning to that which resists it, be it a simple text or the world








































































To concede this much and to allow for the posthermeneutic questioning
of meaning is not, I hasten to add, to embrace irrationalism and the end
of communication, as some critics have argued. Sure, Wellbery’s statement
engages in a performative self-contradiction since his exhortation to stop
making sense cannot butmake sense nonetheless, and it thus implicitly relies
on the same mechanism of interpretative understanding it calls into ques-
tion. While such scholastic reasoning may be logically valid, it completely
misses the powerful rhetorical dimension of this posthermeneutic stance,
which is, after all, of crucial interest to literary critics. Wellbery’s efforts are
still directed toward the analysis of literary texts, yet he approaches the ques-
tion of meaning from its opposite end, so to speak. His criticism focuses
on those instances or elements generally overlooked as mere nonsense or,
quite simply, ‘‘noise.’’ Not only does noise pervade all systems of significa-
tion, Wellbery contends, but its existence must continuously be suppressed
by means of an interpretative method whose only goal remains over and
over again to ‘‘make sense.’’ Both of these factors—the irreducible existence
of nonsense and its continuous suppression—are, in Wellbery’s view, con-
stitutive for the production of (textual) meaning and the survival of herme-
neutics. Since traditional forms of interpretation cannot but presuppose the
very sense or meaning they purportedly find represented in language, her-
meneutics describes a tautological practice at best, a narcissistic projection
of its own methods and prejudices upon textual matters whose sole purpose
becomes to valorize the applied method as such.
Kittler’s work, for example his reading of E.T.A.Hoffmann’s ‘‘DerGoldne
Topf,’’ tries to unveil this self-reflective mechanism at work within Romantic
literary texts in which truth is said to reside in the interiority of the author
as subject, while its revelation, in turn, depends upon the ingenious ‘‘divi-
nation’’ of the reader-subject to ‘‘understand’’ what the text really means to
say.3 Literature thus functions as a kind of mirror reflecting back to the in-
terpreter his or her own self-ideal as a coherent, autonomous subject forever
relishing the uncontestable truth of its own being. The hermeneutic method
sanctions this specular relationship between mankind and language. It calls
upon readers to become authors to become readers again and again until,
finally, the spiraling effects of this universalizing process leave no space un-
affected by the endless proliferation of meaning. Posthermeneutics, by con-
trast, seeks to expose the sociohistorical roots of this seemingly ‘‘natural’’
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of books and other learning material, the institutionalized methods of ‘‘cor-
rect’’ reading and writing, the instrumentalization of the mother’s voice as
the disembodied origin of pure meaning, etc. As soon as the reader rec-
ognizes and critically investigates the contingent effects of these various
‘‘apparati’’ instead of relying on their efficiency to ‘‘make sense,’’ a whole
array of interrelated metaphysical notions both derived from and consti-
tutive of the hermeneutic enterprise—for example, ‘‘understanding,’’ ‘‘sub-
jectivity,’’ ‘‘interpretation,’’ etc.—are thrown into relief, breaking apart the
apparently boundless universe of linguistic meaning.
According toKittler, this is preciselywhat happened in the ‘‘discourse net-
work’’ of 1900. Literary modernism at the turn of the century discovers the
materiality of signification and thus leaves the hermeneutic universe and its
emphasis on sense-production behind. Instead of focusing on the meaning
potential of language, modernism zooms in on the obscurity of the signifier
and the breakdown of communication. Aestheticist authors, in other words,
literally write down and inscribe the death of Romanticism into their texts.
Although I generally agree with this line of criticism, it is too unbalanced
and generalized to be convincing overall. Posthermeneutics provides a tren-
chant critique of the history of modern signification, yet it fails to elucidate
the provenance of the material letter on which it is based. Instead, it tends
to promote a technological determinism that presupposes the givenness
of media (print, analog, digital), much like earlier hermeneutics presup-
posed the existence of meaning. In other words, posthermeneutics differs
from its predecessor in that the latter focused predominantly on the spiri-
tual quality of language, whereas the former focuses predominantly on its
material basis. From the perspective of literary criticism, posthermeneutics
seems least interesting where it succumbs to the simplicity of this reversal
and most productive where it resists it. In order to develop this argument
and to understand what precisely is at stake in the recent shift of emphasis
from sense to nonsense, from hermeneutic interpretation to the analysis of
‘‘meaning-production,’’ I want to examine in greater detail both the theo-
retical and methodological implications of this shift.
Since posthermeneutics evolved out of French poststructuralism, a good
place to start is the Derrida-Gadamer debate of the early eighties in which
the philosophical similarities and differences between German hermeneu-
tics and French deconstruction were already discussed at length. The most








































































ally taken place at all. The Derrida-Gadamer encounter, as it was evasively
phrased, certainly did not qualify as a dialogue as that term was understood
by Gadamer, who expressed his disappointment and even some irritation
with regard to the brief and, in his eyes,misguided questions posed to himby
Derrida.4 In light of this nondebate, some critics have charged Derrida with
willfully sabotaging Gadamer’s ‘‘goodwill’’ toward mutual understanding,
while others have denounced Gadamer’s condescending, even patriarchical,
attitude and blamed his ‘‘closet essentialism’’ for the failure of communica-
tion.5
In more general terms, Manfred Frank has repeatedly lamented the lack
of a ‘‘meaningful’’ exchange between the two schools. Contending that de-
construction is a mere variant of the hermeneutic enterprise that originated
with Schleiermacher’s philosophy, Frank relates both paradigms back to the
Romantic tradition of interpreting the interplay between an abstract linguis-
tic system and its subjective appropriation in individual speech acts. Lan-
guage thus emerges as ‘‘Das Individuelle Allgemeine,’’6 a reservoir of poten-
tial meaning (das Allgemeine) whose instantiation into actual speech or text
(das Individuelle) is tantamount to altering and affecting the very source
from which it emanates. According to Frank’s understanding of traditional
hermeneutics, it never presupposed the idealist notion of pure, self-identical
sense, because every form of linguistic utterance invariably expresses a sense
that previously remained—quite literally—unspeakable. Every text, Frank
argues, represents an innovative and individual performance in the form of
a linguistic event that remains irreducible to the abstract system underlying
it. Hermeneutics simply names the process by which the nascent meaning of
a text is being understood as that which literally ‘‘makes a difference.’’ Frank
thus recognizes Derrida’s insistence on ‘‘différance’’ as already ‘‘prefigured’’
in Schleiermacher’s Dialectics and even regards some of Lacan’s writings as
paradigmatic examples for the hermeneutic interpretation of texts.7
Gadamer’s and Frank’s dogged efforts to elicit further negotiations re-
garding the similarities and differences between hermeneutics and decon-
struction have remained unanswered or been dismissed by the other side as
mere ‘‘attempts at ameliorative appropriation’’ (Wellbery, ‘‘Foreword’’ ix).
Yet this refusal to enter into a hermeneutically charged dialogue is signifi-
cant in and of itself. First, it bespeaks a certain weariness on the part of lit-
erary critics to have to continuously discuss the theoretical foundations of
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important, however, this reluctance is also symptomatic of the intellectual
distance or safety zone that posthermeneutics needs to establish between
itself and its adversary for fear of contamination, since to engage hermeneu-
tic theory on its own ground (i.e., by means of a close reading of some of
its major proponents) would require a project similar to Frank’s that might
lead straight back to the interpretative paradigm posthermeneutics strictly
opposes. It is, therefore, hardly accidental that in those rare caseswhere post-
hermeneutic scholars provide more precise references to what exactly her-
meneutics ‘‘means,’’ they either situate it in highly abstract terms within the
larger context of the modern era since the Renaissance—the need for mod-
ern man to ‘‘interpret the world’’—or they refer specifically to the works of
Wilhelm Dilthey.8
Dilthey, however, represents an obvious and all too easy target: his cease-
less efforts to increase the scientific rigor of the humanities in general, his
emphasis of the methodological rules and regulations that structure the
process of interpretation along with the significance granted to the artistic
genius (the subject par excellence) as the original source of meaningful in-
terpretation, and, finally, his famous exhortation that the ‘‘last goal of the
hermeneutic method is to understand the author better than he understood
himself ’’9—all of this evokes idealist notions of subjectivity and indeed ‘‘pre-
supposes that ‘meanings’ are always given—in the interiority of the sub-
ject’s psyche,’’ as Gumbrecht concludes (‘‘Farewell to Interpretation’’ 396).
Gumbrecht’s criticism strikes to the core of Dilthey’s idealization of artistic
genius, which cannot be defended against the further objection, advanced
by Wellbery, that the notion of genius ‘‘merely reproduces, tautologically,
the discourse it seeks to interpret’’ (SpecularMoment 121–22).The ‘‘genius’’ is
indeed an ideal construction of poetic texts and not an anthropological fact
existing in the real world—whoever claims the latter must come to terms
with the transcendental problem of a self-originating subjectivity the genius
is said to represent. In other words, if the hermeneutic method indeed rests
on the original creativity of the ingenious reader, as Dilthey argues, then it
cannot avoid being entangled in the self-reflective snares of idealist philoso-
phy (i.e., Fichte’s notion of a self-positing ego) that contemporary theory
has successfully called into question. Dilthey’s version of hermeneutics thus
falls prey to the postmodern critique of metaphysics with which all her-
meneutics is said to coincide. Precisely this latter assumption, however, is








































































tion’s critique of subjectivity slays a dead horse since hermeneutics, too, is
built upon the ‘‘subject in crisis’’ and relies on a notion of ‘‘individuality’’
radically different from that of an idealist ‘‘subjectivity’’ ascribed to it by
advocates of poststructuralism.10
My point here is not to come to some final judgment in the philosophical
debate on subjectivity and meaning. Far from it, I want to argue that aside
from its specifics, one can read the peculiar deadlock of the entire discus-
sion itself as symptomatic not of the mere improbability of an encounter be-
tween hermeneutics and deconstruction, but of its structural impossibility.
Anyencounter requires a common ground upon which it can take place, and
as long as deconstruction remains unable or unwilling to advance toward a
new model of interpretation that accounts differently (meaningfully?—but
how?) for the nonsense or blind spots it recognizes in literary texts, it cannot
but avoid a hermeneutic dialogue in which the opponent enjoys a crucial
‘‘home advantage’’ to begin with. Let me briefly discuss the works of Jacques
Derrida and Paul de Man as the two major paradigms that have emerged as
a possible response to this dialogical impossibility.
De Man’s own reading of literary texts often begins and ends with the
startling confession that reading is, indeed, impossible, and this ‘‘impossi-
bility of reading,’’ de Man emphasizes, ‘‘should not be taken too lightly’’
(Allegories of Reading 245). This provocative statement does not declare the
whole process of reading superfluous, but aims to reject its traditional con-
cept, which holds the critic’s genius to be responsible for giving meaning
to a text. De Man reads texts to find an ‘‘essential disarticulation that was
already there’’ to begin with (Resistance to Theory 84) and that reflects a lin-
guistic necessity: any rhetorical figure posits its own deconstruction with it.
It is not a subject that deconstructs the text, but ‘‘the text deconstructs itself,
is self-deconstructive’’ (RT 118) since ‘‘the cognitive function [of literary lan-
guage] resides in the language and not in the subject’’ (‘‘Rhetoric of Blind-
ness’’ 137).11 Consequently, de Man denounces the critic’s greatest insights
regarding the meaning of texts as the unwittingly produced side effects of
their greatest blindness. In other words, ‘‘the paradigm for all texts consists
of a figure . . . and its deconstruction’’—a process that governs both thewrit-
ten text and its interpretation (AR 205). Hence, the important question for
a reader is not to ask whether the author remained obtuse about what he
meant to say, but ‘‘whether his language is blind or not to its own statement’’
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interpretation of literary texts never changes: everything takes place in lan-
guage. This process, for de Man, remains independent of human agency and
is controlled by the linguistic field and its chaotic openness: ‘‘[T]he inhuman
is: linguistic structures, the play of linguistic tensions, linguistic events that
occur, possibilities that are inherent in language—independently of any in-
tent or drive or any wish or any desire we might have’’ (RT 96).
It remains questionable whether de Man’s understanding of language
does not grant linguistic structures the same kind of self-reflexive subjec-
tivity he explicitly denied the human individual—‘‘the return of the re-
pressed,’’ as Frank insists (Was ist Neostrukturalismus? 128). Be that as it may,
what remains crucial in our context is the fact that deMan’s theoryof reading
by no means transcends the hermeneutic model of interpretation. This need
not diminish de Man’s formidable exercises in reading literary texts, but it
does problematize the sentiment that deconstruction has actually moved
beyond hermeneutics. De Man himself was rather unconcerned about the
popular charge that he practiced nothing but a particular form of ‘‘New
Criticism,’’12 whileWellbery and others explicitly reject de Man’s readings as
‘‘a negative theology of the literary work’’ (‘‘Foreword’’ viii) unable to found
a viable alternative to the traditional search for meaning in texts.13
Derrida, by contrast, has promised not only ‘‘the end of the book,’’ but
also ‘‘the beginning of a grammatology.’’ His Of Grammatology from 1967
invoked a new practice of writing that follows the trace of ‘‘différance’’ as
the constituent process that creates linguistic meaning. And yet, he also ad-
mits that any attempt to break out of the metaphysics of presence ‘‘is trapped
in a kind of circle’’ which ‘‘describes the form of the relation between the
history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics.
. . . We can pronounce not a single destructive proposition that has not al-
ready had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of
precisely what it seeks to contest’’ (Derrida, ‘‘Structure’’ 280–81). The circle
Derrida evokes with regard to the impossibility of stepping outside of meta-
physics is reminiscent of the ‘‘hermeneutic circle’’ that Heidegger embraced
in Being and Time. If Derrida’s grammatology thus signifies its own impos-
sibility and remains an unkept promise, as some critics argue, then his own
methods of reading are being reabsorbed into the same playful process of
absence and presence, meaning and nonmeaning that sustains interpreta-
tion proper.14 Hence, not only Frank and Gadamer consider Derrida ‘‘a her-








































































also regards Derrida’s work as ‘‘a deconstructionist version of hermeneu-
tics’’ that aims to suspend its traditional ideal of ultimate cogency ‘‘within a
multiplicity of perspectives that render them possible (and also shows them
to be merely possible)’’ (Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation 91–92, 100). It fol-
lows that deconstructivemeditation ‘‘increasingly resembles a performance’’
(Vattimo, Beyond 101), providing Derrida’s text with an Aestheticist appeal
that, in Vattimo’s eyes, takes precedence over its argumentative strand.
Made (in)famous by Habermas’s (non)reading of Derrida in The Philo-
sophical Discourse of Modernity, this reproach of blurring the generic dif-
ference between literature and philosophy is, of course, well known among
advocates and adversaries of deconstruction alike. At first glance, it betrays a
mere gesture of indignation that hardly advances any substantial criticism of
the issues at hand other than a certain ‘‘provincialism’’ of those who feel the
integrity of academic disciplines violated. But there is more at stake, for the
literary tendency of deconstruction once again bespeaks the lack of a viable
alternative to the hermeneutic principle it attacks yet continues to perpetu-
ate nonetheless. If deconstruction cannot provide a theoretical alternative
to the hermeneutic paradigm of reading and turns toward a peculiar kind of
Aestheticism instead, does it not run the risk of succumbing to the ‘‘pleasure
of the text’’ that founds the aesthetic enjoyment of the (hermeneutic) subject
par excellence—the reader? Does the deconstructive message in the form
of literature not implicitly rely upon and even call for the very methods of
interpretation it seeks to replace? From this perspective, the literary ‘‘turn’’
of deconstruction involves a potentially self-destructive turning toward the
very ‘‘origin’’ of meaning, which, and from which, it sought to split. De-
construction prompts the question whether there really remains no-thing
outside the ‘‘Fort-Da’’ game of language and the hermeneutic universe it
constitutes.
The Materiality of Language
It is precisely at this point that posthermeneutics takes its leave from the
deconstructive mode of reading by returning to Derrida’s unkept promise
of grammatology. ‘‘Writing’’ appears as the keyword in posthermeneutic
criticism, not only in the Derridian sense of ‘‘différance,’’ but particularly
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By focusing on the ‘‘exteriority of writing’’ (Wellbery), critics try to break
the spell of universal meaning. Their goal is to move beyond the confine-
ment of literary interpretation forever caught in the endless circle of pres-
ence and absence, signifier and signified, andmeaning and nonmeaning that
sustains both deconstruction and traditional hermeneutics. Breaking free—
but where to?—to the letter proper, that black mark on a white surface tra-
ditionally charged with obscuring the self-identical presence of the truth it
signifies. The letter emerges as the privileged site of reading since it makes a
difference simply by being there. Posthermeneutics encourages the reader’s
gaze to seize upon the letter not as a transparent sign, but as a material ob-
ject in its own right, with its own history and its own properties. Under the
auspices of this gaze, a different universe unfolds, one in which hermeneu-
tics is exposed as a historical construct based upon particular institutional
and social apparati, one in which the production of sense is recognized as
an anonymous and contingent process rather than the controlled result of
individual action, and one in which the (technological) media literally in-
scribe their message onto the human body, which is subject to, rather than
the subject of, the letter. As it focuses on this universe, posthermeneutics
literally begins to speak a different language. It operates from the outside
rather than the inside of signification and hence is able to recognize the non-
benevolent power of signs: ‘‘The object of study is not what is said or written
but the fact—the brute and often brutal fact—that it is said, that this and
not rather something else is inscribed’’ (Wellbery, ‘‘Foreword’’ xii).
Meaning, in the posthermeneutic sense, is the coerced effect of a violent
contortion of a (linguistic) universe bent out of shape so as to appear for-
ever meaningful by itself, ready to validate and tend to all subjects able to
read and write. Nonhermeneutic readers, like Kittler, who attempt to leave
this universe behind and look beyond, must, in Wellbery’s words, ‘‘suffer
through the difference that post-structuralism makes’’ (‘‘Foreword’’ viii).
Given the posthermeneutic emphasis on the letter, I am inclined to read this
statement literally: the suffering, it seems, bespeaks the level of difficulty and
the pain endured by any form of reading—and writing—that seeks to wrest
itself from the hermeneutic grip of circulatory meaning. Such pain distorts
the physical body of those bearing it as well as the textual body of those
recording it. Kittler’s own readings indeed exhibit the particular marks of
this suffering, evident, for example, in his unorthodox style of writing or the








































































ing that reading and writing around 1900 became a physiological study of
autonomous codes guided by the laws of psychophysics, yet severed from
the subject’s own (un)conscious, Kittler implicitly validates his argument by
performing it: his analysis cuts into pieces the structural coherence of the
literary examples to which he refers. Quoting unsystematically from various
texts at a time, he often reads passages with reference to the various tech-
nological and scientific inventions that allegedly shaped them, and not with
regard to their interior meaning—for his own thesis, of course, forbids that
they should have one to begin with. Rather than trying to understand them,
Kittler’s readings ‘‘spell out for the first time’’ the texts he engages (Dis-
course Networks 317). Kittler’s method perfectly ‘‘makes sense,’’ for if writing
around 1900 indeed mirrored the fragmentation of the senses and the me-
chanical mode of operation of human consciousness, it literally makes no
sense—now as well as then—to try to analyze these texts according to the
hermeneutic principle they deliberately undermine.
As I argued in the first chapter, I believe Kittler’s readings are partly based
upon the same exaggerated notion of a profound ‘‘language-crisis’’ around
1900 that also informs more traditional scholarship. Although arguing from
a decidedly hermeneutic perspective, GotthardWunberg, for example, simi-
larly regards the ‘‘incomprehensibility’’ of literary modernism as its most
characteristic trait, which he defines as the ‘‘impossibility to paraphrase the
text’’ such that it ‘‘leads to a meaningful, consistent result’’ (‘‘Unverständ-
lichkeit’’ 313f.). For Wunberg, as for Kittler, the increasing autonomy and
isolation of single aesthetic particles in literary modernism represents the
logical conclusion of sociohistorical developments.More precisely, it reflects
the triumphal success of scientific positivism and the concomitant rise of
the visual media: ‘‘Ever since there is film, it has become possible for litera-
ture to delegate its traditional task. Now it can explore its own modernity,
that is, the aesthetic autonomy of its signifiers’’ (‘‘Unverständlichkeit’’ 350).
Wunberg thus rephrases Kittler’s basic argument, yet their joined efforts also
give rise to some fundamental problems in literary criticism. Under the aus-
pices of this theoretically sanctioned thesis of overall incomprehensibility,
the often difficult and challenging poetic language around 1900 can legiti-
mately be relegated to the side as little more than ‘‘pure metaphors,’’ or
‘‘absolute ciphers,’’ or a musical ‘‘Gebilde’’ that defies coherent meaning—
especially since authors like George and Hofmannsthal explicitly endorsed
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The mere fact that hermeneutic and posthermeneutic criticism peace-
fully shake hands over the lack of sense allegedly encountered in literary
modernism should suffice to make any reader suspicious. Both sides operate
within a somewhat static framework of binary oppositions that juxtaposes
‘‘sense’’ and ‘‘nonsense’’ without examining in detail the ways in which the
interdependency of both actually shapes individual texts. Thus, the alleged
incomprehensibility of the discourse network around 1900 can be said to
reintroduce, on a metatheoretical level, the hermeneutic mirror theory of
literature it allegedly overcame. Instead of allowing the poetic subject to rec-
ognize its idealized self-image in the text it reads or writes, modern texts,
according to Kittler, reveal the emptiness of the entire concept of bourgeois
interiority and thus, once again, adequately reflect the (this time nonsensi-
cal) nature of the human self. Both times, the signifier has no story to tell
of its own. Literature simply functions as the indispensable mirror in order
to validate whatever notion of (hyper)reality and (non)subjectivity seems
culturally en vogue at the time: once, around 1800, literature operated from
inside the hermeneutic universe, while around 1900 it is used to observe and
record the demise of this mechanism from the outside.
To be sure, there is little doubt that Kittler’s work and posthermeneutic
studies in general rank among the most productive and innovative in re-
cent literary scholarship. Less obvious, however, is the methodological price
to pay for opening one’s eyes to the materiality of the letter. What episte-
mological terrain remains once the critic has abandoned the language game
and come to see the sociocultural mechanisms responsible for the fabrica-
tion of meaning? What guarantees or enables (in the double sense of ‘‘be-
gründen’’ as both to explain and to ground) the various ‘‘presuppositions’’
(exteriority, mediality, corporeality) Wellbery emphasizes in his discussion
of Kittler’s work? What is the significance of the posthermeneutic empha-
sis on external observation that replaces the imaginary inside of linguistic
meaning? And who—or what—is responsible for the pain posthermeneutic
texts both record and are made to bear?
These questions do not simply lead back into the twisted universe of tra-
ditional hermeneutics. Rather, they seek to locate both the posthermeneutic
position and those who claim to inhabit it within the realm of exterior ma-
teriality thus disclosed. If the media are said to shape the production of
meaning and give rise to those cultural phenomena known as literature,








































































first place. Obviously film, for example, was not simply ‘‘born’’ that day
in December 1895 during the Lumière showing at the Grand Café in Paris.
Media do not suddenly emerge out of the blue, as Kittler’s ownwork has con-
vincingly demonstrated, nor can a mere descriptive account of their internal
history—the various technological ‘‘inventions’’ succeeding and reinforcing
each other—suffice theoretically to provide an answer to the question of ori-
gin. On the contrary, the history of cinema points toward a dialectical pro-
cess of ‘‘overdetermined’’ sociopolitical changes caused, among others, by
modern industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century. This
process involves an interconnected array of macro- and microcosmic devel-
opments taking place within ‘‘the complex structured whole’’ of society, as
the French Marxist Louis Althusser described it.17
Kittler’s notion of ‘‘Aufschreibesysteme’’ seems to imply a similar struc-
ture at work on behalf of the letter, yet his own analysis remains ambiguously
suspended between a broad Marxist critique of social materiality in general
and the materiality of modern media in particular. Since Kittler emphasizes
the latter over the former, the scope of his analysis remains too limited to
support his major claim according to which ‘‘media determine our situa-
tion’’ and define the reality in which we live. What then is reality, one might
ask, and how exactly does it take shape? Are media really the primary or
even the only force at work here? Since Kittler does not explicitly engage
these questions, Wellbery addresses them for him. According to him, post-
hermeneutics rejects the common notion of ‘‘Ideologiekritik’’ since Marx’s
own definition of ideology as ‘‘false consciousness’’ presupposes its oppo-
site in the form of a ‘‘right’’ consciousness buried underneath and waiting
to be revealed. In a phenomenological gesture, posthermeneutics abandons
this notion of hidden truths and embraces the ‘‘surface materiality of the
texts themselves,’’ which ‘‘is the site of their historical efficacy’’ (Wellbery,
‘‘Foreword’’ xvii).
Letme note in passing thatWellbery’s critique of ‘‘Ideologiekritik’’ stands
as a red herring in the context of Marxist criticism, particularly in light of
Althusser’s radical redefinition of ideology as a necessary and irreducible
precondition for the sustenance of any human society, even a communist
one.18 Strongly influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis and its emphasis on
linguistic structures, Althusser, contrary to Marx, abandoned the hope of
ever completely stepping outside of ideology. This concession brings struc-
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prise than Wellbery seems ready to admit. Generally speaking, though,
Marxism remains far too concerned with objective reasoning and the deter-
mination of historical truths (i.e.,Marx’s ‘‘historicalmaterialism’’ or Althus-
ser’s continued emphasis, inherited from Engels and Lenin, on the ‘‘last
instance’’ analysis) to be of any assistance to a literary critique that set
out to question the validity of precisely these concepts. Although post-
hermeneutics seeks to fold the hermeneutic universe of signification back
upon the material basis that constitutes it, it nonetheless refuses to identify
with a traditional Marxist perspective, for the latter does not allow for his-
torical contingency or for giving methodological preference to surface ap-
pearances in the form of literary texts and the materiality of writing. Marx-
ism is an obvious, yet dangerous, ally for posthermeneutics and ultimately
needs to be avoided, and this accounts for the tension between traditional
leftist academic circles and Kittler’s media studies in Germany during the
last decade.19
This posthermeneutic effort to sever the materialities of communication
from their broader materialist framework remains problematic because it
avoids coming to terms with the question of origin or grounding both of
the letter and the entire mediated reality it evokes. Having forsaken both
the (hermeneutic and deconstructive) language game of (non)meaning as
well as the basic principles of Marxist dialectics, posthermeneutics needs to
rely on a genealogical account of history exemplified in the works of Michel
Foucault and New Historicism on the one hand and Niklas Luhmann’s sys-
tems theory on the other.20 Yet in doing so, it inherits their theoretical and
methodological baggage as well. Gumbrecht himself acknowledges a pre-
carious tendency in New Historicism to supplant the traditional paradigm
of ‘‘learning fromhistory’’ with that of discursively ‘‘making history’’ as text,
in which case the notion of autopoietic subjectivity threatens to be reintro-
duced under the guise of New Historicist authors expressing themselves in
and through the stories they write.21 Similarly, Foucault’s genealogical ap-
proach posits a contingent and discontinuous series of historical events and
epistemic changes that can be studied merely by means of the complex net-
work of interrelating discourses. He does not, however, determine the epis-
temological position of the ‘‘archaeologist of knowledge’’ who surveys this
historical field. Althusser, who faced the same problem of accounting for
the validity of his own insights into the all-comprehensive mechanism of








































































Marxist: he simply claimed to inhabit a space outside of the ideology he
scrutinized—a hardly convincing argument.22 Explicitly rejecting the scien-
tific objectivity allegedly commanded by Marxism as yet another discursive
effect, Foucault’s texts ultimately remain obscure with regard to their own
location within the discursive history they describe, as Frank argues.23 One
wonderswhere Foucault’s archaeologist comes fromandhowhe knowswhat
he knows. If it is neither the human subject nor language itself that produces
knowledge, who or what does?
Precisely this question is at the very basis of Luhmann’s cybernetic model
of systems theory. It operates under the paradoxical premise that the obser-
vation of the contingent effects that govern modern society as a whole re-
quires systems theory to posit itself as necessary and thus to occupy the very
privileged position Luhmann himself declares impossible.24 Modernity, for
Luhmann, is but the name for an amorphous locus or structure inhabited by
a variety of what he calls ‘‘autopoietic’’ subsystems, that is, self-reflective sys-
tems able to reproduce themselves independently from their environment.
Since the task of modern society as a whole is to enable pluralism and the
peaceful resolution of social conflict, it follows that the law of contingency
that enables this process to unfold must itself be posited as necessary. Any
efforts to break out of this paradox, Luhmann argues, are either doomed
to fail, that is, to lead to new and different dichotomies that merely extend
rather than overcome modernity, or, if they truly were successful, would
obliterate modernity as such without any possible clue to imagine what fol-
lows it since we cannot think that which exceeds the operational mode of
thought itself, namely difference. Hence, the paradox of necessary contin-
gency—the fact that one must start somewhere by means of an arbitrary
distinction that ‘‘cut[s] into the unmarked state of the world’’ (Art 42)—is
constitutive of our thought. This, in turn, liberates the critic from having
to account for the paradoxical position he occupies as long as his ‘‘analy-
sis reclaims for itself the characteristics of its object of study: modernity’’
(Beobachtungen der Moderne 12). In other words, since nobody can observe
himself observing things, it makes little sense to fret about an epistemo-
logical dilemma that cannot be avoided: ‘‘The unobservability of paradox,’’
Luhmann concludes, ‘‘legitimates the arbitrariness of beginning’’ (Art 42).
While Luhmann’s cybernetic model of modern society sounds theoreti-
cally convincing by virtue of acknowledging its fundamental paradox, it pro-
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alized, if intriguing, description of the social subsystem called ‘‘art.’’ In Art
as a Social System, Luhmann spends over 400 pages discussing ‘‘art’’ with-
out specific reference to—let alone an in-depth analysis of—an individual
work of art. Instead, he argues that art cannot possibly ‘‘make a difference’’
inmodern society since this would contradict his basic contention regarding
the closed and self-referential nature of all systems. According to Luhmann,
nobody is able to observe the totality of the world, not even by means of
the work of art: ‘‘Focusing one’s observation on the means of observation—
on artistic means (such as twelve-tone technique)—excludes a total view of
the world. No further reflection can get around that. . . . Transparency is
paid for with opacity . . .’’ (Art 61). Although Luhmann acknowledges that
the goal of art is to provide viable alternatives to the ‘‘way things are’’ and
thus to ‘‘expose reality’’ in some way, he also insists that the means and in-
spiration for these aesthetic counter-paradigms are created within the sys-
tem itself rather than provided by the real environment surrounding it. Like
any autopoietic subsystem, art cannot, by definition, provide an adequate
space for the intersection of conflicting perspectives on modern society at
large since it remains obtuse to what exactly these perspectives are. Art can
certainly imagine how other systems understand themselves, yet there is no
hopewhatsoever that such an aesthetic interpretation will ever fully coincide
with the actual self-understanding of those systems to whom it refers. All
works of art necessarily envision the other in ways prescribed by their own
identity as art. Even if it claims to speak for and with the other, art only refers
to itself, and aesthetic difference is just more of the same.
According to Luhmann, the unfolding of this paradox is what distin-
guishes art from other ‘‘things’’ in the world. Luhmann himself, however,
is not interested in following the particular ‘‘ins’’ and ‘‘outs’’ of this process
with reference to individual works of art. Rather, he provides an outside per-
spective of this operation as such, which is precisely what art itself cannot
afford to do: ‘‘Whatever can be observed in art is thus the unfolding of a
paradox that, for its part, escapes observation. . . . The only option is to ob-
serve forms instead of the unobservable, while knowing that this happens
by unfolding a paradox’’ (Art 42). It follows that Luhmann is ‘‘not offer-
ing a helpful theory of art,’’ as he himself concedes, but instead presents ‘‘a
theoretical endeavor intended to clarify the context and contingency of art
from a sociotheoretical perspective’’ (Art 3). No doubt, Luhmann is as clear-








































































discuss art from the outside without being seduced by its charm, its beauty,
or its paradoxical nature. Luhmann has nothing specific to say about any
work in particular because, in his eyes, they are all more or less alike.
My point is that one need not disagree with Luhmann’s overall theory
regarding modern society to express some dissatisfaction and even disap-
pointment about the insights it yields into the world of art. His comments
are meant to elucidate the overarching idea of his systems theory rather than
individual artworks. Although his critique of the institution of art is very in-
formed, it remains too generic overall and hence ultimately serves to silence
rather than enliven aesthetic objects. In order to resist this tendency, this
study will give more credence to the Aestheticist perspective, according to
which art is more than merely one system among many. Ideally speaking,
one might say that the survival of art paradoxically hinges on its complete
self-annihilation. There literally is no art except as other, for art is the other.
The goal of art is to create an epistemological rupture that enables differ-
ence as such to emerge. Art is believed to be able to reflect and transform
society at large precisely because it only exists in the form of its own nega-
tion. It cannot but keep alive the dream of a world ‘‘in which things would
be different,’’ as Adorno claimed, that is, a world in which things would be
as they truly are by being different from what they have been made to be.
One may certainly disqualify this vision of art as an illusory construct
contrived by artists and intellectuals who try to ensure the survival of their
own subsystem, as Luhmann’s theory implies. Yet the paradoxical ‘‘double
character of art as both fait social and autonomous’’ (Adorno), that is, its
ability to provide a space in which social contingency and difference are re-
vealed as such, oddly mirrors that of system theory itself—which is to say
that by disqualifying the self-understanding of autonomous art, Luhmann
simultaneously jeopardizes the self-understanding of his own system theory
since both are seen (or see themselves) as second-order observers, survey-
ing the sociohistorical mechanisms that regulate modern society. Luhmann,
of course, cannot admit this similarity and therefore charges the ideal of
aesthetic autonomy pronounced by the l’art pour l’art movement with a
fundamental misunderstanding of autopoiesis, a reproach worth quoting at
length: ‘‘ ‘L’art pour l’art’ wants to thematize the essence of the system within
the system itself and hence misses the crucial fact that autonomy does not
abort the connections to the outside, but indeed presupposes them. It would
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as the negation of dependency. Luckily, this program fails—for obvious rea-
sons’’ (‘‘Kunstwerk’’ 626; my translation).
Although he sounds as if he wanted to reprimand art for challenging the
founding principles of his theory, Luhmann nonetheless formulates a cru-
cial insight regarding the primary goal of art around 1900, which many of
its critics have failed to notice. For the aesthetic autonomy of art was indeed
supposed to end the autopoiesis of art by consciously subscribing to it. Aes-
theticism regards the autonomy of art as the paradoxical prerequisite for its
transcendence into life and not, as is generally claimed, as an end in and for
itself. However, instead of discrediting this vision, as Luhmann aims to do,
his expressed relief about the historical failure of Aestheticism testifies to the
very possibility of its success. In fact, I want to argue that art and aesthetic
self-reflexivity can reasonably lay claim to the same epistemological clarity
as does systems theory itself.
What does all of this mean for the discussion of posthermeneutic literary
criticism? The previous analysis was intended to show: first, that the schol-
arly emphasis on the materiality of the letter opens up new dimensions for
the reading of literary texts, while at the same time remaining trapped in
the epistemological aporias of the poststructuralist perspective from which
it emerged; and second, that Luhmann’s recognition of contingency as a
constitutive force of modern society does not categorically disqualify the
revolutionary potential of art to thematize and disrupt the necessity of con-
tingency. Quite the contrary, art might be understood as that paradoxical
element of necessity that enables contingency to actually take place and be-
come recognizable. Art is different and figures as the irreducible ‘‘supple-
ment’’ within the postmodern thinking of difference itself. It literally em-
bodies the difference it signifies. Wellbery himself acknowledges this ideal
of self-cancellation at work in modern art: ‘‘Art is the subdomain of semio-
sis in which the random element intrinsic to all signification is elevated to
a constitutive principle. . . . In art, I want to say, semiosis exposes itself to
randomness, at once gives itself and withdraws itself within the singularity
of its occurrence’’ (‘‘Exteriority of Writing’’ 22). One can easily agree with
Wellbery’s statement without, however, subscribing to the entire agenda of
posthermeneutics. Rather, Wellbery’s own formulations bring to mind the
hermeneutic wanderings of the later Heidegger and his notion of aletheia.
Wellbery’s comments are thus primarily directed against the Romantic ideal








































































It cannot be otherwise, for if posthermeneutics were truly to abandon the
language game that sustains hermeneutics and deconstruction alike, there
literally would be no space left for an analysis of the signifying process, and
posthermeneutics would be forced to advocate and reinscribe the reign of
absolute ‘‘nonsense’’ instead of analyzing themeans ofmeaning-production.
Literary criticism ends in a cul-de-sac if it aligns itself too closely with
media studies. The latter celebrate the arrival of the technological media as
the irrevocable death sentence of art in general, and often ‘‘hail the con-
quering engineer’’25 as the replacement of the traditional artist. These days,
Kittler himself is interested primarily in the social effects of digitalization
and computer software and not in art—a distinction he, of course, would
reject as immaterial and ideological, but one that I believe to be crucial.
It follows that the methodological problems I have tried to point out are
somewhat peripheral to his work, yet they are relevant for art and poetry
around 1900. While that need not bother him or media studies in general,
it should bother literary critics and those still interested in some kind of
interpretative reading. By the same token, Foucault, New Historicism, and
Luhmann can only offer limited insights into the single work of art because
they do not share its basic premise of aesthetic autonomy. This indifference
toward aesthetic difference also explains why Kittler readily adopts the over-
all incomprehensibility theory with regard to high literary modernism. If
the work of art does not call forth a world of its own, but merely reflects the
operative mechanism of media technology, it loses its privileged status and
ultimately falls silent since it has nothing left to say.
I realize that posthermeneutic critics welcome this silence as a long-
overdue repose from the idle chatter of hermeneutic sense-production, and
although I valuemuch of their basic critique, I fail to see howposthermeneu-
tics can possibly lead literary analysis back toward the materiality of the
letter as if that were the absolute and incontestable ground upon which its
own analysis could positively take place. I want to argue the exact opposite,
namely that posthermeneutic criticism, paradoxically, ‘‘misunderstands’’
both its history and its own trajectory by failing to distinguish between the
various models of hermeneutic reading available today. To the degree that
posthermeneutics in fact does examine the contingent effects of the pri-
mordial encounter between meaning and its other within the text—an en-
counter that constitutes and takes place within language—these readings
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a Heideggerian sense. If the material ground for literary analysis cannot be
identified or presupposed as something given without foreclosing the fun-
damental questions it seeks to answer, the appropriate critical practice is one
that reflects its own unfoundedness. Wellbery himself concludes as follows:
‘‘The methodological consequence of my claim, then, would seem to be that
the science of art, if you will, would develop its discourse as a reading of
the unreadable, a reading that adheres to the moment of accidentality and
non-sense that marks the work in its singularity and in the singularity of
its history. But it is unclear whether such a reading could codify itself as a
method, as a protocol, without obliterating the very thing it seeks to account
for’’ (‘‘Exteriority’’ 23).
‘‘A reading of the unreadable’’—is this not exactly what (a deconstructive,
non- or post-) hermeneutics is all about, a nonmethodical method aimed
at honoring aesthetic difference by means of a Heideggerian ‘‘Andenken’’
that tries to remember the different as different? Does, therefore, this liter-
ary practice not lead back to a particular tradition of hermeneutic reading
exemplified in the later Heidegger’s reflections on language and the work of
art? I mean this not in the sense of rediscovering a primordial origin or pre-
senting the common ground from which emerged both Gadamer’s dialecto-
dialogical method and Derrida’s sense of ‘‘écriture,’’ but in the sense of going
back to a corpus of texts that problematize this notion of grounding itself.
The task would be to try to unveil the difference within the identificatory
power of language and the poetic notion of truth it enables.
Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein and its relationship to Being can
also be helpful with regard to the methodological concerns raised by post-
hermeneutic criticism. According to Heidegger, Daseinmust not be under-
stood in the enlightened sense as an independent subject facing a world of
objects, but needs to be determined in relation to Being as such, of which
Dasein partakes.Dasein is turned toward Being and corresponds to it: ‘‘Man
actually is the relation of this equivalence, and he is only that’’ (Der Mensch
ist eigentlich dieser Bezug der Entsprechung, und er ist nur dies) (Identität
und Differenz 22). The circulatory reasoning involved in the discernment of
both Being and Dasein is deliberate: Dasein is its relationship to Being, a
relationship that nonetheless already presupposes Dasein as one of its con-
stitutive poles.26 Dasein can only be itself by entering into a fundamental
relationship with Being as the unconcealment of every-thing in the world:








































































and only he, is the form of being to whom Being reveals itself ’’ (Das Offene
birgt als es selbst die Wesensstätte des Menschen, wenn anders der Mensch,
und nur er, dasjenige Seiende ist, dem das Sein sich lichtet) (Gesamtausgabe
54: 224). This logical circle involves a temporal paradox as well since Dasein
alone may recognize Being as such and create the opening within which it
will enable Dasein to become itself. Dasein thus emerges both as the cause
and the effect of the primordial event of Being. It is called upon to properly
open up the world into which it finds itself always already thrown.
Let me emphasize that one need not endorse Heidegger’s entire philo-
sophical project to appreciate its methodological insights for the study of
literary texts. If one replaces ‘‘Dasein’’ with ‘‘the critic’’ and ‘‘Being’’ with
‘‘the text’’ in the quotes above, one can read Heidegger’s comments as the
outlines of an approach toward literary texts based upon the insight that text
and critic are turned to and influence each other. In this sense, the scholar
is not radically severed from his object of study, as Althusser and modern
science contend, nor does he emerge as a mere effect of discursive epistemes
(Foucault) or media systems (Kittler). Rather, the critic’s gaze is retrospec-
tively enabled by the world he engenders in his own critique. This is not a
matter of simple dialectics between a subject and its own personal version of
history, as criticized in Gumbrecht’s reassessment of New Historicism. In-
stead, it demands a recognition of our passive inheritance of a history that
nonetheless requires its active reconstruction in order to become realized:
‘‘[H]ermeneutics,’’ Vattimo recently argued, ‘‘is legitimated as a narrative of
modernity, that is, of its own provenance,’’ and ‘‘it argues for its own validity
by proposing a reconstruction of the destiny-tradition from which it arises’’
(Beyond Interpretation 12, 108). That reconstruction, or what Vattimo else-
where calls the ‘‘hermeneutical return in infinitum,’’27 is absolutely necessary
and cannot be circumvented. Yet it should not be mythologized either, as
Heidegger often does. Rather, it must be performed self-critically and in full
awareness of its inevitability.
In order to justify one’s own reading of a text, one must provide an in-
terpretation that accounts not only for its latent meaning, but also for the
active reshaping of a hermeneutic world that enables both text and critic to
relate to each other in the first place. This world need not be Heidegger’s
mythical reconstruction of ancient Greece—it might as well be Kittler’s dis-
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simply be based upon some positive ground, such as the materiality of a
letter whose provenance remains obscurely relegated to the domain of the
governing media, presupposed as simply being there. Otherwise, the one
‘‘sense’’ that remains in posthermeneutics—the sense of getting it right by
observing the mechanisms of meaning-production from the outside—must
get it wrong if it refuses to account theoretically for the very ‘‘outside’’ it
claims to inhabit. This, it seems, posthermeneutics cannot do since it would
lead straight back to the very inside from which it allegedly took leave. I
wonder if this tendency of language to give and lose itself in the web of its
own being is not the actual cause for the physical pain posthermeneutics
both suffers and records? Indeed, this pain has no proper place since it does
not emanate froma self-identical origin that could be namedwithout further
proliferating and prolonging the agony it hopes to end. Posthermeneutics,
too, must ‘‘suffer through’’ the difference language makes because its ges-
ture of revealing the hidden grounds of writing and sense-production still
remains caught therein. The materialistic critique of language is being re-
appropriated by the very mechanism it criticizes because the signifier cannot
be set free to tell its story without being lost in the story it tells. Not only is
this aporia always at stake during the process of reading and writing, but it
also leads right to the core of the Aestheticist paradigm.
Modernist poetry around 1900 remains highly conscious of this predica-
ment. In response, it tries to operate simultaneously from inside and outside
the hermeneutic universe. Aestheticism linguistically deconstructs its own
epistemological base, that is, the Romantic paradigm from which it emerges
and upon which it depends for its own survival. This ambivalence gives rise
to a high level of complexity in modernist poetry, which recognizes that
there is no outside of language that has not always already been infiltrated by
its mechanism of internal differentiation. In terms of contemporary media
or systems theory, one might say that Aestheticism recognizes the ubiquity
of the linguistic code that permeates and sustains society at large, at which
point it sees the entire metaphysical history of binary oppositions breaking
down. There remains no difference between art and life because the linguis-
tic code constitutes both, and concepts such as identity and difference, inside
and outside, subject and object, are nothing but the self-expression of the
code underlying them.








































































tive ambivalence of modernist poetry. If poetry around 1900 seeks to voice
the ineffable and professes the death of the author, that demise should give
rise, in the words of Roland Barthes, to ‘‘the birth of the reader’’ (‘‘Death’’;
Image, Music, Text 148). Therefore, this study repeats the constitutive move-
ment of the texts themselves in the process of reading them, which is why I
operate from the inside out rather than, in a posthermeneutic manner, situ-
ating myself firmly outside of and in opposition to the text from the very
beginning. Nor, however, do I presume to find an authorial and prior mean-
ing in the text waiting to be restored, for either practice cannot but miss
the intriguing self-performativity of language that is characteristic of Aes-
theticist poetry. What remains is for readers to follow the letter of the text,
simultaneously looking forward toward the hermeneutic horizon and back-
ward upon the trail of signification left behind. Unlike the gory locomotive
at the Gare Montparnasse, readers cannot simply break through the interior
realm of aesthetics onto the other side lest they are ready to accept the same
disastrous consequences that distinguished the accident in Paris. Indeed, the
surface of the literary text can be likened to thewindowat the train station: it
allows us a glimpse of the other world that surrounds and sustains the inside.
As the borderline that connects and separates two heterogeneous realms,
the window of the text must be approached with caution rather than at high
velocity. Even the posthermeneutic reference to the brutality of fact and the
material aspects of communication does not liberate the critic from the grips
of hermeneutics, but merely recognizes the constraints under which it—
and all of us—are forced to operate. Otherwise, literary criticism is forced
to destroy what it seeks to elucidate, namely the intricate play of materi-
ality and meaning, sound and sense at work in literary texts. The ensuing
ambivalence of a critique suspended between the material plane of isolated
signifiers and the transcendental vision of their signified meaning not only
is inevitable, but constitutes the very essence of literary criticism: ‘‘Like all
authentic quests, the quest of criticism consists not in discovering its object
but in assuring the conditions of its inaccessibility’’ (Stanzas xvi), the Ital-
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Adorno and Heidegger
My readings of works by Hofmannsthal, Rilke, and George presented in
the second part of this study draw not only from Heidegger’s philosophy,
but also from another major reader of high literary modernism,TheodorW.
Adorno. My choice of these two thinkers is determined by various factors,
the most obvious being their shared emphasis and incisive commentaries
on both phenomenology and life philosophy on the one hand and the three
poets on the other. Their particular modes of reading, however, differ dis-
tinctly. Adorno shuns close readings and comments on fragmented passages
exclusively, whereas Heidegger spends dozens of pages translating a single
poem into his own idiosyncratic language, often losing sight of the origi-
nal text. The two approaches are symptomatic of the larger philosophical
framework within which they operate. For Adorno, the aesthetic fragment
functions as a crucial reminder of the catastrophic impact of Western capi-
talism in modern culture.The process of commodification and mindless ho-
mogenization is best resisted in the nonsystematic formof the essay, whereas
any effort to restore the imaginary wholeness of either poetic or critical texts
silences the only remaining voice of criticism still alive in art today: the de-
terminate negation of the untrue. For Heidegger, by contrast, poetry carries
a more positive, yet far less specific, message regarding the primordial inter-
twinement of Being and truth. In order to understand what language means
to say, the critic needs to circle the text and revisit every word over and over
again until finally the presencing of truth (aletheia) is recognized in and
through the work of art. ‘‘On the path towards language,’’ however, Heideg-
ger never experiences the Benjaminian ‘‘shock’’ of sudden awareness or the
‘‘flash of lightning’’ caused by the aesthetic ‘‘constellation’’ of highly charged
particles left over and spurned by capitalist society. Rather, a critic inspired
by Heidegger engages in a slow and tedious process of literally reinventing
the originary moments of truth he claims to perceive in the text.
This leads to a second reason for consulting Adorno in the context of this
study. Seeking to protect the ‘‘particular’’ or ‘‘nonidentical’’ from its appro-
priation into the capitalist mode of exchange, Adorno’s sociopolitical mode
of reading emerges as the necessary corrective to the mythological idealiza-
tion of language recognizable in both Aestheticism and the later Heidegger
‘‘after the turn.’’28 Adorno, whose own deconstructive ‘‘force’’ has repeatedly








































































that allows the philosopher to think the possibility of ‘‘a world where things
would be different’’ (‘‘Rede’’ 52). History sediments into language, he claims,
meaning that Heidegger’s search for the original meaning of single words
is as misguided as his entire effort to name the essence of Being. Heidegger
implicitly counters Adorno’s dialectical investigation of language with an
oracle-like affirmation of its obscure essence: ‘‘Saying and Being, word and
thing belong together in a concealed, rarely contemplated, and unthinkable
way’’ (Sage und Sein, Wort und Ding gehören in einer verhüllten, kaum be-
dachten und unausdenkbaren Weise zueinander) (Heidegger, ‘‘Das Wort’’;
UzS 237). His reflections on language literally silence any sociopolitical cri-
tique, a silence Adorno reads as the confession of its own complicity with
the authoritarian violence governing the outside.30 One of the most funda-
mental differences between Heidegger and Adorno thus lies in the latter’s
emphasis of negativity, his unwillingness to ever identify aesthetic truth with
the primordial power of ‘‘worlding’’ recognized by Heidegger, who takes
comfort in the idea that ‘‘truth is at work within art.’’ This self-sufficiency
of art as well as its (imaginary) rootedness in the lost origin of Greek phi-
losophy stands in stark contrast to Adorno’s emphasis on the fate of mod-
ern art as a fait social determined by capitalism. One might conceptualize
this difference as that between history and historicity, between a dialectical
effort of recuperating that which, for Adorno, has been irrevocably lost in
the course of history (namely freedom from domination) and Heidegger’s
nondialectical effort to ‘‘unconceal’’ the presencing of an ahistorical truth at
work in art.
In spite of these differences, however, the two thinkers also share some
characteristic traits. Both insist on philosophical thought moving in and
through language and thus endorse what Heidegger calls the ‘‘neighborly
relations’’ between ‘‘Dichten und Denken,’’ that is, the interdependency of
art and philosophy. If Heidegger deliberately moves in circles, Adorno’s
thought moves in a dialectical spiral that seeks to reintegrate that which it
was forced to exclude without ever coming to a final conclusion. And yet,
Adorno pursuing a ‘‘negative dialectics’’ is not fundamentally at odds with
Heidegger’s effort to account for the ‘‘Gleichursprünglichkeit’’ of life and
Dasein, of Being and language. Although their methods differ, the ultimate
goal remains similar, namely to salvage, via art, a utopian moment in the
history of modernity that cannot be assimilated into the prevalent mode
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between these two thinkers far exceeds the scope of this study. But I still
want to suggest that Adorno’s often problematic (mis)readings of Heideg-
ger’s ‘‘Jargon of Authenticity,’’ his polemics against the ‘‘tautological’’ and
‘‘antidialectical’’ nature of Heidegger’s philosophy, and his charge that on-
tology fortifies, instead of dismantles, modern myths and thus succumbs to
a totalitarian form of pure ‘‘irrationalism’’—all these attacks might indeed
be read as therapeutic mechanisms of purification meant to exorcise what
appeared ‘‘uncanny’’ in Heidegger, namely the sometimes striking similari-
ties with regard to the meaning and essence of art in modern society, which
Adorno desperately seeks to disavow yet implicitly acknowledges by means
of the disavowal itself.31
This brings up the last reason for juxtaposing Heidegger and Adorno,
which concerns the political implications of their work. Heidegger’s enthu-
siastic cooperation during the early years of National Socialist power in Ger-
many defines one possible response to the challenge of modernity. Adorno’s
critical theory inherited from Marx and Freud designates the other. I am
aware that my attempt to draw from both thinkers may strike some readers
as problematic in light of the ethical implications of their work. While I do
not want to minimize the personal and theoretical differences between the
two philosophers—differences that shall become more apparent in the sub-
sequent chapters of this book—I similarly resist the tendency to disavow the
complexity of their engagement by creating the juxtaposition of a ‘‘good’’
and a ‘‘bad’’ object of reference meant to serve as searchlights guiding the
uncharted course of academic criticism. If Heidegger’s poetics at times sur-
faces as the ‘‘return of the repressed’’ in Adorno’s own Aesthetic Theory, it
seems not only legitimate, but crucial, to read them in the context of each
other in order to understand the ethicopolitical dimension of art and phi-
losophy around the turn of the twentieth century.
Thus, a three-part structure emerges as the guiding theoretical frame-
work for this entire study. While Kittler tries to situate himself completely
outside the imaginary performance of the letter, whose historical modes
of (ab)use he records, and Heidegger’s metaphysical readings of modern
poetry aim at precisely the opposite by literally following the path of lan-
guage from inside the text, occasionally getting lost therein, Adorno’s Aes-
thetic Theory might be said to occupy the middle ground between the two
poles. He explicitly rejects the radical Marxist position exemplified in the








































































the beginning of the twentieth century as a particular form of irrationalism
leading straight to fascism.32 On the other hand, however, Adorno similarly
refuses to follow the hermeneutic paradigm of immanent reading, situating
his critique in the force field between autonomous and socially determined
art instead. What remains is a vast corpus of difficult readings that are often
as idiosyncratic as they are insightful, for example when Adorno condemns
jazz as the epitome of the capitalist culture industry, or unambiguously pits
‘‘Schönberg and progression’’ against ‘‘Strawinsky and reactionism’’ in his
Philosophyof NewMusic, ordenounces Rilke’s ‘‘words of consolation’’ (Trost-
sprüche) as well as Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘theater for children’’ (Kindertheater)
as paling variants of high literary modernism in comparison to the lyrical
works of Eichendorff and Mörike.
I emphasize what I consider to be some of the problematic aspects of
Adorno’s work from the very beginning, not only because this study tries to
resist being appropriated by either one of the three theoretical sources in-
forming it.More important, Adorno’s critical comments about Aestheticism
are symptomatic of a particular bias that pervades his readings, namely his
adherence to some notion of a self-determining, nonalienated subject as the
only basis for an active resistance against the totalitarian politics of capital-
ism. Adorno’s critique consistently favors Romanticism (as well as modern-
ist texts byKafka, Proust, and Beckett) over Aestheticism because the former
anticipated or mourned the loss of subjectivity, whereas the latter deliber-
ately dissolved the human subject within the presymbolic realm opened up
by the look of things, and indeed celebrated this dissolution as the regained
freedom of mankind.
As recent critics have noted, Adorno thus develops an ambiguous, if not
self-contradictory, notion of modern subjectivity: On the one hand, he re-
gards the unified subject as the coerced effect of the pervasive social con-
straints inherent in capitalism and thus as a sign of domination.On the other
hand, however, he equally rejects the dissolution of subjectivity and instead
holds fast to the notion of a ‘‘liberated’’ or ‘‘free’’ subject able to preserve
the integrity of its own ‘‘inner nature.’’33 The latter, it seems, only serves
as the necessary specter for his critique of the former, particularly in light
of Adorno’s refusal to flesh out the details of this utopian promesse de bon-
heur that characterized, for example, much of Herbert Marcuse’s philoso-
phy. Indeed, Adorno’s harsh critique of Benjamin’s arcades project and his
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tishism that abandons theoretical mediation and thus fortifies the already
existing reification of the real, stem precisely from Adorno’s reluctance to
allow for the kind of messianic redemption to which Benjamin aspired.34
‘‘Were one to speak forcefully, one might say that the work [Benjamin’s ar-
cades project] is located at the crossroads of magic and positivism.This spot
is bewitched. Only theory is able to break the spell’’ (Wollte man drastisch
reden, so könnte man sagen, die Arbeit [Benjamins Passagenwerk] sei am
Kreuzweg von Magie und Positivismus angesiedelt. Diese Stelle ist verhext.
Nur die Theorie vermöchte den Bann zu brechen) (Benjamin, Schriften I/3:
1096).
Adorno’s critique of modernist poetry repeats this charge regarding the
mystification of the commodity form over and over again: ‘‘The modernist
poet is vanquished by the power of things like the outsider is subdued by
force of the cartel’’ (Der Dichter der Moderne läßt von der Macht der Dinge
sich überwältigen wie der Outsider vom Kartel) (‘‘George und Hofmanns-
thal’’ 235). In other words, Adorno strongly resists what he elsewhere calls
the ‘‘dissolution of all self-posited human existence’’ (‘‘CharakteristikWalter
Benjamins’’; GS 10/1: 246). However, Adorno’s apodictic rhetoric as well as
his strong critique of Benjamin’s project forestalls the question it implicitly
poses, namelywhether a radical Aestheticism is inherently uncritical, repres-
sive, or even totalitarian by default. If ‘‘theory is able to break the spell,’’ as
Adorno put it in his letter to Benjamin, I do not see any aesthetic ground or
reason to impose such a strict hierarchy betweenRomanticism andAestheti-
cism as long as one does not uncritically hypostatize either one. For Aes-
theticism’s attempt to redeem subject and object alike in the form of poetic
language pays the price of a potentially reified aesthetics, much like Roman-
ticism often fell prey to a purely speculative or idealist notion of freedom
devoid of material substance. The space between these two visions can only
be bridged during the process of critical reading as discussed in my previous
comments. Hence, the following chapter outlines what I consider the major


























































































































































































































































































3 Aestheticism, Romanticism, and
the Body of Language
Given the complexity of their engagement, the relationship between
Romanticism and Aestheticism, or what Kittler calls the discourse networks
around 1800 and 1900, is still a matter of debate among literary scholars.
According to Kittler, the Romantic ideal of intuiting the meaning of liter-
ary texts was seriously undermined by its competition with the visual media
around 1900. The ‘‘moving pictures’’ actually presented the very images that
both philosophy and poetry were merely able to suggest. Hence, literary
modernism was forced to abandon the hermeneutic paradigm that relied
upon the power of poetic imagination as a means to translate the author’s
original vision into language and back again. Around 1900, Kittler main-
tains, ‘‘transposition necessarily takes the place of translation’’ (Discourse
Networks 265), meaning that writing no longer presupposed the Romantic
‘‘author’’ or any message at all beyond the factual event of writing as such.
Confined to the symbolic, writing ‘‘realizes, materially, manifestly, the im-
possible sentence I am writing’’ (Discourse 334). Similarly, Roland Barthes
has linked ‘‘The Death of the Author’’ to the writings of Mallarmé and
French symbolism in particular, and thus implicitly supports Kittler’s analy-
sis: ‘‘Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just
as I is nothing other than the instance saying I’’ (‘‘Death of the Author’’
145).
Contrary to Kittler and Barthes, however, most critics still focus on the
fundamental ‘‘Epochenverwandtschaft’’ (Walter Müller-Seidel) between the
two time periods.1 They identify the birth of the modern episteme, to use
Foucault’s terminology, with the rise of Romanticism and thus tend to em-
phasize its similarities rather than its differences with literary modernism
around 1900. Foucault himself dates the beginning of what he calls ‘‘litera-
ture’’ proper at the beginning of the nineteenth century, at which time lan-
guage ceases to function as the self-effacing mediator between everything
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still, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that ‘‘we still belong to the era it
[Romanticism] opened up. The present period continues to deny precisely
this belonging’’ and uses ‘‘romanticism [sic] as a foil, without ever recogniz-
ing—or in order not to recognize—that it has done little more than rehash
romanticism’s discoveries’’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 15).
These different perspectives on literary history do not simply betray the
terminological confusion surrounding the time period we nebulously refer
to as ‘‘modern’’ (e.g., modernity, modernism, avant-garde), but rather are
symptomatic of the essentially ambivalent relationship between Romanti-
cism and Aestheticism. Aestheticism does not define the discourse network
of 1900, as Kittler argues, but operates in between Romanticism and the
radical avant-garde, for it participates in both paradigms at once. Aestheti-
cism shares with the avant-garde its resistance to the continuous prolifera-
tion of what it perceives as meaningless words, yet it does so meaningfully
from inside rather than outside the hermeneutic circle. Kittler virtuallyoblit-
erates this decisive difference between the l’art pour l’art movement and
the avant-garde because he situates both vis-à-vis the power of cinematic
images: ‘‘Words as literal anti-nature, literature as word art, the relation be-
tween both as material equality—this is their constellation in the purest art
for art’s sake and in the most daring games of the avant-garde. Since Decem-
ber 28, 1895, there has been an infallible criterion for high literature: it cannot
be filmed’’ (Kittler, Discourse 248). I believe it is crucial to augment Kittler’s
account and to distinguish between the radical avant-garde (e.g., Dadaism,
surrealism, Russian constructivism) on the one hand and high literary mod-
ernism (e.g., Aestheticism, symbolism) on the other. While this distinction
is hardly ever observed in Anglo-American literary theory, it is nonetheless
highly instructive for the understanding of both movements, as some critics
have rightly argued with reference to Peter Bürger’s influential Theory of the
Avant-Garde.2
Hence, although I generally agree with Kittler’s overall assessment, I dis-
agree with the implicit notion that Aestheticism’s ‘‘art for art’s sake’’ repre-
sented a complete and utter disinterest in life on all levels. Instead, it seems
obvious that modernist poetry ultimately shared the same utopian goal as
the avant-garde, except that it operated from the other side of the equation,
so to speak. Whereas the avant-garde sought to aestheticize life, that is, to
pull art into life, high modernism tried to enliven art, that is, to pull life into
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ize its utopian potential as art. In other words, Aestheticism continues the
Romantic project of world transcendence by reversing its trajectory. Instead
of expanding outward, it folds back upon itself. Poetry around 1900 thus re-
flects the paradoxical nature of nineteenth-century culture and its dual focus
on science and metaphysics, materiality and its dissolution. It embodies a
positivist vision of Romanticism, a poetry engaged in the process of decon-
struction that differs from both the Romantic ideal of aesthetic production
and its avant-gardist counterpart of demolition. Rather, Aestheticism tries
to dismantle the history of artistic production from within by pushing it
toward the brink of self-annihilation. It certainly mobilizes the materiality
of linguistic signifiers, as Kittler claims, yet it does so in order to provide
a physical basis for the meaning-potential of language and not in order to
eradicate this potential altogether, as did the avant-garde.
The following outline of four central theses may help to substantiate this
claim. First, I argue that posthermeneutic criticism does not adequately re-
flect the ambivalence of ‘‘sense making’’ that informs modernist poetry. For
example, Kittler’s discussion of Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ in the context
of Morgenstern’s nonsense poem ‘‘Das Große Lalula’’ aptly highlights their
common problematization of language, yet tends to disregard the differ-
ent means by which they operate.3 Morgenstern’s poem consists of words
like ‘‘Kroklokwafzi’’ and ‘‘Seiokrontro,’’ and, in Kittler’s eyes, represents a
typical example of the avant-gardist attempt ‘‘to write writing’’ and ‘‘to in-
scribe more and different sorts of things than any voice has ever spoken’’
(Discourse 212). Instead of deconstructing hermeneutics on its own ground,
Morgenstern’s poem simply refuses to signify anything at all. Disobeying all
semantic and syntactical rules of language, ‘‘The Great Lalula’’ defines the
materiality of writing as the site of resistance against meaning.
Aestheticism, by contrast, radicalizes the hermeneutic process by taking
its method of reading to its disastrous conclusion: Hofmannsthal’s Chandos
pursues the search for linguistic meaning until the imaginary-symbolic
space between words and things finally collapses and language itself begins
to matter and become ‘‘real.’’ Rather than the promised apprehension of
the text’s ultimate meaning, however, Chandos experiences a vortex caused
by words that ‘‘stop making sense’’ and stare right back at him instead:
‘‘The individual words swarmed around me; they transformed into eyes that
looked at me and into which I had to look in return: they form vortexes that
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looking down into them’’ (Die einzelnen Worte schwammen um mich; sie
gerannen zu Augen, die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hineinstarren
muß: Wirbel sind sie, in die hinabzusehen mich schwindelt, die sich unauf-
haltsam drehen und durch die hindurch man ins Leere kommt) (‘‘Ein Brief ’’
466). The subject is being read by the text it tries to read. Aestheticist texts
literally face the real emptiness that pervades the imaginary space of the her-
meneutic universe, yet this confrontation takes place in the context of seem-
inglymeaningful, rather than nonsensical, texts. If Kittler implies that, in lit-
erary modernism, ‘‘the medium is the message’’—to use McLuhan’s famous
dictum—my readings of Hofmannsthal, Rilke, andGeorge aim to prove that
the reverse is more accurate: their ‘‘message is the medium.’’ The reversal
indicates a crucial shift of perspective and expresses Aestheticism’s quasi-
religious belief in language itself as the productive source for everything it
talks about.
This also means that the aesthetic differences between literature and the
visual media around 1900 are not as exclusive as Kittler suggests. The ‘‘look
of things’’ is important to high literary modernism, which seeks to under-
mine the dichotomy between words and images. Some poems even employ
a cinematographic technique to achieve their magical effect of transubstan-
tiation. Rilke’s thing-poems are exemplary in this regard. They force the
reader’s gaze to oscillate between words and things as the two interdepen-
dent poles that define the aesthetic parameters of the poem. Minimizing
the spatiotemporal difference between these poles, the two are ultimately
superimposed upon each other: words become things without losing their
identity as ‘‘dark spots’’ on the page. For George, too, theGestalt of language
vouches for poetry’s construction of a different world. Aestheticism tries to
picture the weakness of language as its inherent strength, meaning that the
materialist aspect of language is often celebrated as an advantage vis-à-vis
the ‘‘imaginary signifier’’ in film because it is in and through writing that
signification begins to matter again.
My second thesis argues that Aestheticism recognizes the self not in the
Romantic ideal of poetic subjectivity, but in the look of things and the ex-
perience of life. German poetry around 1900 assimilates and subverts the
Romantic notion of aesthetic experience in which the subject envisions the
other mainly as a mirror reflecting back the subject’s own self. As David
Wellbery argues, the poetic gaze in early Romanticism functions to consti-
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seeing,’’ such that ‘‘male identity—his ich—is constituted within the mirror-
ing that allows him to see himself being seen’’ (Specular Moment 40–41). By
contrast, poetry at the turn of the century transforms the typical Romantic
juxtaposition of male subject and female object into one of a nonidentifiable
identity between self and other. Once again, the Chandos Letter is paradig-
matic in this regard, for oncewords are said to develop eyes of their own that
gaze back at the beholder, he becomes subjected to the gaze of an ‘‘other.’’
The hermeneutic paradigm of artistic self-recognition in and through the
text breaks down the moment the reader himself is being read by the words
he tries to read, meaning that language ceases to function as the imaginary
space for the formation of the self. This reciprocity of the Aestheticist gaze
upsets the Romantic power hierarchy. It reveals the seeing subject as the
always already seen object and opens up a whirling abyss that does not lead
toward a final self-understanding or coherent meaning, but rather ‘‘into an
emptiness.’’ Chandos falls into the nonsignificant space of Being opened up
by the look of things, that is, a decentered network of interconnected stares
that no longer add up to a coherent whole.
Poetryaround 1900 ceases to function as the imaginarymirror for reading
and writing subjects and becomes a gateway to a different, life-philosophical
experience of the ‘‘self ’’ instead. To put it paradoxically, one might say that
Aestheticism hopes to redeem the philosophical ideals of early Romanticism
by negating them. While the Romantics envisioned themselves on the move
toward the final unification of self and world—‘‘Die Wunderblume stand
vor ihm, und er sah nach Thüringen, welches er jetzt hinter sich ließ mit
der seltsamen Ahnung hinüber, als werde er nach langenWanderungen von
der Weltgegend her, nach welcher sie jetzt reisten, in sein Vaterland zurück-
kommen, und als reiste er daher diesem eigentlich zu’’ (Novalis)—the poetic
goal around 1900 was to realize that this journey was always already com-
pleted even before it had begun. Aestheticism eradicates the spatial and tem-
poral distance necessary for subject and object to become identified with one
another since the self is always already ‘‘at home’’ in the world. The Aes-
theticist subject encounters life both within and without the borders of its
own body: ‘‘Within me the universe, the zap of all things dead or alive mov-
ing most individually like in this tree’’ (In mir der Kosmos, die Säfte aller
lebendigen und toten Dinge höchst individuell schwingend, ebenso in dem
Baum)—this is how Hofmannsthal described one of his magical moments in







































































142 : part i i
own nostalgia for life the very instant it expresses itself, because life cannot
transcend itself, but always remains present and indeed, at every instance,
sustains my own presence, my own being. Life is envisioned as a multiper-
spectival field in which the Romantic subject figures as a topographic void
because the self is exposed as nothing but a word among words, a look
among looks, and a body among bodies.
Aestheticism’s critique of the Cartesian subject and the poetics of early
Romanticism anticipates the postmodern dissolution of subjectivity. In his
reflections on the gaze, Jacques Lacan, for example, argues that the ‘‘pre-
existing gaze’’ undermines the self-centered field of human vision. Although
the individual actively perceives the visual world, it simultaneously remains
the object of a gaze emanating not necessarily from some other person, but
rather from the symbolic ‘‘Other’’ that locates the subject within the invisible
order of the real. ‘‘I see only from one point,’’ Lacan observes, ‘‘but in my
existence I am looked at from all sides’’ (The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis 72). Lacan explicitly refers to this objectification of the sub-
ject as a mode of representation, of taking pictures: ‘‘[I]n the scopic field, the
gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I amapicture. . . . Hence it comes
about that the gaze is the instrument throughwhich . . . I amphoto-graphed’’
(Concepts 106). In modernist poetry around 1900, this ‘‘photo-graphic’’ gaze
indeed reveals the subject’s imaginary at work within the symbolic universe
of written texts. The snapshot taken by the ‘‘Other’’—or, in a more famil-
iar terminology, the pivotal ‘‘Augenblick’’ constitutive of art at the turn of
the century—exposes the rigidly fixed position of the hermeneutic reader
caught in a specular mode of exchange determined by the letter. Aestheti-
cism replaces the Romantic mirror with the look of things as the utopian
freedom of self and other outside the traditional rules of signification and
meaning.
This Aestheticist practice of deconstructing hermeneutic paradigms and
poetic subjectivity fundamentally changes the status of language: this is my
third thesis. Although Romanticism had already recognized and even pro-
grammatically endorsed the autonomy of language, it bestowed upon lit-
erature a metaphysical function beyond the exploration of linguistic self-
referentiality. The time period around 1800 is characterized by a utopian
optimism about the future possibilities of language in the form of a ‘‘tran-
scendental poetry’’ (Schlegel) and its universal ‘‘Zauberwort’’ (Novalis).







































































the body of language : 143
ence of the signifier. In Romantic poetry, language cannot be left standing
on its own ground, but needs to be engaged in the continuous process of
becoming that ensures the proliferation of meaningful discourse and allows
for the narcissistic self-representation of the poet’s (and reader’s) subjec-
tivity in and through language. German Aestheticism, by contrast, unveils
the Romantic quest for the origin—the home, the voice of the mother, ulti-
mately the womb, as Kittler and Wellbery argue4—as the continued real-
ization of the (linguistic) difference constitutive of discourse. Whereas the
Romantic period ultimately denounced poetic language as an inadequate
representation of the absolute (e.g., God, nature, subjectivity) whose essence
necessarily transcends its ownmanifestation, the culture around 1900, under
the strong influence of ‘‘life philosophy,’’ displays a tendency to collapse both
poles into one: existence becomes essence and language is said to embody
truth.
Seeking the embodiment of meaning, Aestheticism contributes to ‘‘the
other discourse of modernity,’’ as Georg Braungart characterizes an often
overlooked critical and aesthetic tradition that sought to overcome the
metaphysical opposition of mind and body, sign and referent.5 Unlike in
Romanticism, what is at stake in modernist poetry is neither the Freudian
unconscious nor the body as the locus of our instincts and drives, but the
body of language and the language of the body. Aestheticism deconstructs
hermeneutics and rediscovers materiality in and through language. Around
1900, the Romantic Zauberwort is always already present and absent, famil-
iar and unknown, because, once properly looked at, words reveal themselves
not as abstract notions, but as material beings that resonate with the life
they evoke. Poetic language carries life within: it consists of a potentiality for
pure, embodied meaning that cannot become manifest without falling prey
to the commodification it critiques. The look of things ceaselessly evoked
in modernist poetry is language speaking with its own, unalienated voice,
yet it is also, at the same time, nothing but a constructed metaphor already
dead by the time it meets the eye of the reader. The only means to make
this potentiality of language known is for poetry to fold language back upon
itself so that its inner life shines through the very words that mask it. Aes-
theticism does not seek to transcend language, but to withdraw into it until
the Romantic journey of eternal becoming finally implodes into the being
of life.







































































144 : part i i
cal dimension of the sociocultural critique proclaimed by the Aestheticist
movement rings hollow: this is my last thesis. Protesting against the reifica-
tion and commodification of modern lifewithout offering any concise vision
other than the metaphysical ideal of life itself, Aestheticism succumbs to
just one more of the many metaphysical notions it originally had sought to
render superfluous. Life, like nature, God, or the holy spirit, is envisioned
both everywhere and nowhere and thus hardly distinct from earlier philo-
sophical ideals or scientific theorems. Moreover, in spite of its antisubjective
tone, modernist poetry still advocates a narcissistic ideal of the poetic self,
this time founded on the alleged lack of subjectivity rather than the reflec-
tion of its imaginary wholeness. The aristocratic stance that distinguished
all three authors regardless of their actual social background is symptomatic
of the ideological distance separating the poet from the ‘‘mob’’ (George), the
‘‘poor’’ (Rilke), or the ‘‘peasants’’ (Hofmannsthal) who roam in a world be-
yond the magical circle of art. The elitism of the George circle reveals the
social impotence of an aesthetics whose ‘‘success’’ hinges on its failed imple-
mentation into real life. In other words, the Aestheticist ideal of embodied
meaning in the ‘‘Weltinnenraum’’ (Rilke) of art cannot but remain funda-
mentally at odds with the reality it claims to transform. It is precisely the
interminable fear that poeticwords might fall prey to the instrumental ratio-
nality governing the outside that accounts for the self-reflexivity of modern-
ist poetry and the fortification of its borders. Although the poetic voice of
a language literally ‘‘speaking itself ’’ promises to alleviate the pain caused
by the alienation of modern life, it cannot do anything but commemorate
its own failure to succeed. This ambiguity alone authenticates the sense of
truth palpable in poetry around 1900.
Once Aestheticism stops reflecting upon its inevitable failure and be-
comes mesmerized by its own rhetoric and materiality instead of decon-
structing it again and again, that interior space of extreme tension necessary
to sustain the poem’smagical vision of life collapses.The end of poetic ambi-
guity and the lack of self-reflexivity signals the beginning of a totalitarian
politics that regards the external world as nothing but a blank screen for
the aesthetic projection of the inspired artist. Fascism defines the moment at
which aesthetics turns into politics in order to overcome its lack of influence
upon social reality. ‘‘Only a God can save us,’’ Heidegger still proclaimed
in his Spiegel interview in 1966, fully aware of the disaster brought about







































































the body of language : 145
divine power in the Gestalt of the failed artist reborn as a national leader.
For many critics, Heidegger’s stubborn insistence on metaphysical redemp-
tion and his unwillingness to come to terms with his own contribution to
the barbarism of the Nazi regime are the most disappointing and problem-
atic aspects of his life and work. In spite of the persistent denial of hard-core
Heideggerians, there can indeed be little doubt that Heidegger’s political in-
volvement was by no means accidental or an arbitrary personal choice that
needs to be evaluated independently from his philosophical legacy. On the
contrary, Heidegger’s rectorship in Freiburg and his enthusiastic Nazi par-
ticipation present the necessary and logical conclusion of his own call for a
metaphysical revolution, for the crucial ‘‘Entschlossenheit’’ ofDasein and its
‘‘Sprung’’ into Being, as Rüdiger Safranski’s biography clearly documents.6
Heidegger’s unyielding silence after the war hence indicates his refusal to
think through the philosophical and ethical implications of his failed at-
tempt of trying to help philosophy break out of its cave and take control of
the sociopolitical reality of Being.
And yet, without trying to exonerate Heidegger, one might read his
Spiegel interview as the quiet renunciation of his own political engagement
in favor of a God who does not exist and divine ideals that will never come
true. Having struggled his entire life with the Catholic faith, Heidegger’s
confessed hope for redemption is not as passive and facile a stance as itmight
appear at first. It does require the constant renewal of personal faith in the
face of its eternal frustration. This forever hopeless activity also constitutes
the basic principle of Aestheticist poetry, which seems able to provide a cor-
rective vision of life as long as its ‘‘God’’ presents a phantasmagoria whose
power relies on it being severed from the world it criticizes and seeks to
change. Once this autonomy is abandoned in an effort to implement these
ideals within the sociopolitical world, however, modernism ultimately de-
stroys rather than protects the ‘‘true’’ reality it claims to have always already
created aesthetically. This indeed seems to be the silent message of the look








































































4 Hofmannsthal and the
Voice of Language
Verstehen, Gestalten, Künstler sein, wozu?
Wozu denn Leben, und wozu die Kunst?
—Hofmannsthal
Poetry, Freedom, and Subjectivity
‘‘[O]ur voices demand language and at the same time enjoy an al-
most perfect freedom of use vis-à-vis language’’ (Zumthor 4). Paul Zum-
thor’s broad ethnographic and literary investigations into the history of oral
poetry, ranging from antiquity to the present, from Africa to South America
and Europe, lead him to unveil this ‘‘paradox of voice’’ (Zumthor 7) at the
heart of language.Unlike thewritten sign, Zumthorargues, thevoice ‘‘speaks
itself at the verymoment it speaks; in and of itself, it is pure exigency’’ (Zum-
thor 6). Although indebted primarily to anthropological research rather
than literary studies, Zumthor’s observations are particularly relevant for
textual critics. Given the empirical rather than speculative basis of his study,
his observations lend further credence to the literary and philosophical de-
bate concerning the nature of signification and the relationship between
spoken and written language, that is, what Jacques Derrida has termed the
phonocentrism of Western philosophy. Western poetry, usually separated
in the form of writing from this originary self-presence, seeks to regain its
lost voice in an effort to speak of nothing but its own being: ‘‘From its ini-
tial outburst poetry aspires, like an ideal term, to purify itself from semantic
constraints, to get outside language, ahead of a fullness where everything
that is not simple presencewould be abolished’’ (Zumthor 128). This venture
of trying to utter the pure voice of language, Zumthor argues, ‘‘culminates in
song’’ (Zumthor 4), and in the eyes and ears of literary criticism, poetry, in-







































































the voice of language : 147
Valéry’s definition of the poem as a ‘‘prolonged hesitation between sound
and sense’’ (Agamben, The End of the Poem 109), Hans-Georg Gadamer ex-
plicitly charges poetry with the exploration of the ‘‘tonality of language’’
(Poetica 21f.), and one of Adorno’s favorite metaphors refers to the musical
‘‘murmur’’ of modern poetry (‘‘Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs’’ 79f.).
Like music, lyric poetry can be said to commemorate a form of com-
munication operating beyond the basic divide of signifier and signified. By
liberating words from the burden of signification, poetic language reminds
the critic that the essence of language does not consist in forging a bond be-
tween linguistic sense and extralinguistic reality, between word and thing.
Twentieth-century hermeneutics argues that any such correspondence al-
ready presupposes a primordial ground upon which to take place, that is,
a Heideggerian ‘‘clearing’’ that first allows to relate a linguistic utterance to
the material world. This space of pure Being, Heidegger argues, is opened
up in and through the work of art, most notably poetry, because ‘‘all art is,
in essence, poetry’’ (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’; Holzwege 60). This
metaphysical conception of (poetic) language is not unique to Heidegger or
the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition. In his book of the German
drama, Walter Benjamin, for example, similarly states that ‘‘truth is not re-
lational,’’ but appears ‘‘in a primordial perception in which words possess
their denominating nobility, which has not been lost to cognitive meaning’’
(‘‘Ursprung des deutschenTrauerspiels’’;Gesammelte Schriften 1/1: 216). Like
Heidegger, Benjamin regards truth as a temporal occurrence rather than an
empirical fact or a static relationship between words and things. Particularly
in his early writings, truth is an uncontrollable event inherent in language. It
erupts only for the flash of a moment and gives rise to those modern shock
sensations that the later Benjamin believed had the power to shatter the
reified relations that characterize capitalist society. ‘‘Language,’’ he claims,
‘‘does not have a content,’’ but literally ‘‘expresses itself ’’ (‘‘Sprache’’; GS 2/1:
142, 145). The task of the philosopher, like that of the translator, consists
in expressing a ‘‘pure language which does not mean anything or express
anything’’ other than ‘‘the creative word’’ that names the essence of things
(‘‘Übersetzer’’;GS IV/1: 19). The ‘‘language of truth’’ is but a ‘‘true language’’
(‘‘Übersetzer’’; GS IV/1: 16).
Given this potential of language, the ultimate goal of both author and
critic is not simply to explore the meaning or the musical qualities of words.
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lost in the modern world. Benjamin’s messianic belief in the ‘‘word of God’’
(‘‘Sprache’’; GS 2/1: 150) and the ‘‘self-expression’’ of language resonates
throughout the history of twentieth-century literary criticism. In essays on
Eichendorff, Mörike, George, among others,1 Adorno again and again calls
for the poet to submerge into language, to lose his sense of (estranged) sub-
jectivity in order to reemerge as the poetic voice of language itself: ‘‘Hence
the highest lyric works are those in which the subject, with no remaining
trace of mere matter, sounds forth in language until language itself acquires
a voice’’ (Notes I: 43) (Die höchsten lyrischen Gebilde sind darum die, in
denen das Subjekt, ohne Rest von bloßem Stoff, in der Sprache tönt, bis
die Sprache selbst laut wird) (‘‘Rede’’; GS 11: 56). Adorno’s ideal of ‘‘lan-
guage acquiring a voice’’ and ‘‘speaking itself ’’ is echoed in the later Hei-
degger’s formulation that ‘‘language speaks’’ (Unterwegs zur Sprache 19) and
literally ‘‘comes to terms with itself through speech’’ (Unterwegs 161): ‘‘We
leave speaking up to language,’’ because ‘‘language is: language. Language
speaks’’ (Der Sprache überlassen wir das Sprechen,’’ because: ‘‘Die Sprache
ist: Sprache. Die Sprache spricht) (Unterwegs 12, 13).
Both Adorno and Heidegger regard poetry as the privileged medium for
the immediate and unalienated expression of an original truth that has been
silenced in modern society. High literary modernism is exemplary in this
regard since it claims that ‘‘true’’ language is saturated with a silence that
vibrates throughout speech. The art of poetry, it follows, consists in the bal-
ancing act of giving voice to a speech on the brink of silence. At the end of
the century, an ‘‘aesthetics of silence’’ ensues (Susan Sontag) by means of
which modernist poetry quietly gestures toward the ineffable as that which
informs all art. Aestheticism seeks to transcend the communicative purpose
of language toward the evocation of a primordial sense that, paradoxically, is
nonetheless said to reside within the very words that ostracize it. According
to Heidegger, ‘‘[T]he essence of the word does not consist in its utterance,
not in idle talk nor noise nor in its function to regulate the traffic of commu-
nication’’; instead, the ‘‘essentially speaking word,’’ the word of myth, is the
‘‘silent word’’ constitutive of all art (‘‘Parmenides’’;GA 54: 172f.). InAdorno’s
words: ‘‘The true language of art is beyond language’’ (Die wahre Sprache
der Kunst ist sprachlos) (Ästhetische Theorie 171).
The following reading of Hofmannsthal’s early works examines this rela-
tionship between speech and silencewith regard to high literary modernism
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poetry is based on the paradoxical belief that language has a voice of its own
that must be silenced in and through poetic speech before it can be heard. As
a consequence, poetry around 1900 objectifies language and increasingly ex-
plores its own being as a linguistic artifact consisting of form and sound.The
material substance and acoustic resonance of words takes precedence over
the meaning expressed therein. Put differently, the voice of silence literally
gains shape as an absence rendered present in and through the poetic con-
stellation of words. The acoustic thus becomes intertwined with the visual
since the dialectics of silence and speech is correlated to that of written and
spoken language. Much like the written words of the poem seek to capture a
pure meaning that ultimately escapes them, speech hopes to give voice to a
silence it cannot express. The essence of poetry, in other words, is precisely
that which transcends the poem, be it the silence of speech or the mean-
ing of words. The chore of the artist is to express or literally give shape to
this primordial ‘‘other’’ of poetry; the complimentary task of the critics is to
follow its trace and mark its presence.
The task, needless to emphasize, is a formidable one. It requires a par-
ticular finesse or ‘‘technique’’ on both parts to understand what defies logi-
cal understanding, an ability to intuit what cannot be perceived. As a con-
sequence, most scholars focus almost exclusively on the formal qualities
(rhythm and rhyme, alliterations and assonances) ofmodernist poetry while
disregarding or even dismissing its semantic content as secondary, enig-
matic, or simply incomprehensible. As I argued in the previous chapters, I
am suspicious of hermeneutics’ good-natured retreat from the question of
meaning. It rests on a quid pro quo, a sort of symbolic exchange in which
the real text is replaced by the ideal meaning it is said to embody without
being able fully to express it. This quantum leap of hermeneutics, if I may
call it thus, is generally revered as the sign of a successful reading. Ironically,
it is precisely this leap, the critic’s sudden ‘‘eureka’’ uttered at the precise mo-
ment she perceives the ineffable, that distinguishes some of the best exegeses
of art. The most important Augenblick in any reading, it is also the most
idiosyncratic, a point strikingly illustrated in Roland Barthes’s reflections
on the nature of photography. Once he has found the one photograph that,
in his eyes, captures the very essence of the medium—one in which the ab-
stract ‘‘studium’’ of the image is entirely replaced by the personal ‘‘punctum’’
that pierces through the representation and reveals a ‘‘subtle beyond,’’ as he
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cause ‘‘it exists only for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent
picture’’ (Camera 73).
My concern is not to question the authenticity of Barthes’s, or anybody
else’s, epiphany in response to art, including my own. It would be a crude
misunderstanding of deconstruction (both in its subjective and objective
sense) to identify it(self ) with such a denouncing gesture that simply aims at
unveiling a primordial void at the center of the reader’s aesthetic experience.
Such a version of deconstruction merely corroborates the obvious fact that
there is a void or silence inherent in art without which any effort of interpre-
tation, including that of deconstruction itself, would be utterly superfluous.
The purpose of art is the communication of the ineffable, and the fact that
this effort can never succeed does not render it any less pleasurable or im-
portant for the critic to engage it nonetheless. I dowant to suggest, however,
that the collective retreat of literary critics from the ‘‘incomprehensibility’’
of modernist poetry might be indicative of a tendency to avoid something
else that expresses itself therein, a somber noise distinctly different from the
sweet melody of poetic language. We find a first indication for this presence
when Roland Barthes, with reference to Mallarmé, speaks of ‘‘murder’’ as
the most characteristic trait of modernist art (Writing Degree Zero 5), or in
Agamben’s claim that ‘‘art for art’s sake’’ does not mean ‘‘the enjoyment of
art for its own sake, but the destruction of art worked by art’’ (Stanzas 49). A
tendency toward self-destruction inheres in the history of modern art and
finds its most distinct expression in high modernism around 1900.The rum-
bling of physical violence is the basso continuo that accompanies the silent
song of modernist poetry. Adorno’s musical sensitivity, for one, perceives
the ‘‘silent tremors’’ (‘‘George und Hofmannsthal’’; GS XI: 528) of this vio-
lence precisely in what he considers to be the most beautiful examples of
lyric poetry.
The question emerges as to the meaning and origin of this violence:
Where does it come from and what does it mean? Who or what exactly is
being silenced in modern art and why? According to Heidegger, the silence
emanates from Being itself. Being simultaneously appears and withdraws in
the work of art, and poetry is foremost among the arts to commemorate
this motion of unconcealment that defines Being. Put differently, the silence
inherent in lyric poetry testifies towhat Heidegger calls the ‘‘Seinsvergessen-
heit’’ of the modern era, the fact that in the eyes of modern man, the world
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a rationalist subject unaware of the ontological interdependency between
itself and everything else. It is precisely the modern notion of subjectivity
that poetry must overcome in order to speak of itself. Language is able to
express its own voice only to the degree that it simultaneously silences the
noisy Gerede of the ‘‘man’’ responsible for the proliferation of meaningless
chatter. What Zumthor refers to as the ‘‘song of poetry’’ is the resonance of
a poetic movement that vibrates from the suppression of subjectivity and
the concomitant welcoming of Being. In the end, ‘‘true’’ language, for Hei-
degger, does not sing or speak, but falls silent and dissolves into the sacred
moment of ‘‘worlding’’ it has opened and closed through speech.
Adorno sees things differently. He regards the disturbing ‘‘tremors’’ un-
derlying poetic language as a symptom of the social reification caused by
commodity fetishism.Capitalismoppresses the free expression of the human
individual. The latter seeks refuge in the pure voice of language itself, yet
it can never completely overcome the sociopolitical forces responsible for
the silence it must endure and against which it tries to speak out—hence
the inner dissonance characteristic of modern art. For Adorno, the fate of
language and subjectivity is inextricably intertwined since language finds its
own voice only in and through that of the human subject, while the subject
is able to survive only by abandoning itself to a kind of ‘‘pure’’ language both
autonomous and subservient, ubiquitous and self-effacing at the same time.2
Adorno grants language a certain level of autonomy only to ascribe it im-
mediately to the users of language. Poetic speech is freed from the serfdom
of capitalism for the sole purpose of serving those who are said to acquire
freedom through its voice.
The following reading of Hofmannsthal departs from Adorno at pre-
cisely this point. For Aestheticism implicitly challenges his notion that pure
language, that is, the silent voice of poetry, is concerned primarily with
providing a shelter for the alienated subject of modernity. Rather, poetry
around 1900 speaks of the struggle to rid itself from the shackles of pre-
cisely the kind of humanist legacy Adorno upholds in his texts, meaning
the (bourgeois/Marxist) ideal of free, self-expressive subjectivity. One might
say that the violence in modernist poetry stems not from the sociopoliti-
cal restraints limiting the potential of human subjectivity, but rather from
those that restrict the being of language itself. This interpretation, however,
is also at odds with Heidegger, since he, too, subordinates language to a
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the human individual. For Heidegger, it bears the name of Being. Yet both
thinkers limit the freedom of language to literally express itself. Poetry at the
turn of the century, however, is far more self-reliant and self-absorbed than
both Adorno and Heidegger were willing to concede. In Aestheticist poetry,
language seeks to find its proper voice as a representation of its own ‘‘poten-
tiality’’ (Agamben) to represent, which is to say that its efforts to express
the ‘‘life’’ it carries within must always be understood as a genuine form of
self-expression.
This is not to claim that words could ever become completely autono-
mous and independent from those who use them. If that were the case, lan-
guage itself would acquire the status of self-sufficient subjectivity it denies
to human agents. This problem haunts Paul de Man’s radical conception
of language as entirely ‘‘inhuman.’’ Whereas he refers to ‘‘the fundamen-
tal non-human character of language’’ (Resistance to Theory 96), I argue
that poetic language around 1900 aligns itself strictly with the human body
rather than the mind. The poetic promise of freedom does not completely
overcome the human, but rather shifts emphasis from spirit to matter, from
subjectivity to the body of the individual. Hence, one need not completely
renounce Adorno’s and Heidegger’s notion that poetry is concerned with
human salvation or the unconcealment of Being in the world. For during
the course of its attempted self-liberation, poetry—understood as a thing
in its own right—might be able to liberate and present other things as well,
and those certainly include the human body, but not the humanist construct
of autonomous subjectivity growing on its back. Agamben phrases it most
succinctly: ‘‘[T]he polemic of modern art is not directed against man, but
against his ideological counterfeiting; it is not antihuman, but antihuman-
istic’’ (Stanzas 55).
Not only is this precisely the fundamental Aestheticist belief around 1900,
but it also accounts for the alleged ‘‘incomprehensibility’’ of modernist
poetry. The strategic retreat of traditional hermeneutics, its lack of curiosity
when confronted with some of the most difficult texts in modernism, seeks
to rescue humanism from the humiliation of being explicitly rejected in and
through thevery genre it had declared itsmost reliable ally. In poetry around
1900, it is the body that speaks, and not the subject. If a murder takes place
in modernist poetry, the humanist notion of subjectivity is its first victim.3
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and that of the thing itself. Both are shown to take shape within the play of
words hovering between silence and sound, written and spoken language.
Aestheticism offers the materiality of the signifier as physical evidence of the
demise of traditional humanism. The ‘‘body’’ of language is made to testify
to the death of the subject.
The question remains as to the nature of this ‘‘body.’’ It cannot be thewrit-
ten word becausewriting reifies rather than liberates language. But what else
is there? How can we find a signifier that materializes the voice of language
without suppressing it at the same time? Is there a sign that signifies the
end of signification? Modernist poetry, I argue, identifies such paradoxical
signs as the signs of punctuation that regulate the flow of language. Punc-
tuation signs cannot be voiced outside of a specific context since they carry
no meaning by themselves. Yet they are nonetheless crucial for linguistic
meaning to emerge. Having no voice of their own, punctuation signs com-
memorate language itself. They materialize a pure potentiality for meaning
without activating it, allowing language to find its proper voice in the body
of a text.
The following reading of Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ (1891) will serve
to clarify this point. My argument is twofold, claiming, first, that ‘‘Vor-
frühling’’ self-reflectively thematizes and performs its own production of
linguistic meaning in the form of poetic speech. For Hofmannsthal in par-
ticular and modernist poetry in general, the world literally comes alive and
dies in discourse. The purpose of poetry is to commemorate this paradoxi-
cal nature of language to both embody and disfigure the things to which it
refers. Poetry around 1900 thus anticipates major insights of later poststruc-
turalist theory: far from being ‘‘incomprehensible’’ itself, it merely promotes
an overall incomprehensibility meant to deconstruct the Romantic tradition
of universal sense. My second argument specifically concerns this relation-
ship between Romanticism and Aestheticism. I contend that the latter aban-
dons the Romantic ideal of transcendental consciousness and the power of
poetic imagination in search of a prior,moremeaningful, formof expression
located beyond the traditional opposition of mind and body, sign and ref-
erent. A medium without a message other than the medium itself, the voice
of language around 1900 is depersonalized and, unlike its Romantic prede-
cessor, must not be ‘‘understood’’ in the mind, but literally experienced in
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sibility to stop making sense and to explore the primordiality of language
liberated from the burden of all identifiable meaning. Focusing in particu-
lar on the use of punctuation signs in Hofmannsthal’s poem, I argue that it
literally ‘‘makes the point’’ of identifying the pure voice of poetry with the
body of language in its written form.
The Poetry of Breath: Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Vorfrühling’’
Vorfrühling




Er hat sich gewiegt,
Wo Weinen war,








Die weichen und wachen
Fluren durchspürt.




Er flog mit Scheigen
Durch flüsternde Zimmer
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The spring wind is gliding
Mid boughs that are bare,
In his heart hiding
Strange things and rare.
His cradle hath swung
In sob-shaken air,




His breath cooled the bosoms
That throbbing glowed.
Lips in their laughter
First he would claim,
Soft fields thereafter
Woke when he came.
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The sunset’s red ruin
He swiftly flew by.
In silence proceeding
Through whispering rooms,
And quenched with his speeding
The lamps’ yellow blooms.
The spring wind is gliding
Mid boughs that are bare,
In his heart hiding
Strange things and rare.
Through the reviving
Alleys and meadows
His breath is driving
Wraith-like shadows.
A scent without name
He bears in his flight
From whence he came
Since yester-night.4
Although widely regarded as one of Hofmannsthal’s most accomplished
poems—Stefan George ranked it among his best—‘‘Vorfrühling’’ has rarely
been the object of a close reading. Adorno’s brief remarks situate it mainly
in the context of French Impressionist painting, while other critics revere its
musical form of expression, yet nobody seems interested in paying attention
to the performance of the letter inHofmannsthal’s text.5 Instead, one usually
encounters statements such as this from Michael Hamburger, who, referring
to ‘‘Vorfrühling,’’ professes that ‘‘to a very large degree, the German lan-
guage itself has written this poem’’ (Michael Hamburger 28). Even Adorno
concurs: ‘‘As if to enact a form of self-control, Hofmannsthal’s poems re-
cite themselves. Their talkative tone allows the verses to listen to themselves’’
(Wie zur eigenen Kontrolle rezitieren seine [Hofmannsthals] Gedichte sich
selbst. Ihr Redendes gestattet es den Versen sich zuzuhören) (‘‘George und
Hofmannsthal’’; GS 10/1: 211). A poem literally written and recited by and
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analysis of modernism’s ideal to give rise to the pure voice of speech and to
‘‘let language speak itself.’’ Can we hear what it says?
Adorno’s and Hamburger’s comments offer a good starting point for ex-
ploring this question. Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ (1891) is indeed exem-
plary for the musical qualities of poetic language. It is one of the few poems
for which the Blätter für die Kunst chose to publish a musical score, written
by Clemens Frankenstein.6 And yet, the effort is somewhat redundant, be-
cause the poem, when read aloud, sings a kind of melody on its own accord.
Moreover, its rhythmic structure mirrors the erratic nature of the ‘‘running’’
wind it describes. Although the meter consistently shows two stressed syl-
lables, the verses begin and end irregularly as masculine or feminine, while
their length varies between as few as three and as many as six syllables. The
changing rhythm at workwithin the poem stands in contrast to its structural
coherence, which features nine stanzas of four verses each. The external ap-
pearance of the poem suggests a formal regularity or stasis at odds with its
internal emphasis on incessant flux, creating a latent conflict between dis-
charge and containment that erupts in the last two strophes. In contrast to
the rest of the poem, most lines in the eighth and the ninth stanza begin
with a stressed rather than an unstressed syllable, while the rhyme pattern
changes from the embracing pattern ‘‘abab’’ to ‘‘abba’’ in stanza eight and
‘‘abcb’’ in stanza nine, thus setting them apart as a coda from the rest of the
poem. The repetition of the first stanza further corroborates this sense of
conflict, for it literally encloses the first part of the poem and excludes the
coda. This rupture of the poem’s formal and structural coherence is signifi-
cant and deliberate. Looking at its first publication in theBlätter fürdie Kunst
in December 1892, one notices that the original version of the poem was
indeed printed without the repetition of the first stanza and also featured
the last two stanzas in the very center of the poem as stanzas four and five.
Hofmannsthal’s subsequent rearrangement of ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ highlights the
importance he bestowed upon the last two stanzas and the aesthetic break
they signify.
Although my reading will concentrate on the significance of the coda at
the end of the poem, I shall briefly examine the first part of Hofmanns-
thal’s poem (stanzas one through seven). It presents the history of thewind’s
travels within the repetition of the first and the seventh strophes, which func-







































































158 : part i i
ment is its central theme.Written in the past and perfect tense, these stanzas
enumerate the multitude of ‘‘strange things’’ the wind not only witnessed,
but literally ‘‘touched,’’ or even brought to life by means of its ability to
change and adapt to them. Shaking blossoming flowers from the tree or play-
ing with human hair, the wind literally ‘‘runs through’’ and inhabits these
things much like the flute whose sobbing cry is nothing but the metamor-
phosed wind itself caught in a different shape.
The fourth stanza provides a good example in this regard. Located at the
structural core of the poem’s first part, it accentuates the sensuous intimacy
of the lips ‘‘it has touched’’ by breaking through the repetitive syntactical
pattern that dominates the first line of stanzas two through six. Instead of
beginning with the same pronoun ‘‘Er’’ followed by the finite verb form, the
strophe begins with the object rather than the subject of the sentence. The
rupture visually situates the immediate perception of things themselves at
the (geographic and figurative) center of the poem, yet it also speaks to its
cardinal theme of trying to overcome the inside/outside or subject/object
dichotomy. The image of the laughing lips represents the kind of physical
openness necessary for the wind to become alive inside every-thing it en-
counters. The wind enlivens these things much like our breath ‘‘running’’
through the human body sustains it as a whole, a parallelism anticipated
andmotivated by the immediately preceding line describing the ‘‘breathing’’
limbs touched by the wind.
The wind recalls the breath of life. It is life, a life that continuously needs
to breathe while, simultaneously, in and through this breath all living things
seem forever joined together in the shapeless body of ceaseless movement
evoked in Hofmannsthal’s poem. Although it never tarries in the presence
of these things, the wind nonetheless connects with them physically and, in
parting, takes part of them along on its journey. The transitoriness of life is
both acknowledged and overcome in this peculiar memory of things past.
The temporal change frompast to present tense in stanzas one and seven sig-
nifies that all things ‘‘are’’ still alivewithin the ‘‘Wehn’’ of thewind itself. This
fusion of wind and things is also expressed in the first line of these strophes,
which, on a grammatical level, refuses to grant the wind the same amount of
self-determining subjectivity it enjoyed in the narrative proper. Instead of
‘‘Der Frühlingswind läuft,’’ a parallel construction to the other introductory
lines of the first part, we read: ‘‘Es läuft der Frühlingswind,’’ a phrase that







































































the voice of language : 159
‘‘runs.’’ Once again, the wind has metamorphosed by virtue of the ‘‘things’’
that now are being carried along with ‘‘it.’’ The wind literally is the presence
of things past that are alive and still breathe therein.
The last two stanzas, however, speak a different language. Their tone
is sharper, the verses grow shorter, and the rhythm becomes more pro-
nounced. A kind of dramatic climax is palpable, introduced by the eighth
stanza’s rewording of the previous one in which the union of wind and
things was still experienced as ‘‘seinWehn.’’ This ‘‘Wehn’’ connotes not only
the blowing movement of the wind proper, but its pains of labor as well—
‘‘Wehn’’ understood as the spastic movement of one body giving birth to
another. The poem’s first part can thus be read as the story of the wind’s im-
pregnation by the things that he now carries along as part of its own self,
while the eighth stanza describes the actual moment of delivery that once
again (grammatically) separates the wind’s ‘‘Wehn’’ from the strange things
‘‘it’’ was before: ‘‘Durch die glatten / Kahlen Alleen / Treibt sein Wehn /
Blasse Schatten.’’ The adjective ‘‘glatt’’ emphasizes the slickness of a world in
which it has become difficult, if not impossible, to hold onto things, mean-
ing that the erstwhile promising narrative pregnant with life literally ‘‘gives
birth to’’ (Treibt sein Wehn) nothing but mere shadows of all those things
it once bore within. What had originally seemed the long-awaited renewal
of nature brought about by the winds of spring is revealed as mere reverie.
The coda thus rearranges ‘‘things’’ both literally and figuratively on the
syntactical and semantic level alike. Adding several new words such as
‘‘shadows’’ while repeating others, the eighth stanza seemingly restates the
previous one, yet completely alters its tone and meaning, creating a funda-
mental split within what appeared to be the impervious unity of life itself.
In a self-reflective gesture, the text is being restructured so that it says dif-
ferent things than before. The presence of life is lost, a shift emphasized in
the last stanza, which reverts back to the perfect tense and ends with a yet
intensified image of darkness—‘‘night.’’ The coda tells a different story from
the rest of the poem, for once the wind of life abides, things emerge as their
own shadows until night comes and darkness reigns. The wind of spring
can merely conjure, almost teasingly, the absence of a late life in the form
of ‘‘pale shadows’’ without being able to enliven the scenery of the barren
alleys.
If one were to give a provisional summary of Hofmannsthal’s poem, one







































































160 : part i i
entire text as a clever deconstruction of a traditional literary topos (spring)
that promises more than it can keep. The poem provides a chilling, if aes-
thetically pleasing, moment of disillusionment fairly typical for the young
Hofmannsthal and representative of one of his most favorite themes, the
transitoriness of life—(Wie kann das sein . . . ?). It seems that after all is
said and done, what remains for both poet and readers alike is to acknowl-
edge the transitoriness of life aesthetically by writing or reading about it.
Although the wind can slacken and spring may never come, the poem as art
prevails and outlasts the powers of death it both conjures and conquers. In
this sense, Hofmannsthal’s poem ultimately triumphs over the night with
which it ends.
This fairly typical reading for Hofmannsthal studies in general is, in this
particular case, based on an oversight, because it must come to terms with
a particular and quite literary point—a syntactical marker, that is, a simple
period in themost common linguistic sense.The last stanza is grammatically
incomplete and hence difficult to ‘‘understand’’ unless the reader chooses
to disregard the period that separates the last line of stanza eight from the
first in stanza nine. The oversight of this period is significant. Along with
the ‘‘Und’’ that starts the stanza, it allows one to align ‘‘the fragrance / it
has brought’’ with the verb ‘‘treibt’’ that properly refers to the ‘‘pale shad-
ows’’ mentioned earlier, in which case the last stanza can be read as the mere
continuation of the previous one. The wind now drives along not only the
shadows of things past, but also their smell. Only by means of this syntac-
tical connection does the whole poem ‘‘make sense’’ again. However, if left
standing alone by itself, the last stanza remains fragmentary and resists in-
terpretation because of the complete lack of finite verb forms causing a se-
mantic incoherence with regard to its proper meaning. To be sure, I do not
refer to the missing auxiliary verbs needed to complete the lines ‘‘Den er
gebracht hat’’ or ‘‘Von wo er gekommen ist,’’ for they are unambiguously
implied by the text itself. Rather, what remains uncertain is the semantic
trajectory of the entire stanza and its connection to the poem at large. The
reader is forced to guess what the poem means to say, and this is precisely
the reason most might tend to disregard the point of separation and seek to
reconnect the two last stanzas in spite of the grammatical rules they have to
bend.
In light of this oversight, it becomes clear that if the above-mentioned in-
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at all, it is with regard to the further questions it raises rather than those it
purports to have answered. At stake is not merely a specific topos of mod-
ern poetry, but the nature of language itself, particularly its ability to render
present—via the power of signification—all those things that are, in fact,
absent—which is to say that the motif of transitoriness not only applies to
the proper theme and semantic content of the poem (i.e., the cyclical nature
of life), but also pertains to the linguistic medium that sustains its aesthetic
form as such. If we grant ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ this quality of poetic self-reflexivity
and, at the same time, refuse to overlook the syntactical markers that struc-
ture the text, then two more oppositional readings of the poem can be put
forward.
The first focuses on the transitory nature of both human memory and
linguistic representation unable to present life as it really is. Let me call this
the Romantic interpretation, in that it emphasizes the ideal of poetic tran-
scendence and regards language as the failed and reified expression of the
absolute. The ‘‘night’’ pictured at the end of the poem is an image not only
for the darkness that ensues once the wind has blown over and individual
things have passed away; rather, it self-consciously refers to the poem’s own
constitutive process as a mere constellation of words, and thus speaks, on
a metalevel, to the semantic obscurity that ensues once the reader’s gaze
fails to ‘‘make sense’’ of the words it encounters. Such a gaze literally goes
blind and ends up in the dark. With its final emphasis on ‘‘Nacht,’’ the
poem reveals the fragility of a hermeneutic sense utterly dependent upon
the meaning it needs to engage. As it allows for multiple readings and re-
fuses to privilege one in particular, the poem exposes its own failure to
illuminate, indeed enliven, the dead signifiers that promised life, much as
the wind ultimately failed to really bring about the spring it announced.
The pale shadows mentioned in the poem can be regarded as its own lit-
erary images evoked by symbolic structures that have lost their power to
call forth and present the meaning they signify. Since the poem ultimately
remains a prisoner of language in the form of a written text, it inevitably
succumbs to the very darkness and petrification it laments. Hofmannsthal’s
‘‘Vorfrühling’’ has failed because language always fails, and it is that failure
that it self-consciously acknowledges as unavoidable. The lack of a verb in
the last line intensifies this morbid, lifeless atmosphere left behind both by
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The second reading, which I shall call the Aestheticist reading, also ac-
knowledges the poem’s emphasis on transitoriness and its ultimate failure
to make sense. However, it seeks to redeem this inadequacy of language by
focusing on its equally inherent power to call forth the life of which it speaks.
From this perspective, the very life the poem seems unable to represent is
nowhere to be found outside of the text either, since the entire theme of pres-
ence and absence is predicated upon, and hence illuminates, nothing but its
inherent power to create the world in the first place. It is only because poetic
language has always already called things by their proper name that it can
subsequently be charged with the failure to adequately represent them once
again. The textual evidence in support of this Aestheticist endorsement of
the constitutive function of language can be found in the last stanza in gen-
eral and the final line in particular. These might be read without intuitively
adding the missing verb, in which case the poem remains unfinished, and
the last sentence incomplete. The fragmentary character of the poem calls
for a continuation of the narrative, the abrupt ending of which signifies the
‘‘night’’ as the lack of a wor(l)d that ensues were language simply to stop and
fall silent. This ‘‘night’’ is not to be seen primarily as a symbol for the intu-
itive lack of referential language and its inability to render present what it
signifies. Rather, it is the literal darkness resulting from the lack of language
and the silencing of the poetic word.
The Aestheticist perspective on language is thus essentially ambiguous.
Language not only enables the meaning it forestalls, but also calls forth the
world that it simultaneously hides behind the symbolic bars of signification.
Hence, it is impossible to decide which of the two readings I suggested is
more accurate. No matter how they look at it, readers are forced to provide
the missing links themselves. They must choose to disregard particular signs
or invent others if their reading is to ‘‘make sense.’’ It follows that the ques-
tion of the ‘‘right’’ interpretation literally becomes one of reading: once read
aloud the poem achieves meaning via a particular intonation of the text. The
reader must become a speaker and give voice to the text. His task consists
in deciding where and which words to accentuate so that the poem begins
to speak beyond the limits of what it is able to say in its written form. The
reading gaze gives way to the poetic ideal of spoken language. Hofmanns-
thal’s poem deliberately calls for a corporeal voice since otherwise its mean-
ing remains, quite literally, unheard or lost in the dark of the ‘‘night’’ with
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language to make its point—and this, incidentally, consists in granting pri-
ority to speech rather than writing. Being spoken, language itself speaks,
since language finds its own voice the very moment it gets lost in speech.
The wind both described and poetically simulated within the erratic
rhythm of Hofmannsthal’s verses can be likened to the breath of the reader.
Just as the wind, in the first part of the poem, functions as the invisible bond
that physically connects and enlivens the various ‘‘things’’ it has ‘‘touched,’’
poetic language needs to be spoken in order to express its own potentiality
for creating meaning. Language and this potentiality for meaning lie at the
heart of matter. Things are as long as they are one with the wind, that is, as
long as they are nurtured, indeed embodied, in and through the breath of
the speaker who sings their names by virtue of the poem’s acoustic quali-
ties continuously emphasized by Hofmannsthal’s critics. Once these things
are released and severed from the speech that sheltered them, they succumb
to their own ‘‘pale shadows’’ in the form of empty signs. Such a language is
alienated from itself and the things it signifies, and the (temporal and spa-
tial) difference between sign and thing is responsible for the loss of their
primordial unity and the lack of unequivocal meaning the poem signifies at
the end.
This juxtaposition of speech and writing also accounts for the peculiar
tension between the poetic rhythm that enlivens the poem and its static
reification in the form of a written text that is but the corrupt derivative of
speech. In contrast to the discourse network around 1800, which calls for
the continuous perpetuation of the reading and writing processes in order
to authenticate meaning, Hofmannsthal’s poem calls for the deconstruction
of writing and the reactivation of the primordial power of language. Those
who ‘‘understand’’ the Aestheticist message of ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ must also turn
it back against itself and reverse its genetic mode of operation. They must
stopmaking sense of it and instead begin to feel the voice of language within
the sense(s) of their body.
And yet, I want to argue that it would be simplistic and ultimately mis-
leading to contend that Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ merely reaffirms the
traditional metaphysical distinction between oral and written language.
Rather, Hofmannsthal’s juxtaposition of vision versus acoustics, written ver-
sus spoken discourse serves to reveal a fundamental dilemma at the heart
of language, whose self-expression is the cause of its own undoing as lan-
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voice. For in order to speak, language requires the presence of a body that
is not its own. Readers must lend their voice to language and thus prevent
it from gaining full autonomy and self-presence. This is not to imply that
the reader is the true subject of Hofmannsthal’s poem. The text does not
call upon readers to express themselves in language, but, on the contrary,
to help language express itself as that which unites the subject and object
of speech. The real ‘‘subject’’ of ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ is not the interiority of the
humanist individual or that of an ideal reader/speaker/writer, but the wind
that sustains life, that is, the breath of a living being able to voice language.
In quite a literary sense, the poem renders this point visually evident.
The period separating the last two stanzas functions as a material stumbling
block for the reader’s gaze and its visionary powers of imagination. Rather
than spiraling outward toward a potentially infinite universe of significa-
tion, the reading process in Hofmannsthal’s works spirals inward instead
until it ends up in a realm without any spatiotemporal extension at all. The
reader’s gaze finally encounters the mute body of language in the form of
a punctum that cannot quietly be dissolved into meaning—which is to say
that the first obstacle on the way toward pronouncing the voice of language
can be overcome only if the reader understands herself not as an individual
subject, but as part of the omnipresent force of life, in which case her voice
cannot but mergewith the poem to the effect that reader and language com-
plement each other. On the basis of this fusion, language indeed gains a
means of self-expression that does not speak of itself, but of life as such. As
soon as language finds its own voice, it gets lost therein, because this voice
inevitably presents a world without ever being able to represent itself. This
self-cancellation of language in the name of things is the second reason why
there is no pure speech that gives voice to language. ‘‘Pure’’ speech is either
nonsensical, and hence not related to language at all, or self-effacing in the
sense that it calls forth a world in which it gains a presence only in the form
of writing.
In order to reveal this constitutive paradox of language, Hofmannsthal’s
poem must somehow signify the ability of language to speak and create
meaning without simultaneously activating that meaning. The crucial issue
is to evoke language’s potentiality to speak by means of a sign that is not
meaningful by itself, since otherwise language itself immediately vanishes
from sight. This is precisely the function of the period separating the eighth
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understood outside the context in which it appears, yet is nonetheless deci-
sive for giving meaning to the poem. On the one hand, the poem recognizes
the period as a sign of the reification of language that must be dissolved
acoustically within the living voice of its reader to become meaningful; on
the other hand, however, the ultimate goal of this liquidation of language is
to make language ‘‘matter’’ again and to recognize the primordially ‘‘real’’
qualities of language as opposed to the hermeneutic focus on its imaginary
effects. Words are not meant to evoke the mere visual illusion of things, nor
do they signify their abstract meaning, but they are themselves constitutive
of these things and such meaning. The period ultimately makes the point
that language only matters in precisely those moments of its own undoing,
for the potentiality of language to signify and to name its own ability to
name must remain unsaid or suspended in order to preserve itself. And yet,
the paradox is that this potentiality has always already been realized in and
through this suspension, which signifies the being of language.
Adorno’s critical stance toward modernist poetry is based upon precisely
this antihumanist emphasis on life around 1900: ‘‘Subjectivity no longer
knows itself as the soul-providing center of the cosmos’’ (Nicht länger weiß
sich Subjektivität als das beseelende Zentrum des Kosmos) (‘‘George und
Hofmannsthal’’; GS 10/1: 234), he laments with regard to Hofmannsthal’s
and George’s poetry. However, Adorno’s Romanticist bias for the traditional
notion of subjectivity might also be indicative of a more fundamental fear
haunting all art criticism: that of being superfluous. Whereas Romanticism
called upon the poetic imagination of the reader to complement its utopian
visions, Aestheticismproposes the exact opposite, namely the silencing of an
endless commentary that suffocates the voice of a primordial language that
has always already spoken and said what it means to say. Of course this is not
to argue that modernist poetry has truly captured the ‘‘voice of silence,’’ for
this ideal itself remains forever bound to the very language it seeks to tran-
scend. Nor does it mean that Aestheticist poetry could ever truly dispense
with commentary, my own included. Quite the contrary, the enigmatic na-
ture of modernist poetry deliberately solicits literary criticism, yet does so
solely for the purpose of undoing it. The entire process of (critical) reading
is called upon to self-destruct and give way to the mere sensation of being in
the world. Poetry around 1900 self-consciously thematizes this paradox and
regards the human body rather than the mind as the site and the origin of
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posthermeneutic critics have proposed, but to signify themeaning-potential
of language and the primordial quality of life as meaningful in itself. At
the same time, Aestheticism’s destruction of the hermeneutic ideal of total
understanding cannot but offend the ears of traditional literary critics and
their search for identifiable meaning. This may not be the least of reasons
for scholars to plead deaf to the ‘‘voice of silence’’ and to denounce the ‘‘in-
comprehensibility’’ of modernist poetry while revering its musical qualities
instead. For it is still easier to sing along to an inaudible tune than to fall
silent and simply listen to oneself breathe.
Gestures of Speech
The previous reading of Hofmannsthal’s poem may serve as an intro-
duction into his reflections about the process of linguistic signification.
Hofmannsthal’s early works are self-reflexive about their own constitutive
mechanism as language. They thematize the play of presence and absence,
identity and difference that enables textual meaning and allows for various
interpretations of a given text. At the same time, they lament the concomi-
tant loss of an unequivocal sense that allegedly remains preserved in spo-
ken language alone. Speech is granted priority because it is said to preserve
the undifferentiated origin of a corporeal meaning in which sign and refer-
ent, spirit and matter have not yet been divorced. The voice inaugurates the
originary ground upon which the written sign can subsequently take place
and establish itself. But yet again, the primordiality of speech finds its most
adequate expression in a poetic text whose goal is to prove visually that lan-
guage matters and enjoys a physical presence of its own. For Hofmannsthal,
the voice and the body of language are intertwined and codependent, and
‘‘Vorfrühling’’ calls upon the material presence of signification as physical
evidence of the inherent ability of language to speak itself. The task of the
literary critic consists precisely in resisting the temptation to dissolve this
paradox—the friction between spoken and written language—in either di-
rection. A study of Hofmannsthal’s works cannot simply privilege one of
the poles, nor can it be anchored in a positive or identifiable ground out-
side the self-referential play of signifiers at work within the literary text. Any
such efforts are themselves based upon the constitutive interplay of speech
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Aestheticist stance vis-à-vis poetic and critical language. In the following,
I shall try to contextualize the above reading of Hofmannsthal’s poem by
reference to his other writings around 1900.
The most programmatic endorsement of this magical understanding of
language expressed in ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ can be found in Hofmannsthal’s brief
comments in ‘‘Eine Monographie’’ (1895) about the actor Friedrich Mitter-
wurzer whose language, Hofmannsthal contends, is free of the reified speech
patterns that dominate public discourse:
WennwirdenMund aufmachen, reden immer zehntausendTotemit. Der
Mitterwurzer hat seine Beredsamkeit das Schweigen gelehrt. Er hat die
zehntausendToten totgetreten, undwenn er redet, redet nur er. In seinem
Mund werden die Worte auf einmal wieder etwas ganz Elementares, der
letzte eindringlichste Ausdruck des Leibes,Waffen wie die Zähne und die
Nägel, Lockungen wie das Lächeln und die Blicke, reine sinnliche Offen-
barungen des inneren Zustandes. (‘‘Eine Monographie’’; RA; GW I: 480)
Whenever we open our mouth, ten thousand dead talk as well. Mitter-
wurzer has learned his eloquence through silence. He has trampled the
ten thousand dead to death, and when he talks, he alone speaks. In his
mouth the words once again become something elementary, the last in-
tense expression of the body, weapons like the teeth and the nails, temp-
tations like the smile and the looks, pure sensuous epiphanies of an inner
condition.
The ‘‘ten thousand’’ dead that usually accompany human speech are the
emissaries of the entire hermeneutic tradition that assigns meaning towords
by situating them within the discursive network of previous and possible
statements. Under the auspices of this traditional system of signification,
life speech is impossible since every word always remains caught within an
antiquated network of preestablished symbolic codes and anterior mean-
ings. Conjuring up the dead, language, too, dies the very moment it is being
spoken.
The endless network of interrelated discourse based on the continual de-
ferral of pre-sense pronounces the speaker’s loss of self as well. In a letter to
his friend von Bebenburg, Hofmannsthal relates his not feeling well to the
lack of immediate life experiences during times of travel: ‘‘I often do not feel
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living life, and whatever I experience appears as if read in a book’’ (Ich fühle
mich während einer Reise meist nicht recht wohl: mir fehlt die Unmittel-
barkeit des Erlebens; ich sehe mir dann selbst leben zu, und was ich erlebe,
ist mir wie in einem Buch gelesen) (6 Sept. 1892; Frankfurt 1966; 19). To en-
counter one’s life written down or illustrated in a book is, of course, the de-
finitivemoment in the lifelong voyage ofmost Romantic heros, fromEichen-
dorff ’s Sternbald and Brentano’s Godwi, to Novalis’s Heinrich and beyond.
The ‘‘Romantic irony,’’ as it is called, demarcates the realm of aesthetic self-
reflection and signifies the hero’s eventual return back home to the proper
self. Hofmannsthal’s rejection of this Romantic paradigm is based on his
life-philosophical demand for sensual immediacy and the concomitant em-
phasis of the body. His arduous travels in real life are similar to the fictional
hero’s metaphorical journeys through the hermeneutic universe of reading
and writing. They forestall the crucial experience of ‘‘the fullest, most sub-
lime presence’’ that Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos senses and seeks to ex-
press in ‘‘Ein Brief.’’ The Romantic trail of the signifier allegedly guiding the
fictional hero and his reader back to their own selves cannot but self-destruct
since it perpetually postpones rather than actualizes the definitive moment
of returning home. Aestheticist poetry around 1900 literally cannot afford
the time to chase romantically after the ever-fleeting presence of discursive
(self-)signification. Beyond all poetic reflection, being and meaning must
physically coincide for language proper to find its voice.
It follows that Hofmannsthal’s denunciation of reading and writing ap-
plies only to the reified linguistic system endorsed by modern rationality
and not to language in general. On the contrary, the real experience of life
still depends upon the ‘‘creation of new terms, powerful, all-conjuring in-
cantatory words whose last, most simple one God knows, God is’’ (Und
dann das Bilden neuer Begriffe, mächtiger, vielbeschwörender Zauberworte,
deren letztes, einfachstes Gott weiß, Gott ist) (RA; GW III: 375). Although
the religious dimension of these ‘‘last words’’ betrays the utopian nature of
Hofmannsthal’s search for pure speech, it also sanctions his call for radical
aesthetic action. Around 1900, to speak is to kill the living dead in language
once and for all since the necessary rejuvenation of speech depends upon the
poet’s violent act of liberation from the restrictive and life-threatening para-
digms of hermeneutics. Although the Romantics had liberated language
from its burden of referentiality, they had stopped short of renouncing the
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presence they could only imagine but not literally enact. Romanticism un-
wittingly impedes, rather than provides, access to an original presence lost
in signification, leading Hofmannsthal to proclaim that the name ‘‘Roman-
ticism’’ itself should be ‘‘put out of use’’ (RA; GW III: 484). The voice of
pure language, by contrast, pronounces a death sentence it has always al-
ready executed, since otherwise it could not be heard at all. The history of
linguistic meaning needs to be silenced before true speech can reemerge,
which is to say that the voice of language remains inextricably bound to its
own self-negation in the form of silence.
For Hofmannsthal, silence is constitutive of speech. Yet it can only be
evoked in and through speech, and the actor Mitterwurzer is praised for si-
lencing the dead by literally talking them to death. ‘‘Only in true speech is
it possible to remain silent’’ (Nur im echten Reden ist eigentliches Schwei-
gen möglich) (Sein und Zeit 165), Heidegger asserts in Being and Time and
thus captures the essence of Hofmannsthal’s early reflections on language.
Silence is the ultimate limit and (im)possible fulfillment of speech as well
as its lost origin and necessary ground for rejuvenation. It is not opposed
to speech, but rather entwined with it, nurturing its magical power to ma-
terialize the presence of life. This presence becomes visually manifest in the
physical body that voices language. Unlike Romanticism, Aestheticism does
not simply strive toward poetic silence or the absolute as an end in and of
itself. Rather, it recognizes this originary silence always already at work in
speech, which thus partakes of the being of language. Poetic words are born
and come alive only in and through a living body that, in speaking their
name, both dissolves them into thin air and grants them a material basis for
being themselves. As physical properties of that body, words become trans-
formed into ‘‘weapons like the teeth and the nails,’’ whose function it is to
ward off death and to embrace life. For Hofmannsthal, to speak is to give
voice to a primordial silence that testifies to one’s own physical presence and
hence to the being of language.
It is crucial, for two reasons, to remember that Hofmannsthal’s brief essay
‘‘Eine Monographie’’ refers to an actor rather than an arbitrary individual.
First, because the celebrated self-expression evident in Mitterwurzer’s
speech—the ‘‘inner condition’’ he so accurately portrays—always pertains
to an other (i.e., the fictional character he personifies) rather than to the
actor’s own proper self. This split between self and other adequately cap-
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upon human agency, it controls it nonetheless: ‘‘It is not I who thinks; it
thinks in me’’ (Mauthner 42), Fritz Mauthner declared categorically already
in 1902. His formulation anticipates Jacques Lacan’s later investigation into
the linguistic structure of the unconscious, and the early Hofmannsthal con-
ceives of language very much along the same lines. For him, too, language is
not a human invention, ‘‘because all of its meaning language already carries
within itself, and whoever descends down into its dark chambers will en-
counter such a knowledge blowing from its shafts that hewill fall silent like a
mute’’ ([D]enn: allen Sinn hat sie [die Sprache] schon in sich und wer in ihre
Gewölbe hinabsteigt, dem weht aus ihren Schachten ein solchesWissen ent-
gegen, daß er verstummt wie ein Stummer) (‘‘Nachlass’’; RA; GW III: 414).
The being of language precedes the speaking subject, yet requires it nonethe-
less since the task of the poet consists in setting language free so that it can lit-
erally learn to speak itself: ‘‘The point is not to express ourselves in language,
but to express language within us’’ (Es handelt sich nicht darum, uns in der
Sprache, sondern die Sprache in uns auszuprägen) (‘‘Nachlass’’; RA; GW III:
309). The parallels to later twentieth-century philosophy of language are
obvious and best exemplified in Heidegger’s Unterwegs zur Sprache, where
he states: ‘‘That of which we speak, language, is always already ahead of us.
We only speak after it’’ (‘‘Das Wesen der Sprache’’ 179).
Hofmannsthal’s claim that ‘‘when he [Mitterwurzer] talks, he alone
speaks,’’ must thus not be understood as a celebration of bourgeois sub-
jectivity. On the contrary, he applauds the actor’s ability to extinguish his
own self by giving voice to the performativity of his body. Language, for
Hofmannsthal, always seeks to express itself and not the extralinguistic in-
tentions of the speaker. Around 1900, ‘‘it is language which speaks, not the
author,’’ as Barthes formulates it with reference to Mallarmé (‘‘Death of the
Author’’; Image 143). This notion of the ‘‘author’’ is the second reason for
remembering Mitterwurzer’s profession, for it is much easier to bring lan-
guage to life through actual speech as compared towritten poetry. Although
Hofmannsthal will later turn his attention to opera and the performing arts,
in his early years he still faces the dilemma of having to write rather than
actually speak poetry. Writing is paradigmatic for the process of alienation
Hofmannsthal tries to avoid since it visually represents the reification of a
once embodied and living language into the fixed grid of static symbols. In
any text, letters have to take their place once and for all before signification
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It follows that the status of poetry remains ambivalent for Hofmanns-
thal: as a textual document, the poem acts as irrefutable evidence that it has
always already died before meeting the eye of its reader. Since it cannot not
solidify into writing—otherwise it could never traverse the spatiotemporal
distance that separates it from the reader—the only option left for poetry is
to try to undo the process of its own reification retrospectively during the
act of being read. As I argued above, Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Vorfrühling’’ does
precisely that: it thematizes and self-consciously exploits the breathing appa-
ratus—the ‘‘Windes Wehn’’—of its reader to enact its own being and be-
come alive again as pure and original, that is, spoken language. At the same
time, however, the poem is not simply being undone, but also reaffirmed
as the material evidence for the being of language. Language must be lib-
erated from writing and the reification of meaning, but it must also return
to and reinhabit the text in order to rejuvenate it from within. The point is
that both movements, the transcendence and the restoration of writing in
and through poetry, must occur simultaneously, a process that, in the eyes
of the young Hofmannsthal, can only be described as the work of magic.
Literary criticism, however, has generally tried to dissolve this magical
paradox toward either of its constitutive poles. Commenting on the com-
plex relationship between life and poetry, Adorno, for example, converts
the paradox into a dialectics: ‘‘The alienation of art from life advocated by
George and Hofmannsthal is meant to elevate art, yet it reverts to a limit-
less and submissive closeness to life’’ (Die von George und Hofmannsthal
urgierte Entfremdung der Kunst vom Leben, die die Kunst zu erhöhen ge-
denkt, schlägt in grenzenlose und gefügige Nähe zum Leben um) (‘‘George
und Hofmannsthal’’;GS 10/1: 234). Adorno establishes an either-or relation-
ship between art and life. In doing so, he misses the crucial point that, ac-
cording to the Aestheticist ideal, art is united with life precisely by remaining
separated from it, just like words gain their proper meaning by refusing to
signify. Due to this limited perspective, Adorno once again charges Aestheti-
cism with sacrificing the human subject to the forces of capitalism: ‘‘Instead
of the things surrendering as symbols of subjectivity, subjectivity gives in
and becomes a symbol for things. Thus, subjectivity accepts its own reifi-
cation into the thing to which society has already condemned it anyway’’
(Anstatt daß die Dinge als Symbole der Subjektivität nachgäben, gibt Sub-
jektivität nach als Symbol der Dinge, bereit, in sich selber schließlich zu
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wird) (ibid.). Aestheticism, by contrast, takes pride in this loss of subjec-
tivity, which it pictures as the sine qua non for the liberation of language,
humans, and things alike, whereas for Adorno it is tantamount to the indi-
vidual’s inability to withstand the hegemony of capitalism and the culture
industry. Although Adorno criticizes the authoritarian tendencies inherent
in the bourgeois notion of subjectivity, he cannot renounce it altogether
without also forfeiting the necessary basis for active resistance. The rational-
ist perspective informing his language—‘‘Subjectivity no longer knows itself
as the soul-giving center of the cosmos’’—betrays his defensiveness toward
a kind of poetry willing to abandon completely the humanist ideal of sub-
jectivity. Instead, it ought merely to expose its false redemption in the guise
of the capitalist consumer, as Adorno’s critique aims to do.
For Hofmannsthal, however, the problem of modernity cannot be solved
dialectically since dialectics tries to reconcile that which should have never
been severed to begin with. From an Aestheticist perspective, the modern
era first distinguishes between art and life (meaning and materiality) and
subsequently tries to undo the very separation it inaugurated. Both attempts
violate the integrity of the primordial ground constitutive of art and life
alike. In a time characterized by the fundamental forgetting of Being, as Hei-
degger would later argue, language necessarily succumbs to a universe of
empty signs that interject themselves in between Dasein and its world. The
following quote from Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics discerns both
aspects of Aestheticism’s notion of language, that is, the primordial power
(Gewalttat) to name and call forth theworld as well as its corrupt subsistence
in the form of material signs:
Das Nennen versieht nicht nachträglich ein sonst schon offenbares
Seiendes mit einer Bezeichnung und einem Merkzeichen, genannt Wort,
sondern umgekehrt: das Wort sinkt aus der Höhe seiner urspünglichen
Gewalt-tat als Eröffnung des Seins zum bloßen Zeichen herab, so zwar,
daß dieses selbst sich dann vor das Seiende schiebt. (Einführung in die
Metaphysik 131)
Naming does not come afterward, providing a being that is alreadyother-
wise revealed with a designation and a token called a word, but to the
contrary: from the height of its originary act of violence as the opening-







































































the voice of language : 173
such a way that this sign then thrusts itself before beings. (Heidegger,
Introduction to Metaphysics 182)
For Heidegger and Hofmannsthal alike, to speak is to open up violently the
realm of being, and this creative potential inheres in pure language. It fol-
lows that the problem of modern alienation needs to be approached not
from its desolate result, but from its original cause. By strictly separating
the realm of art and life, Hofmannsthal hopes to avoid the false attempts of
reconciliation yet simultaneously opens, in his eyes, the path toward the pri-
mordial understanding of both as fundamentally related in and through the
body of speech. As Hofmannsthal emphasizes repeatedly, poetry does not
artificially create a new language, but merely unlocks the invisible beauty
and magic already inherent in every single word itself. Common language
harbors gems we often fail to appreciate: ‘‘So tritt des Bettlers Fuß den Kies, /
Der eines EdelsteinsVerlies’’ (‘‘Weltgeheimnis’’;Gedichte 20), or: ‘‘Wir gehen
auf staubverhüllten Perlen’’ (‘‘Nachlaß’’; RA; GW III: 315).
Like Adorno, most scholars seeking to ‘‘grasp’’ Hofmannsthal’s poetics
miss this crucial point. They try to clarify the ‘‘matter’’ of modern poetry
by dissolving its constitutive paradox, that is, the nonidentical identity of
art and life, word and thing, toward one of its poles instead of keeping the
tension as such alive. Critics in the 1950s and 1960s generally interpreted
the Augenblick—those moments of ‘‘preexistence’’ or ‘‘magic’’ Hofmanns-
thal associateswith early childhood7—as a ‘‘religious experience’’ (Wunberg,
Der Frühe Hofmannsthal 106–7) or an ‘‘epiphany’’ (Ziolkowski) that leads
the subject toward its own self. More recent studies, by contrast, read the
Augenblick as an ‘‘aesthetics of flight’’ (Ästhetik des Flüchtigen) (Neumann)
that calls for a new poetics ‘‘at the border of the body’’ (Brandstetter and
Neumann). They argue that Hofmannsthal’s poetics does not point toward
some divine presence of absolute self-consciousness, but ratherdiscovers the
physical reality of the human body as a language in its own right.
Although I basically agree with the second kind of reading, it oddly co-
incides with the first in its predominantly negative view of poetic language,
which is said to completely efface itself in order to conjure either the spirit or
the body as the ‘‘real’’ world of poetry. Critics’ focus on this ‘‘aesthetic trans-
formation’’ allegedly affected by poetic language implicitly presupposes the
very separation of art and life that Hofmannsthal himself called into ques-
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already inhabits life, grants it, lives it. Hofmannsthal’s poetics indeed tries to
speak from the ‘‘ground zero’’ (Barthes) of language, that is, from the spatio-
temporal realm that underlies and sustains the dualistic universe of signifi-
cation. In this sense, poetry is a primordial quality of life, and the function of
speech is precisely to uncover the original, yet forgotten, ground—the being
of language itself—that reveals this original unity of words and things. Once
this revelation has occurred, art withdraws, and things linger in a state of
disarray, while an alienated system of signification mediates between them:
‘‘The thing itself,’’ Agamben notes, ‘‘is not a thing; it is the very sayability,
the very openness at issue in language, which, in language, we always pre-
suppose and forget, perhaps because it is at bottom its own oblivion and
abandonment’’ (Potentialities 35). Poetry around 1900 refuses to forget this
potentiality of language, and the ‘‘language-crisis’’ refers less to the lack of
absolute meaning captured in words than to this effort of language to find
its own voice and ‘‘speak itself.’’
For Hofmannsthal, there is no ‘‘I’’ expressing itself in art. Diametrically
opposed to the Cartesian notion of cognitively assured self-presence or the
Romanticist ideal of poetic genius, Hofmannsthal’s poetic ‘‘subject’’ emerges
as a hyphen between things. It is a locus of intersecting forces in the form
of a living body that can be read as the originary signature of things—the
‘‘metaphor of the subject’’ (Wiethölter 17). For many recent critics, his topo-
graphic sense of subjectivity redeems language in Hofmannsthal’s eyes—
not in the form of writing, to be sure, but understood metaphorically as the
imaginary text written by the gestures and movements of the human body.
Hofmannsthal’s increasing interest in the performing arts is said to reflect
both his emphasis on physical presence and his disinfatuation with the lyri-
cal genre. Contrary towritten texts, the life arts present a precarious balance
between acoustics, that is, the ephemeral presence of music and speech, on
the one hand, and vision, that is, the corporeal presence of moving bodies
metaphorically envisioned as text, on the other. This facile interplay of eye
and ear is regarded as superior to the complicated rhetorical mechanisms
necessary to make language speak poetically and overcome its false materi-
alization in the form of written symbols.
This juxtaposition of language versus the body is yet another false di-
chotomy that haunts Hofmannsthal studies, most notably those focusing on
his later contribution to the performing arts. Again, critics advance a dualis-
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‘‘false’’ language of linguistic utterances. Neither, however, can exist in total
isolation, meaning that for Hofmannsthal, word and gesture always belong
together and are primordially related.8 This is not to deny that Hofmanns-
thal’s later turn away from poetic production and toward real-life perfor-
mances was prompted by his search for a more direct expression of life in
the physical movements of the body. His comments on pantomime, ballet,
dance, and opera generally focus on the communicative power of the ‘‘ges-
ture’’ and must be situated in the context of Wilhelm Wundt’s ‘‘Gebärden-
sprache’’ and the entire ‘‘Lebensreform’’ cult around 1900.9 For Hofmanns-
thal, as for Wundt, Fiedler, Bergson, and many other artists and scientists
at the time, the gesture is an immediate articulation of an inner emotion or
thought and hence superior to everyday language: ‘‘A pure gesture is like a
pure thought’’ (Eine reine Gebärde ist wie ein reiner Gedanke) (‘‘Über die
Pantomime’’; RA; GW I: 504).
However, my discussion in the first part concerning the monistic prin-
ciple around 1900 has shown that such efforts to find an authentic expression
of inner life are related to the modernist ideal to give voice to a speaking
gaze able to merge materiality and meaning into one. A language beyond
language, the speaking gaze remains nothing but a fantasy still chained to
the process of signification it claims to transcend. The same holds true for
Hofmannsthal. Although in his later life he sought to express the intimate
connection between language and the body not poetically, but by means of
gestures and physical movements in space, the two forms of expression still
complement rather than contradict each other. Visual forms of communi-
cation are not simply superior to language, but instead approach the same
ideal of embodied meaning from its opposite end.
Given the abundance of studies regarding Hofmannsthal’s occupation
with theater, opera, and dance, let me briefly comment upon Hofmanns-
thal’s relationship to film for clarification of my point. Hofmannsthal was in-
deed very interested in the new medium and wrote several film scripts, some
of which were actually realized, with moderate success.10 In his short essay
‘‘Der Ersatz für die Träume’’ from 1921, Hofmannsthal regards the cinema
as the ‘‘honorable’’ space where modern man can still conceive of a more
immediate contact with the fleeting life surrounding him. Regular language,
he reformulates his well-known objection, has ceased to function as a me-
diator to life because ‘‘there remains too much of algebra in language, every
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jeder Buchstabe bedeckt wieder eine Ziffer) (‘‘Ersatz’’;RA; GW II: 143). Film,
by contrast, is reminiscent of humanity’s long-forgotten dreams and hence
emerges as a new kind of language of the soul that has moved ‘‘from digits
to epiphany’’ (‘‘Ersatz’’; RA; GW II: 145). In the essay Hofmannsthal evokes
the visionary power of film in a whole series of literary images that strik-
ingly resemble the strange apparitions mentioned by Lord Chandos in his
‘‘Letter’’: the old smelly basement, the look of an animal, scattered objects
lying in the sun. The two texts reveal a structural and thematic parallelism
that aligns the new medium of film with the motif of the ‘‘language-crisis’’
evoked in 1902.11
Moreover, Hofmannsthal’s various comments on pantomime and ges-
ture actually anticipate and rival central ideas later expressed in film theories
by Münsterberg, Balázs, or Kracauer, as recent critics have noted.12 Since
film, unlike photography, ‘‘captures’’ the fleeting presence of life only for the
duration of a magical Augenblick, it exemplifies Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic
notion regarding the constant flux of life and functions as a cultural ve-
hicle for his critique of common language. Similarly, Chandos’s enchanted
gaze might be understood as the recording and projecting lens of the cam-
era, while his body can be reconfigured as the apparatus itself that harbors
the intimate connection of all things. In other words, Chandos, the nar-
rator of the ‘‘Letter,’’ might be said to ‘‘pose as a forerunner of Münster-
berg’s film viewer, giving in to the perceptual intensity of his own creations’’
(Oksiloff 75).
In spite of such similarities between the aesthetics of cinema and Hof-
mannsthal’s poetics, he ultimately remained ambiguous about the medium.
This ambivalence stems less from his ‘‘archaic modernism,’’ which allegedly
forced him to reject film as a symptom of mass culture,13 and is rather in-
dicative of the same reservation that led Bergson to denounce the cinemato-
graphic method.Unlike life philosophy, which focused on the pure duration
of time, film merely suggests continuity on the basis of difference. The struc-
tural analysis of the cinematic apparatus reveals the contradictory nature
of film, which, in the words of Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘‘lives on the denial of
difference: difference is necessary for it to live, but it lives on its negation’’
(Baudry 306).14 Film represents the incessant movement of life by means of a
technological apparatus that cannot but falsify it. The ‘‘imaginary signifier’’
(Christian Metz) of film is exclusively based on visual appearances and their
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ality on screen and hence realize Hofmannsthal’s poetic ideals exclusively in
the realm of the imaginary. In so doing, cinema exposes its fetishistic nature
as well as its complicity with the more traditional means of representation,
including everyday language. Both present a mere illusion of life, an illu-
sion that is based upon the spatialization of time typical for modernity at
large. By contrast, Hofmannsthal is still caught up in the paradoxical effort
to somehow signify the end of signification, which is to say that regardless
of the various aesthetic media he engages over the years—be they poetry,
film, or the performing arts—his goal remains to intuit the primordial unity
of meaning and matter, language and body, rather than promoting the su-
periority of one over the other.
Silence in ‘‘A Letter’’
In the final part of this chapter, I want to turn to one of Hofmanns-
thal’smost famous texts to support this claim. ‘‘Ein Brief,’’ published in 1902,
has been celebrated as the quintessential modern text, a work that not only
marks a decisive shift in Hofmannsthal’s literary career, but signals the de-
finitive break of modernism with traditional nineteenth-century aesthetics,
as Walter Jens and Richard Brinkmann have argued. The discussion usually
centers on the so-called ‘‘language-crisis’’ that functions as the constitutive
paradox of Hofmannsthal’s text. Chandos’s tormented confession that the
words ‘‘disintegrate in [his] mouth like rotten mushrooms’’ is belied by the
eloquence and rhetorical power of the statement itself. According to earlier
critics, the paradox can be explained by Hofmannsthal’s ability to exploit it
aesthetically. It is only because he himself suffered through the ‘‘language-
crisis’’ that he was able to express and thus overcome it poetically.15 By
contrast, more recent studies have questioned the genesis of the Chandos
Letter out of a ‘‘language-crisis’’ allegedly experienced by Hofmannsthal
himself and thus have tried to disassociate the biographical from the fictional
realm.16
This seemingly academic issue about the relationship between Hof-
mannsthal and his most famous text is far from irrelevant. It speaks, above
all, to the question of artistic genius with which traditional scholarship tried
to account for what is still conceived as the aesthetically enticing, yet none-
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words, consists in the ambivalent or paradoxical nature of Hofmannsthal’s
text, which critics desperately try to disentangle. Chandos, the diegetic hero
allegedly suffering from speech paralysis, had to be rehabilitated by refer-
ence to the mature poetic genius of Hofmannsthal himself. The latter sup-
plied the creative power the former was said to lack, thus resolving the aes-
thetic tension that characterizes ‘‘Ein Brief.’’ The major problem with this
approach concerns not only the obvious methodological taboo to equate
fictional characters with their authors. More important, the affirmation of
creative genius completely invertsHofmannsthal’s poetological ideal, for the
notion of modern subjectivity is precisely what needs to be undone before
the liberation of words and things can be effected in the first place. The
human subject, like any other ‘‘thing,’’ comes into its own in conjunction
with poetic or linguistic effects and not as their cause. Like Bergson’s phi-
losopher of life, the poet tries to express and ‘‘speak after’’ his original intu-
itions of life, only to discover that life itself inheres in speech much as in
other movements of his body.
Hofmannsthal’s deconstruction of modern subjectivity also exposes the
problematic aspect of Daviau’s and le Rider’s interpretations, which fall
prey to the same misperceptions they critique. Although they disentangle
Hofmannsthal’s texts from his private life, they, too, imply a sense of artis-
tic mastery and subjective control that runs counter to Hofmannsthal’s own
poetic visions. For him, the poet is not hewho speaks or manipulates words,
but he who lets himself be spoken by a language that ‘‘grows into one’s
mouth’’ and is like a ‘‘chain in one’s hand’’ (Gedichte; GW 189), that is, rep-
resents a physical part of one’s own body.17 Even if one were to agree with
critics’ claim thatHofmannsthal’s ownpoetic practice contradicts his poeto-
logical critique of subjectivity insofar as he ultimately remains in total con-
trol of the texts he writes, the question still remains as to the aesthetic rele-
vance of this contradiction. Why should one further investigate this alleged
conflict between the real poet Hofmannsthal and the fictional poet Chandos
unless onewere interested in corroboratingHofmannsthal’s canonical status
as an exemplary, ingenious writer at the turn of the century? Since this is not
my primary concern, it is more germane to resituate this tension between
mastery and resignation within the text itself rather than between the artist
and his creation, particularly since Aestheticism itself is defined precisely by
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An adequate way of reading ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ must locate and trace this aes-
thetic movement within Hofmannsthal’s own text until the reader encoun-
ters its outer limits. This approach allows one to articulate a critique of
Hofmannsthal’s poetic ideal that emanates from within the text’s own pa-
rameters rather than from an ‘‘objective’’ viewpoint outside the text. By
means of this technique, it also becomes apparent that the traditionally
emphasized Sonderstellung of the Chandos Letter with regard to both Hof-
mannsthal’s own literary career and the history of literary modernism can-
not be sustained. ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ does not fundamentallydiffer fromHofmanns-
thal’s other texts around 1900, nor does its self-conscious exploration of
linguistic difference distinguish it from similar poetic and philosophical ex-
periments at the time. The constitutive paradox of ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ is nothing
but the paradoxical nature of language itself.
In the end, Chandos explicitly acknowledges this paradox as a kind of
mythical ormagical experience inwhich ‘‘the silent things themselves’’ begin
to speak in a language ‘‘of which not even one word is known to me’’ (‘‘Ein
Brief ’’ 472). Chandos’s call for a new language that allows us to ‘‘think with
the heart’’ (‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 469) represents an emphatic rejection of stereo-
typical and lifeless metaphorical constructs in favor of new and truly un-
thinkable ones, those that do not immediately—and ideally never should—
‘‘make sense’’ and therefore have the potential to ‘‘become’’ that which they
are not: a pure symbol that literally is the thing itself—a language beyond
language. However, one may also reverse this perspective: Chandos’s im-
possible language has always already been spoken the same moment it was
declared impossible. His ideal to ‘‘think with the heart’’ came alive and died
within the very metaphors he used to express it. Hence, it remains unclear
and ultimately irrelevant whether Chandos’s future silence is to be seen as a
fulfilled language finally coming into its own or as a broken language unable
to speak with its own voice.What is important, however, is to see if there re-
mains in the end some kind of material proof or physical imprint that might
serve to consolidate and thus anchor the self-reflexive movement of the text.
Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ does not dismiss language as such, but criti-
cizes primarily the use of abstract terms and reified concepts that have be-
come self-referential and out of touch with the living ‘‘things’’ they are sup-
posed to represent. Chandos describes the gradual disintegration of an entire
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Es gelang mir nicht mehr, sie [die Menschen und ihre Handlungen] mit
dem vereinfachenden Blick der Gewohnheit zu erfassen. Es zerfiel mir
alles in Teile, die Teile wieder in Teile, und nichts mehr ließ sich mit
einem Begriff umspannen. Die einzelnen Worte schwammen um mich;
sie gerannen zu Augen, die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hinein-
starren muß: Wirbel sind sie, in die hinabzusehen mich schwindelt, die
sich unaufhaltsam drehen und durch die hindurch man ins Leere kommt.
(‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 466; my emphasis)
I could no longer comprehend them [people and their actions] with the
simplifying glance of habit. Everything fell into fragments for me, the frag-
ments into further fragments, until it seemed impossible to contain any-
thing at all within a single concept. Disjointed words swam about me,
congealing into staring eyes whose gaze I was forced to return; whirlpools
they were, and I could not look into them without dizziness, their inces-
sant turning only drew me down into emptiness. (Lord Chandos Letter
21; my emphasis)
Since the quote above emphasizes the lost ability to execute common vision
first, the ensuing disintegration of language pertains particularly to its visual
aspects in the form of writing. The words staring back at Chandos are those
reified symbols that have gained a material existence of their own, inde-
pendent from the real life experiences they are supposed to convey. As in
the poem ‘‘Vorfrühling,’’ Chandos presents the undoing of a reified lan-
guage system as the indispensable step toward metaphorically embracing
that which lies at its core. In this regard, the Chandos Letter again repeats
the typical metaphysical distinction between a live and a dead language,
particularly since the disintegration of common, everyday words represents
more to Chandos than simply a loss. Chandos’s unlearning of an abstract
language system is accompanied by his simultaneous visual appreciation of
the life surrounding him, such that the pure presence of things is witnessed
and experienced as part of his own self:
Diese stummen und manchmal unbelebten Kreaturen heben sich mir mit
einer solchen Fülle, einer solchen Gegenwart der Liebe entgegen, daß
mein beglücktes Auge auch ringsumauf keinen toten Fleck zu fallen vermag.
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alles, was meine verworrensten Gedanken berühren, etwas zu sein. (‘‘Ein
Brief ’’ 469; my emphasis)
These dumb, often inanimate creatures lift themselves toward me with
such fullness, such an intensity of love that my enraptured eye cannot light
on any lifeless spot anywhere about me. And it strikes me then that every-
thing, everything in this world, everything I can remember, everything
that my most wayward thoughts might touch upon, is something after all.
(Lord Chandos Letter 27; my emphasis)
Chandos becomes mute in order to see what he feels and he feels what he
sees. This distinction between language and vision is central to the Chandos
Letter. It focuses on two central themes, the ‘‘Sprach-Spiel’’ and the ‘‘Augen-
Blick’’ (Neumann, ‘‘Sprach-Spiel’’). Hofmannsthal scholars have generally
seen these concepts in competition with each other in the sense that the infi-
nite play of linguistic difference is finally overcome in the momentary ‘‘light-
ning’’ of visual truth. The proper meaning of one paradigm is thus defined
in opposition to the other, most obviously in Hofmannsthal’s early plays,
wherewe find the individual self situated in between the interdependent, yet
adverse, forces of language and vision, spirit and body, absence and pres-
ence. In ‘‘Die Hochzeit der Sobeide,’’ to give a specific example, words are
judged responsible for inhibiting meaningful discourse: ‘‘Stop these words,’’
Hofmannsthal’s heroine Sobeide exclaims toward the end of the play, ‘‘I am
dizzy and they glitter before my eyes’’ (Laß solche Worte, mir ist schwindlig
und sie flimmern vor den Augen) (442f.).
The quote recalls the disintegration of language described by Chandos
and points to a typical motif in the early Hofmannsthal: the look of things
is literally obstructed by the linguistic universe interjected between self and
other. Those who must see (or read) words cannot see the things themselves
anymore and hence are unable to feel the touch of the reciprocal gaze that
sustains life.18 The ‘‘Augen-Blick,’’ it follows, is one of those rare moments of
a quasi-religious epiphany in which the self feels itself being seen by an other.
Let me emphasize again that this reciprocity of the gaze is fundamentally dif-
ferent from its poetic counterpart around 1800.Unlike theRomantic subject,
the seen seer around 1900 feels himself touched by a gaze he does not con-







































































182 : part i i
because the other’s look has already pierced the realm of the imaginary and
made contact with the corporeal reality that sustains it.
Around 1900, that which looks back is language, and Sobeide, much like
Chandos, must come to terms with a reality that is constituted upon words
and things alike. Throughout the ‘‘Letter,’’ there appears no gaze purified
from language, an observation that holds true both for the extradiegetic
readers of Hofmannsthal’s texts and the fictional characters they encounter
therein. On both levels, the poetic ‘‘Augen-Blick’’ is exposed as a linguis-
tic metaphor that summons language the very moment it overcomes it.
Hofmannsthal depicts the relationship between language and vision not as
a static opposition, but as an interdependent play of metaphors in which the
two poles simultaneously constitute and eradicate each other both as and
within the text. Instead of maintaining a strict dichotomy between language
and vision, the Chandos Letter simultaneously advocates and breaks down
the juxtaposition between ‘‘Sprach-Spiel’’ and ‘‘Augen-Blick.’’
Given this subversive performativity of ‘‘A Letter,’’ it becomes exceed-
ingly difficult for the reader to see the difference between the time before and
after his ‘‘language-crisis’’ because thewords used to describe this difference
are literally the same. This is most apparent in the central metaphor of the
spiraling abyss that relates both to Chandos’s earlier ‘‘language-crisis’’ (i.e.,
the words staring back at him from the bottom of an abyss) and to his later
states of apotheosis, which he depicts as follows:
Und das Ganze ist eine Art fieberisches Denken, aber Denken in einem
Material, das unmittelbarer, flüssiger, glühender ist als Worte. Es sind
gleichfalls Wirbel, aber solche, die nicht wie die Wirbel der Sprache ins
Bodenlose zu führen scheinen, sondern irgendwie in mich selber und in
den tiefsten Schoß des Friedens. (‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 471)
All of this is only a kind of feverish thought, but thought in a medium
more direct, more fluid, more incandescent than words.Whirlpools there
are in it too, yet of a kind that does not appear to lead to the abyss like the
whirlpools of language, but rather into my inner self and into the deepest
womb of peace. (Lord Chandos Letter 31)
The vortex metaphor thus creates a bridge between the time before and after
the crisis. Although it is called upon to mark a difference, the metaphor con-
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metaphorical ambiguity pervades the entire text. The Lord’s early projects
leading up to his ultimate oeuvre entitled ‘‘Nosce te ipsum,’’ for example,
are characterized as follows:
Ich wollte die Fabeln und mythischen Erzählungen . . . aufschließen als
die Hieroglyphen einer geheimen, unerschöpflichenWeisheit, deren An-
hauch ich manchmal, wie hinter einem Schleier, zu spüren meinte. Ich
entsinne mich dieses Plans. Es lag ihm ich weiß nicht welche sinnliche
und geistige Lust zugrunde: Wie der gehetzte Hirsch im Wasser sehnte
ich mich hinein in diese nackten, glänzenden Leiber, in diese Sirenen und
Dryaden, diesen Narcissus und Proteus, Perseus und Aktäon: verschwin-
den wollte ich in ihnen und aus ihnen heraus mit Zungen reden. (‘‘Ein
Brief ’’ 463)
I wanted to elucidate the fables and mythological tales handed down to
us by the ancients, those endless sources of naive delight for painters and
sculptors, as hieroglyphs of an arcane, inexhaustible wisdom, a breath of
which I had convinced myself I could feel at times as though through a
veil. I remember the planwell, but I no longer knowwhat sensual or intel-
lectual urges lay behind it. As the hunted stag strains toward water, so did
I yearn to cast myself into those naked, radiant bodies, those sirens and
dryads, Narcissus and Proteus, Perseus and Actaeon; I wished to become
one with them and to speak forth from them in tongues. (Lord Chandos
Letter 16–17)
This project certainly does not describe a rationalist project of scientific
empiricism, at least not in the sense that Francis Bacon, the addressee of
Chandos’s letter and the founder of British empiricism, could have possibly
approved of it.19 Instead of explaining the things in the world in rational
terms, Chandos’s original hope was to ‘‘speak in tongues’’ the primordial
language spoken by the things themselves. This hope to dissolve himself
within the world that surrounds him not only renders suspect the pro-
posed title of the entire project,20 but it also reveals human self-knowledge
to be based not on a strong sense of Cartesian subjectivity, but rather on
an intimate relation with and understanding of every-thing around us, a
self-understanding that demands individual openness rather than closure,
artistic fluidity rather than scientific rigor.







































































184 : part i i
periences of ‘‘life,’’ the change allegedly affected by the ‘‘language-crisis’’
becomes questionable, as does the opposition between ‘‘Sprach-spiel’’ and
‘‘Augen-blick.’’ There seems to remain little, if any, difference betweenChan-
dos’s previous aspirations to ‘‘be in themiddle of everything,’’ to ‘‘disappear’’
in signs and things alike in order ‘‘to speak in tongues’’ from out of them
(‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 463f.), and his later sensations of an ‘‘incredible empathy, a
flowing over into these beings’’ (‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 468) that allows him ‘‘to think
with the heart’’ and to speak ‘‘a language in which the silent things speak’’
to him (‘‘Ein Brief ’’ 472). Twice his body is depicted as the locus where signs
and things meet, an unalienated space ‘‘consisting of nothing but chiffres’’
(469) able to ‘‘open up one creature after the other’’ (464). Both before and
after his ‘‘crisis,’’ Chandos portrays the human body as the site where a new
language is inscribed. Twice, the body is said to consist of nothing but signs
literally in touch with their external referents, meaning that the very dis-
tinction between self and other, sign and referent becomes immaterial and
breaks down.
Indeed, the ‘‘Letter’’ seems to mirror this breakdown on the textual level
by means of literary images that fuse and undermine the linearity of Chan-
dos’s story. The text not only mobilizes similar metaphors at its begin-
ning and end, but uses similar key words throughout: ‘‘aufsperren’’ and
‘‘aufschließen,’’ ‘‘Hieroglyphe’’ and ‘‘Chiffre,’’ a homology that culminates
in the juxtaposition of two different kinds of ‘‘vortexes,’’ one of which is
said to lead into the abyss, while the other, we read, leads to Chandos’s own
self.21 It appears that anyone trying to think through these (dis)connections
will herself inevitably fall prey to that metaphor, that is, will be absorbed
into the linguistic vortex Chandos depicts in his letter. This aesthetic self-
performance is central to Hofmannsthal’s text. His letter, one might ar-
gue, reaches its proper destination each time the nauseating nonpresence of
meaning is being experienced by the reader during the act of reading.
Obviously, such a one-dimensional reading of the ‘‘Letter’’ completely
disregards the performative quality of Hofmannsthal’s text, which literally
works through these metaphors. If the text indeed folds back upon itself,
the point is to examine how the ‘‘Letter’’ accounts for this temporal move-
ment in spatial terms within its own aesthetic structure—not, to be sure, on
the diegetic level of the text, but rather on its stylistic and material plane.
The problem, in other words, needs to be solved on the material level of
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ever, is precisely what most recent studies have failed to do. Recognizing
the difficulty to distinguish the time before and after the ‘‘language-crisis’’
in Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Letter’’ while, at the same time, refusing simply to ac-
cept this difficulty as the definitive characteristic or the founding paradox
of the text, contemporary scholarship argued in favor of dissecting the text
into three distinct phases with each one of them allegedly governed by dif-
ferent notions of subjectivity and its relationship to the world. In doing so,
however, critics have reinscribed de facto the very notion of spatiotemporal
polarity and abstraction the ‘‘Letter’’ itself deliberately tries to undermine.
Waltraud Wiethölter, for example, claims that Chandos’s earlier attempts
to conjure the presence of meaning were stilled marred by his narcissistic
gaze ‘‘that did not want anything else but itself ’’ (Wiethölter 62), whereas
the Lord later adapts his own self to ‘‘a body-languagewhose laws, rules, and
grammar are least determined by the subject itself ’’ (68; my translation).
Chandos, in other words, gives up his Romantic illusion of self-governed
subjectivity in favor of a self governed by the (Lacanian) Other.22 To be sure,
Wiethölter and others aptly configure the crucial difference between the
‘‘discourse networks’’ of 1800 and 1900. The first encounters the self in lit-
erally every-thing it perceives, the second reduces the same self to a thing
among things and a body among bodies. In the context of our previous dis-
cussion, one might rephrase these critics’ position as follows: Hofmanns-
thal’s ‘‘Letter’’ describes the history of modern poetics from its Romanticist
beginnings to its Aestheticist dissolution as one of loosing the (conscious)
self in favor of finding the (physical) body. The transition from one to the
other necessitates an equally crucial shift from verbal to corporeal significa-
tion, from linguistic to embodied meaning. The young Chandos was still en-
gaged in a hermeneutic project because it was through the process of reading
and writing that he had sought to discover both the external world and his
own inner self. The older Chandos, by contrast, experiences his own self as
a contingent and arbitrary body within the flux of life. As he rejects the idea
of a ubiquitous, disembodied subject of pure consciousness, Chandos comes
to realize that the silent language of things he romantically envisioned else-
where always already speaks through the actions and sensations of his own
body. In the end, Chandos has learned to feel within himself the language
of life.
If I nonetheless hesitate to embrace this by now canonical reading of







































































186 : part i i
tures or subjectivity and the body, I do so because it strikesme as unbalanced
in its disregard for the performative dimension of the text that emphasizes
the connection between these poles.23 Contemporary critics read the text
referentially and reduce it to its ‘‘message’’ about embodied meaning at the
end. Hence, all stylistic consideration falls by thewayside: the striking meta-
phorical similarity between the first and the third phase of the ‘‘Letter’’ is
only mentioned in order to be immediately dissolved again within the larger
framework of Chandos’s personal development. In this sense, the somehow
warped structure of the ‘‘Letter’’ seems to be more or less accidental and not
worthy of further analysis. This, in turn, allows critics to situate ‘‘Ein Brief ’’
in the broader cultural context of the time, such as the popular cult of the
(naked) body or Charcot’s and Freud’s studies on hysteria and physiologi-
cal dysfunctionalities.24 Kittler, for example, discerns the nonhermeneutic
‘‘meaning’’ of Hofmannsthal’s text as if he himself had indeed witnessed,
like Charcot and Freud, the actual body language of the ‘‘patient’’ Chandos
rather than merely read about the behavior of a fictional character. This per-
spective, however, distorts the picture, because Hofmannsthal’s new para-
digm of embodied meaning only unfolds within the old system of linguistic
signification and hence remains intertwined with it. Reading the ‘‘Letter,’’
the reader must not in the end abstract from the difficulties inherent in the
reading process as such since the text merely performs the signification of
this new ‘‘body language,’’ but does not actually present that language itself.
To take the ‘‘Letter’’ at face value, that is, to read it referentially as if it were
nothing but a scientific document describing the symptoms of alexia, is to
disregard the self-conscious exploration of the very letter that constitutes
the text.
Although I am wary of the common fallacy to identify Hofmannsthal
himself with his fictional hero, the parallels established by the critical re-
ception of both are striking. Twice, critics focus on the final message of the
text and try to establish a linear narrative leading from one state of affairs
to another. They read two life stories along the chronological lines of a time
‘‘before’’ (i.e., Hofmannsthal before the language-crisis exemplified in ‘‘Ein
Brief ’’ andChandos before he lost his ability to ‘‘speak’’) and the time ‘‘after’’
(i.e., Hofmannsthal after he had forsaken poetry and turned toward the per-
forming arts and Chandos after he experienced his quasi-religious epipha-







































































the voice of language : 187
notion of becoming that Aestheticism seeks to overcome in favor of a Berg-
sonian élan vital, which cannot be intellectualized and dissected into dif-
ferent stages of a linear development. Rather, it needs to be intuited as a
paradoxical whole, much as Chandos’s epiphanies of a silent language spo-
ken by the things themselves ultimately take shape in the form of a written
text.
I want to suggest that there is no way out of the performative paradox
that linguistically signifies a language beyond language except bymarking it
as an impossibility in the structure of the text. If ‘‘presence, then, is the trace
of the trace, the trace of the erasure of trace’’ (Derrida, Margins of Philoso-
phy 66), the ‘‘Letter’’ must somewhat recover its own tracks, that is, the trail
of signification it leaves behind. This is why Hofmannsthal’s text ultimately
circles back to its own beginnings. The ‘‘Letter’’ signifies on two interdepen-
dent levels, telling the storyof Chandos’s changed relation to theworldwhile
simultaneously undermining that difference by means of the similar meta-
phors it employs. It reflects its own existence as text and relates it to the
message evoked therein. Since Chandos’s momentary experiences of ‘‘full,
most solemn presence’’ are expressed in a medium itself defined by its ‘‘dif-
férance’’ (Derrida), the ‘‘Letter’’ must try to deconstruct the difference that
constitutes it. At the same time, however, itmust leave some formof physical
residue (a trace, if you wish) to authenticate this process of self-erasure.
In the poem ‘‘Vorfrühling,’’ this residue was pictured as a syntactical
marker in the form of a period. In the ‘‘Letter,’’ it takes the shape of stylis-
tic and syntactic changes that both reiterate and disfigure earlier passages
of the text. As Neil H. Donahue has argued, the ‘‘Letter’’ structurally culmi-
nates in the final image of the antique orator Crassus that haunts Chandos’s
thought:
Das Bild dieses Crassus ist zuweilen nachts in meinem Hirn, wie ein Split-
ter, um den herum alles schwärt, pulst und kocht. Es ist mir dann, als ge-
riete ich selber in Gärung, würfe Blasen auf, wallte und funkelte. Und das
Ganze ist eine Art fieberisches Denken, aber Denken in einem Material,
das unmittelbarer, flüssiger, glühender ist als Worte. Es sind gleichfalls
Wirbel, aber solche, die nicht wie die Wirbel der Sprache ins Bodenlose
zu führen scheinen, sondern irgendwie in mich selber und in den tiefsten







































































188 : part i i
At times the image of this Crassus lodges in my mind like a splinter that
makes everything around it fester, throb, and burn. When that happens
I could almost think that I myself am beginning to ferment, to send up
bubbles, to boil and throw off sparks. All of this is only a kind of feverish
thought, but thought in a medium more direct, more fluid, more incan-
descent than words.Whirlpools there are in it too, yet of a kind that does
not appear to lead to the abyss like the whirlpools of language, but rather
into my inner self and into the deepest womb of peace. (Lord Chandos
Letter 31)
This image of an ‘‘irreducible fixation,’’ Donahue argues in a detailed analy-
sis, is the quintessential focus of the text and literally pictures, by means of
the paratactical style used to describe it, Chandos’s ideal of a spatialized or
embodied language: ‘‘The stasis of hermetic self-containment in the splin-
ter paragraph, based on reflexive reference, establishes the autonomy of the
paragraphwithin the letter as awhole, which it nevertheless concludes and in
form recapitulates. The paradox of autonomy within the letter is the formal
execution of the paradox of immanent transcendence, a formal simulacrum
of Chandos’s described experience of ‘secular revelation’ ’’ (Donahue 45).
This crucial shift from abstract content to concrete form at the end of the
‘‘Letter’’ once again highlights the fact that language figures as culprit and
liberator simultaneously. It is both the cause and the remedy for the separa-
tion of body and meaning. Hofmannsthal’s view of language is neither en-
tirely ‘‘negative’’ nor entirely ‘‘positive,’’ but both at once. His text points to
the fundamental interdependency of these binary oppositions that allegedly
inform the entire culture around 1900, such as language versus intuition,
mind versus matter, and meaning versus the body. Given Hofmannsthal’s
vision of language (for to call it his ‘‘understanding’’ of language would be
to violate what he envisions), critics’ emphasis on the ‘‘language-crisis’’ al-
legedly expressed in the ‘‘Letter’’ simply amounts to a tautology because
language is always and necessarily ‘‘in crisis’’: it seeks to become what it is
not by remaining true to what it already is. This aporia is the very essence
of language.
Once we read the ‘‘Letter’’ as the self-conscious effort to highlight this
aporia at the heart of language, the traditionally emphasized self-contradic-
tory nature of Hofmannsthal’s text is revealed as an integral part of its advo-







































































the voice of language : 189
in ordinary, meaningful language, Hofmannsthal’s text must create a geo-
graphical space for it to appear. Hence, the ‘‘Letter’’ tells the story of two
different ‘‘moments’’ that nonetheless metaphorically blend together so that
the narrative as a whole has nothing left to say (on the content level), but
only to show (on the stylistic level). Seeking to erase itself, it becomes a
medium without a message, or, put differently, its message consists in the
transformative power of the linguistic medium itself, whose spatial recon-
figuration visually presents the end of signification and the beginning of a
body language still alive within the words that ostracize it. And yet, it is
equally obvious that the ‘‘ ‘stylistic revelation’ of parataxis in the splinter
paragraph’’ (Donahue 47) cannot picture this embodied language as poi-
gnantly as ‘‘Vorfrühling.’’ The crucial period in the latter presents a more
radicalized version of Hofmannsthal’s ideal because it completelyovercomes
the temporal dimension of language and thus moves beyond signification
without forsaking meaning altogether. In the following chapter, I will ex-
amine how Rilke tried to solve the same problem via reference to the spatial
arts. My argument is that, once again, syntactical markers (periods, colons,
ellipses, etc.) will be called upon to purify language from the vicissitudes of
signification in order to create a material space—Rilke’s Weltinnenraum—







































































5 Rilke’s Stereoscopic Vision
Ja, alles, was wirklich geschaut wurde,
muß Gedicht werden!
—Rilke1
The Labor of Looking
Da neigt sich die Stunde und rührt mich an
mit klarem, metallenem Schlag:
mir zittern die Sinne. Ich fühle: ich kann—
und ich fasse den plastischen Tag.
Nichts war noch vollendet, eh ich es erschaut,
ein jedes Werden stand still.
Meine Blicke sind reif, und wie eine Braut
kommt jedem das Ding, das er will.
Nichts ist mir zu klein und ich lieb es trotzdem
und mal es auf Goldgrund und groß,
und halte es hoch, und ich weiß nicht wem
löst es die Seele los . . .
(Werke I: 253)2
Now the hour bows down, it touches me, throbs
metallic and lucid and bold:
my senses are trembling. I feel my own power—
on the plastic day I lay hold.
Until I perceived it, no thing was complete,







































































rilke’s stereoscopic vis ion : 191
My vision is ripe, to each glance like a bride
comes softly the thing that was willed.
There is nothing too small, but my tenderness paints
it large on a background of gold,
and I prize it, not knowing whose soul at the sight,
released, may unfold . . .3
The introductory poem in Rilke’s Stundenbuch (1899) describes the time
of the poet’s inspiration as a synaesthetic experience that literally makes the
body tremble. Auditory, visual, and tactile senses all work together to pro-
duce an overwhelming feeling of creative power. It gives rise to a poetic sub-
jectivity whose triumphant arrival is proclaimed by the threefold repetition
of the ‘‘ich’’ in verses three and four. The ‘‘I’’ promises a kind of mythical re-
demption in which the human individual becomes reunited with the things
surrounding him: ‘‘. . . und wie eine Braut / kommt jedem das Ding, das er
will.’’ The wedding signalizes the end of the modern dichotomy separating
subject and object by means of an embrace mirrored not only in the rhyme
pattern, but also in the structure of the poem. The poet stands not opposed
to the world he perceives, but is part of it, engaged in an eternal process of
receiving and giving that sustains all things. The ‘‘I’’ designates this power
to seize and shape the surrounding world to the maturity of a gaze that not
only perceives the things, but literally touches and completes them.Through
the mere act of looking, the artist unlocks the reified forces of life. Under his
auspices, things finally come into their own and fulfill the potential that had
laid dormant inside them: ‘‘Nichts war noch vollendet, eh ich es erschaut, /
ein jedes Werden stand still.’’
Located at its center, this ‘‘Werden’’ is the cardinal concept of Rilke’s
poem.The sixth verse describes the crucialmoment of a ‘‘standstill,’’ a rhyth-
mic pause that results from the reversal of the élan vital running through the
poem.This transformative shift from reception to production, from looking
towriting defines Rilke’s poetics. The poet, himself ‘‘touched’’ by, and hence
but an object of, divine inspiration, returns the gift as he, now the sovereign
subject of his own action, ‘‘seizes the corporeal day’’ and literally ‘‘paints’’ a
new world in the guise of a poem. Indeed, the patron for Rilke’s process of
creative transformation is the spatial arts. He aims to paint a kind of poetry
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as the hands of the sculptor or painter give shape to the artwork, the gaze of
the poet must materialize in the shape of words that express the essence of
things. The poet’s ‘‘I’’ becomes the ‘‘eye.’’ It bequeaths a poem that appears
to have written itself during the mere act of looking at the world.
Although this poetic transformation is said to affect all things, it is lit-
erally bracketed by the twofold repetition of ‘‘Nichts’’ at the beginning of
stanzas two and three. The ‘‘Nichts’’ expresses an anxiety always present
within Rilke’s ideal of artistic creation, the fear that after all is said and done,
‘‘nothing’’ might remain to authenticate its success. In order to overcome
this anxiety and convince aesthetically, the poem, therefore, must be con-
ceived not only as an entire world of its own, but as a material work of art
as well. Only then can the inherent flaw of language, that is, its inability to
enter into a tactile relationship with the external world, be overcome. In the
end, the painted poem is being lifted up like one of the many ‘‘things’’ it
describes. This ‘‘thingness’’ of poetry and its material existence as a work of
art allows the poet to liberate the soul of a person unknown—the reader.
The ellipsis in the end signifies an openness that is crucial for the magi-
cal transformation allegedly affected by the poem. It creates an outlet for
the movement of creative energy passing from top to bottom through sub-
ject and object alike. This energy cannot remain confined to the fictional
realm of the poem itself, but must be allowed to traverse the abyss separat-
ing its own world from the realm beyond. Poetic success hinges on the ever
renewed ability of the artist to ‘‘touch’’ those outside of his reach by means
of a poetic gaze that connects and intertwines everything it perceives. The
fictional relationship between the lyrical ‘‘I’’ and its world is thus realized in
the factual encounter between the reader and the poem itself, for it is on the
receptive level that this poetic gaze gains shape. Due to the temporal nature
of language, Rilke’s poem not only describes the force of artistic creation,
but self-referentially performs it in the act of being read. The reader’s eyes
traversing the letters on the page become synonymous with the poet’s eyes
scanning and rejuvenating the world he envisions. The artist animates the
external world much like the reader enlivens the seemingly dead words of
the poem itself, and the real activity of the latter serves to validate the imagi-
nary performance of the former. To read is to realize the poetic gaze that
gives life, meaning that the reader becomes a poet in his own right.
The identity between the two becomes more obvious in Rilke’s later
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the inspired artist toward the ‘‘you’’ of the reader. The introductory poem
‘‘Eingang’’ in his Buch der Bilder from 1902, for example, once again evokes
the creative power of looking at things, yet also emphasizes the arbitrariness
of the person looking:
Eingang
Wer du auch seist: am Abend tritt hinaus
aus deiner Stube, drin du alles weißt;
als letztes vor der Ferne liegt dein Haus:
wer du auch seist.
Mit deinen Augen, welche müde kaum
von der verbrauchten Schwelle sich befrein,
hebst du ganz langsam einen schwarzen Baum
und stellst ihn vor den Himmel: schlank, allein.
Und hast die Welt gemacht. Und sie ist groß
und wie ein Wort, das noch im Schweigen reift.
Und wie dein Wille ihren Sinn begreift,
lassen sie deine Augen zärtlich los . . .
(Werke I: 371)
Entrance
Whoever you are: in the evening step out
of your room, where you know everything;
yours is the last house before the far-off:
whoever you are.
With your eyes, which in their weariness
barely free themselves from the worn-out threshold,
you lift very slowly one black tree
and place it against the sky: slender, alone.
And you have made the world. And it is huge
and like a word which grows ripe in silence.
And as your will seizes on its meaning,
tenderly your eyes let it go . . .4
The poem indeed reads like an instruction manual for aspiring poets.While
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to ‘‘undermine its aesthetic quality’’ (Willems 377f.), the poem also yields
crucial insights regarding Rilke’s poetic ambitions. The self-centered ideal
of the inspired artist who passively receives the divine gift of creation has
given way to a description outlining the various steps of a poetic practice
allegedly open to everyone able to see for him- or herself. In order ‘‘to create
theworld,’’ ‘‘you’’ merely need to leave behind the confinements of everyday
life and step outside not only your familiar surroundings (die Stube), but the
realm of the ‘‘known’’ in the factual sense (drin du allesweißt). Rilke’s choice
of ‘‘wissen’’ instead of the idiomatically more correct ‘‘kennen’’ locates artis-
tic creation outside of and opposed to the intellectual sphere. It also alludes
to the necessity of subverting existing linguistic idioms through innovative,
poetic speech. Both ‘‘used’’ (commodified) language and the ‘‘known’’ room
are part of the house ‘‘drin du alles weißt,’’ the rationalized, modern world
of everyday life Rilke rejects.
By contrast, the step over the exhausted threshold marks an entry into
the unknown openness of life as such. This new world still lacks words and
things alike, and the poem’s challenge consists in the evocation of a powerful
gaze able to fill the void and to recreate the world. This gaze is distinguished
from common perception since the twilight implied by the poem (Abend)
as well as your ‘‘tired’’ eyes impede a clear, enlightened vision of the world.
If seeing things relates to reading poetry, the new gaze in question must take
shape in the eyes of the reader. Hence, ‘‘Eingang’’ not only introduces the
major themes of Rilke’s entire collection of poems whose very title—Das
Buch der Bilder—speaks to the relationship between vision and language.
It also promotes the poem itself as the gateway for the reader to enter into
the very ‘‘open’’ that remains one of Rilke’s central themes. He who reads
poetry experiences life itself, Rilke contends in an essay on Goethe: ‘‘The
true and sublime art of the poet is to present the narrated events right in
front of the reader’s eye such that the present and its entire surroundings
would seem to vanish. Given this naturalness of art, the reader should not
merely feel the work of art, but actually experience the event itself ’’ (Das
ist des Dichters wahre, erhabene Kunst, dem Leser die Begebnisse, die er
erzählt, so lebhaft vor Augen zu führen,—daß ihm die Gegenwart und seine
ganze Umgebung zu entfliehen scheint, und daß er nicht nur ein Kunstwerk
empfindet, sondern über dessen klarer Natürlichkeit die Kunst vergißt, und
die Begebenheit—miterlebt) (‘‘Der Wanderer’’; Werke V: 283).
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‘‘neo-Romantic’’ (Käte Hamburger) stance nonetheless veils some funda-
mental differences between his own poetic ideals and those of German
Romanticism. One of them concerns the peculiar nature of Rilke’s gaze:
whereas Romanticism specified the mind, or Einbildungskraft, of the reader
as the locus where words are hermeneutically understood and transformed
into the images they represent, Rilke endorses the physiological aspects of
vision and thus grants full autonomy to the senses. For him, it is no longer
the mind that sees, but the eye itself now operates in cooperation with the
entire body. Similarly, ‘‘Eingang’’ calls for ‘‘you’’ not to stand in opposition
to the world, but literally to enter into and physically engage with it. This
movement is the prerequisite for both the liquidation of the old, reified uni-
verse and the creation of a new one through art. The two aspects are inex-
tricably linked together since poetry is both the cause and the effect of a
liberated world.
Being in this new world also necessitates being in a new language. Toward
the end, the poem explicitly relates the making of the world to the power of
a word ‘‘that still ripens in silence’’ (. . . wie ein Wort, das noch im Schwei-
gen reift). The avowed similarity of world and word again emphasizes the
self-referential nature of Rilke’s poem, which transforms the visual world
allegedly engendered by ‘‘your’’ look into the verses describing it and vice
versa. Linguistic signs and external referents are declared interchangeable.
The creation of the world takes place only in language so that language con-
stitutes theworld it evokes. Both realms converge at the very end of the poem
in the empty, open space again signified by the three dots. Without naming
it, the concluding ellipsis in ‘‘Eingang’’ specifies Rilke’s aesthetic goals as the
creation of a spatiotemporal ‘‘openness’’ that bridges inside and outside as
well as ‘‘you’’ and the world.
‘‘Through all beings works the one space: / interiorworldspace’’ (Durch
alle Wesen reicht der eine Raum: / Weltinnenraum) (Werke II: 93). Rilke’s
later poem ‘‘Es winkt zu Fühlung . . .’’ seems to continue where ‘‘Eingang’’
breaks off, evoking the aesthetic ideal ofWeltinnenraum or Innenwelt (Rilke-
Salome Briefwechsel 325) as an expanding ‘‘void’’ filled by the ripening of a
‘‘silent word.’’ Once again, Rilke’s poetics resembles the Romantic ideal of
language since this expression seems to call for a kind of speech that, if it
could be voiced, would implode the subject-object dichotomy into one. In
the eyes of Romanticism the ‘‘silent word’’ is the signifier of an impossible
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ing silent and effacing itself in light of what cannot be named. Like the pre-
vious poem from the Stundenbuch, ‘‘Eingang,’’ too, appears to acknowledge
its own impossibility, seeking redemption of its utopian claim in another
realm elsewhere.
However, I believe this Romantic interpretation of Rilke’s poem misses
its more positive and positivist message. ‘‘Eingang’’ does not abandon the
ideal of absolute poetry to the very words that, once written down, are de-
clared responsible for its failure. Quite the contrary, the task of the poet
consists in exploring our being in the world by daring to speak about it.
Rilke’s poetry entails both the realization to be always already within lan-
guage and thewillingness to abandon oneself to it.The ‘‘word that still ripens
in silence,’’ however, is not the spoken, but the written sign in the form of
a comma, a period, or a colon, since it is ‘‘your look’’ that anchors poetic
language and enables the comparison between world and word. Given the
interdependence of vision and language that sustains Rilke’s poems, the gaze
of the reader emerges as a silent form of speech and the true expression of
language. For Rilke, the obvious weakness of writing obscures its inherent
strength, since it is the nature of writing to give existence to speech, to call
things into the open and to make them seen, provided one is guided by the
inner vision proclaimed in his poetry.
The reader’s gaze leads to a final ‘‘begreif(en),’’ a term that connotes both
a conceptual and a physical connection between ‘‘you’’ and your world.
Poetic vision evokes a tactile intimacy that transcends the body-mind di-
chotomyand restores to sight a quality of touch that had been lost during the
rationalist emphasis of the mind’s eye scanning the geometrically structured
universe of lifeless objects. Rilke’s reader must see and feel his entry into
language along a string of words that, much like ‘‘Eingang’’ itself, paradoxi-
cally dissolve and become manifest in(to) the three dots and the perceptual
field they open up. At the end of the reading, ‘‘your’’ eyes have to both hold
on to and ‘‘let go’’ of the poem and its language in order to enter into the
Weltinnenraum it bespeaks. Rilke is a self-doubting Romanticist. He moves
beyond Romanticism, not because he rejects hermeneutics or its poetic ideal
of liberated language, but because he lacks verifiable proof that this poetics
could ever be successful. HisWeltinnenraum is but the hermeneutic ideal of
an ever-expanding universality forced back into every single thing we see.
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(‘‘Geschichten’’; IV: 355). For Rilke, even a mere dot on the page literally
contains a world.
Hence, the final ellipsis in ‘‘Eingang’’ is not a sign of poetic resignation,
but actually delivers fulfillment. Contrary to Novalis’s ‘‘geheimes Wort’’ or
Tieck’s ‘‘Zauberwort,’’ Rilke fills the poetic silence with the matter of lan-
guage. He envisions the voice of an unalienated language in the form of an
ellipsis that marks its absent presence in the rationalized world of present
absence. Reading the poem, ‘‘you’’ have already realized the world it be-
speaks simply by resting your gaze on the words themselves. Rilke’s ‘‘Ein-
gang’’ demarcates the entry into a magical space of metamorphosis, a relay
station that allows the artist’s vision to materialize through language on its
way toward a final embrace of the things perceived. The semantic ambiguity
of the preposition ‘‘through’’ unveils the constitutive paradox of this poetic
transformation. Rilke’s gaze both moves beyond the realm of language and
remains forever caught within. It splits into seeing the words that constitute
the poem and the things called forth by overlooking them. Such poetry re-
quires the presence of language only to deny and supplant it by vision, yet
this vision nonetheless must hold on to language in order to materialize the
things it sees.
This chapter examines the correlation between vision and language in
Rilke’s middle period. It is characterized by a peculiar work ethos inherited
from the leading artists at the time. ‘‘I am learning to see’’ (Ich lerne sehen)
(WerkeVI: 710)—Rilke’sMalte not only summarizes the primary task of the
modern poet echoed throughout his entire oeuvre, but also unveils the para-
dox at the heart of Rilke’s visual paradigm. The ability to see things as they
really are, namelyoutside the bourgeois sphere of production and commodi-
fication, is itself based on a learning process that requires what it seeks to
overcome: labor. Hence, Rilke’s Weltinnenraum must not simply be under-
stood as defining a utopian space located somewhere outside the material
world or the realm of modern culture. The point is rather that such a space
first needs to be recreated from within the present sociopolitical conditions
that impede our immediate access to it. Although theWeltinnenraum cannot
simply be presupposed or posited as a self-reliant ‘‘thing’’ in its own right,
it must nonetheless take shape right in front of our eyes.
This is why Rilke is fascinated by modernist art. His admiration of Rodin
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which hinges the liberation of human vision: ‘‘il faut toujours travailler!’’
Although itself the product of a free, liberated gaze, Rodin’s work nonethe-
less forces the beholder ‘‘to shoulder the burden of looking,’’ as Rilke states
in one of his essays on Rodin (‘‘Auguste Rodin. Zweiter Teil’’;WerkeV: 225).5
For Rilke, Rodin’s figures do not simply present a different look of things,
but also document the process of how they came into being. They shelter
the kind of gaze that, in Rilke’s eyes, awakens life. Similarly, his praise of
Cézanne and the French Impressionists centers on the openness of a visual
field capable of bestowing upon things their natural way of being outside
and beyond the confinements of the modern scopic regime. Modernist art
does not concern itself with individual objects. It does not depict this or
that particular thing, but instead teaches us a novel way of seeing things
in general. Rilke explicitly attributes this achievement to Cézanne’s lifelong
commitment to artistic ‘‘work’’ and the labor of being ‘‘sur le motif.’’ This
work is preserved within the paintings themselves and must be repeated in
the act of looking at them.
Rilke’s New Poems are modeled after the spatial arts. They require the
reader to ‘‘shoulder the burden of looking,’’ as must the beholder of Rodin’s
sculptures and Cézanne’s paintings. To see things is to read without reading
and to unlearn ‘‘known’’ language in an effort to look at words differently
without losing them from sight altogether. This labor of looking gives rise
to a fundamental tension at the center of Rilke’s poetics, which both un-
does and upholds the ideal of material production. For Rilke, aesthetic de-
struction and creation are inextricably intertwined. A more immediate or
less alienated relationship with the natural world can only be achieved by
the arduous process of deconstructing the normative and ideologically de-
formed rules of perception that presently prohibit such a relationship. At the
same time, however, the artistic goal of this liberation must itself be authen-
ticated in and through a material product, and Rilke’s new way of looking
at things is deemed successful only if it allows him literally to present things.
Put differently, one might say that Rilke’s poetry tries to re-turn the reader’s
gaze in the twofold sense of reorienting and thus giving it back to him as a
work of art. This re-turn of the gaze must take place in and through poetic
language.
Like most intellectuals and artists around 1900, Rilke thus draws a sharp







































































rilke’s stereoscopic vis ion : 199
tween secondary criticism and one’s immediate self-expression through art.
The latter is rooted in and returns to the body, while the former becomes
severed from it. One makes you see, whereas the other forever ruins your
vision. Critical discourse is perceived as yet another artificial obstacle pre-
venting the direct communication between objects and the human eye. Art,
by contrast, cannot but connect both poles. Hence, Rilke lauds Cézanne’s
inability to comment upon his own work, yet criticizes van Gogh’s episto-
lary eloquence, because ‘‘all talk is misunderstanding. Insight is only within
the work. No doubt about that’’ (Letters about Cézanne 78). In the same let-
ter, he states: ‘‘[P]ainting is something that takes place among the colors,
and how one has to leave them alone completely, so that they can settle the
matter among themselves. Their intercourse: this is the whole of painting.
Whoever meddles, arranges, injects his human deliberation, his wit, his ad-
vocacy, his intellectual agility in any way, is already disturbing and clouding
their activity’’ (75). Cézanne’s colors are Rilke’s words. The free interplay of
Cézanne’s colors on the canvas, much like Rodin’s creative use of sculpted
fragments in ever-newartistic constellations, is likened to the rearrangement
of words on a piece of paper.
Rilke, however, must come to terms with the particularities of language,
for the poet has no things to show, merely words meant to represent things.
Hofmannsthal ‘‘solved’’ the same problem by calling on language to dissolve
within the living bodyas the silent origin of speech.He relied upon themagi-
cal power of language to call forth the world from which it must withdraw
in order to be. Rilke’s ideal of ‘‘sachliches Sagen’’ differs from Hofmanns-
thal with respect to his fascination with vision and the spatial arts. Whereas
Hofmannsthal increasingly saw language as an aesthetic performance taking
place in real time, Rilke is forced to grant language a stronger physical pres-
ence if his art is to competewith that of Rodin or Cézanne.Therefore, Rilke’s
effort to discover the body of language is more invested in the materiality of
words and things than Hofmannsthal’s, meaning that he ultimately favors
written over spoken language. Words are posited as meaningful things in
their own right, and Rilke wants to use the spatial arts as a mediator, a kind
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Words and Things
The New Poems advocate a kind of ‘‘sachliches Sagen’’ able to merge
words and things, yet the question remains as to the specifics of this rela-
tionship between language and vision, word and world. Rilke’s reader must
determine what really are the ‘‘things’’ his poems describe: words, images,
or objects? Trying to answer this question, literary criticism has focused on
the tension between the self-referentiality of the New Poems and their goal
of objective representation. The discussion centers on whether Rilke’s Ding-
gedichte are primarily concerned with the adequate portrayal of external ob-
jects or, on the contrary, merely utilize the presence of ‘‘things’’ as a means
to focus on the autopoietic qualities of language.The immediate answer that
comes to mind is that they are essentially both since the New Poems try to
renegotiate the relationship between inside and outside. Although literary
critics somewhat acknowledge this ambiguity at work in Rilke’s poetry, they
ultimately privilege self-referentiality as its most characteristic feature. In
their eyes, Rilke’s ‘‘thing-poem’’ does not merely describe material things,
but itself becomes the thing it describes: ‘‘The poem absorbs predicates of
the thing,’’ Engelhardt already claimed in the seventies (Engelhardt 34), and
more recently, Peter Por argued that ‘‘his [Rilke’s] single topic is poetry
itself ’’ (Por 25). In another recent study, we read that Rilke ‘‘emphasized the
submerging of the subject in the self-representation of the object’’ so that
‘‘[t]he poem in itself comes more and more to take the place of the real thing
in itself ’’ (Lawrence Ryan 32, 35).
This argument regarding the autopoietic quality of Rilke’s poems is made
most eloquently by Paul de Man. For de Man, too, ‘‘[t]he referent of [Rilke’s]
poem is an attribute of [its] language, in itself devoid of semantic depth;
the meaning of the poems is the conquest of the technical skills which they
illustrate by their acoustic success’’ (Allegories of Reading 31). Rather than
using language in order to describe things, de Man asserts, Rilke’s poems
evoke things merely in order to ‘‘play at language according to the rules of
rhetoric as one plays ball according to the rules of the game’’ (38). Again,
Rilke’s text is granted an ‘‘awareness of its linguistic structure’’ (54) in which
the ‘‘figure’s truth turns out to be a lie at the very moment when it asserts
itself in the plenitude of its promise’’ (55). What remains in the end is ‘‘a
picturesque description’’ or ‘‘a picture postcard’’ (43) outlining a process of
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from the fallacy to ascribe self-awareness to linguistic structures, de Man’s
interpretation suffers fromakind of hyperbole paradigmatic of Rilke studies
in general. Focusing on the creative transformation Rilke hoped to achieve
in his poetry, critics often fall prey to the very rhetoric they seek to exam-
ine and hence claim to see a real metamorphosis ‘‘actually occurring before
their eyes.’’ Rilke himself contributed to this myth. In a letter from 1925, he
states that ‘‘many of my New Poems have somewhat written themselves, in
their final version, often times several in one day’’ (viele meiner ‘‘Neuen Ge-
dichte’’ haben sich gewissermaßen selbst geschrieben, in endgültiger Form,
oft mehrere an einem Tag) (qtd. in Lauster 284).
However, Rilke’s self-stylization as an inspired writer turns his poems up-
side down. They simply work too hard to negotiate their autopoietic and
their descriptive quality to appear to be self-authenticating. Rilke’s ‘‘thing-
poems’’ occasionally fail to convince because they are far too concerned with
being convincing. On the diegetic level, the New Poems certainly evoke the
‘‘Umschlag’’ or ‘‘Verwandlung’’ of subject and object into one, as JudithRyan
argues. On the extradiegetic level, however, this transformation remains fic-
titious—a poetic ideal. While this point may seem trivial, it nonetheless ap-
plies to Ryan’s reading, which at times insinuates that Rilke’s poetic achieve-
ment transforms both language and reality such that the poet would truly
become reconciled with words and things alike. Contrary to Ryan’s perspec-
tive, which simply mirrors the utopian vision of Rilke himself, the following
remarks insist that ‘‘the ‘seeing’ and the ‘building’ of things’’ are precisely not
‘‘participating in a single process of creation’’ (18), because the poet ‘‘sees’’
one thing and ‘‘builds’’ another, namely a poem—if one were to call it a
thing at all.6 This is not to deny the self-referentiality of Rilke’s poetry, but
to question the success of its poetic program.
Most of Rilke’s thing-poems do not easily lend themselves to Ryan’s con-
clusion about their ‘‘quasi-dialectical structure’’ (19) either. Nor can we refer
to Rilke’s poetic ideal as the ‘‘total equilibrium between thing and form’’
(Herman Meyers 263–64). Both perspectives adequately describe Rilke’s
poetic ideal, but not his actual practice, which consists of a particular kind of
movement based not on the connection of different poles, but on their sepa-
ration.This separation leads neither toRyan’s notion of ‘‘metamorphosis’’ or
aesthetic transformation nor to Meyers’s perfect ‘‘equilibrium’’ understood
as a harmonized balance of powers becauseRilke’s poemsmust continuously
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outside. Put differently, Rilke’s poems focus on the simultaneity of word and
world or the coexistence of materiality and meaning without there being an
absolute balance or a dialectical process negotiating between them. If dia-
lectics there is, it is a Benjaminian ‘‘dialectics at a standstill’’ or a version
of ‘‘negative dialectics’’ (Adorno) that speaks to the ‘‘hovering’’ quality of
language itself (Adorno, ‘‘Jargon der Eigentlichkeit’’ 495). It denotes a kind
of creative energy trembling within Rilke’s poetry, which works to prevent
the possible implosion of materiality and meaning. What is at stake in the
New Poems is the threat of an actual collapse between world and word that
would annihilate both, and hence must be avoided.
Contrary to the rhetoric of theNew Poems, the labor of looking they em-
phasize refers less to a ‘‘real’’ poetic transformation than to the lack thereof.
Instead of something new, there emerges a void. This void, however, is not
simply nothing, nor does it give rise to an aesthetic transformation. Rather,
it carries a definitive function: it literally marks the empty spot where the
poetic metamorphosis ought to take place. Thus, it creates an opening that
both connects and separates inside and outside, self and other. Because of
this void, the reader’s gaze is forced to ‘‘shoulder the burden of looking.’’
The gaze must oscillate between (reading the) word and (seeing the) thing
without ever coming to rest at either one of the poles. A successful reading
of Rilke’s poems is one that switches back and forth at such high speed that
the two realms seem to become one. World and word are thus being fused
together as they appear to become superimposed one upon the other. The
look of things, in other words, is nothing but an optical illusion in the eye
of the reader.
Heidegger’s critique calls attention to precisely this specular quality of
Rilke’s poetry.His reading focuses on the return of the gaze, which the eighth
elegy associates with the look of the animal. He takes issuewith Rilke’s juxta-
position of mankind and openness, that is, the idea that ‘‘man is not ad-
mitted into the open. Man confronts the world’’ (Er [der Mensch] ist nicht
eingelassen in das Offene. Der Mensch steht der Welt gegenüber) (‘‘Wozu
Dichter?’’;Holzwege 286), as he paraphrases it. For Heidegger, Rilke’s notion
of ‘‘the open’’ remains oriented exclusively along the multitude of beings,
rather than focusing on Being itself in the sense of ‘‘aletheia’’ or the un-
concealment of the world. Although Rilke’s thing-poems advocate an ideal







































































rilke’s stereoscopic vis ion : 203
eyes, that this balancing act itself has already been achieved the verymoment
Dasein realizes its ‘‘being in the world.’’ Since ‘‘Rilke neither suspects nor
knows anything about aletheia’’ (GS 54: 231), his poetry remains primarily
concerned with the articulation of individual things and the harmonious
reconciliation of inside and outside instead of the presentation of Being,
which itself is this reconciliation. It follows that ‘‘Rilke’s poetry is the last
remnant of modern metaphysics’’ (GS 54: 235). It neglects to speak about
man’s or Dasein’s existential condition, which locates us always already be-
yond the subject-object dichotomy. Rilke, in other words, presupposes and
thus perpetuates the modern problem of fragmentation he hopes to solve in
his poetry. He works too hard to re-turn the human gaze instead of simply
acknowledging the primordial openness given in and through the wor(l)d
we perceive.
Adorno’s scattered remarks about Rilke’s ‘‘Dingkult’’ advance a critique
from the exact opposite direction. Whereas Heidegger charges Rilke with
the glorification of poetic subjectivity and specific beings rather than Being
as such, Adorno focuses on the alleged lack of both subjectivity and speci-
ficity in Rilke’s poetry. His comments concentrate on Rilke’s disdain for the
critical reflection of art. Aesthetic autonomy, in Adorno’s eyes, by no means
includes a prohibition to speak about its genesis or its meaning. On the con-
trary, it requires philosophical discourse to speak out the truth enigmati-
cally contained within each work of art.7 Rilke, however, advocates the very
rupture between art and criticism that Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory seeks to
overcome. For Rilke, the liberation of language from its referential burden
compels ‘‘a carefree letting-go of oneself ’’ (‘‘Über Kunst’’; Werke V: 429), ‘‘a
half-unconscious finding’’ as opposed to the deliberate ‘‘search’’ of the intel-
lectual (‘‘Moderne Lyrik’’; Werke V: 378). Once the living body rather than
the conscious mind governs the moment of artistic production, Rilke sug-
gests, it cannot but lead to the rebirth of a ‘‘new, young, and non-alienated’’
language of art (‘‘Max Bruns, Lenz’’; Werke V: 464). Rilke’s abandonment
of subjectivity and his refusal to specify the function of art cause Adorno
to dismiss his reflections on art and his poetry alike: ‘‘Because it remains
stupefied vis-à-vis the truth and precision of its own words—even the most
vague expression ought to be determined as vagueness and not treated as if
it were determined—[Rilke’s] lyric poetry is bad in spite of its virtuosity’’
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Worte—noch das Vageste müßte als Vages bestimmt, nicht als Bestimmtes
eingeschmuggelt sein—ist sie auch als Lyrik schlecht trotz ihrerVirtuosität)
(‘‘Jargon’’ 470).8
The opposed perspectives of Adorno and Heidegger are indicative of the
ambiguity in Rilke’s work, which simultaneously espouses and undermines
the objectivity of words and things alike. Indeed, his poetry is best where
it does not repress, but emphasizes the aesthetic labor that negotiates be-
tween these poles. In so doing, the New Poems are closer to Adorno than
Heidegger, in spite of the fact that the latter esteemed his art considerably
more than the former. The uncertainty regarding the ontological status of
Rilke’s ‘‘things’’ recalls Adorno’s dictum that the work of art never actu-
ally possesses the apparent unity it must proclaim in order to question the
way things are: ‘‘Dissonance is the truth about harmony’’ (Dissonanz ist die
Wahrheit über Harmonie) (ÄsthetischeTheorie 168). Such dissonancewithin
the work of art, the inner disparity it tries to conceal and yet discloses un-
wittingly in the very act of concealment itself, defines the self-destructive
character of modern art: ‘‘Works of art that are deliberately conceived as a
tour de force are semblance because they must purport in essence to bewhat
they in essence cannot be; they correct themselves by emphasizing their own
impossibility’’ (Aesthetic Theory 106) (Als tour de force konzipierte Werke
sind Schein, weil sie wesentlich als das sich geben müssen, was sie wesentlich
nicht sein können; sie korrigieren sich, indem sie die eigene Unmöglich-
keit hervorheben) (ÄT 163). Adorno’s description fits Rilke’s New Poems.
They, too, acknowledge their ‘‘own impossibility’’ and thus undermine the
aesthetic ideal of ‘‘sachliches Sagen’’ that informs them. Suspended between
words and things, matter and meaning, they simultaneously proclaim and
disavow their ability to liberate everything from the burden of instrumental
rationality that governs the outside. The work of art is understood as ‘‘pro-
cess and instant (Augenblick) combined’’ (ÄT 154), the paradoxical product
of the sociopolitical conditions of capitalism and the utopian vision of its
transcendence.
For both Rilke and Adorno, art cannot simply rely on its aesthetic au-
tonomy without losing its critical potential and falling prey to the realm
of pure illusion. And yet, without this autonomy, it lacks both the histori-
cal validity and material substance necessary to authenticate its different
vision of the world. The work of art must therefore never abandon its tradi-
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only to itself, which is to say that poetry literally describes the impossible
art of being self-identical by promising every-thing its own unique iden-
tity. It envisions the liberation of the world while itself remaining a prisoner
of the utopian space it calls forth. Fraught with this interior contradiction,
the poem pronounces an ideal of (self-)harmony it cannot enact. Its hypoc-
risy lies in judging the world from an imaginary space inside, as if that were
not also determined by the outside it denounces. Poetry speaks the truth,
however, as soon as it thematizes and thus unveils its own hypocrisy.
To be sure, this is not to claim that Rilke’s notion of artistic labor can be
reconciled with Adorno’s Marxism. Undoubtedly, Rilke’s ‘‘work’’ remains
largely unconcerned with the sociopolitical dimension of the capitalist cri-
tique it implies, as Reinhold Grimm and others have argued. Things rather
than people are the true subjects of Rilke’s poetry. According to Rilke, the
inner voice of the poet emerges as the objective language of material reality,
which is to say that human subjectivity is called upon to liberate the things
rather than the other way around. As if in response to Nietzsche’s dictum
that ‘‘God is dead,’’ one reads in Rilke’s ‘‘Geschichten vom Lieben Gott’’
that ‘‘every thing can become God. It must only be told’’ (‘‘Geschichten’’;
Werke IV: 355).9 This aesthetic deification of commodities, however, can
hardly be the answer to the sociopolitical problems caused by the ‘‘disen-
chantment’’ (Max Weber) of the modern world. Rilke’s expressed goal to
‘‘talk to the things rather than about them’’ (‘‘Moderne Lyrik’’; Werke V:
370)10 betrays the very anthropomorphization of objects that Adorno de-
nounces as the ‘‘aesthetic weakness’’ of Rilke’s Dingkult.
In the following, I seek to specify and redeem Rilke’s ‘‘aesthetic weak-
ness’’ in the context of the spatial arts as well as Husserl’s phenomenology.
Unlike Adorno, I read the New Poems not primarily in the sociopolitical,
but rather in the aesthetic and philosophical context of its time. Although
Adorno would have undoubtedly rejected this distinction as ideological, I
believe it is ultimately more productive to question Rilke’s poetry on its own
grounds than to denounce its inconsistencies as nothing but ‘‘reactionary’’
symptoms of capitalist reification. On the contrary, it is precisely by ‘‘brack-
eting,’’ in a Husserlian sense, the sociopolitical background of his poetry
that one might discover its philosophical dimension. Without disavowing
Adorno’s disapproval of Rilke’s ‘‘thing-cult,’’ his emphasis on the ‘‘thing-
ness’’ of art can also be regarded as a critique of the idealist impulses at the
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unburdened vision is symptomatic for a failed phenomenological perspec-
tive around 1900 that claims to ‘‘see’’ and adequately describe the essence of
things.
In contrast to most critics who discuss the relationship between Rilke’s
middle period and Husserl’s philosophy, I argue that Rilke implies a radical
critique of phenomenology because he unveils the autopoietic dimension
of language that Husserl refuses to acknowledge. It follows that Adorno’s
denunciation of Rilke’s work as ‘‘irrational’’ misses the manifest materialist
dimension at work therein, one that allows his poetry to expose the idealist
and transcendental nature of Husserl’s eidetic visions. In spite of Rilke’s ex-
plicit rejection of art criticism, his poetry invites it nonetheless. The critique
inheres in his ideal notion of artistic labor that structures the reading process
effected by his poems. The reader’s gaze is deliberately forced to oscillate
between the ideal intuition of the ‘‘thing itself ’’ towhichRilke’s poetry seem-
ingly refers and the recognition of mere letters on the page. ‘‘Seeing’’ thus
becomes a process suspended between the Romantic ideal of poetic imagi-
nation and the Aestheticist turn toward the materiality of the letter, giving
rise to a stereoscopic vision the reader cannot but acknowledge if she wants
to make sense of Rilke’s poetry.
The Blood of Language and the Art of Writing
I want to approach Rilke’s middle period by way of a detour via the spa-
tial arts that nonetheless leads right to the poetological center. It was in
the realm of modern art where Rilke encountered the ‘‘realization’’ of those
things he sought to express in his own poetry: ‘‘Somehow I too must find a
way of making things: not plastic, written things, but realities that arise from
the craft itself ’’ (Irgendwie muß auch ich dazu kommen, Dinge zu machen,
nicht plastische, geschriebene Dinge,—Wirklichkeiten, die aus dem Hand-
werk hervorgehen), he proclaims in a letter to his wife (Briefe über Cézanne
7). The sense of artistic inferiority palpable in this and similar statements
throughout his middle period stems from the particular lack of ‘‘reality’’
attributed to linguistic signs as opposed to colors or marble. The former
merely signify the physicality that the latter embody. Rilke’s laments are, of
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concomitant valorization of vision as superior to language.Yet Rilke’s poetic
concerns must be contextualized within the contemporary art world at the
time in order to gain full meaning.
In his popular essay regarding the ‘‘Origin of Artistic Production,’’ pub-
lished in 1887, the art historian Konrad Fiedler distinguishes vision from
all other senses by its inherent ability to find its ‘‘own voice’’ and ‘‘express’’
itself aesthetically in the work of art. Fiedler regards the physical move-
ments of the artist as the uncensored continuation and direct expression
of the visual sense: ‘‘It is one and the same action that, beginning with
sensations and perceptions, finally unfolds itself in expression movements’’
(Schriften zur Kunst I: 164; my translation). Fiedler’s ‘‘expression move-
ments’’ (Ausdrucksbewegungen) name the ideal of an uninterrupted creative
process that organically lives and spreads through the body of the artist. It
testifies to the unmediated connection between the eye and the hand. The
self-expressive, yet silent, ‘‘language’’ of art stands in sharp contrast to every-
day language since any effort to translate one’s artistic insights intowords in-
evitably goes astray, Fiedler argues. Language, in other words, is necessarily
self-referential and hence unable to express anything else but its own being:
‘‘After all, the meaning possessed by the miracle of language is not that of
signifying Being, but that it is itself a Being. And since that which emerges in
linguistic form does not even exist outside that form, it follows that language
can always only signify itself ’’ (Schriften I: 123; my translation). In Fiedler’s
eyes, language deserts and ultimately confronts the human body as a distinct
and autonomous entity, whereas the spatial work of art expresses the body
and remains intimately connected to it. The hand of the artist is able to ex-
press what his eye has seen, whereas language is concerned only with itself.
Of course one should question the basic assumption of Fiedler’s juxtapo-
sition of art and language. There is no reason to assume that the sculptor’s
hand is any more ‘‘expressive’’ or ‘‘authentic’’ than that of the writer. How-
ever, such a critique must also point to and acknowledge the widespread
popularity of Fiedler’s ideas among artists and intellectuals at the end of the
century. Similar to Fiedler, Rilke acknowledges the superiority of the spa-
tial arts as a form of artistic self-expression that involves the entire body as
opposed to the fragmentation and autoreferentiality effected by language.
A brief and by no means exhaustive discussion of Rilke’s The Notebooks
of Malte Laurids Briggemay serve to elucidate this point. One of the central
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contrasted with the ideal of self-expressive vision. Malte’s effort to reassure
himself of his own existence in and through the process of writing is depicted
as an utter failure. Malte’s ‘‘inability to protect himself against the chaos’’
(Huyssen 134) of modern life leads to a process of ‘‘Ent-Ichung’’ (Sokel) as
he ‘‘is being written’’ by his own hand (Malte; Werke VI: 756). The ‘‘broken’’
author Malte thus emerges as the precise opposite of Fiedler’s ideal artist.
Whereas the latter is engaged in the self-authenticAusdrucksbewegung of his
entire body, Malte becomes increasingly separated even from his own hand:
‘‘For a while I can still write and say all of this. But a day will come when
my hand will be far from me, and when I ask it to write, it will write words
that do not belong to me’’ (Noch eine Weile kann ich das alles aufschreiben
und sagen. Aber es wird ein Tag kommen, da meine Hand weit von mir sein
wird, und wenn ich sie schreiben heißen werde, wird sie Worte schreiben,
die ich nicht meine) (Malte; Werke VI: 756). The ‘‘phantom hand’’ Malte re-
peatedly evokes in his notebooks is symptomatic of a kind of writing that
fails to render visible what the author claims to have seen. Writing indepen-
dently on its own without interference from the ‘‘author,’’ Malte’s hand has
broken free from the stifling rules of the mind and the oppressive regime
of Romantic subjectivity. It engages in a self-governed activity that articu-
lates the perspective of the body. The latter, of course, must no longer be
understood as a clearly demarcated object in space, but as a mere vessel for
a creative energy or an élan vital that transcends and transforms the indi-
vidual. Malte’s hand writes down the world as seen from the viewpoint of
the body.
Rilke’s Malte indeed exposes the purpose of writing, much like the pur-
pose of painting, as an exercise in vision. The writer’s goal is to learn how to
see, and one of the central concerns of the novel is to specify this relation-
ship between writing and seeing, as Graf Brahe illustrates to his daughter
Abelone during their shared writing lessons: ‘‘ ‘She cannot write it,’ he said
in a sharp tone, ‘and others will not be able to read it. And will they even
be able to see what I say?’ he said wickedly as he continued to gaze at her’’
(‘‘Sie kann es nicht schreiben,’’ sagte er scharf, ‘‘und andere werden es nicht
lesen können. Und werden sie es überhaupt sehen, was ich da sage?’’ fuhr
er böse fort und ließ Abelone nicht aus den Augen) (Malte; Werke VI: 847).
The paradox of a vision that needs to have been experienced before it can be
written down, yet must be written down in order to be experienced, haunts
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‘‘too slow for his recollections,’’ he begins to see writing in a strictly meta-
phorical sense. The entire body is now envisioned as a kind of text: ‘‘ ‘The
books are empty,’ yelled the Count with an angry gesture toward the walls,
‘the blood, that’s what counts, one must read in there’ ’’ (‘‘Die Bücher sind
leer,’’ schrie der Graf mit einer wütenden Gebärde nach den Wänden hin,
‘‘das Blut, darauf kommt es an, da muß man drin lesen können’’) (Malte;
Werke VI: 848). Blood, in this context, does not refer to family lineage or
race, but rather to the living body as such. In order to see the world, Brahe
suggests, one needs to be able to read the body—not, to be sure, in its solid
form, but as the exterior of a pulsating energy that runs through it.
The flow of blood within the body relates to that of language within
books. For Brahe, the body is like a book. If we look at them as material ob-
jects, they are empty, yet their insides are alive. Seeing things means to look
through bodies and read their entrails as a kind of language that dissolves
the gaze within its flow and carries the reader along. Brahe’s comments elu-
cidate this ideal kind of reading. He has no problems visualizing the body
as text: ‘‘He took Abelone’s hands and opened them like a book’’ (Er nahm
Abelones Hände und schlug sie auf wie ein Buch), whereas Abelone, in an
effort to remember the things she has seen, can only ‘‘look almost curiously
into her empty hands’’ (Malte; Werke VI: 851). The episode is crucial be-
cause it insists on the subjective nature of vision, which cannot objectively
be translated into language. As he moves beyond the writing exercises that
still engulf Malte, Brahe experiences a freedom of vision that allows him to
‘‘read’’ the hands and eyes of those around him.Words and things alike take
shape in the eye of the beholder and not in the mind of educated readers,
as Brahe comments: ‘‘Me, I remembered his eyes. . . . I have seen a good
many eyes, believe you me, but not that kind. For these eyes, nothing would
have had to be there, they had it in them’’ (Ich aber merkte mir seine Augen.
. . . Ich habe allerhand Augen gesehen, kannst du mir glauben: solche nicht
wieder. Für diese Augen hätte nichts da sein müssen, die hatten es in sich)
(Werke VI: 848). Taken literally, this expression, of course, refers to the reti-
nal reflections visible on the surface of the living eye. In contrast to most
Romantic heroes, however, Brahe does not recognize himself as he looks into
the eye of the other. Rather, he sees things that seem to belong exclusively
to the eye itself. The eyes that ‘‘have it in them’’ are eyes that carry within
themselves every-thing they saw.
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Romanticism still partook. For Descartes and the discourse network around
1800, ‘‘[i]t is the mind, which sees, not the eye’’ (‘‘Optics’’ 108), for the eye as
well as any physical organ responding to a stimulating movement from the
outside can be deceived, Descartes admits, but the mind cannot. For Brahe,
however, vision takes place exclusively in the eye, meaning that, for him,
disembodied perception does not exist anymore. The things one has seen
become alive not through the power of poetic imagination or the memo-
ries of the ‘‘author,’’ but are preserved within one’s own blood, and the only
successful kind of writing, the novel suggests, would be one nourished by
these interior visions that sustain the human body as a whole: ‘‘Because the
memories themselves are not yet it. Onlywhen they become bloodwithin us,
and gaze and gesture, all of them nameless and not to be distinguished from
our own self anymore, only then can it happen that in a very rare hour the
first word of a verse arises out of their midst and springs forth from them’’
(Denn die Erinnerungen selbst sind es noch nicht. Erst wenn sie Blut werden
in uns, Blick und Gebärde, namenlos und nicht mehr zu unterscheiden von
uns selbst, erst dann kann es geschehen, daß in einer sehr seltenen Stunde
das erste Wort eines Verses aufsteht in ihrer Mitte und aus ihnen ausgeht)
(Malte; Werke VI: 724). This ideal of a poetic word literally ‘‘standing up’’
and ‘‘walking forth’’ from the midst of human memories again testifies to
the physical attributes of language, which literally possesses a body of its
own. Similar to the human body, this body of language shelters vision and
carries our memories along with it. The gaze of the reader, like that of the
writer, must bathe in the élan vital that runs through these bodies, for it con-
nects and sustains them as what they are. Which is to say that any successful
writer must simultaneously be a reader of the body—otherwise the essence
of things is lost from sight.Unlike Brahe,Malte literally breaks apart because
he wants to control rather than abandon himself to his own body and that
of language. His writing exercises cannot but fail, for his efforts to master
language will never capture the visual experiences contained therein.
Rilke’s poetic goal of ‘‘sachliches Sagen,’’ it follows, does not simply con-
sist in speaking the name of things. Rather, language must once again be-
come reconnected to the human body in order to express what it sees. Rilke’s
increasing interest in Rodin and Cézanne is mediated by this idealization
of the spatial arts whose ‘‘language was the body,’’ as he claims (‘‘Rodin’’;
Werke V: 146). Indeed, Cézanne’s paintings are said to gain expression only
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pass them by somewhere out there and nothing is being called inside’’ (mein
Blut beschreibt sie in mir, aber das Sagen geht irgendwo draußen vorbei
und wird nicht hereingerufen) (Briefe über Cézanne 42). For speech to be
meaningful, it must be invited to enter the body and then float through it.
Poetry must reunite the language of the body and the body of language. Dis-
cussing Rilke’s relationship to Cézanne, Anette Schwarz has convincingly
demonstrated the corporeal process of signification at work in Rilke’s poetic
visions. To attain a dingliche Wirklichkeit, Schwarz argues, ‘‘the thing must
first become an object of digestion and must be ‘translated,’ or decomposed,
by the enzyme-colors into its irreducible, that is, indigestible ‘color content.’
. . . ‘Pure things,’ in this thingly physiology, are only those that have been
expelled by the process of metabolism’’ (Schwarz 197). In order to compete
with the expressive quality—theAusdrucksbewegung—of the artist, the poet
needs to use his words as enzymes digesting and dissolving things within his
own body before they can be reborn as poetic language.
Poems, in other words, are composed of the pulp of signification. Poetic
writing originates from the organic rhythm that precedes coherent language,
and the act of reading needs to re-turn the gaze to this original site—that
is, to the studio of the artist where everything is being disassembled and re-
arranged again—in order to understand what the reified text can no longer
say. One must learn, like Brahe, ‘‘to read in the blood’’ although—or pre-
cisely because—it sweeps away all stable references and speaks a language
beyond decipherable meaning.What remains for both writers and readers is
to ‘‘blind’’ common vision in order to develop eyes that ‘‘have it in them’’ and
look from the inside out: ‘‘ ‘Do you see him?’ he bellowed at her [Abelone].
And suddenly he took the silver candelabrum, lighting up her face, blinding
her. Abelone remembered having seen him’’ (‘‘Siehst du ihn?’’ herrschte er
sie [Abelone] an. Und plötzlich ergriff er den einen silbernen Armleuchter
und leuchtete ihr blendend ins Gesicht. Abelone erinnerte sich, daß sie ihn
gesehen habe) (Malte; Werke VI: 850). Once Abelone is blinded and visually
severed from the things outside, she is able to see them for the first timewith
her own eyes.
In light of the subjectivity of the artist’s inner vision, Rilke, throughout
his middle period, denounces art criticism not only as superfluous, but as
dangerous. In his eyes, it serves to undermine rather than fortify the au-
thenticity and ingenuity of those who see and express what has not been
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lyze or critique a particular work. Rather, it consists in exercises of trans-
lation that serve to mobilize the inner vision of the body. The critic must
be able to ‘‘see and speak the colors’’ of modern painting and ‘‘to repeat
in words the smile of the Mona Lisa’’ or ‘‘the aging expression of Tizian’s
Karl V and the fragmented, lost look of Jan Six at the collection of Amster-
dam’’ (‘‘Worpswede’’; Werke V: 9). Rilke’s New Poems rest upon this con-
flation of poetry and the arts, and his essays about Worpswede insist from
the very beginning on the translatability of word and image. An early paint-
ing by the painter Mackensen, we are told, ‘‘says with one word what he
later repeated in long sentences’’ as he developed his ‘‘grammar and the sen-
tence structure of his idiom’’ (Hier hat er mit einem Wort gesagt, was er
später in längeren Sätzen wiederholt hat. Das soll kein Tadel sein; er hat
uns zuerst ein wunderbar großes Wort seiner eigenen Sprache gezeigt und
uns dann erst eingeführt in die Grammatik und den Satzbau seines Idioms)
(‘‘Worpswede’’; Werke V: 48f.). Modersohn also developed ‘‘his own lan-
guage’’ (Werke V: 66) in which he crafted ‘‘confessions in verses’’ (Werke V:
64): ‘‘So many powerful things—words for the almost ineffable—are present
in this land, the language of Otto Modersohn. And it is clearly visible that he
increasingly uses it as a poet’’ (So Mächtiges—Worte für fast Unsagbares—
enthält dieses Land, die Sprache Otto Modersohns. Und es ist zu sehen, daß
er sie immer mehr als Dichter gebraucht) (Werke V: 87).
The translatability of word and image works in the reverse as well, for
Rilke discusses modern poetry also with reference to painting. About the
poems of Hans Benzmann, he writes in 1896: ‘‘Benzmann has superb and
brilliant colors on his pallet and he paints with a full brush. His pictures
are saturated with hue and need to be looked at both with leisure and
understanding.—These poems I call pictures in the true sense of the term.
I have gazed at this book rather than read in it!’’ (Benzmann hat herrliche,
leuchtende Farben auf seiner Palette und er nimmt den Pinsel sehr voll.
Seine tonsatten Bilder wollen mit Muße und Verständnis geschaut sein.—
Diese Gedichte nenne ich Bilder im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes. Ich habe
in diesem Buche geschaut, nicht gelesen!) (‘‘Hans Benzmann’’; Werke V:
302). About Hermine von Preuschen, Rilke exclaims: ‘‘She paints her mag-
nificent poems. Their heavy flowof rhymeless rhythm flows like melted gold
and she composes her colorful allegories on the canvas. . . . In front of these
images, one asks oneself: is the poem a picture or the picture a poem?’’ (Sie
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geschmolzenes Gold hinströmt, und sie dichtet in farbensatten Allegorien
auf die Leinwand. . . . Vor diesen Bildern fragt man sich: Ist das Gedicht ein
Bild, oder das Bild ein Gedicht?) (‘‘Hermine von Preuschen’’;Werke V: 310).
Like the ‘‘I’’ of the introductory poem in the Stundenbuch, the inspired art-
ist paints as he writes and writes as he paints because all art is nurtured by
life itself. In order to express its essence, Rilke claims, art must invent a new
language, as did Cézanne, whose ‘‘difficulties,’’ according to Merleau-Ponty,
‘‘are those of the first word’’ (‘‘Cézanne’s Doubt’’ 69).
The ultimate goal of both poetry and art is to present life as such. Rodin’s
works, for example, simply ‘‘are’’ (Werke V: 169) and aspire to nothing else
but the expression of ‘‘life itself, nameless life’’ (‘‘Auguste Rodin. Erster Teil’’;
Werke V: 179). This lifelike character of Rodin’s work held tremendous ap-
peal for Rilke. Over and over again he describes how Rodin, who has mas-
tered the art of looking, is surrounded by an abundance of life in the form of
his own sculptures looking back at him. This reciprocal gaze gives rise to an
essentially flat universe of perceiving and perceived images in which intel-
lectual distinctions such as subject and object, inside and outside, become
meaningless. Rilke’s Weltinnenraum takes shape in the élan vital running
through Rodin’s sculptures: ‘‘There is only a single, thousand-fold, moving
and modifying surface. For a moment, the whole world could be reflected in
this thought. . . .’’ (Es giebt [sic] nur eine einzige, tausendfältig bewegte und
abgewandelte Oberfläche. In diesem Gedanken konnte man einen Moment
die ganze Welt denken. . . .) (‘‘Auguste Rodin. Zweiter Teil’’; Werke V: 213).
This surface is but the reflection of the crucial ‘‘Werden’’ that sustains the
matter of art and life alike.
According to Rilke, Rodin has exteriorized the interiority of things. He
has turned them inside out and revealed their inner life to the eye of the be-
holder. Where there used to be only rigid forms separated from each other,
there emerges in Rodin’s studio a world of interconnected parts providing
new insights into life. Looking at details from Rodin’s Gates to Hell (figures
5 and 6), one gets a sense of this incessant movement that unites and en-
livens his figures. The convoluted disarray of arms, legs, and entire bodies
hopelessly entangled in one another testifies to their being part of a larger
whole whose essence consists precisely in its lack of finite form. Rodin can
reassemble his figures into ever-new aesthetic constellations, because what
‘‘matters’’ is not this or that particular shape, but the interior energy that







































































Figure 5. Auguste Rodin, The Gates of Hell, 1880–1917. Bronze, S. 1304,







































































Figure 6. Auguste Rodin, The Gates of Hell, 1880–1917, detail. Bronze, S. 1304,
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Bilder, Rodin’s work has opened the Gates to the primordial vision of life
itself.
Rilke’s characterization of Rodin’s work as a ‘‘surface’’ anticipates his later
description of Cézanne’s paintings, which he similarly praises for expressing
the creative power of seeing things anew and more truthfully. The history
of art criticism has often pointed to the phenomenological dimension of
Cézanne’s work, which is situated between Realist and Impressionist paint-
ing, equally renouncing and endorsing both movements. His goal was to
‘‘ ‘faire la chose,’ i.e., to paint the visual thing, not the mere impression,’’
and ‘‘critics almost universally agree upon the radically objective character
of Cézanne’s maturest works’’ (Forrest Williams 167). Rilke was fascinated
by Cézanne’s sense of objectivity, which did not eschew sensory perception,
but embraced it as the sole path toward visual truth. For in spite of Cézanne’s
belief that there is a ‘‘right’’ picture for everything we see—what Husserl
called the ‘‘eidos’’ of an object—he also insisted on this picture taking shape
only in the sovereign eye of a seer unbound by the laws of common per-
ception. Objectivity, in other words, is being attained entirely by subjective
means. This paradox leads to the discernable demise of Euclidian space in
Cézanne’s paintings. Their visual coherence is undermined by a multiplicity
of different perspectives guiding the viewer’s gaze on the canvas. Oftentimes,
the foreground recedes into the background and vice versa. Everything we
see touches upon and becomes part of its surrounding. Cézanne merges the
various outlines of the ‘‘things’’ he portrays such that they lose their physi-
cal autonomy as clearly demarcated bodies in space. And yet, he does not
dissolve them entirely as did the Impressionists or pointillists. Rather, he
mainly looks upon colors to give rise to form.
Still Life with Curtain and Flowered Pitcher (figure 7) exhibits this
material-like substance of colors in Cézanne’s work. The painting works to
undermine the distinction of foreground and background, using the sinu-
ous lines of curtain and napkin to mediate between them. The large bowl in
the center appears slightly tilted and thus located on a different visual plane
from the other objects on the table. In fact, the table itself seems somewhat
elevated in the right back corner, giving the impression that things would
have to start sliding toward the edge of the table. Overall, these deliberate
spatial incongruities serve to undermine the presumed unified perspective
of the painting. They create a slight rupture within the harmonious compo-
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Figure 7. Paul Cézanne, Still Life with Curtain and Flowered Pitcher, ca. 1899.
Oil on canvas; courtesy of the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg.
What is most striking about the painting, however, is the use of color as a
means to let objects appear and present themselves to the viewer. The white
cloth in the foreground to the left is distinguishable from the dark drapes
in the background mainly on the basis of color since its shape and texture
match that of the curtain perfectly. And yet, the other part of the napkin
completely merges with the white bowl in the center in spite of their clear
difference in shape. What matters in Cézanne’s painting is not simply the
givenness of any particular material form, but the visual impression of color
that literally shapes these forms to begin with. The point, then, is not to
deny the existence of matter and form, but to gain insight into their sensory
composition.
This is most obvious with regard to thewhite cloth at the right, which has
been left unfinished by the painter. Because of this lack of color, we ‘‘see’’ a
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particular ‘‘thing’’ shown at this precise spot.What appears instead is a rup-
ture in color, a brown ‘‘looking through’’ and replacing the white that might
have covered it. The table, in other words, can be seen without being seen. It
is both present and absent at the same time, an object caught at the very mo-
ment that it presents itself to the gaze of the viewer. ‘‘The painter’s vision is
not a view upon the outside,’’ comments Merleau-Ponty on Cézanne’s paint-
ings in general, and he continues: ‘‘The world no longer stands before him
through representation; rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the
world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible.
Ultimately the painting relates to nothing at all among experienced things
unless it is first of all ‘autofigurative.’ It is a spectacle of something only by
being a ‘spectacle for nothing,’ by breaking the ‘skin of things’ to show how
the things become things, how the world becomes world’’ (‘‘Eye and Mind’’
141). Merleau-Ponty points to the moment of ‘‘presencing’’ as the central
characteristic of Cézanne’s paintings, and it is precisely this moment that
mesmerizedRilke. For him, the plain ‘‘surface’’ inCézanne’s paintings,much
like that of Rodin’s sculptures, expresses life because it refuses to signify, and
instead reveals, their essence and the inner bloodstream of things. In Rilke’s
view, both artists have found their own language and are now able to create
the world from within by means of the Ausdrucksbewegung constitutive of
their art. They have captured life like a genie in a transparent bottle, thus en-
abling us to see how everything is engaged in a process of incessant change
right in front of our eyes. Rilke’s claim that ‘‘all reality is on [Cézanne’s] side’’
does not merely judge the ‘‘thing-like’’ character of his paintings, but again
endorses the expressive ‘‘superficiality’’ of an art that ‘‘does not show it, but
has it,’’ as Rilke claims about van Gogh’s work (Letters about Cézanne 50;
footnote 3).
As soon as Rilke turns toward his own art, however, he does not ‘‘have’’ it,
since he has not yet found the ‘‘first word’’ of his own craft. Trying to come
to terms with this lack, his New Poems labor to fill it with the substance of
art. However, Rilke’s ideal of a perfect aesthetic balance between space and
time by emphasizing the substantive quality of language takes revenge on
him. Internally split to the core, theNew Poems stumble over the materiality
of their own words, because every one of them opens and closes itself at the
same time that it attracts and rebuts the gaze of the reader. Although the
thing-poem deliberately addresses words as autonomous objects in order to
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denly encounter them in all their opacity as unequivocally foreign, a strange
substance that undermines the transparency of the wor(l)d it creates. The
‘‘thing itself ’’ is thus being reborn within the poem in the form of black let-
ters on the page. Rilke’s words are themselves unruly objects demanding to
be seen and heard, like those in ‘‘Ein Prophet.’’ The poem depicts a convul-
sive body that has lost control over the stone-like words it spouts forth:
. . . . Und in seinem Innern richten
sich schon wieder Worte auf,
nicht die seinen (denn was wären seine
und wie schonend wären sie vertan)
andre, harte: Eisenstücke, Steine,
die er schmelzen muß wie ein Vulkan,
(Werke I: 566–67)
. . . and words are being accumulated
deep within him once again:
not his own (for what could his words settle?
And how temperedly would they be dealt!),
other, harder: chunks of stone and metal,
which, like a volcano, he must melt
(New Poems 179)
Words are being born within the speaking subject, yet they are not the
subject’s own. They are literally ‘‘other,’’ and their materiality needs to be
‘‘melted down’’ and digested before the subject can ‘‘throw them out’’ in the
form of speech. The words of ‘‘Eine Sibylle’’ (‘‘A Sibyl’’), to provide another
example, are like roaming bats leaving her hollow and burned out from a
power she cannot master:
. . . . Sie aber stand
. . . . . . .
hoch und hohl und ausgebrannt;
von den Worten, die sich unbewacht
wider ihren Willen in ihr mehrten,
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während die schon wieder heimgekehrten
dunkel unter ihren Augenbogen
saßen, fertig für die Nacht.
(Werke I: 568)
. . . . But she returned
. . . . . . . .
high and hollow and outburned;
ever circled by the screaming flight
of words that, all unwatched for and unwilled,
lodged within her breast and propagated,
while the home-returningly fulfilled
sombrely beneath her eyebrows waited,
ready for the coming night.
(New Poems 181)
It is telling that these words ‘‘sit beneath her eyebrows,’’ thus underlining
not only the general connection between language and vision, but also their
specific function as both mediator and barrier between the gaze and the out-
side world. To read is not simply to imagine things, as in Romanticism, but
to encounter them as visions already contained within language. It is not
the subjective mind of the imaginative reader that sees, but language itself.
Vision inheres in language. In order to partake of it, one must not read the
words, but see through them—not, to be sure, in the Romantic sense of es-
chewing their materiality in favor of the subjective hallucinations to which
they give rise, but, quite the contrary, by getting into physical contact with
them. Words are saturated with vision. They are the eyes of the reader.
And yet, although language enables vision, the words before us do not
see the things the way we do who rely upon their help. Words, to be sure,
stay in intimate contact with the things, yet their own vision forever remains
inaccessible to us. We cannot witness the way language itself perceives the
world. For as soon as words are placed before our eyes, their original insights
immediately become obscured. Not only are they now physically in the way
of our vision. Worse still, they only unveil dead images since they can no
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have eyes of their own, but they lost them once and for all in the textual
maze of signification. Exploited as signifiers that constitute discourse, they
are condemned to tell dilapidated stories about what they once were able to
see for themselves. It follows that neither by looking at words, as in the act of
reading, nor by blinding one’s regular vision, as suggested by the old Brahe,
does the seer regain access to living things. Once called upon to surrender
its vision, language obfuscates the images it provides and prepares the reign
of darkness: ‘‘fertig für die Nacht.’’
The only possibility left for the reader of Rilke’s poems is to both ac-
knowledge the materiality of language and simultaneously liquify and digest
this materiality within one’s own body. The reader’s gaze must merge with
the text and dissolve it while standing opposed to it at the same time. Rilke’s
poetry gives rise to a stereoscopic vision of the reader. One eye must seize
upon and hold fast to the physical being of language, whereas the other must
intuit its liquified meaning as the language of being. A Münchhausen effect
ensues in which language is charged with undoing the very process of in-
strumentalization to which it owes its own existence. Signifying their own
deconstruction, words are now being reborn as meaningful things in their
own right only to be immediately subjected to the same liquidation process
all over again. TheNew Poemsmust self-destruct if they want to survive, and
can survive only in and through this gesture of self-destruction. However, as
in my previous readings, I argue that these poems leave a material imprint
in the form of punctuation signs meant to authenticate this process of their
own undoing.
Hence, my emphasis on the profound ambiguity at work in Rilke’s poetry
does not include a verdict with regard to its artistic ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure.’’ I
merely want to point to the specificity of his poetic vision, which could never
be achieved through Dadaist wordplays or experiments in ‘‘visual’’ or ‘‘spa-
tial’’ poetry conducted throughout the twentieth century (e.g., Schwitters,
Morgenstern). Rilke does not just visualize some primordial nonsense by
means of the idiosyncratic arrangement of words on paper, as Kittler’s gen-
eralized account of the discourse network around 1900 at times suggests.
Rather, he seeks to mediate the conflict between their exterior shell and the
interior life that shell protects. Whether one regards the resulting tension
within Rilke’s poetry as symptomatic of his poetic success or his failure—
whether, in other words, one reads Rilke’s paradoxical gaze as a symptom
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eyes, a rather arbitrary and hence less relevant issue than the epistemological
potential it yields. What remains crucial is to recognize that Rilke’s poetic
enterprise becomes undone—or undoes itself—because it desperately seeks
a kind of empirical realization it cannot possibly achieve. Precisely the nego-
tiation of this failure remains his major achievement.
Phenomenological Vision in the Face of Language:
Reading Rilke’s ‘‘Die Gazelle’’
Let me examine the phenomenological dimension of Rilke’s New Poems
to clarify this point. In contrast to Husserl, Rilke fully acknowledged the
structural ambiguity of language and made it the focus of his poetics. In
the New Poems, words not only are regarded as the constituents of an au-
tonomous meaning, as in Husserl, but are granted the freedom to become
objects in their own right, freed from the intentionality usually ascribed to
them. Although one may regard this difference as constitutive of that be-
tween poetry and philosophy in general, the juxtaposition of Husserl and
Rilke is particularly instructive for the art of looking around 1900. As ar-
gued above, Rilke locates ‘‘truth’’ within the play of liberated, ‘‘superficial,’’
nonsignifying linguistic elements. Language is said to be both every-thing
and no-thing, a medium simultaneously identified with, and separate from,
the appearances of modern life. This paradox reveals the intimate relation
between Rilke’s poetics and Husserl’s phenomenology. For Husserl, words
are but the contingent and dispensable signs of the self-identical essence of
things. In his eyes, language testifies to the existence of pure meaning with-
out, however, being identical to it. Similar to Husserl’s convoluted apparatus
of philosophical terms, Rilke’s poems claim to describe the eidetic essence
of things, but they cannot present it outside the very signifying process they
so vehemently denounce. This, of course, was the reason why Rilke oriented
his work along the ‘‘reality’’ of the visual arts in the first place, only to once
again get caught in the same circle he wanted to escape.
Trying, unsuccessfully, to collapse materiality and meaning, Rilke’s
poetry, if unwittingly, deconstructs Husserl’s entire premise of phenomeno-
logical intuition. Once words are simultaneously identified as both material
things and transparent signs, they become riddled with an interior contra-
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the ideal meanings they are said to represent. The speaking gaze in the New
Poems remains chained to the words that pronounce what it sees. As a con-
sequence, Rilke is forced to instrumentalize (as meaning) the very language
he wants to set free, while Husserl, on the other hand, cannot but set free
those terms he claims to instrumentalize. Contrary to Husserl’s major argu-
ment, his phenomenological concepts do not simply describe or signify the
ideal objects of intentionality, but, in some sense, literally are these object,
whereas Rilke’s poems never simply are the things themselves, but also sig-
nify them. This interior contradiction creates a ‘‘void’’ Rilke himself refers
to as theWeltinnenraum, yet whatever term one chooses in order to describe
this nonspace, Husserl’s eidetic entities remain its prisoner. They are caught
therein as time is arrested in a photograph.
This tension between Husserl’s phenomenology and Rilke’sNew Poems is
rarely recognized by critics. Käte Hamburger, for example, rightly claimed
that Rilke develops ‘‘a lyric in lieu of an epistemology’’ (Käte Hamburger
84), yet her own readings of Rilke are often marred by the coerced attempt
to prove the ‘‘uniqueness’’ of Rilke’s poetry (Käte Hamburger 84, 152). In-
stead of giving equal attention to both the hermeneutic and deconstructive
dimension at work in his texts, Hamburger stresses the formerover the latter
and thus fails to appreciate the interdependence of both. If poetry triumphs
over philosophy, as Hamburger’s analysis implies, it is not because it in-
tends the things themselves more intimately or more directly than philoso-
phy, but, quite the contrary, because it recognizes the futility of the entire
project, yet performs it nonetheless.11 At the center of Rilke’sWeltinnenraum
dwells this paradox that cannot be solved logically, but must be rehearsed
over and over again in the act of reading. David Wellbery, therefore, focuses
his critique on the semiotic overdetermination of Rilke’s poetic language
and, by way of a direct response to Hamburger’s readings, concludes as fol-
lows: ‘‘[Rilke’s] poems exemplify the dissolution of substantial things into a
series of systematic partial values . . . which expose the illusory hope to ever
achieve the final transformation of language into the presence of things. In
this context of a ‘general relativity of theworld,’ ideology consists in the pre-
tense that the missing substantiality of things nonetheless exists, trying to
fill the void left behind by this substantiality with the signifier of a full ob-
ject, a fetish, a being’’ (‘‘Gazelle’’ 132). Rilke’s poetry, one might summarize
Wellbery’s position, is an antiphenomenology seeking to destroy the myth
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Rilke pictures a primordial void. As soon as critical analysis approaches it,
however, it gets caught in a paradox: on the one hand, poetic language seeks
to fill this void by taking the place of the thing itself and covering up the
lack, while, on the other hand, given the deferral of sense that characterizes
discourse, poetry continuously perpetuates this void, unwittingly exposing
its own failure to establish the absolute presence of things.
Hamburger’s and Wellbery’s perspectives, it follows, demarcate the ex-
treme perimeters within which the scholarly debate of Rilke’s middle period
takes place, and critics usually argue in favor of either one of the two sides.
The following analysis seeks to collapse this discursive field by reconnect-
ing the seemingly oppositional poles that sustain it. At its center one finds
Rilke’s advocacy of a particular art of reading based upon a stereoscopic
field of vision. It calls for an oscillating gaze that changes back and forth
between words and images, signs and things. In other words, Rilke’s best
poems not only exhibit a ‘‘decompository tendency’’ to expose the ideologi-
cal attempt of phenomenological fetishization, as Wellbery suggests (ibid.).
More important, they simultaneously endeavor to account for the semblance
of presence encountered in and through the oscillating gaze. TheNew Poems
explore a stereoscopic vision at work during the process of reading and thus
recognize both the fundamental difference as well as the intimate relation
between words and things.
This stereoscopic vision is not dialectical in nature. It does not, as Judith
Ryan argues, result in the ‘‘reversal of a negative ‘void’ into a positive pres-
ence.’’ Nor is it ‘‘an emblem of an extreme negative aesthetics,’’ as Erica
Greber puts it (Greber 184). Rather, it labors to maintain the semblance of
presence for the sole purpose of deconstructing it. Whereas Husserl con-
jures the imaginary ideal of a speaking gaze in which matter and meaning
coincide, Rilke’s poem advocates a mode of reading in which the gaze con-
tinuously oscillates between these two poles. The New Poems neither try to
cover up the primordial void (i.e., the lack of an objective presence at the
heart of matter) nor do they simply aim to expose it as such. Rather, they
explore the interdependence of both attempts as constitutive of the process
of reading, which is built upon the simultaneous acknowledgement and dis-
avowal of its own impossibility. Rilke’s poetry both exposes language as a
fetish and idealizes it as the real thing the fetish seeks to replace.This paradox
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Die Gazelle
Gazella Dorcas
Verzauberte: wie kann der Einklang zweier
erwählter Worte je den Reim erreichen,
der in dir kommt und geht, wie auf ein Zeichen.
Aus deiner Stirne steigen Laub und Leier,
und alles Deine geht schon im Vergleich
durch Liebeslieder, deren Worte, weich
wie Rosenblätter, dem, der nicht mehr liest,
sich auf die Augen legen, die er schließt:
um dich zu sehen: hingetragen, als
wäre mit Sprüngen jeder Lauf geladen
und schösse nur nicht ab, solang der Hals
das Haupt ins Horchen hält: wie wenn beim Baden
im Wald die Badende sich unterbricht:




Enchanted thing: however can the chime
of two selected words attain the true
rhyme that, as beckoned, comes and goes in you?
Out of your forehead leaf and lyre climb,
and all you are has been in simile
passing through those love-songs continually
whose words will cover, light as leaves of rose,
the no-more-reader’s eyes, which he will close:
only to look upon you: so impelled
as though each limb of yours with leaps were laden,
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the head in hearkening: as when a maiden
breaks off from bathing in some lonely place,
the forest-lake within her swift-turned face.
(New Poems 88)
In a self-referential gesture, the poem compares the gazelle to the power
of language to conjure its essence. This essence is characterized as an inner
rhyme, a movement that comes and goes not unlike the regular rhyme and
pentameter at work in Rilke’s poem. The gazelle, indeed, is a work of magic,
and the first word we read simultaneously addresses both creatures, the
poem and the animal, as one and the same. The ‘‘Gazella Dorcas’’ is born
of the mere attempt to picture its referent via language, since due to its ‘‘en-
chanted’’ existence, the gazelle immediately converts into poetry any com-
parative statementmade about it (‘‘und alles Deine geht schon imVergleich /
durch Liebeslieder . . .’’).To describe the gazelle is to enter the realmof lyrical
language—this is the central premise of Rilke’s poem. The premise is imple-
mented as soon as it is stated: the gazelle’s ears and antlers are addressed as
laurel and lyre, the insignia of Apollo, the god of the arts.
Since everything happens ‘‘as if ’’ controlled ‘‘by a sign,’’ one might read
both the gazelle and the poemdescribing it asmere signifiers for thewonders
of presence and absence engendered by language. The gazelle not simply in-
spires poetry, but literally is poetry in its pristine form. This equation seems
to render obsolete any attempt to elevate one side over the other. Contem-
plating the relationship between words and things, Rilke’s poem refuses to
concede ontological priority to either one of its constitutive poles. It ap-
pears that words do not imitate things, nor are things born out of words,
but each is mirrored and takes shape in and through the other. And yet,
the first stanza rhetorically refutes this reading, for it implies that language
might never adequately describe or imitate the beauty of the gazelle. In other
words, Rilke’s ‘‘Gazelle’’ explicitly acknowledges the linguistic constructed-
ness of an external object (the gazelle is but a poem and can only be referred
to in the form of poetic verse) while at the same time questioning that any
such linguistic reference be meaningful or possible at all. This hypothetical
negation in turn serves to call into positive existence the verbal construct of
the poem meant to defy it.
The ‘‘Gazelle’’ is pictured both within and beyond language. It is said to
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upon to ‘‘read through’’ the poem in order to ‘‘see’’ what she reads. Although
this emphasis on movement serves to highlight the temporal dimension of
language, Rilke’s words are once again endowed with a physical quality that
contradicts their status as transitory, ephemeral signs. The words inspired
by the ‘‘Gazelle’’ (i.e., Rilke’s poem) are like rose petals covering the closed
eyes of those who do not read them anymore and thus truly begin to ‘‘see’’
(‘‘. . . derenWorte, weich / wie Rosenblätter, dem, der nicht mehr liest, / sich
auf die Augen legen, die er schließt: // um dich zu sehen’’). This is the de-
fining moment of Rilke’s poetics and its constitutive paradox: at precisely
the moment in which words become objectified, that is, at the very moment
they are freed from the burden of signification and become self-identical,
material things in their own right, they enable a true and unrestricted kind
of vision in the form of a gaze directed not outward toward the ‘‘real’’ object
beyond language, but inward toward a transparent essence evoked by the
very words that allegedly have ceased to signify anything at all.
This moment of transformation effected in the second half of the poem
is, of course, facilitated by the incantatory quality of Rilke’s language since
words that can no longer be seen must be heard or felt instead. Hence, the
regular and harmonic structure of the sonnet, the constancy of rhyme and
meter as well as the skillful use of alliteration (‘‘Laub und Leier’’; ‘‘Worte,
weich’’; ‘‘DerHals // dasHaupt insHorchen hält’’) and the repetition of vow-
els (such as the ‘‘ei’’ in the first part or the various umlauts in the second)
all contribute to the ‘‘magic’’ described by the poem. Put differently, one
might say that Rilke uses the sound of language in order to promote his ideal
vision of things. This merging of eye and ear serves to reinforce the overall
synaesthetic dimension of the poem. It calls upon the visual, auditory, and
tactile senses in order to overcome the static equilibrium between the two
interdependent, yet autonomous, realms of language and being by merging
them into one. Instead of indeterminately oscillating between the two poles,
the reader’s gaze suddenly zooms in and seizes upon its object, ‘‘um dich zu
sehen’’. The image sharpens, the picture takes shape, ‘‘The Gazelle’’ appears.
This, indeed, is a typical example of the phenomenological dimension in
Rilke’s poetry so often noted by critics. Covering their eyes, the readers can-
not possibly see any particular animal anymore, but rather must intuit the
gazelle in its very essence, as the Latin title clearly indicates. What becomes
visible in Rilke’s poem is the intentional object itself, the eidos of its being.
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eidetic intuition, he simultaneously undermines this notion, for the reader
of Rilke’s poem can only perceive a mental image of the animal; this, how-
ever, is precisely whatHusserl so vehemently rejects throughout his writings.
For him, the eidetic essence of things must never be pictured in the form
of an image in human consciousness since the latter is contingent and em-
pirical, whereas the former are necessary and ideal. Although the essence
of things is implicit and hence evident within individual acts of conscious-
ness, as Husserl argues, it is not ‘‘really’’ contained therein like a picture in a
photo album. As I argued in the first part of this study, it remains unclear in
Husserl how exactly ideal entities are to be intuited at all. Rilke’s own efforts,
for one, are constantly in danger of succumbing to a kind of neo-Romantic
imagery sustained by the power of poetic imagination, a view at odds with
Husserl’s notion of objective, intuitive evidence as well as Rilke’s own poetic
ideal.
As a deliberate countermeasure, Rilke’s poems emphasize the tactile ma-
teriality and ephemeral resonance of language simultaneously.He calls upon
the reader to actually feel the words and listen to them rather than only
reading them.Visual perception, for Rilke, once again must develop the tac-
tile sense and the very physicality that had been lost during modernity. The
goal is to stop reading and to close the semiotic gap between sign and refer-
ent by means of a language literally in touch with the body and with itself.
Words become objects in their own right, covering the eyes of the reader
and thus replacing them with the very words the reader originally tried to
read. The ability to ‘‘see’’ the intentional object of the poem hinges on this
crucial transformation of words into eyes that look for themselves and carry
their immediate visions within.
The art of reading must leave ordinary perception behind and see things
with words, through them and in spite of them. Because words are both ob-
stacles and conduits in the path of poetic vision, they are self-asserting and
self-effacing at the same time, necessary and ephemeral to the poetic process
they inaugurate. Not only does ‘‘Rilke’s poetics question the value of intu-
ition to guarantee one’s immediate awareness of a visible object,’’ asWellbery
argues (‘‘Gazelle’’ 131), Rilke also defines intuition itself as dependent upon
language, thus undermining the popular distinction around 1900 between
immediate perception and linguistic difference. For him, words are the eyes
of every-thing, and intuition is but the poetic effect of coming into contact
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the experience of reading, for example in ‘‘Der Leser’’ (‘‘The Reader’’), who
looks up from the book,
. . . . . . . . .
. . . alles auf sich hebend,
was unten in dem Buche sich verhielt,
mit Augen, welche, statt zu nehmen, gebend
anstießen an die fertig-volle Welt:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
(Werke I: 637)
. . . . . . . .
. . . thereby upheaving
all the book’s deepness to the light of day,
with eyes which, now outgiving, not receiving,
impinged upon a filled environment:
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
(New Poems 287)
Contrary to Romanticism, Rilke’s notion of reading emphasizes the corpo-
real dimension of a gaze that literally lifts up what has been read and tries to
‘‘give’’ it to the external world with which it is said to ‘‘collide.’’ The reader’s
eyes literally ‘‘have it in them,’’ as the old Brahe used to say. By means of this
tactile gaze, theNew Poems attempt to solve the crisis of reading and writing
discussed in Malte. Language figures as a material body that looks at things
in its own way.
One might say that whereas the quartets of Rilke’s ‘‘Gazelle’’ betray a
certain stasis as they focus on the reader’s gaze oscillating between words
and things, the terzets stereoscopically blend both poles and let us see the
ideal essence of the object intended. And yet, the poem also unveils the
price to pay for this semblance of intuition and the heightened feeling of
‘‘real’’ presence. This price consists in the mortification of being since the
phenomenological vision cannot but replace the ‘‘real’’ gazelle with a mere
representation. The very moment Rilke’s imaginary reader is said to intuit
the ideal object itself, the moment she has replaced her eyes with the words
that allow her to partake of the inherent vision of language itself, that is
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‘‘hingetragen,’’ we see the ‘‘Lauf ’’ of the gazelle, and while this image in-
deed implies movement, the remainder of the poem divulges the artificiality
of this appearance, which culminates in the cessation of motion altogether.
Rilke’s formulation (‘‘geladener Lauf ’’) indeed evokes a loaded gun barrel
as much as a galloping gazelle and thus speaks to the violence inherent in
this ideal of purified vision. The reader becomes the hunter preying upon
the eidos of the animal. The poem has ‘‘shot’’ a picture of life, so to speak,
in the paradoxical effort to preserve things by killing them.
This paradox accounts for the tension palpable in the second part of
Rilke’s poem,which posits and immediatelywithdraws the definingmoment
of ‘‘pure’’ vision. Topographically located at the center of the poem, the phe-
nomenological gaze—‘‘um dich zu sehen’’—itself is bracketed, so to speak,
by two colons isolating it from the rest of the poem, with similar interrup-
tions reappearing throughout the last two stanzas. Together, they provoke
an atmosphere of suspended tension epitomized in the final image of the
female bather ‘‘interrupting herself.’’ The image itself exposes a motion in
standstill. The moment of pure vision, that is, the stereoscopic impression
that coerces two heterogeneous realms (i.e., time and space, language and
being) into one gives rise to a kind of neutral space, a realm of pure me-
diation. Still vibrating within, time itself seems arrested in this space, as if
something had passed by and is still passing by without, however, resulting
in any movement at all.
A crucial ‘‘interruption’’ separates the quartets and the terzets, and the
eidos of the gazelle takes shape within this ruptured space. What exactly is
the nature of this ‘‘interruption’’ that harbors the essence of things? First
of all, it is due to the many colons that fortify the generic caesura already
inherent within the sonnet form itself. In his reading of Hölderlin, Lacoue-
Labarthe contends that the caesura ‘‘prevents . . . the racing oscillation . . .
and an orientation towards this or that pole. The disarticulation represents
the active neutralityof the interval in between’’ (Typology 235).What appears
in the caesura, according to Hölderlin himself, ‘‘is no longer the alterna-
tion of representation, but representation itself ’’ (Hölderlin, qtd. in Lacoue-
Labarthe, Typography 234). In other words, the caesura opens up a space of
absolute neutrality that functions as the ‘‘interval in between’’ the two poles
of word andworld in Rilke’s poem.The same can be said of the colon, which,
in the words of Giorgio Agamben, possesses ‘‘an intermediary function’’: it
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a passage without spatial movement’’ (Potentialities 222f.). The colon repre-
sents the fault line both separating and connecting inside and outside, word
and thing. More precisely, it ‘‘represents the dislocation of immanence in
itself, the opening to an alterity that nevertheless remains absolutely imma-
nent’’ (Potentialities 223). The colon addresses whatever follows as always
already enclosed within that which came before—it is the syntactical insig-
nia of Rilke’s Weltinnenraum and the ‘‘interstices of time.’’ It is literally a
placeholder that renders present the absence of the space ‘‘in between,’’ the
spacewhere immanence and transcendence touch upon each other. In other
words, the colon demarcates the poetically overdetermined realm of empti-
ness and plentitude, the phenomenological ideal of a spatial void inhabited
by all those intentional objects of pure intuition.
Rilke’s entire poem takes shape under the auspices of such a colon and the
magic it yields. It begins with ‘‘Verzauberte:’’—note the colon!—and every-
thing that follows literally belongs to this enchanted beginning. The poem
unfolds the colon’s interior and makes visible the things it shelters, and the
gazelle is pictured in the nonpictorial, poetic space opened and closed by the
colon itself. Like Husserl’s perceptual noema, the gazelle is a ‘‘quasi-being’’
that exists only in the moment of suspended tension between the I and the
world. The ‘‘Gazella Dorcas’’ lives in the nonextended space and the imagi-
nary visions afforded by the colon. The ability to ‘‘read’’ the colon is the
prerequisite for seeing the gazelle and for entering Rilke’s Weltinnenraum.
And yet, the colon cannot be read since it carries no independent meaning
that could be translated into language. Elements of punctuation, Adorno
argues, are not signs of communication pertaining to the relationship be-
tween language and reader, but inhere within language itself. They regulate
the traffic that occurs ‘‘within the interior of language, on its own paths’’
(‘‘Satzzeichen’’; Noten 106).
Rilke exposes this interior and the ‘‘incorporeal presence’’ (ibid.) of lan-
guage that he expects his readers to perceive. If punctuation can be said
to help regulate the heartbeat (i.e., the rhyme, rhythm, and meter of every
text), thenRilke’s reader, like the oldBrahe,must learn to ‘‘read in the blood’’
of language. Closing the eyes, the reader must sense the rhythm of the poem
and feel the pulse of language in order to ‘‘read’’ the colon and ‘‘see’’ the
gazelle. The reader must experience the liquified meaning of words flowing
through his own veins, as does the imaginary reader in Malte, who ‘‘closes
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his blood’’ (Malte;WerkeVI: 928). The reader of ‘‘The Gazelle’’ must literally
feel his way alongside the string of words much like ‘‘The Blind Man’’ (‘‘Der
Blinde’’) in Rilke’s poem fingers his way through the streets of Paris:
Sieh, er geht und unterbricht die Stadt,
die nicht ist auf seiner dunkeln Stelle,
wie ein dunkler Sprung durch eine helle
Tasse geht. Und wie auf einem Blatt
ist auf ihm der Widerschein der Dinge
aufgemalt; er nimmt ihn nicht hinein.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Werke I: 590)
Look, his progress interrupts the scene,
absent from his dark perambulation,
like a dark crack’s interpenetration
of a bright cup. And, as on a screen,
all reflections things around are making
get depicted on him outwardly.
. . . . . . . . . . .
(New Poems 217)
The visual ideal of the New Poems is embodied by the tactile vision of the
blind man.Where hewalks, the city cannot be, both because he does not see
it and because he physically occupies the city’s place. Yet he feels the space
‘‘he interrupts’’ as he himself becomes the fissure that reconnects the two
halves of the city he has divided. ‘‘Sprung’’ in this context connotes both
Heidegger’s notion of ‘‘Riß’’ and Dasein’s decisive ‘‘Sprung’’ into Being by
authentically ‘‘being in the world.’’ The blind man dwells where all readers
ought to be. ‘‘The reflection of things’’ painted upon the blind man’s body
‘‘as if on a sheet of paper’’ are, indeed, nothing but the words that engage
the reader’s gaze in the form of the poem itself.
Like the protagonist in Rilke’s ‘‘Der Blinde,’’ the reader of Rilke’s poetry
needs to go blind in order to get in touch with the things surrounding him.
Once the reader sees with words instead of eyes, once she uses words as eyes
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to become part of a scene she was merely able to imagine before. One might
surmise that the tension palpable in the second part of the ‘‘Gazelle’’ results
from the gazelle having been surprised by a reader who now perceives what
otherwise would have remained literally out of sight. Taking notice of his
sudden presence, the gazelle feels ‘‘interrupted,’’ the poem suggests, much
like the female bather who senses that she is being spied upon by an intruder.
The reader of Rilke’s ‘‘Gazelle’’ is this intruder. Practicing the art of non-
reading, she has interrupted and short-circuited the self-sufficient realms
of being and language. The strained atmosphere of motionless tension cap-
tured in the image of the ‘‘loaded’’ animal’s body bespeaks a moment of
contact between human and animal, inside and outside, text and world. All
boundaries seem to have collapsed for the flash of a moment, and the last
stanza appears to inaugurate ‘‘a new level . . . insofar as the two poles of
the poem [the realms of being and of poetry] are melted together into a
single metaphor,’’ as Judith Ryan contends (54; my translation). Ryan’s read-
ing, however, is problematic because Rilke’s comparison serves precisely the
opposite function. It explicitly links the gazelle to the bathing woman, with-
out, however, merging them into one. Indeed, critics have often read Rilke’s
(in)famous ‘‘wie’’-comparisons (i.e., ‘‘wie auf ein Zeichen,’’ ‘‘wie wenn beim
Baden,’’ etc.) as evidence for ‘‘a weakness of the creative transformation,’’ as
Gottfried Benn contends (‘‘Probleme der Lyrik’’ 1068). Instead of forging a
convincing metaphor that merges the constitutive parts of the comparison
into a new whole, the wie merely connects them without affecting an inner
transformation in either. Adorno, to provide another example, equally di-
rects his critique against a ‘‘poetry which allows itself every metaphor, even
the plainly unmetaphorical as a comparison’’ (‘‘Jargon’’ 470).
In disagreeing with Ryan, however, one need not necessarily sanction
Benn’s and Adorno’s harsh criticism of Rilke either. Indeed, judged accord-
ing to the poetic ideal of a seamless metaphorical assimilation that dissolves
one element of the comparison into the other, Rilke’s wie-constructions ap-
pear unpoetic and even clumsy at times. However, since Rilke’s primary goal
consists in undermining this seemingly ‘‘natural’’ ideal of poetic transfor-
mation, his style affords an aesthetic quality of its own. Thewie-comparison
both dissolves and preserves the integrity of the two terms compared. It
recalls the complex relationship between language and being as two inter-
dependent, yet nonetheless autonomous, realms. The poetic virtuosity of
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scribes the oscillatory movement of Rilke’s gaze in between the two poles
of material reality and poetic utterance. Rilke’s refusal to resolve the tension
between sign and referent throughout the poem is indicative of his under-
standing of words as both matter and meaning. As for Hofmannsthal, poetic
language here mediates the reconciliation of words and things by means of
their separation from one another.
The suspended tension captured in Rilke’s ‘‘as if ’’ comparisons immedi-
ately undermines the seemingly harmonious reconciliation of being and
language. The exemplary moment of phenomenological vision is unveiled
as a highly precarious one, for it can disappear any time the gazelle decides
to ‘‘shoot’’ away. The morbid atmosphere underlying the entire scene re-
sembles that of a still life not painted but actually ‘‘shot’’ in a photograph.
In a letter to Clara, Rilke narrates his ‘‘real’’ encounter with the ‘‘Gazella
Dorcas’’ at the Jardin des Plantes and indeed mentions photography: ‘‘They
[the gazelles] remained a few yards apart, ruminating, resting, looking. Like
women look out of pictures, that’s how they looked out of something with
a quiet, irrevocable turn. . . . They were so beautiful that I could not walk
away. And exactly as I felt in front of your tender photograph: as if they
had just now been transformed into this shape’’ (Sie [die Gazellen] lagen ein
paar Schritte voneinander, wiederkäuend, ruhend, schauend. Wie Frauen
aus Bildern schauen, so schauen sie aus etwas heraus mit einer lautlosen,
endgültigen Wendung. . . . Ich konnte gar nicht fortgehen, so schön waren
sie, und ganz wie ich vor Deiner zarten Photographie fühlte: als ob sie eben
erst in diese Gestalt verwandelt worden wären) (Briefe aus Muzot 161). The
mention of the photograph in Rilke’s letter points to the power of modern
media to capture the look of things and to affect a momentary transforma-
tion from appearance to essence that informsRilke’s own ideal of ‘‘sachliches
Sagen,’’ as if Rilke, with the help of the photograph, could finally see and
‘‘feel’’ the magical moment of transformation that enables the primordial
contact between the eye and the world.
Rilke’s ‘‘[v]erzauberte’’ gazelle indeed reads as if it were itself based upon
a photograph rather than life. The apparatus he used, however, is not the
camera, but language, and Rilke’s picture of the gazelle is like a photograph
that inheres neither in external reality, nor in human consciousness, but only
within the words that mediate between both realms. His poetic photograph
denotes the ideal fault line between inside and outside, the imaginary and







































































rilke’s stereoscopic vis ion : 235
phenomenology, consists in relocating that ideal itself within the realm of
the symbolic. Both, image and referent, are claimed to take shape exclu-
sively within language. They are captured within the nonextended spaces
represented by the multiplicity of colons that pervade the second half of the
poem. Whereas Husserl claimed that language is a mere tool for the ade-
quate expression of intuitive perception, Rilke’s poem focuses on the photo-
graphic and mortifying ability of language itself. His failure to preserve the
‘‘Gazelle’’ in a more real, less mediated state unveils that of phenomenology
itself. There is no ‘‘pure vision’’ in Husserl’s sense except by doing violence
to one’s own insight since the speaking gaze must ‘‘shoot’’ a picture of the
very life it seeks to preserve.
The last line of the ‘‘Gazelle’’ once again both acknowledges and disavows
the possibility of the phenomenological perception it rehearses. Given the
equivocality of the term, ‘‘Gesicht’’ refers both to the bather’s face and to
the ideal visions taking shape therein.Much like the bather literally ‘‘has’’ the
lake in her face by turning away from it, the reader must turn away from the
text in order truly to see what it says—an impossible task given the need to
read the words in order to overlook them. Rilke’s impossible art of reading
thus consists in turning one’s face into a projection screen for the inherent
visions of language. The poetic text emerges as something to look at and
something that informs and guides our vision toward the true look of things.
And yet both, words and things, are chimeras. They are photographs of sorts
that have alreadymortified the lifelike intuition they claim to render present.
The gazelle is but a picture of life, preserved as the face of language.
In the last chapter, I reexamine this notion of the face of language once
again with reference to Stefan George’s poetry. I will argue that Rilke’s ad-
miration for the ‘‘reality’’ of the spatial arts and his ideal of ‘‘free’’ readers
set him apart from the more ritualistically oriented work of Stefan George.
Rilke’s thing-poems cling to the very notion of irrecuperablemateriality that
George tries to transcend. In George’s poetic vision, the body of language
replaces and ultimately eradicates without a trace the reality it was supposed
to render present. The dubious achievement of George and his circle thus
consists in having pushed the reification of language to its limit. In order
to ensure the purity of their aesthetic ideals, they shut out and abandon the
external world without any immediate attempt to affect its necessary trans-
formation. Social change is claimed to occur magically right in front of our
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ing it. However, once these ties between art and life are severed, such that
there remains no interior trace (in the form of a signifier without signified)
in the text that bears witness to the continued tension between these two
realms, then poetry loses its potentiality for magical transformation and in-







































































6 Other as Same
The Politics of the George Circle
Ich bin der Eine und bin Beide . . .
Ich bin ein end und ein beginn.
—Stefan George
Art, Religion, and the Gesamtkunstwerk of Life
‘‘Can he who does not belong to the realm of art possibly claim to
partake of life?’’ (Wer gar keiner kunst angehört darf sich der überhaupt
rühmen dem leben anzugehören?) (Briefwechsel George-Hofmannsthal 87).
Stefan George’s rhetorical question highlights his belief in the inseparability
of art and life. Those who are not situated within the aesthetic realm lose
contact with real ‘‘life,’’ because ‘‘life,’’ for George, is precisely that which tri-
umphs over the mundane reality of everyday existence. The self must with-
draw from the outside world into the inner sanctuary of art in order to em-
brace ‘‘life.’’ Given this premise, the Blätter für die Kunst insist from the very
beginning on the radical separation of art and social reality: ‘‘The name of
this publication partly already indicates what it is all about: to serve art and
poetry in particular and to eschew everything that pertains to state and so-
ciety’’ (Der name dieser veröffentlichung sagt schon zum teil was sie soll: der
kunst besonders der dichtung und dem schrifttum dienen, alles staatliche
und gesellschaftliche ausscheidend) (Landmann, Einleitungen 7).1
In spite of this and similar statements, it would be erroneous to interpret
George’s aesthetic stance as a total disinterest in life or material reality as
such. Quite the contrary, his journal seeks to rescue modern society from
the ‘‘false perception of reality’’ it deems responsible for the reification of
life. George’s poetry allegedly provides the only foundation for the possible
rejuvenation of the world outside. The Blätter für die Kunst rehearse the







































































238 : part i i
art around 1900. Art needs to be freed from society in order to serve it, and
the necessary transformation of the world can only be achieved by separat-
ing what ought to be united. Once art has been liberated from any kind of
entanglement with reality—‘‘an art freed from servitude’’—it will inevitably
affect and give rise to sociopolitical changes in modern life.
The social circle around Stefan George symbolizes the magical ring that
protects arts against the disastrous intrusion of the profane outside. Fried-
rich Wolters’s essay ‘‘Gestalt,’’ published in 1911, extrapolates from inside
the circle what the outsiders have yet to comprehend, namely the life-giving
genius of ‘‘our spiritual leader’’ George (‘‘Gestalt’’ 146), who was able to
show the ‘‘Oneness of the world’’ (All-Eine der Welt) in his own Gestalt,
understood as both his physical being in the world and the poetry it be-
queaths: ‘‘[the One binds] eternal peace and eternal storm; it unites the in-
finite sphere which flows from center to periphery, from the periphery to
the center . . . , this complete, living world, this blessed god in whom every-
thing can be found according to the measure of the reflected purity of his
image’’ ([das Eine bildet] den ewigen frieden mit dem ewigen sturme einend
die unendliche vom kern zum umkreis, vom umkreis zum kerne wallende
kugel . . . , diese ganze lebendige welt, den seligen gott in dem alles ist nach
demmaasse der widergestrahlten reinheit seines bildes) (‘‘Gestalt’’ 145).This
god is George, and the dazzling redundancy of Wolters’s praise reflects on
a rhetorical level the paradoxical efforts to overcome the inside-outside di-
chotomy that defines it. The George-circle delineates the parameters of that
paradoxical space—the mythical realm Hofmannsthal referred to as ‘‘pre-
existence’’ and Rilke called the ‘‘Weltinnenraum’’—in which the Aestheticist
visions of life can finally take shape.
The resemblance betweenGeorge, Rilke, andHofmannsthal consists both
in their shared hope for the rejuvenation of poetic language and in their ex-
plicit rejection of any art that seeks an immediate social effect. Poetry has
literally nothing left to say but to confirm its own existence as art: ‘‘Any-
body who is still tempted by the desire to ‘say’ or ‘create’ something in the
realm of poetry or by other artistic means is unworthy even of entering the
mere vestibule of art’’ (In der dichtung—wie in aller kunst-bethätigung—
ist jeder der noch von der sucht ergriffen ist etwas ‘‘sagen’’ etwas ‘‘wirken’’ zu
wollen nicht einmal wert in den vorhof der kunst einzutreten) (Blätter für
die Kunst, zweite Folge, 4. Bd.Oct. 1894).The difference betweenGeorge and
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failure of their project. Once it became clear that the poetic rejuvenation of
life remained an illusory hope at best, Hofmannsthal, for one, abandoned
his earlier poetic ambitions and, after 1900, got increasingly involved in the
public life and politics of the Habsburg monarchy. If Hofmannsthal had ex-
perienced the impossibility of writing authentic poetry, George’s entire life
was meant to prove the opposite. Although the relationship to George had
already begun to deteriorate much earlier, Hofmannsthal’s decision, in the
first decade of the twentieth century, to leave the world of Aestheticism be-
hind and turn toward the sociopolitical realm instead sealed the irrevocable
end of their friendship. For Hofmannsthal, George indeed was ‘‘One who
passes by’’ (Einer, der vorübergeht), as he put it in one of his early poems.
More precisely, it was Hofmannsthal who ‘‘walked on’’ in life while George
remained confined to the circle of Aestheticism.
Rilke’s way of coping with the illusory nature of Aestheticist politics was
less decisive and more ambiguous than Hofmannsthal’s. He certainly did
not abandon his ideal of world redemption in and through art, but instead
chose to recuperate his doubts poetically as part of the project itself. Rilke’s
poetry skillfully oscillates between presence and absence, word and thing.
Yet his vision of a world liberated from modern alienation and fragmen-
tation, from instrumental reason and the commodity fetishism of capital-
ism remains phantasmic because it hinges on the reader’s gaze to create the
Weltinnenraum it promises. The paradox of a poetic vision that implicitly
presupposes the sociopolitical revolution it claims to implement may not
be the last reason for Rilke’s repeated withdrawal from the world into the
microcosm of the inner self. Unlike George and his circle, Rilke did not seek
the communal realm necessary to implement his ideals into sociopolitical
reality. In isolation from family, friends, and the world alike, the lonely poet
Rilke relied instead on the contemplative reception of autonomous, discon-
nected readers in the whole of Europe—a phantom empire of ‘‘free’’ indi-
viduals pursuing the poetic Auftrag of speaking things into existence.
In the end, Rilke’s poetic enterprise finds its last refuge in the exalted em-
brace of material presence as such. Mere being—including the ‘‘real’’ pres-
ence of actual letters on the page—appears as the solution to the problem it
continues to perpetuate. Being is embraced as meaningful simply by virtue
of its crude existence. Similarly, Rilke regards the creative act, by force of
its mere facticity, as a guarantee for the social implementation of its poetic
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by being there: ‘‘But now it is. Is. Is. Amen’’ (Aber nun ists. Ist. Ist. Amen)
(qtd. in Szondi 386), Rilke proclaims in a letter to the Countess Thurn und
Taxis after he has finally finished his Duino Elegies. In spite of this and simi-
lar epiphanies, Rilke had wrestled with his religious belief in the emancipa-
tory power of art throughout his life. It is precisely this sense of doubt that
authenticates his faith.
A widespread phenomenon among many European poets around 1900,
Rilke’s celebration of aestheticGestalt orGebilde as the revelation of a divine
truth finds its most pronounced German expression in the George-circle.
Contemporaries and scholars alike have pointed to George’s ‘‘style,’’ his self-
aggrandizing ‘‘habitus,’’ and the aesthetic ‘‘rituals’’ that function as impor-
tant elements in a quasi-religious cult. George’s poetry had ‘‘a mesmerizing,
incantatory quality’’ (bannend wie Zaubersprüche), reports Edith Land-
mann (qtd. in Braungart, Ästhetischer Katholizismus 154), and Gottfried
Benn declared that George’s ‘‘will towards form, and this new feeling for
form, was not simply Aestheticism, nor Intellectualism, nor Formalism, but
the most exalted belief ’’ (‘‘Rede auf Stefan George’’ 1039).2 Similar to the
Eucharist, the source of the magical power ascribed to George’s poetry ulti-
mately relies on an act of faith. Those who claim to be worthy recipients
of the Blätter für die Kunst must renounce their earlier beliefs and accept
George as the divine prophet of a more spiritualized world. Thus, the reader
of George’s poetry is converted into his disciple. For only then can ‘‘theword
become flesh and the flesh word, German language’’ (Gundolf 27), as Gun-
dolf exalts.3 George himself simply abstained from further commenting on
the nature of this transformation, a gesture that reveals the inherent con-
straints of a radical belief forced to scorn all academic or critical investiga-
tion as dangerous heresy.
The alleged magic of George’s poetry, however, depends upon the artifi-
cially created circle of ritual practice outside of which it loses its power: ‘‘Free
within the necessary paths’’ (Frei in den bedingten Bahnen) (Wolfskehl 231;
Gundolf 87). With this line from George’s ‘‘Algabal,’’ two of his disciples,
Wolfskehl and Gundolf, summarize the essence of George’s oeuvre, leaving
it up to the reader to focus on the freedom or the coercion inherent in this
poetic practice. Whoever chooses the former becomes a believer and hence
‘‘free’’ to join the aesthetic community, whereas all others—‘‘the boisterous
pack,’’ ‘‘the mass,’’ ‘‘the many’’ (‘‘die laute horde,’’ ‘‘das volk,’’ ‘‘die vielen’’)—
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formed in George’s poetry. Ludwig Klages clarifies the esoteric nature of
George’s circle, which preaches only to those ‘‘whose soul already partici-
pates’’ (Klages 3), and the journal Blätter für die Kunst repeatedly echoes the
exclusivity of its sacred cause.4
Of course, George is not alone in promoting art as a surrogate for the-
ology. Hofmannsthal’s notion of ‘‘magic’’ and Rilke’s glorification of the
‘‘angel’’ are no less idiosyncratic forms of secularized religion than is
George’s circle or his later Maximin cult. All three poets regarded aesthetic
experiences as a sort of religious epiphany that allegedly spiritualizes and
redeems external reality from the inside out. The major difference, how-
ever, consists in the radicality of George’s approach and his willingness to
put into practice the basic principles of his faith. To do so, he first needed
to cut any remaining connection between his circle and the outside world:
‘‘We tried to initiate the reversal within art and leave it up to others to de-
velop its continuation into life’’ (Wir suchten die umkehr in der kunst ein-
zuleiten undüberlassen es andren zu entwickelnwie sie aufs leben fortgesetzt
werden müsse) (Landmann, Einleitungen 20),5 the Blätter für die Kunst de-
clares in 1896. Although this withdrawal signals the defeat ofGeorge’s project
on a strictly sociopolitical level, it is presented as a victory instead. Those
who want to practice the Aestheticist faith must remain confined to the
inside, since otherwise their efforts would dissolve within the overdeter-
mined and chaotic structure of cultural modernity. Once within the circle,
however, there simply remains no ‘‘outside’’: ‘‘The circle finally mutates
into a ‘nation-state’ and its inner members become ‘state-constituents’ ’’
(Braungart, Ästhetischer Katholizismus 82; my translation). The George-
circle thus functions as the sociopolitical basis from which to launch the
modern project of reconciliation and to which it always and inevitably must
return given its phantasmic and narcissistic nature.
Although one might be tempted to equate Rilke’s Handwerk with
George’s Technik, the formal rigidity and often noted coercion of language
in George’s poetry hardly coincides with the playful liberation of words
and things to which Rilke (and Hofmannsthal) aspired. The main difference
between Rilke and George hence does not consist in what they seek, but
how they seek it. Rilke toils, George reigns. One doubts, the other knows.
Whereas Rilke’s gaze oscillates between poetic words and material things,
George increasingly insists on the phantasmagoric quality of everything be-







































































242 : part i i
language by breaking off the very connection to the material outside that
Rilke had hoped to establish harmoniously. Rilke’s gaze seeks to meet the
actual referent of language, while George merely recognizes the signified of
his own words. If Rilke still tries to convince both himself and his readers
about the magical power of art, George preaches only to those already con-
vinced to begin with. His self-assured style of writing implies that his poetry
has always already said what it meant to say. If ‘‘you’’ fail to understand the
‘‘solution’’ it proclaims—see ‘‘Der Teppich’’ discussed in the introduction—
it is because ‘‘you’’ are unworthy to share its secrets. George’s clandestine
language can be read and understood only by those who, like the ‘‘seher’’
below, have turned their gaze away from the mundane reality of everyday
life toward the higher realm of art. Nothing could be further from Rilke’s
ideal of a commonly shared poetic vision—‘‘Wer du auch seist’’—than the
esoteric nature of George’s self-invented language:
Des sehers wort ist wenigen gemeinsam:
Schon als die ersten kühnen wünsche kamen
In einem seltnen reiche ernst und einsam
Erfand er für die dinge eigne namen—
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Werke I: 137)
The word of seers is not for common sharing.
In curious kingdoms, earnest and alone,
When first his wishes roused him with their daring,
He summoned things with names that were his own.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(The Works of Stefan George 136)
Ultimately, the politics and faith of George’s circle are self-authenticating
in the crudest sense of the term because he and his disciples simply refused
to consider or even acknowledge anything that might serve to undermine
the validity of their belief. The inherent danger of this self-congratulatory
gesture celebrating the divine power of art consists in a radical form of aes-
thetic projection. It reduces the outside to a blank screen waiting to come
alive through the utopian visions of the inspired master.
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‘‘chokes his words until they cannot escape him anymore’’ (Adorno, ‘‘George
und Hofmannsthal’’; X/1: 215), Adorno claims, and Gert Mattenklott simi-
larly regards the major effect of George’s language as the ‘‘petrification of
life’’ (Bilderdienst 278).6 This petrification of life is the Gestalt of the living
word worshiped by the circle, which is to say that the ‘‘death’’ of material
reality is the price to pay for the coming alive of language. George’s poetry
is able to redeem things only through a verbal embalmment that preserves
their corpses in the mausoleum of poetic form. It follows that the schol-
arly discussion between George’s advocates and adversaries, between those
who cherish his ‘‘powerful words’’ (Wort-Macht) and those who denounce
his ‘‘words of power’’ (Macht-Wort [Wolfgang Kämpfer]), is simplistic given
that each paradigm remains inextricably linked to its own opposite. The
reader cannot appreciate or discuss one without reference to the other. Let
me support this claim with regard to another poem from the collection Der
Teppich des Lebens, namely the one that immediately follows ‘‘Der Teppich’’
(see figure 3).
Urlandschaft
Aus dunklen fichten flog ins blau der aar
Und drunten aus der lichtung trat ein paar
Von wölfen · schlürften an der flachen flut
Bewachten starr und trieben ihre brut.
Drauf huschte aus der glatten nadeln streu
Die schar der hinde trank und kehrte scheu
Zur waldnacht · eines blieb nur das im ried
Sein end erwartend still den rudel mied.
Hier litt das fette gras noch nie die schur
Doch lagen stämme · starker arme spur·
Denn drunten dehnte der gefurchte bruch
Wo in der scholle zeugendem geruch
Und in der weissen sonnen scharfem glühn
Des ackers froh des segens neuer mühn
Erzvater grub erzmutter molk
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Primeval Landscape
From brooding pines an eagle upward swept
Into the blue, and toward the clearing stepped
Two wolves. They lapped the shallow pool and swung
To stark attention, marshalling their young.
And then across the glossy needles whipped
A flock of hinds, and drank, and shyly slipped,
Back to the dusk of woods, but one remained
Alone among the reeds to wait his end.
Here the lush grass had never felt the blade,
But hands had been at work, for stems were laid
And further on a plough had ridged the sod,
Where in the fertile odour of the clod
And happy in the white and stinging sun
With fields and gains their novel toil had won,
Arch-father delved, arch-mother milked,
Shaping the fate of all this human ilk.
(The Works of Stefan George 185f.)
The first edition ofDerTeppich des Lebens from 1900 pictured ‘‘DerTeppich’’
and ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ opposite each other on adjacent pages in the book. This
placement is significant, for it designates the poems as two sides of the same
coin. The life that originally took shape in the arabesque patterns and words
of ‘‘Der Teppich’’ now appears as the ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ of a nascent world.
My interpretation centers on the nature of this transformation from one
poem to the next. What happens in the space that separates and connects
the two?
Contrary to ‘‘Der Teppich,’’ ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ is written not in the present,
but in past tense. Whereas the first poem emphasizes a spatiotemporal im-
mediacyanddesignates the act of reading as thatwhich enlivens themeaning
and being of the poem, ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ describes a past scenario indepen-
dent from the reader’s participation. It portrays a landscape observed from a
distant and elevated perspective, thus situating the seer/reader in opposition
to, rather than in conjunction with, the scene portrayed. The picturesque







































































other as same : 245
sense of solemn serenity it projects. The formal rigidity of the poem does not
allow for a more animated depiction of the animals in the first two stanzas
(‘‘starr,’’ ‘‘scheu,’’ ‘‘still’’), and the morbid atmosphere is adequately captured
in the image of the dying creature isolated from the herd. The second part of
the poem slightly alters this tone. It shifts focus from the picture of death to
the fertility of the landscape itself evident in the unhampered growth of the
‘‘fat grass’’ and the ‘‘ripe’’ smell of the arable land that surrounds it. Although
the harvested trees—‘‘Doch lagen stämme’’—are read as signs for the pres-
ence of a powerful force—‘‘starker arme spur’’—the people in charge of the
‘‘Urlandschaft’’ and hence responsible for the fecundity of the scene por-
trayed do not appear until the end of the poem. ‘‘Erzvater’’ and ‘‘Erzmutter’’
have left their mark on this primordial terrain, and their heroic work has
prepared for the arrival of an entire nation: ‘‘Das schicksal nährend für ein
ganzes volk.’’
Such lines as this may have prompted Gundolf to argue that ‘‘the con-
tent of [the collection] ‘Teppich’ is the emergence of human culture under
the auspices of the Germans’’ (Gundolf, qtd. in Lauster 119). Be that as it
may, what remains of George’s ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ in the end is but mythologi-
cal puffery, a rhetorical balloon that hides the obscurity of its utopian vision
behind the bloated grandiosity of its stilted language. The usual awkward-
ness of George’s poetry caused by his deliberate use of neologisms and an-
tiquated, long-forgotten German vocabulary is amplified to the level of ab-
surdity in lines such as ‘‘Erzvater grub erzmutter molk.’’ Reading the last
lines of the poem, I ask myself what it means to ‘‘nurture the fate for an entire
people,’’ as it should be translated more literally. Providing arable land cer-
tainly nurtures people, but how does it nurture ‘‘fate’’ as such? Similarly, the
meaning of the two genitive constructions in the last stanza remains obscure.
‘‘Erzvater,’’ one can surmise, is ‘‘pleased’’ about the ‘‘field’’ he ‘‘spurred,’’ but
it is unclear what exactly ‘‘erzmutter’’ was doing since the second half of the
line cannot be reconciled with her ‘‘milking,’’ unless one assumes that she
indeed ‘‘milked’’ the ‘‘new distress of the blessings.’’ The only reading pos-
sible in order to rescue the poem from nonsense is to apply the word ‘‘froh’’
to both genitives at once so that the lines read: ‘‘Des ackers froh [und froh]
des segens neuer mühn / Erzvater grub erzmutter molk.’’ This addition, of
course, destroys the rhythm and highly formalized structure of the entire
poem, which was probably the reason why George suppressed it in the first
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only give rise to absurd syntactical structures, but are also symptomatic of
the coercion of language that sustains his poetic visions.
Obviously, I regard ‘‘Der Teppich’’ as an excellent poem and ‘‘Urland-
schaft’’ as a mediocre one at best. This estimate does not simply reflect my
discomfort with the nationalist tone of the latter that many critics have seen
as indicative of the protofascist sentiments of George and his circle. Rather,
the poem’s ideological fervor camouflages its aesthetic weakness. Or, con-
versely, ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ cannot convince aesthetically because it leaves the
poetic realm behind and instead projects a mythologized vision of national
renewal. In contrast to ‘‘Der Teppich,’’ the reader’s gaze no longer focuses
on the poem itself, but is directed outward toward the fertile land of the
ancestors and the utopian promise it allegedly holds. What is missing from
George’s ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ is the self-referentiality of the previous poem, its
continuous movement between signifier and signified, word and thing. The
reader of ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ contemplates a poetic picture of mythical land-
scape beyond the text rather than seeing the imaginary landscape of the
carpet coming alive in the very words and texture of the poem itself. Play-
ing with language, ‘‘Der Teppich’’ is provocative, seductive, and even teas-
ing at times. It activates and challenges the reader to unveil its secret and
loathes failure.Whetheror not the secret truly exists is less important a ques-
tion than the poem’s daring and defiant gesture of revelation that requires
and explicitly demands ‘‘your’’ help in order to be successful. In spite of its
self-assured tone, the poem still acknowledges that its reader has a decisive
choice about how to read.
This sense of choice is completely lost in ‘‘Urlandschaft.’’ Due to its rigid
structure and solemn tone, the poemmortifies rather than enlivens the scene
it depicts. Since everything appears to be already finished and perfect the
way it is, there remains no need for ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ to try to further ani-
mate this world or to invite the reader to enter into it. Instead, the poem
increasingly slips away into a mythical and completely imaginary past. Un-
like the animals witnessed in the first two stanzas, the heroic achievements
of the parental figures are not presented directly, but are conjectured from
certain clues and retroactively posited as the beginning of history.The ‘‘fate’’
emphasized in the last line of the poem further evinces a predetermined his-
torical process independent of those individuals who are subjected to it.This
denial of historical contingency and the suppression of individual agency
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pich.’’ The static image of a mythical accomplishment in the past replaces
the procedural notion of history and truth at work in art, while the posited
heroic act in ‘‘Urlandschaft’’ remains a pure conjecture on the diegetic level
of the poem. It is stipulated rather than developed, enforced rather than
enacted during the process of reading since the poem fails to convincingly
unfold its poetic vision in front of the reader’s eyes. Instead, it denies the
reader any autonomy as well as the right to participate (or refusal to partici-
pate) in the creation of its primordial world.Unlike ‘‘DerTeppich,’’ ‘‘Urland-
schaft’’ neither concedes nor works through the dilemma of self-alienation,
but simply represses it.
It follows that the seemingly insignificant step from one poem to the
next indeed crosses a crucial boundary between aesthetic emancipation
and aesthetic escapism, revelation and confinement, freedom and slavery.
According to most critics, George’s collectionDer Teppich des Lebens is situ-
ated right at the cusp between his earlier Aestheticism and his later proto-
fascism. Such generic demarcations are less significant than their negotia-
tion within the single poems themselves. For every one of them is at risk of
succumbing to the reification and absolutist vision prescribed in George’s
‘‘Urlandschaft,’’ and my inquiry into Aestheticist poetry around 1900 tried
to scrutinize the different poetic strategies employed toward off this danger.
Metaphorically speaking, my entire discussion of Hofmannsthal, Rilke, and
George took place within, and sought to elucidate, the fault line or imper-
ceptible space that divides ‘‘Der Teppich’’ from ‘‘Urlandschaft.’’ As in Rilke’s
‘‘Die Gazelle,’’ the interpretative goal must be to unfold the Weltinnenraum
of poetic language and to examine the authenticity and legitimacy of the
look of things it evokes. This look is mirrored in the eye of the reader, for the
reader’s agency and the poem’s allowance for it determine the poetic success
or failure of Aestheticism.
As I have argued in the previous chapters, the best poems around 1900
both acknowledge their inability to capture pure presence (i.e., truth, Being,
life, etc.) and, at the same time, leave a textual imprint in the form of punc-
tuation signs meant to authenticate this knowledge. George’s poetry often
fails in this regard because it mass-produces this imprint by means of an
idiosyncratic language and the St-G print-type, rather than letting it emerge
from within the specific context of each and every particular poem. A look
at the table of contents in the first edition of the Blätter für die Kunst in
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ent fonts or print patterns exhibited on a page of far less than one hundred
words. The plethora of italic, boldface, and small and capitalized letters con-
spires to make the page itself appear as a work of art. All words seem unique
and literally present a different perspective in light of their unusual ‘‘face’’
that distinguishes them from most others. And yet, the overall impression
nonetheless is one of rigidity and petrification because the coming alive of
language appears too coerced and strained to be convincing.
George’s emphasis on Gestalt violates the delicate process of trying to
negotiate the paradox of autopoietic language during the act of reading.
Aestheticism, however, is justified to reject outside reality only if it remains
conscious of the complex problematic arising from its dreams of transcen-
dence.The true danger inherent inAestheticism consists precisely in the self-
promoting and static celebration of its poetic success. This danger is most
evident in some of George’s poetry, which succumbs to the very commodi-
fication it allegedly rejects. Wolters’s uncritical praise elucidates the prob-
lem: ‘‘because their [George’s poems’] being is also their meaning’’ (denn
ihr [Georges Gedichte] sein ist auch ihr sinn) (‘‘Gestalt’’ 150), he exclaims.
This sentence unwittingly celebrates the final demise of both thought and
poetry as their grandiose fulfillment. If true, Wolters’s claim would amount
to its own undoing and give rise to a truly reconciled world in which art and
philosophy would indeed be superfluous.
Over and over again, Adorno evoked the ideal of such a world only to
resist its false redemption in twentieth-century society. Confusing the real
problematic with its imaginary solution, Wolters’s statement also rings false
in the context of Heidegger’s reflections on modern art because it literally
short-circuits his entire philosophical enterprise. Sein und Zeit attempted to
answer the question as to the ‘‘meaning of being’’ (Sein und Zeit 2) by think-
ing throughDasein’s ‘‘being in the world.’’ Heidegger’s thought embarks on
a journey that can never encounter a ‘‘solution’’ present at hand as if the goal
of the entire quest were just to find a particular kind of being actually ‘‘out
there.’’ George’s magical trick consists in abandoning the circuity of such
efforts in favor of celebrating the Gestalt of poetry and the stylized rituals of
his circle as the truth sought and found. The path toward truth is replaced
by the sight of truth. The simultaneity of revelation and concealment that,
according to Heidegger, distinguishes the work of art is being suppressed in








































































Figure 8. Table of contents of the first publication of the Blätter für die Kunst,







































































250 : part i i
George’s language is the Gesamtkunstwerk of life—it is life itself that
speaks and looks back at the reader from out of the Gestalt of his poetry.
George cannot and must not tolerate any doubt concerning the actual ac-
complishment of his divine mission, since to voice doubt is equal to blas-
phemy. Instead, George builds on an elitist cultural politics that represses
dissent in any form. If this cult is to convince at all, it must eliminate any
trace of a life beyond the circle. The more reality threatens to break through,
the stricter the circle’s politics, the tighter the poetic form, and the more
rigid and severe George’s gaze becomes in the many paintings and photo-
graphs that circulate among his disciples (see figure 9).7 At the same time,
however, the aesthetic cult of the circle literally seeks to breathe life into
George’s poetry. A critical activity that ought to activate an exchange be-
tween poem and reader, the process of reading for George becomes an act
of faith and a sacred ceremony of the utmost importance, for to read well
is to give life to what is being said. Hence, the Blätter für die Kunst con-
tinuously emphasize the importance of movement and rhythm in poetry.8
Superior to all other artistic forms of expression, poetic verse is able to ‘‘say
the ineffable’’ and ‘‘to achieve, in a word, the impossible’’ (Landmann, Ein-
leitungen 38)—provided, of course, the reader reached the right timbre of his
voice, found the adequate tempo of speech, and exhibited the correct body
gestures during the act of reading. Applicants seeking admittance into the
circle were required to prove their worthiness in private recitals of George’s
poems. Those who failed to read convincingly not only proved themselves
unworthy; they were sinners and guilty of sacrilege because they had vio-
lated and thus spoiled the utopian world nascent in George’s poetry.
The unsurmounted master of reading, however, was George himself, as
Lou-Andreas Salomé commented on in one of his lectures: ‘‘Never before
has a poemexperienced such a victorious and overwhelming transformation
for me as Stefan George’s during his personal readings’’ (Für mich hat ein
Gedicht noch niemals eine solche siegreiche und überwältigende Umwand-
lung erlebt, wie Stefan Georges Gedichte in seinem mündlichen Vortrag)
(qtd. in Mason 14). Similarly, Rilke states in a letter to George: ‘‘Maestro
Stephan [sic!] George, the immense impression left by your reading in the
salon Lepsius urges me to pursue vigorously and with dedicated interest
everything that pertains to your art’’ (Meister Stephan [sic!] George, der
große Eindruck, den ihr Leseabend im Salon Lepsius auf mich gemacht hat,







































































Figure 9. Photograph of Stefan George by Theodor Hilsdorf, ca. 1928.
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treuem Interesse zu verfolgen) (qtd. inMason 14).TheGeorge-circle literally
orbited the voice of its master, and the aesthetic ritual of his private lectures
performed in the semidarkened salons of friends and committed worship-
ers aspired to let language itself come into being. Overall, these efforts are
reminiscent of Hofmannsthal’s hope to breathe life into language by means
of reconnecting speech to the human body from which it emanates. The fa-
mous last poem in Das Neue Reich (published 1928), ‘‘Du schlank und rein
wie eine flamme,’’ is exemplary in this regard. Not a single punctuationmark
interrupts the rhythmic flow of words, and the repetitive structure as well
as the rearrangement of the first stanza at the end clearly speak to the self-
referentiality of George’s verses. Indeed, if one identifies the ‘‘Du’’ with the
poem itself, it begins to speak about the ephemeral body of poetic speech:
Du schlank und rein wie eine flamme
Du wie der morgen zart und licht
Du blühend reis vom edlen stamme
Du wie ein quell geheim und schlicht
Begleitest mich auf sonnigen matten
Umschauerst mich im abendrauch
Erleuchtest meinen weg im schatten
Du kühler wind du heisser hauch
Du bist mein wunsch und mein gedanke
Ich atme dich mit jeder luft
Ich schlürfe dich mit jedem tranke
Ich küsse dich mit jedem duft
Du blühend reis vom edlen stamme
Du wie ein quell geheim und schlicht
Du schlank und rein wie eine flamme
Du wie der morgen zart und licht.
(Werke I: 469)
You like a flame, unflawed and slender,
You flower sprung from Crown and Spear,
You like the morning, light and tender,
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Companion me in sunny meadows,
Encompass me in evening haze,
And where I go, you shine through shadows,
You cool of wind, you breath of blaze.
You are my thoughts and my desire,
The air I breathe with you is blent,
From every draught I drink your fire,
And you I kiss in every scent.
You like the morning, light and tender,
You flower sprung from Crown and Spear,
You like a flame, unflawed and slender,
You like a spring, withdrawn and clear.
(The Works of Stefan George 410)
Contrary to Hofmannsthal, the George-circle emphasized the static Gebilde
rather than the performative gesture. It does not denounce writing as a sign
for the reification of language and life alike, but instead embraces it uncriti-
cally and without hesitation. The development of a new font is offered as
visual proof for the magical transformations allegedly affected by George’s
poetry. The Gestalt of his poetry is the Gesamtkunstwerk of life captured in
language. This complete mythologization of poetic language literally petri-
fies the outside and forbids any reference to it. As George tells his readers in
Jahr der Seele (1897), the ‘‘urbild’’ that inspires art must be forgotten, because
it ‘‘has been transformed to such a degree that it became irrelevant even for
the artist and hence rather confuses than solves anything’’ (Werke I: 119). As
in the above poem, the ‘‘Du’’ is not an autonomous ‘‘other,’’ but is literally
incorporated into the ‘‘Ich’’ and becomes part of it. Any attempt to differ-
entiate between the two is misguided because there simply is no other out
there. Ultimately, ‘‘I and You [are] the same soul’’ as George maintained in
1897 (‘‘Es [das urbild] hat durch die kunst solche umformung erfahren dass
es dem schöpfer selber unbedeutend wurde and ein wissendarum für jeden
andren eher verwirrt als löst. Namen gelten nur da wo sie als huldigung oder
gabe verewigen sollen und selten sind sosehr wie in diesem buch ich und du
die selbe seele’’) (ibid.). Nowhere in his entire oeuvre has George expressed
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Ich bin der Eine und bin Beide
Ich bin der zeuger bin der schooss
Ich bin der degen und die scheide
Ich bin das opfer bin der stoss
Ich bin die sicht und bin der seher
Ich bin der bogen bin der bolz
Ich bin der altar und der fleher
Ich bin das feuer und das holz
Ich bin der reiche bin der bare
Ich bin das zeichen bin der sinn
Ich bin der schatten, bin der wahre
Ich bin ein end und ein beginn.
(Werke I: 359)
I am the One, I am the Two,
I am the womb, I am the sire,
I am the shadow and the true,
I am the faggot and the fire.
I am the bow, I am the shaft,
I am the seer and his prediction,
I am the sheath, I am the haft,
I am abundance and affliction,
I am the victim and the slayer,
I am the symbol and the meaning,
I am the altar and the prayer,
I am an end and a beginning.
(The Works of Stefan George 322)
The self-aggrandizing, totalitarian tone of the poem, its unabashedly narcis-
sistic, almost child-like equation of ‘‘Ich’’ and world, beyond any attempt at
their dialectical negotiation, as well as its disarming simplicity in form and
content capture the grandiose aspirations of GermanAestheticist poetry like
none other. Both a promise and a threat, the poem keeps alive the dream of
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Coda: A World of Images
Heidegger’s and Adorno’s postwar criticism of George’s work not only
helps elucidate the central aspects of Aestheticist poetry, but also speaks
to broader cultural issues, such as the relationship between vision and lan-
guage, which are at the center of cultural studies today, for George’s ritualist
aesthetics and the glorification of poetry reflect the zeal of many modernists
to hold fast to the enlightening and redemptive powerof language in the face
of twentieth-century popular and mass culture. This notion was not only
widespread around 1900, it also informed much of twentieth-century liter-
ary criticism, including that of Adorno and Heidegger. Both regard poetry
in general as a privileged site for social reconciliation because such recon-
ciliation is always already nascent in language itself. The demise of language
in the twentieth century speaks the truth about a society unable or unwilling
to heed its call. For truth and human freedom to (re)gain their proper voice,
language must be enabled to speak for itself. In the work of both Heideg-
ger and Adorno, this belief in modern poetry often leads to a strong criti-
cism of visual and mass culture since they regard the proliferation of images
as symptomatic of, and contributing to, the alienation and fragmentation
of modern society. Poetry, by contrast, is said to carry its own true vision
within, meaning that Adorno’s and Heidegger’s appreciation of poetic lan-
guage often occurs in combination with a strong iconoclastic sentiment. I
shall trace this iconoclasm in their readings of George’s poetry and end this
chapter with a discussion of this highly problematic juxtaposition of word
and image, language and visual media in twentieth-century criticism.
One of the major concerns of Adorno’s negative dialectics is not to de-
stroy the modernist ideal as such, but to resist its false implementation or
realization in sociopolitical terms. Although the George-circle did fall prey
to this temptation, Adorno does not outright dismiss its aesthetic aspirations
as mere signs of cultural decadence and ‘‘protofascist’’ sentiments, as other
critics have done.9 ForAdorno, however, it would be equally aswrong simply
to glorify their ritualist aesthetics as the redemptive solution to the mod-
ern dilemma of social fragmentation and alienation. Rather, George’s legacy
must be situated in a historical framework, which, according to Adorno,
points back to the fate of art and subjective freedom under the rule of capi-
talism. In his ‘‘Rückblick auf Stefan George,’’ Walter Benjamin focuses spe-
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of art. Since George’s poetry and his aestheticist ‘‘stance’’ regarded social
antagonisms as the representation of cosmic or natural conditions indepen-
dent of historical change, Benjamin argues, George remained obtuse to the
contingent socioeconomic and technological forces that actually shaped and
determined his art.
Aestheticism, in other words, is situated within a broad cultural shift
from words to images, from autonomous art to popular culture. It reacts to
this shift by trying to fuse language and vision in the form of a speaking gaze
that focuses on the material aspects of language. The rise of visual and mass
culture around 1900 led to a division among both artists and intellectuals
at the time. Some embraced the new media and the concomitant destabili-
zation of the modern world, while others tried to resist it, yet everybody
was affected by it one way or another. George’s poetry most forcefully cele-
brated the body and the being of language in response to this challenge. His
work promises to redeem the modernist ideal of giving voice to language,
while, at the same time, it perversely glorifies the petrification of truth as
Gestalt. Although he and his circle withdrew from the increasingly destabi-
lized world into the inner sanctuary of art, their work is nonetheless shaped
by the exterior world it denounces: ‘‘All neo-romantic words are last ones’’
Adorno rightly concludes (‘‘George-Hofmannsthal’’; GS X/1: 235), empha-
sizing both the religious and defensive nature of Aestheticist poetry. Given
the rise of modern media and the proliferation of moving pictures at the
beginning of the twentieth century, George’s emphasis on Gestalt seems an
attempt to stabilize and anchor the flux of the modern world. It functioned
as a psychological shield and a reliable guide to guarantee the individual’s
visual control over its environment. It also served to combat the disarray of
multiperspectival images that rendered the world ever more complex and
thus undermined the narcissistic ideals of modern subjectivity.10 George ex-
pressed his efforts to ‘‘invent new names for things’’ most poignantly and
programmatically in his famous poem ‘‘Das Wort,’’ first published in 1919:
Das Wort
Wunder von ferne oder traum
Bracht ich an meines landes saum
Und harrte bis die graue norn
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Drauf konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark
Nun blüht und glänzt es durch die mark . . .
Einst langt ich an nach guter fahrt
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart
Sie suchte lang und gab mir kund:
›So schläft hier nichts auf tiefem grund‹
Worauf es meiner hand entrann
Und nie mein land den schatz gewann . . .
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.
(Werke I: 466f.)
The Word
I carried to my country’s shore
Marvels and dreams, and waited for
The tall and twilit norn to tell
The names she found within the well.
Then I could grasp them, they were mine,
And here I see them bloom and shine . . .
Once I had made a happy haul
And won a rich and fragile jewel.
She peered and pondered: ‘‘Nothing lies
Below,’’ she said, ‘‘to match your prize.’’
At this it glided from my hand
And never graced my native land.
And so I sadly came to see:
Without the word no thing can be.
(The Works of Stefan George 408)
The poem radicalizes the autonomy of art so as to declare its primacy over
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which grants material existence not only to concrete objects, but to abstract
notions as well. Dream worlds materialize and become real once they are
called by their proper name; ‘‘wonders’’ and ‘‘dreams’’ gain actual physi-
cality and can literally be ‘‘grabbed’’ as they start to ‘‘bloom.’’ Without their
name, however, all things are doomed to vanish as does the unsignifiable
object at the end of the poem. The subjunctive ‘‘sei’’ in the last line, how-
ever, indicates a rhetorical distance between the lyrical I and its utterance.
The statement can be read both as the expression of an illusory hope (i.e.,
‘‘there should not be a thing independent of a word’’) or as a legal prohibi-
tion (‘‘there must not be a thing independent of a word’’). Both readings as
well as the ambivalence itself highlight the precarious nature of the alleged
symbiosis between word and thing. Their existence ought to be intertwined
and codependent, but may not be so regardless of what the poem claims. In
other words, the aesthetic perspective on life remains valid only within the
borders of the mythical land to which the poem itself belongs—the realm
of art—which brings the reading full circle back to the ‘‘George-Kreis’’ from
which it started.
In Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger comments on George’s poem at
length as he tries to assimilate it into his own philosophy of language.With a
decisive and—from a literary critic’s point of view—illegitimate ‘‘jump’’ into
pure speculation, Heidegger identifies the ‘‘kleinod’’ in ‘‘Das Wort’’ as the
word itself, for which another word, and hence existence as such, is lacking:
‘‘the word, the saying, has no being’’ ([D]as Wort, das Sagen, hat kein Sein)
(‘‘Das Wesen der Sprache’’; Unterwegs zur Sprache 192), Heidegger summa-
rizes his reading. Language cannot express its own essence, and its magical
power can never be revealed or ‘‘begriffen’’ in the double sense of the Ger-
man original: conceptually understood and physically grasped. There is no
stepping behind language, no world beyond words. What remains is for the
poet to articulate this moment of renunciation, which, paradoxically, en-
ables him to find the very means of expression inaccessible to him before:
‘‘As self-denial, renunciation is a Saying which says to itself: ‘Where words
break off no thing may be’ ’’ (Way to Language 147) (Verzichten ist als Sich-
versagen ein Sagen, das sich sagt: ‘‘Kein ding sei, wo das wort gebricht’’)
(‘‘Das Wort’’; UzS 228).
Heidegger’s reading of the last stanza of George’s poem rhetorically oper-
ates on two levels. It shifts focus from the prepositional content of the utter-
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cally by letting it go physically: ‘‘His renunciation having pledged itself to the
word’s mystery, the poet retains the treasure in remembrance by renuncia-
tion’’ (Way to Language 154) (Insofern der Verzicht sich dem Geheimnis des
Wortes zugesagt hat, behält der Dichter das Kleinod durch den Verzicht im
Andenken) (‘‘DasWort’’ 236).With the help of this ‘‘Andenken,’’ the ‘‘secret’’
is both unveiled and forever locked away because the poet now knows he
must renounce the knowledge he seeks in order to gain access to it. His in-
ability to speak the essence of language now emerges as a poetic success.
The creative power of language is preserved in the very moment that ac-
knowledges its demise. Poetic truth is captured through the process of its
renunciation.
Heidegger’s reading of George is problematic not only because it is based
upon the identification of the ‘‘kleinod’’ as the word itself, for which there is
absolutely no hermeneutic basis, but more important, because it points to
an ambiguity inherent in Heidegger’s poetics, which at times overempha-
sizes the being of art, thereby reducing it to a mere object present at hand.
The ‘‘Andenken’’ alive in poetry is identified with a simple message that ac-
knowledges the mere facticity of being. The problem is most apparent in
his artwork essay from 1935/1936, where Heidegger argued that the work of
art opens up a space for truth to simultaneously reveal and withdraw itself.
The artwork is characterized by an internal struggle (the ‘‘Geviert’’ of world
and earth, humans and gods) similar to the movement of concealment and
revelation in Heidegger’s notion of ‘‘aletheia’’: ‘‘Im Werk ist das Geschehnis
der Wahrheit am Werk’’ (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’; Holzwege 45),
meaning that ‘‘art is the becoming and happening of truth’’ (‘‘Der Ursprung
des Kunstwerkes’’ 59). Contrary to the classical correspondence theory of
truth, Heidegger insists on the ‘‘presencing’’ of truth in art, which denotes
a temporal occurrence rather than a static fact.11
Precisely this notion of temporal movement gets lost during other pas-
sages in Heidegger’s text, which refer to the ‘‘arrestment’’ of truth in art. Al-
though the artwork essay acknowledges the presencing of truth as an event,
it nonetheless distinguishes two separate moments, one concerned with the
‘‘creation,’’ the other with the ‘‘preservation’’ of the work of art:
Demnach wurde im voraus das Wesen der Kunst als das Ins-Werk-Setzen
der Wahrheit bestimmt. Doch diese Bestimmung ist bewußt zweideutig.
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heit in die Gestalt. Das geschieht im Schaffen als dem Hervor-bringen der
Unverborgenheit des Seienden. Ins-Werk-Setzen heißt aber zugleich: in
Gang- und ins Geschehen-Bringen des Werkseins. Das geschieht als Be-
wahrung. Also ist die Kunst: die schaffende Bewahrung der Wahrheit im
Werk. (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’ 59)
Accordingly the nature of art was defined to begin with as the setting-
into-work of truth. Yet this definition is intentionally ambiguous. It says
on the one hand: art is the fixing in place of a self-establishing truth in the
figure. This happens in creation as the bringing forth of the unconcealed-
ness of what is. Setting-into-work, however, also means: the bringing of
work-being into movement and happening. This happens as preserva-
tion.Thus art is: the creative preserving of truth in thework. (‘‘TheOrigin
of the Work of Art’’; Poetry 71)
Heidegger’s definition of what art ‘‘is’’ pictures truth as the property or even
the prisoner of art waiting to be liberated during the act of reception. This
liberation depends upon the ‘‘preservers,’’ as Heidegger calls a particular
class of people—the high priests of art? who are they?—whose task it is
to mobilize the ‘‘arrested’’ truth contained within the artwork. Heidegger’s
sense of ‘‘fixedness’’ (Feststellen) or, worse still, in a passive construction,
‘‘truth’s being fixed in place in the figure’’ (‘‘Origin’’ 64) (Festgestelltsein der
Wahrheit in die Gestalt) (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’ 51), finally cul-
minates in the mere existence of art: ‘‘And what is more commonplace than
this, that a being is? In a work, by contrast, this fact, that it is as a work, is
just what is unusual. In the bringing forth of the work there lies this offer-
ing ‘that it be’ ’’ (‘‘Origin’’ 65f.) (‘‘Was aber ist gewöhnlicher als dieses, daß
Seiendes ist? Im Werk dagegen ist dieses, daß es als solches ist, das Unge-
wöhnliche. Im Hervorbringen des Werkes liegt dieses Darbringen des ‘‘daß
es sei’’) (‘‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’’ 53). Similar formulations can be
found in the later ‘‘Letter about Humanism’’ (1946), where Heidegger states:
‘‘But Being—what is Being? It is itself ’’ (Doch das Sein—was ist das Sein?
Es ist es selbst), and ‘‘there is Being’’ (es gibt das Sein) (‘‘Über den Huma-
nismus’’ 19, 22). Both, Being and art, are, and the purpose of art and philoso-
phy is to circle within these tautologies in order to understand the meaning
of their being.
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degger’s philosophical reflections on ‘‘aletheia’’ and his own poetic ‘‘travels
toward language.’’ The very notion that truth could ever be ‘‘arrested’’ vio-
lates the sense of mobility—the movement of revelation and concealment—
that constitutes both critical thought and poetry alike. Contrary to the over-
all trajectory of his philosophy, the artwork essay at times suggests that
the mere being of art guarantees the static presence of truth, in which case
Heidegger’s entire ontological difference would become undone since both
truth and Being would be reduced to mere beings in the sense of modern
science. Heidegger himself acknowledged this dilemma. In his Zusatz to the
artwork essay written twenty years later, he dedicates several pages of ety-
mological analysis to the word ‘‘fixed’’ (Feststellen), concluding that ‘‘the
‘fix’ in ‘fix in place’ can never have the sense of rigid, motionless, and secure’’
(‘‘Origin’’ 83) (kann das ‘‘Fest-’’ im Feststellen niemals the Sinn von starr,
unbeweglich und sicher haben) (‘‘Kunstwerk’’ 71).
Whether his additional remarks are ultimately convincing seems less im-
portant than the fundamental problem they implicitly acknowledge. It con-
sists partly in Heidegger’s attempt to reflect upon the origins of art with-
out distinguishing methodologically between literature and the spatial arts.
Including painting and architecture while, at the same time, insisting on
poetry as the essence of all art, Heidegger is at pains to reconcile the spa-
tial and temporal dimensions of art. Much like Rilke, his generalizations
inevitably lead him to embrace the notion of ‘‘Festgestelltsein’’ and that of
aesthetic preservation. Yet both, the imprisonment of truth in the form of
Gestalt and its continuous preservation during the process of reception,
contradict the basic principles of his philosophical enterprise and situates
him in close alliance to the ritualized aesthetic politics of the George-circle.
George sought to apprehend and identify truth as present at hand and ‘‘ar-
rested’’ in language, which was to be appreciated only by the chosen few.The
members of the circle willingly abandoned the movement of revelation and
concealment that Heidegger identified as the paradoxical essence at work
in art.
Heidegger’s own philosophy both resists and succumbs toWolters’s iden-
tification of being and meaning. It resists by way of traveling from one side
of the equation to the other, thinking through the (linguistic) space that
both connects and separates the two poles. However, once Heidegger em-
phasizes the being of art and stylizes the moment of poetic renunciation as
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cannot defend his philosophy against the misguided attempt to short-circuit
the constitutive movement of thought. To be sure, I am not concerned with
defending the ‘‘good’’ against the ‘‘bad’’ Heidegger and leave it to others to
determine who the ‘‘real’’ one is. My point is rather that any reflection on
modernist poetry sooner or later gives in to the temptation of perceiving
the voice of language and the Gestalt of truth. This moment of epiphany is
inevitable, for it is the raison d’être of literary criticism. It marks the crucial
Augenblick of reading in which the look of things takes shape and is finally
apprehended in the gaze of the reader.
Adorno’s reading of Heidegger andGeorge is further evidence of this nec-
essary epiphanyduring the act of reading. Adorno’s critique centers precisely
on these moments of reification I discerned in Heidegger’s artwork essay.
He repeatedly denounced Heidegger’s ‘‘rhetorical moves’’ as the ‘‘empty
essence’’ of his ‘‘jargon of authenticity.’’ Heidegger, according to Adorno,
fatally abandons human subjectivity in favor of the mystified call of lan-
guage. He glorifies the ineffable as the truth precisely because it cannot be
named. The falsity of his entire ontological system is identified in a mecha-
nism of reified thought that hides what it claims to have found: the essence
of Being (Sein): ‘‘The Absolute is supposed to be thought within Being, but
only because it cannot be thought at all is it declared to be the Absolute’’ (Im
Sein soll das Absolute gedacht werden, aber nur weil es nicht sich denken
läßt, sei es das Absolute) (Negative Dialektik 111).12 For Adorno, the asserted
tautology of a ‘‘being’’ and an ‘‘art’’ that simply ‘‘is,’’ is nothing but indica-
tive of Heidegger’s jargon that ‘‘turns in a circle’’ (‘‘Jargon’’ 475) without
ever moving beyond the ‘‘always already’’ acknowledged status quo of exis-
tence.13
Heidegger’s belief in the evocative power of ‘‘authentic’’ words and the
concomitant lack of human agency collides with Adorno’s understanding of
philosophical inquiry. In his view, the emphasis on single words is not the
cure, but the major cause, for the reification of language. Words in isolation
do not possess an inherent truth-content since they gain meaning solely as a
part of thewhole in which they function: ‘‘In truth all concepts are implicitly
rendered concrete in and through the language in which they appear’’ (In
Wahrheit sind alle Begriffe implizit schon konkretisiert durch die Sprache,
in der sie stehen) (‘‘Essay’’; Noten 20). For Adorno, history sediments into
language and resonates therein. The meaning of words cannot be freely de-
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mological studies, as Heidegger attempts to do: ‘‘He [the philosopher] must
neither conceive of words as already given nor must he invent a word’’ (Er
[der Philosoph] darf so wenig ein Wort als vorgegeben denken wie ein Wort
erfinden), he declares (Adorno, ‘‘Thesen über die Sprache des Philosophen’’;
GS I: 369). Language, for Adorno, necessarily reflects the influence of specific
historical circumstances and the use to which it has been subjected. Given
the increasing fragmentation and alienation in capitalist society, philosophy
must seek to approach truth in a spiral movement, encompassing it from
different sides. Critical thought reflects and undercuts social reification by
reconfiguring the broken fragments of language into ever new word constel-
lations that bear witness to the violence from which they emerge: ‘‘Only he
who remains mindful of the relationship between language and individual
words by means of their constellation measures up to what language as such
insinuates. . . . Both elements are mediated in a languageworthy of its name’’
(Nur der genügt dem, was Sprache erheischt, der ihres Verhältnisses zu den
Einzelworten in deren Konfigurationen sich versichert. . . . In Sprache, die
etwas taugt, vermittelt sich beides) (Negative Dialektik 452).14 This ‘‘mo-
bility of words’’ (‘‘Jargon’’ 482) has been lost in Heidegger’s ‘‘jargon,’’ claims
Adorno. Heidegger’s etymological wanderings through language fail to ex-
amine the sociohistorical competence of language in favor of the original
meaning he ascribes to it.
Given their similar philosophical ambitions to heed the voice and nature
of language, however, these differences appear secondary in contrast to the
continuous belief in the redemptive power of language, which Adorno and
Heidegger both share with all three poets discussed in this book. Language
literally calls forth or commemorates a different world of reconciliation be-
tween subject and object. If reified discourse is both the cause and the effect
of a reified world, then liberated discourse cannot but be the cause and the
effect of a liberated world. According to this utopian perspective on lan-
guage, it is impossible to prioritize or even distinguish properly between the
being and becoming of language since the striving of language to come into
its own defines its very nature. The essence of language is its gradual devel-
opment toward its own essence. Its becoming is its being, and this is why it
cannot and never must ‘‘be’’ purely and immediately present as such, be it
in the form of poetic Gestalt or philosophical thought. Such static ‘‘being’’
of language is a symptom of its death.
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times cannot but violate it in their praise of George. Although highly am-
bivalent about George’s legacy in general, Adorno nonetheless embraces
some of his poems as the language of truth: ‘‘George is flawed where he tries
to exercise a power he has usurped as though it were authentic. But this
permits almost the reverse: it is the poems that appear inauthentic, without
social context, that are authentic’’ (Notes II: 182) (Brüchig ist George, wo er
als authentisch, ermächtigt Macht auszuüben trachtet. Das jedoch erlaubt
beinahe die Umkehrung: authentisch sind die Gedichte, die als nichtauthen-
tische auftreten, gesellschaftlich ungedeckt, isoliert) (‘‘George’’ 527). The
‘‘almost’’ alone prevents Adorno’s simplistic reversal of conventional judg-
ment from falling prey to the very ‘‘authenticity’’ he so vehemently de-
nounced. Still, to follow George is treacherous, not only for the reader of
Adorno’s essay, but also for Adorno himself, as his remarks on the following
poem from George’s ‘‘Jahr der Seele’’ will serve to demonstrate:
Ihr tratet zu dem herde
Wo alle glut verstarb ·
Licht war nur an der erde
Vom monde leichenfarb.
Ihr tauchtet in die aschen
Die bleichen finger ein
Mit suchen tasten haschen—
Wird es noch einmal schein!
Seht was mit trostgebärde
Der mond euch rät:
Tretet weg vom herde ·
Es ist worden spät.
(‘‘Werke’’ I: 165)
You reached the hearth, but dwindled
To cinders was the glow,
The moon was all that kindled
The earth with deadly hue.
Your listless fingers crumble
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And grope in them, and fumble,
Will light return again?
See, how the moon consoles you
With soothing gait,
Leave the hearth—she tells you—
It has gotten late.
(The Works of Stefan George 159)
The poem ranks among the most cited in George’s oeuvre. Without fail, it
serves those who invoke it as proof that George’s poetry defies the reader’s
effort to understand its enigmatic essence. For example Klages writes in
1902: ‘‘Who could claim to know the meaning of the hearth whose glow has
dwindled to cinders’’ (Wer wüßte ganz den Sinn des Herdes, auf dem die
Glut verstarb?) (66). Or Gundolf in 1921, who regards it as ‘‘a completely in-
comprehensible poem’’ (eines in jedem ‘‘Sinn’’ unverständliche[s] Gedicht)
and continues: ‘‘The secret is neither what one sees nor what one hears or
is able to think, and yet, it is not hidden behind these sensations either. The
secret is itself ’’ (Weder was man hier sieht noch hört noch denken kann
ist das Geheimnis und doch steckt es auch nicht dahinter. Es ist es selbst)
(Gundolf,George 143)—a statement leading right back toWolters’s vision of
George’s Gestalt that simply equates being and meaning. As if a member of
this circle himself, Adorno ardently joins the chorus: ‘‘This poem is fully and
unallegorically absorbed in the sensory situation. No conceptual meaning is
distilled from the situation’’ (‘‘Stefan George’’; Notes II: 185) (Unallegorisch
geht das Gedicht in der sinnlichen Situation auf. Keine gedankliche Bedeu-
tung wird abdestilliert) (‘‘George’’ 529). What remains, for Adorno, is ‘‘the
feeling of an era that prohibits the song that still sings of it’’ (ibid.).
A brief interpretation of the poem may suffice to cast doubt on Adorno’s
claim. Given the prevalent context of life philosophy around 1900, the poem
appears as the allegorical presentation of a death scene. The ‘‘corpse-like’’
color of the moon recalls the mortality of human life, much like the ‘‘dying’’
coals that are being shuffled around to keep them burning. Yet mere Schein
ensues from such efforts, a false source of light that recalls the derivatory
glow of the moon illuminating the entire scene. George’s ‘‘hearth’’ emerges
as the glow of human life about to lose its fire.15 The poem sanctions this
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ness and death as the inevitable effect of the passage of time. Asked to move
away from what was sought to be kept alive, namely life itself, the ‘‘you’’
must step back into the gloom of brute existence it originally had hoped to
enlighten. The poem suggests that to follow nature’s advice is to accept the
unintelligibility of a late world without light and without warmth. And yet,
the incontestable beauty of the poem serves to mitigate the serenity of the
scenario it describes. Like most modernist poems, this one, too, functions
as a self-reflective exploration of its own being. Similar to George’s ‘‘Der
Teppich,’’ it invites the reader to try to enlighten its obscure meaning and
make it speak beyond what it has to say. The poem’s final message, how-
ever, does not reward these interpretative efforts of the reader, but calls for
their resignation. The conciliatory gesture ascribed to the moon bestows a
glimpse into the secret of life only to renounce any attempt to solve it. The
reader is left with a shimmer of hope granted by the mere being of the poem
itself.
Adorno’s thesis, according to which the poem remains entirely unalle-
gorical, thus refers less to the poem as such than to his own reluctance to
perform the very critique he declares obsolete. Instead of trying to enlighten
the obscurity of the poem, Adorno himself endorses its refusal to shed light
on the scene of life and death. In so doing, he specifically obeys George’s
poetic command to abstain from any further effort of interpretation. By
contrast, Adorno might have commented on the imperative tone of the last
strophe, which disguises its command in the form of conciliatory advice, al-
legedly uttered by nature itself. He could have questioned the origin of the
poem’s renunciatory message, which, in spite of its natural gesture, reflects
the subtle, yet crucial transformation of vision into language: to ‘‘see’’ the
moon is to ‘‘hear’’ its advice. The major question in this context is one of
agency. Who speaks?—nature itself or the hidden voice of the lyrical ‘‘eye’’
that has mastered the art of looking? Does not the master himself issue a
quiet mandate to his readers to simply let being and art be?
Adorno chose not to pursue the possibility of such a reading. Instead, he
truly hears language come into its own, a quasi-religious experience not at all
different from Klages’s ‘‘Offenbarung’’ or Gundolf ’s celebration of George’s
‘‘Zaubersprüche’’: ‘‘At times, however, language itself really speaks from
George, as if for the last time, in a way that others have only feigned’’ (‘‘Ste-
fan George’’;Notes II: 185) (Manchmal jedoch redet wirklich aus George, wie
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529), he concludes. Adorno’s earlier use of the passive voice (‘‘Keine gedank-
liche Bedeutung wird abdestilliert’’) (‘‘George’’ 529) cleverly suggests a lan-
guage that indeed speaks itself, but in fact merely highlights the author’s
own will to make it so. One is reminded of Clemens’s unanswered question
in Hofmannsthal’s fictional ‘‘Conversation about poetry’’ (‘‘Gespräch über
Gedichte’’): ‘‘You say really,Theodor?’’ (Du sagstwirklich,Theodor?) (503).16
The question is not simply meant to promote the truism that language itself
never speaks, neither in art, nor in philosophy. It rather points to the par-
ticular tension in Adorno’s aesthetics, which calls for a negative dialectics
guided by critical thought, yet at times must succumb to the temptation of
what allegedly roams beyond it: pure and true language. To be sure, these
rare moments of epiphany in Adorno’s readings—inspired, no doubt, by the
ghost of Benjamin and his messianic notion of history—do not invalidate
them. Quite the contrary, they are indispensable for the utopian vision that
Adorno wants to sustain vis-à-vis the reified world of Western capitalism.
Rather, what I find peculiar is Adorno’s insistence on language or music as
the privileged medium that commemorates this utopian moment. Adorno’s
aesthetics clearly privileges sound over sight, leading him to take an uncom-
promising critical perspective on visual media such as film.
In spite of his explicit rejection of Heideggerian terminology, Adorno’s
comments thus demonstrate howdangerously close he comes at times to the
‘‘jargon of authenticity’’ in some of his own readings. Such is the tempting
allure of the utopian hope to overcome the constitutive differences ofmoder-
nity that Adorno at times takes a break from the ‘‘Sisyphus work’’ of phi-
losophy (Negative Dialektik 114) to enjoy the fruits of his intellectual labor:
to listen to the self-identical voice of a mute language he himself has enabled
to speak. And while he generally acknowledges this utopian vision as what
it is, he nonetheless claims it to be realized in some works by Eichendorff,
Mörike, or George. ‘‘The act in which the human being becomes language,
the flesh becomes word, incorporates the expression of nature into language
and transfigures the movement of language so that it becomes life again’’
(‘‘Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs’’; Notes I: 69)—this is how Adorno sum-
marized the acoustic effects of Eichendorff ’s poetry, a praise reminiscent of
Gundolf ’s claim about the eucharistic power of George’s words.
Given Adorno’s bias for Romantic subjectivity, it is not surprising that he
would reserve this praise for Eichendorff rather than George. But even the
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of the circle’s explicit attempt to arrest the flow of language and to regard
the mere existence of art as meaningful in itself. The ritualistic cult of the
George-circle (what Heidegger refers to as the ‘‘Festgestelltsein derWahrheit
in die Gestalt’’ of art) violates Adorno’s dictum about the nonessential na-
ture of truth. If ontology and phenomenology ‘‘hypostatize the insolubility
of the problem as its solution’’ (Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie 191),
as he claims in his comments on Husserl, so does George’s poetry. And yet,
Adorno favors George over Hofmannsthal and Rilke not because his poetry
is less reified, but because it is more so. In a dialectical tour de force, the most
coerced poetry suddenly emerges as the most liberated, while Rilke’s verses
are rejected as ‘‘unspecific’’ because they are concerned with the matter of
things (Rilke’s Dingkult). It seems that the utter self-sufficiency of George’s
poetry, which circles around a promise it fails to deliver, allows Adorno to
fill the voidwith themeaningful presence of language itself. And although he
knows all too well that the ‘‘stated secret itself does not exist’’ (‘‘George und
Hofmannsthal’’ 199) and that his own ideal of ‘‘language speaking itself ’’ in-
evitably falls prey to the philosophical and sociopolitical abuse it sought to
alleviate, he embraces some of George’s poems precisely because they give
voice to what he hopes to hear. These epiphanies are inevitable if one wants
to keep alive the hope of redemption through language, as both Adorno and
Heidegger aim to do.
However, by the time George first published ‘‘Das Wort’’ in 1919, this be-
lief in the magical power of language was already anachronistic. The same is
true of Adorno’s hopes to salvage bourgeois subjectivity in the poetic voice
of pure language or of Heidegger’s ideal to ‘‘think after’’ (in the sense of An-
denken) the ‘‘Sage’’ of language as the unconcealment of Being itself.Modern
culture at the beginning of the twentieth century was already governed by
the spec(tac)ular rather than the linguistic realm. Weimar cinema emerged
as a respectable form of entertainment and aspired to be recognized as a
sincere form of art. The moving images began to replace language as the
locus where subjectivity celebrated its euphoric resurrection in the form of
the camera’s disembodied gaze with which the spectator identified. Even the
conservative forces in Germany increasingly recognized the political poten-
tial of film for the purpose of nationalist propaganda, leading to the creation
of the UFA in 1917. The visual media rather than poetic language shaped the
face of the twentieth century.
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from word to image during the twentieth century. For him, the entire hu-
manist paradigm was based upon the letter and was being undermined by
media technology. Heidegger lamented the ubiquity of visual stimuli be-
reft of any critical or analytical dimension whatsoever, which, he claimed,
lead to the mere curiosity of seeing for the sake of having seen.17 He relates
the rise of visual imagery to the loss of true vision. Language, by contrast,
is said to guarantee a deeper, less superficial way of looking at the world.
Heidegger even traced the ‘‘ruining’’ of philosophy itself to the rise of visual
metaphors that originated in Greek philosophy. Plato’s ideas, Heidegger ar-
gued, are no longer connected to the notion of Being as the primordial event
that lets things emerge into their own and creates an opening for the pres-
encing of the world. Instead, Plato focused on the mere existence of things
(‘‘Anwesenheit’’) that are identified as always already being there. The world
thus degenerated into an abstract space filled with material objects allegedly
alienated from their proper essence (the Platonian ideas) whose immaterial
purity they are said merely to re-present. This notion of representation, for
Heidegger, was the beginning of the end of Western metaphysics. It cul-
minated in the forgetting of Being itself and gave rise to the subject-object
paradigm of the modern era as well as the reign of technology and instru-
mental reason in the twentieth century. In his Introduction to Metaphysics,
Heidegger writes:
Das SeiendewirdGegenstand. . . . Das ursprünglichWeltende . . . fällt jetzt
herab zumVorbild für das Abbilden und Nachmachen. . . . Das Auge, das
Sehen, das ursprünglich schauend einstmals in das Walten erst den Ent-
wurf hineinschaute, hineinsehend das Werk her-stellte, wird jetzt zum
bloßen Ansehen und Besehen und Begaffen. Der Anblick ist nur noch das
Optische. (Einführung in die Metaphysik 48)
Beings become objects. . . . That which originarily holds sway . . . now
degenerates into a prototype for reproduction and copying. . . . The eye,
the seeing, which first viewed the project into the sway in an originary
viewing, and pro-duced the work while seeing into the sway, has now
been reduced to mere observing and inspecting and staring. The view is
now only the optical. (Introduction to Metaphysics 66)
This is the ‘‘Time of the World-Picture,’’ as Heidegger phrases it in his essay
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of the world as a picture’’ (‘‘Weltbild’’ 94). The demise of language is tanta-
mount to a growing inability to ‘‘see’’ things, a competence that originally
had made visual forms of representation less relevant for premodern times.18
Although Heidegger establishes a strong connection between ‘‘pure’’ lan-
guage and ‘‘true’’ vision, he certainly does not speak in favor of the ma-
terial letter in the sense that written language needs to be perceived visu-
ally.19 On the contrary, language engenders the world only on the basis of
its own self-withdrawal, which leaves no trace of its own presence. Like
Being itself, language is not simply another thing among things because the
word is that which gives, but is not given as such.20 To conceive of language
in the form of writing or grammatical structures would be to misperceive
the nature of both language and Being as something present at hand. It
would repeat the fundamental error that characterizes the history of West-
ern metaphysics. True language, it follows, always already carries its own
vision within.
Even Adorno concurs. He explicitly acknowledges that the original unity
between word and image no longer exists, yet denounces the split itself as a
historical contingency that needs to be resisted and rethought if truth is to
emerge:
Wie die Hieroglyphen bezeugen, hat das Wort ursprünglich auch die
Funktion des Bildes erfüllt. . . . Die Trennung von Zeichen und Bild
ist unabwendbar. Wird sie jedoch ahnungslos selbstzufrieden nochmals
hypostasiert, so treibt jedes der beiden isolierten Prinzipien zur Zer-
störung der Wahrheit hin. (Dialektik der Aufklärung 33f.)
Hieroglyphs demonstrate that words originarily also fulfilled the func-
tion of images. . . . The separation of sign and image is irreversible. How-
ever, if it is unwittingly hypostatized once again, then each of the two
isolated principles works toward the destruction of truth.
Adorno questions the entire juxtaposition of vision and language and ac-
knowledges the efforts of poetic and philosophical language to reestablish
the lost unity of word and image. And yet he also remains highly critical of
the mimetic power of mere images in his discussions of modernity. As if to
continue Husserl’s phenomenological project, his Negative Dialektik unam-
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Der Gedanke ist kein Abbild der Sache . . . sondern geht auf die Sache
selbst. Die aufklärende Intention des Gedankens, Entmythologisierung,
tilgt den Bildcharakter des Bewußtseins. Was ans Bild sich klammert,
bleibt mythisch befangen, Götzendienst. Der Inbegriff der Bilder fügt
sich zum Wall vor der Realität. . . . [N]ur bilderlos wäre das volle Objekt
zu denken. (ND 205, 207)
The thought is not a copy of the thing . . . but works on the thing itself.
The enlightening intention of thought—demythologization—eradicates
the image-like characteristics of consciousness. That which clutches to
images remains confined to myth and idolatry. The essence of images
coalesces into a wall in front of reality. . . . The full object could only be
thought in the absence of images.
In Adorno’s eyes, images partake of the truth only to the degree that they
remain linked to language: ‘‘Dialectics reveals every image as writing’’ (Dia-
lektik offenbart vielmehr jedes Bild als Schrift) (DA 41), he argued in theDia-
lectics of Enlightenment, and the Aesthetic Theory states: ‘‘Artworks become
images in that the processes that have congealed in them as objectivity be-
come eloquent’’ (Aesthetic Theory 85) (Kunstwerke werden Bilder dadurch,
daß die in ihnen zurObjektivität geronnen Prozesse selber reden) (ÄT 132f.).
Adorno’s predilection for words over images is equally evident in his praise
for George, whose best poems allegedly resist their translation into paint-
ing and ‘‘find their specific intuition [Anschaulichkeit] in language, not in
optical imaginations’’ (‘‘Die Kunst und die Künste’’ 441). He ends his essay
on ‘‘Die Kunst und die Künste’’ as follows: ‘‘For a reality devoid of images
has become the perfect (and perverted) reflection of the imageless condi-
tion into which art would dissolve if the utopia that is enigmatically writ-
ten into every artwork were to be realized’’ (Denn die bilderlose Realität ist
das vollendeteWiderspiel des bilderlosen Zustands geworden, in dem Kunst
verschwände, weil die Utopie sich erfüllt hätte, die in jedem Kunstwerk sich
chiffriert) (‘‘Die Kunst und die Künste’’ 452f.).
It appears that Adorno’s criticism, much like the subjectivity it sought to
recover, withdraws into the inner sanctuary of language in the hope of re-
maining unaffected by the allegedly subversive visions proliferated by the
mass media. His best readings, however, both endorsed and resisted the
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nity, for Adorno remains true to what he himself said about Borchardt’s
work:
Die Idee der Beschwörung einer nichtexistenten Sprache impliziert deren
Unmöglichkeit. . . . Borchardts Klugheit hat, trotz des pathetischen Glau-
bens an den inspirierten Dichter, darüber keineswegs sich getäuscht.
Wohl hegte er die Hybris. . . . Aber nicht minder wußte er, daß es Hybris
war. (‘‘Die beschworene Sprache’’ 540)
The idea of conjuring a nonexistent language implies the impossibility
of that language. . . . Borchardt’s shrewdness had no illusions about that,
despite his pathos-laden belief in the inspired poet. But there was hu-
bris in him. . . . But he was no less aware that it was hubris. (‘‘Charmed
Language’’; Notes II: 197)
Contrary to both Adorno and Heidegger, I believe that twentieth-century
swan songs about the doom of literacy and language are not only exagger-
ated, but completely miss the point with regard to its sociocultural function.
Regardless of its quasi-religious status around 1900, there is nothing inher-
ently sacred about language as such. ‘‘In the beginning was the word,’’ one
reads in the book of books, yet this word, one must remember, was never
conceived in terms of everyday communication, but imagined to carry its
visionary powerswithin. In poetryandphilosophyalike, language is claimed
to be constitutive of reality if and only if it exceeds the mere use of linguis-
tic signs. The true word, the word of God, says more than it signifies, for it
speaks through silence and perceives the unperceivable essence of things.
It follows that Heidegger’s and Adorno’s critique regarding the (post)-
modern proliferation of images misconstrues the symptom as the di-
sease. They conflate the disarray and ideological abuse of images in
twentieth-century society with their alleged deceptive nature, their essential
‘‘un-truth.’’ Yet images per se are notmore or less truthful than everyday lan-
guage. The entire juxtaposition is ill conceived because it contrasts an ideal-
ized vision of pure, nonreferential languagewith the generic images govern-
ing contemporary culture. Oncewe fully acknowledge the metaphorical and
utopian character of the poetic ideal of language, it becomes obvious that
its alleged primordiality cannot be sustained since there remains no reason
to assume that other media could not fulfill the same function. If modernist
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guage for the sake of truth, as one might argue with reference to all authors
discussed in this book, could the same not apply to visual rather than lin-
guistic paradigms? If Western philosophy still dreams of hearing the pure
voice of language, why could we not hope for vision to develop its proper
self-image? If the word speaks itself, why can the image not present itself ?
Why should truth reside only within the self-speaking word rather than the
self-seeing image? It seems reasonable to allow contemporary society to fur-
ther explore the possibility of a kind of ‘‘visual thinking’’ (Rudolf Arnheim)
before dismissing images as inherently deceptive or inadequate for the pres-
encing of truth. Since images have replaced words as the primary means
of interacting with the world, the primary task for artists and intellectuals
today does not consist in lamenting the fact or in simply fostering a new
appreciation of visual culture, but in trying to make these images speak be-
yond their inherent mode of iconic reference. Is there a general theory of
the visual ‘‘punctum’’ (Roland Barthes) for postmodern culture?
‘‘What is at stake, then,’’ Gumbrecht argues in Making Sense in Life and
Literature, ‘‘is the invention of a new epistemology capable of theorizing and
analyzing ways of sense making that perhaps no longer include effects of
meaning and reference’’ (Sense 12). He is right, of course, except that this
goal has been at stake throughout the history of modernity, and the effort of
Aestheticism to capture the look of things in and through language can be
understood precisely in these terms. Posthermeneutics, however, denounces
the history of aesthetics in favor of ‘‘interfaces such as those between TV
and psychic systems, or between computers and social systems’’ (ibid.). This
juxtaposition between aesthetics and media is highly problematic, not only
because it runs the dangerof simply reversing the traditional value judgment
espoused by Adorno and Heidegger, but also because its positivist stance
implies that the search for something like primordial ‘‘truth’’ is superflu-
ous or even dangerous. I, for one, think this search is inevitable, and the
real challenge of the digital revolution governing contemporary society is to
continue the quest to ‘‘make sense’’ of it, whereas any deliberate attempt to
abort this process ultimately self-destructs or leads back to previous epis-
temological positions. This persistence in the search for truth might be the















































































































































1. Wahr ist die Erkenntnistheorie, insofern sie der Unmöglichkeit des eigenen
Ansatzes Rechnung trägt und in jedem ihrer Schritte von dem Ungenügen der
Sache selbst sich treiben läßt. Unwahr aber ist sie durch die Prätention, es sei ge-
lungen . . .
2. Jean-François Lyotard, ‘‘Ob man ohne Körper denken kann,’’ inMaterialität
der Kommunikation, ed. Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer (Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 813–29.
3. All translations from German into English are my own unless noted other-
wise.
4. English translation: Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama,
trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), 30.
5. In the following, I will not explicitly distinguish between the various schol-
arly classifications for high literarymodernismaround 1900, such as ‘‘fin de siècle,’’
‘‘Aestheticism,’’ ‘‘neo-Romanticism,’’ and ‘‘decadence.’’ In fact, I believe such clas-
sifications are both superfluous and misleading. Friedrich Gundolf, for example,
regards Hofmannsthal as an ‘‘Aestheticist,’’ whereas Peter Szondi classifies him as
the ‘‘anti-Aesthete’’ he believed himself to be. Käte Hamburger believes it nec-
essary to defend the ‘‘neo-Romanticist’’ Rilke from the accusation of being an
‘‘Expressionist,’’ while Müller-Seidel emphatically argues to finally get rid of the
term ‘‘Neu-Romantik’’ altogether: ‘‘Es ist ein gänzlich irreführender Begriff, ein
Begriffsgespenst und nichts anderes!’’ See Walter Müller-Seidel, ‘‘Epochenver-
wandtschaft. Zum Verhältnis von Moderne und Romantik im deutschen Sprach-
gebiet,’’ inGeschichtlichkeit und Aktualität. Studien zur Literatur seit der Romantik,
ed. Klaus-Detlev Müller et al. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1988), 370–92: 390. Unlike
Müller-Seidel, I believe none of the other terms to be any better; this is why I
simply use ‘‘Aestheticism’’ or ‘‘literary modernism’’ throughout this book. I want
to emphasize, however, that the rejection of such labels is not to deny aesthetic dif-
ferences between various authors around 1900, but to claim that one can analyze
them without recourse to the confusing disarray of academic categories.
6. Cf. Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974). For a
comprehensive critique of Bürger’s approach, see Richard Murphy, Theorizing the
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bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–48. Murphy criticizes Bürger’s ap-
proach for failing to acknowledge the indispensability and continued relevance
of aesthetic autonomy, even for the avant-garde movement.
7. Andreas Huyssen, ‘‘Adorno in Reverse: From Hollywood to Richard Wag-
ner,’’ inAfter the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 16–43.
8. There is a tension in Jameson’s later work regarding this point. On the one
hand, his own analysis of postmodernist culture clearly resists the antihermeneu-
tic and nontheoretical discourse of its object and instead advocates a continued
critique of late capitalism, while, on the other hand, Jameson seems to accept the
loss of critical distance as inevitable (Postmodernism 48) since the ‘‘status of art
(and also of culture) has had to be irrevocably modified in order to secure the
new productivities’’ in late capitalism, meaning that ‘‘it cannot be changed back
at will’’ (Postmodernism 318).
9. Cf. Judith Ryan, Rilke, Modernism, and Poetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999).
10. For a detailed description of the first edition, see Stefan George. Bilder und
Bücher aus dem Nachlass.
11. See also Heidegger, ‘‘Der Weg zur Sprache,’’ in Unterwegs zur Sprache, 243.
12. Rainer Maria Rilke, The Duino Elegies, trans. Leslie Norris and Alan Keele
(Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1993), 55.
13. Similar passages can be found in ‘‘Das Kleine Welttheater,’’ vol. 1 of Gesam-
melte Werke, 373, 382–83.
14. Cf. Benjamin, ‘‘Motive,’’ vol. 1/2 of Gesammelte Schriften, 646–47; Jacques
Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 106; Jean Paul Sartre,
Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1992), 340–400; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 134–35.
15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, vol. 2 of Gesammelte Werke, 250; qtd. in Kai Ham-
mermeister, Hans Georg Gadamer (München: Beck, 1999), 117.
chapter 1
1. ‘‘Ich denke manchmal, es fehlt uns nicht an gelehrter Prosa, sondern an ge-
lehrter Poesie.’’ Niklas Luhmann, Short Cuts, ed. Peter Gente et al. (Frankfurt:
Zweitausendeins, 2000), 5.
2. Given the long and intricate development of photography and animated
pictures, the origin of film proper seems irretrievably lost, or rather: has never
existed to begin with. Due to personal preferences, scholars have referred to dif-
ferent historical events or particular moments as the ‘‘birth’’ of motion pictures.
See Jean-Louis Comolli, ‘‘Technique and Ideology,’’ in Narrative, Apparatus, Ide-
ology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University
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see Georges Sadoul, vol. 1 ofHistoire Générale du Cinéma (Paris: Editions Denoel,
1948).
3. Cf. Tom Gunning, ‘‘An Aesthetics of Astonishment: Early Film and the
(In)Credulous Spectator,’’ Art and Text 34 (1989): 31–45; and Dai Vaughan, ‘‘Let
There Be Lumière,’’ in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaes-
ser (London: British Film Institute, 1990), 63–67: 63. I have personally checked
the daily newspaper Le Figaro for the time of the first Lumière showing, but could
not find any remarks lending credibility to the anecdote of the frightened spec-
tators. Besides, it should be remembered that Lumière’s premiere showed several
less threatening films before L’arrivée d’un train, and this gave spectators sufficient
time to adapt to the illusory power of the cinematic apparatus.
4. Kenneth S. Calhoon adds an interesting twist to this discussion as he relates
Lumière’s film to a painting byMagritte entitled ‘‘LaDurée poignardée,’’ which de-
picts a locomotive emerging from a fireplace into a living room (parlor). Accord-
ing to Calhoon, both ‘‘pictures’’ portray the threatening consequences of adequate
representation (i.e., the demolition of the private interior through the invasion of
dangerous images that became ‘‘real’’), yet they simultaneously console the spec-
tator by exposing such representation as illusory appearance—‘‘a reminder that
art never wanted the thing itself, only an imposter.’’ Kenneth S. Calhoon, ‘‘Screen
Memories: The Shadow of Technology in Early German Cinema,’’ unpublished
paper, presented at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association in
Los Angeles, 1991.
5. See, for example, Miles Orvell, The Real Thing: Imitation and Authenticity
in American Culture, 1880–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1989).
6. Anton Giulio Bragaglia, Fotodinamismo futuristica, ed. Anton Giulio Bra-
gaglia et al. (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1970); qtd. in Bernd Hüppauf, ‘‘Experiences
of ModernWarfare,’’NewGerman Critique 59 (Spring/Summer 1993): 54, note 29.
7. Cf. Siegfried Kracauer, ‘‘Die Photographie,’’ in Das Ornament der Masse
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 21–39.
8. Cf. Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey. Commenting on the psychologi-
cal effect of the train ride, Wolfgang Schivelbusch alludes to the new cinematic
medium as the artistic correlative to this cultural experience: ‘‘He [the traveler]
perceives objects, landscape etc. through the apparatus with which he is moving
through the world.’’ The world outside was indeed converted into a tableau, a
complex of ‘‘moving pictures’’ (Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey 61). See also
Lynne Kirby, ‘‘Male Hysteria and Early Cinema,’’ Camera Obscura 17 (1988): 113–
14; and the collection of essays called Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life, ed.
Leo Charney and Vanessa R. Schwartz (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995).
9. In 1914, Kurt Pinthus publishes Das Kinobuch, a collection of several movie
scripts that, alas, were never to appear on celluloid. Pinthus’s own story is called







































































278 : notes to pages 46–59
taking off into the air—an image reminiscent of the fatal accident at Gare Mont-
parnasse. In 1935, Walter Benjamin implicitly mobilized the train metaphor by
arguing that film had finally abolished the outdated and uncritical aesthetics of
contemplation: ‘‘Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the
dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins
and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling’’ (Illuminations 236). A simi-
lar expression can be found in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, which characterizes the
relationship between the modern work of art and its spectator as follows: ‘‘The
relation to art was not that of its physical devouring; on the contrary, the beholder
disappeared into the material: this is even more so in modern works that shoot
toward the viewer as on occasion a locomotive does in a film’’ (Aesthetic Theory
13) (Das Verhältnis zur Kunst war keines von Einverleibung, sondern umgekehrt
verschwand der Betrachter in der Sache; erst recht ist das der Fall in modernen
Gebilden, die auf jenen zufahren wie zuweilen Lokomotiven im Film) (Ästhetische
Theorie, 27).
10. See, for example, W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Mitchell argues that Lessing’s notion of a
spatial versus a temporal art is misconceived since the hybridization between the
arts is not a marginal practice, but rather at the very heart of art. Lessing’s whole
distinction relies not on differences in kind, but in degree, and is thus indicative
of certain political and ideological biases.
11. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970),
89.
12. For a comprehensive exploration of Descartes’s dilemma, see Margaret
Atherton, ‘‘How to Write the History of Vision: Understanding the Relationship
between Berkeley and Descartes,’’ in Sites of Vision, ed. David Levin, 139–65.
13. See also Helmholtz’s essay ‘‘The Origin and Meaning of Geometric Axioms
(1),’’ in SelectedWritings, 247–65, particularly 263–65, where Helmholtz treats this
point at length.
14. Helmholtz, ‘‘Recent Progress in the Theory of Vision,’’ 218; ‘‘Origin,’’ 506f.
15. See Sigmund Freud, ‘‘Hemmung, Symptom, Angst,’’ vol. 14 of Gesammelte
Werke, 111–205; ‘‘Jenseits des Lustprinzips,’’ vol. 13 of Gesammelte Werke, 1–69.
16. Eberhard Bauer, ‘‘Spiritismus und Okkultismus,’’ in Okkultismus und
Avantgarde, 60–80: 77–78.
17. Terry Castle, ‘‘Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics
of Modern Reverie,’’ Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn 1988): 26–61.
18. Adorno was among the first and most clear-sighted critics of this historical
juncture between magic and positivism. For him, the allurement of a Dionysian
flow of life is but the ideological guise of a capitalist society that ultimately serves
to legitimize the reified world of commodity fetishism, as he argues in a famous
letter to Benjamin in 1938: ‘‘the theological motif to call things by their name has
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theologische Motiv, die Dinge beim Namen zu nennen, schlägt tendenziell um in
die staunende Darstellung der bloßen Faktizität) (Benjamin, vol. 1/3 of Gesam-
melte Schriften, 1096).
19. Lauster points to the sonnet as a poetic form whose genesis and historical
use mirrors the struggle between stasis and mobility, space and time (288–311).
In contrast to Lauster, who privileges the sonnet’s formal stasis over its dynamic
content, Ryan reverses the perspective and emphasizes the latter over the former
(55–65). The different views literally bespeak the inherent ambivalence of the son-
net form itself.
20. Rainer Maria Rilke, Selected Poems, trans. Albert Ernest Flemming (New
York: Methuen, 1986), 92.
21. Cf. Rilke’s ‘‘Marginalien zu Friedrich Nietzsche,’’ vol. 6 of Werke, 1163–77.
22. For a comprehensive critique of the ahistorical and ontological presump-
tions underlying theories of the cinematic apparatus, see Judith Mayne, Cinema
and Spectatorship (London: Routledge, 1993).
23. Many of the essays in Thomas Elsaesser, ed., Early Cinema: Space, Frame,
Narrative (London: British Film Institute, 1990), speak to this issue. See also Noel
Burch, Life to Those Shadows (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), who
distinguishes what he calls ‘‘primitive modes of representation’’ before 1909 from
the ‘‘institutional mode of representation’’ and its spectator-oriented approach
that controlled cinema thereafter.
24. Cf. Walter Gebhard, Der Zusammenhang der Dinge. Weltgleichnis und Na-
turverklärung im Totatlitätsbewußtsein des 19. Jahrhunderts;Monika Fick, Sinnen-
welt und Weltseele. Der psychophysische Monismus in der Literatur der Jahrhunder-
twende.
25. The term is coined by Donald M. Lowe in his book History of Bourgeois
Perception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
chapter 2
1. All quotes by Husserl refer to the following edition and are cited in the
body of the text: Edmund Husserl, Husserliana. Gesammelte Werke, ed. H. L. van
Breda (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958–). I shall use the following abbreviations: LU for
Logische Untersuchungen (2 vols. Husserliana XVIII and XIX); Idee for Die Idee
der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen (Husserliana II); Ideen for Ideen zu einer
Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie (2 vols.Husserliana
III and IV). All translations are my own unless noted otherwise. For a historical
account of Husserl’s oeuvre, see J. N. Mohanty, ‘‘The Development of Husserl’s
Thought,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David
Woodruff Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45–77.
2. This distinction, of course, was the focal point for Derrida’s critique of
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3. Cf. Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘‘Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and
Perception,’’ in Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, ed. Hubert L. Drey-
fus (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982), 31–41.
4. Cf. Gottlob Frege, ‘‘On Sense and Reference,’’ in Translations from the Philo-
sophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Black-
well, 1960). Almost the entire collection of essays in Husserl, Intentionality, and
Cognitive Science, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1982), points to this similarity.
5. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and
Albert Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (LaSalle: Open Court, 1986).
6. See Peter Simons, ‘‘Meaning and Language,’’ in The Cambridge Companion
to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 106–37: 110. Similarly DallasWillard, ‘‘Knowledge,’’ in The
Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 138–67.
7. Cf. LU II/1, § 14, 56f.
8. Cf. LU II/1, § 21, 77.
9. See also Ideen I/1, § 19, 43, and Ideen I/2, ‘‘Beilage,’’ 8, 534.
10. Dreyfus rightly claims that in the LU, ‘‘there is no mention of the intuitive
sense,’’ for Husserl did not coin such a term. Yet Dreyfus is mistaken, I believe, in
claiming that Husserl at that time had ‘‘no way of generalizing his conception of
a non-spatial, non-temporal, universal, abstract sense to cover a concrete form
which is inseparable from the sensuous content it organizes’’ (Dreyfus, 106), for
that is exactly how Husserl defines the ‘‘object’’ (Gegenstand) of inner perception,
which he claims is ‘‘physically’’ (leibhaft) given in the act that constitutes it. Of
course this object is not ‘‘really’’ physical, but that terminological ambiguity is
precisely the foundation on which Husserl later erects his eidetic principle. The
Ideen, in otherwords,merely continue the prioritizing ofmental reflection already
latent in the LU.
11. See, for example, Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, ‘‘Introduction,’’
in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 1–44; 34–37 in particular; and Dallas
Willard, ‘‘Knowledge,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 138–67.
12. Harrison Hall, ‘‘Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?’’; Herman Philipse,
‘‘Transcendental Idealism,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 239–322.
13. Most essays in Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science discuss this
question. See also Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, ‘‘Introduction,’’ inThe
Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 1–44.
14. Cf. Jaakko Hintikka, ‘‘The Phenomenological Dimension,’’ in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Husserl, 78–105.
15. Cf. LU II/2, ‘‘Beilage,’’ 14, 586–88.
16. In the introduction to the second volume of the LU, for example, we read:
‘‘Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfaßten Wesen und rein in den Wesen grün-
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deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen Wesensaussagen zu reinem Aus-
druck’’ (LU II/1: 6). In the Idee lectures from 1907, Husserl again asserts the possi-
bility of ‘‘nestling’’ language against the clarity of vision: ‘‘[S]ie [Gegebenheiten]
stehen anschaulich da, wir reden über sie nicht bloß in vager Andeutung, in leerer
Meinung, wir schauen sie und sie schauend können wir ihr Wesen, ihre Konstitu-
tion, ihren immanenten Charakter herausschauen und unsere Rede in reiner An-
messung an die geschaute Fülle der Klarheit anschmiegen’’ (Idee 31). And again,
in the Ideen from 1913: ‘‘Wir haben nicht philosophische Theorien aufgestellt, wir
haben nicht von einem metaphysischen Standpunkt aus doziert, sondern selbst-
verständliche Folgen aus einigen prinzipiellen Feststellungen gezogen. Was diese
aber anbelangt, so haben wir einfach beschrieben, was wir in der Intuition als
direkt gegeben vorfanden, und haben es genau in dem Sinne beschrieben, in dem
es sich gab, ohne jede interpretierende Hineindeutung, ohne Hinzuziehung von
solchem, was uns durch gelehrte Traditionen, durch alte und neue Vorurteile
zugemutet, statt eben am Gegeben selbst zu sehen war’’ (Ideen I/2, ‘‘Beilage,’’ 15,
560). Similarly Ideen I/1, § 18, 39.
17. It is obvious that Husserl’s concept of ‘‘hyle’’ as the unstructured matter of a
sensation is problematic since such raw data, by definition, cannot be consciously
registered as such, but is immediately interpreted and hence transformed into a
meaningful form by the receiving consciousness. I shall not, however, pursue this
issue any further in the context of my discussion.
18. Cf. Bell, 63.
19. For a comprehensive overview, see ‘‘Introduction,’’ in The Cambridge Com-
panion to Husserl, 1–44.
20. The following summary of Gurwitsch’s interpretation refers to his Studies
in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1966) andhis essayon ‘‘Husserl’sTheoryof the IntentionalityofConsciousness,’’ in
Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982), 59–71.
21. Cf. Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘‘Husserl’s Notion of Noema,’’ in Husserl, Intention-
ality, and Cognitive Science, 73–80; and Hubert L. Dreyfus, ‘‘Husserl’s Perceptual
Noema,’’ in Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, 97–123.
22. Cf. Dreyfus, 108–10.
23. JaakkoHintikka convincingly argues this point in his essay ‘‘The Phenome-
nological Dimension,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 78–105: 81.
24. Cf. Føllesdal, 74.
25. For a detailed discussion of Bergson’s influence onmodern art such as fauv-
ism, cubism, and futurism, see Mark Antliff, Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics
and the Parisian Avant-Garde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
26. Similarly CE, 328, 343, 344f., 357, 361. Also Intro, 16, 18.
27. Bergson refers to ‘‘pure’’ rather than ‘‘real’’ perception because real percep-







































































282 : notes to pages 89–9 1
preserved in the mind. Incoming sensations emanating from the object are being
mixed with the memory of previous sensations to propel the body into action.
‘‘Together, these two currents make up, at their point of confluence, the percep-
tion that is distinct and recognized’’ (MM, 127f.). Although a key issue throughout
Matter andMemory, this aspect is less relevant in the context of this study and will
not be developed further.
28. Deleuze rightly points to a development in Bergson’s thought concerning
the notion of space, which ‘‘seemed to him to be less and less reducible to a fic-
tion separating us from this psychological reality’’ and rather ‘‘was itself grounded
in being’’ (Bergsonism, 34). Unlike Deleuze, however, I want to argue that these
qualifying shifts are symptomatic of a terminological uncertainty located at the
very center of Bergson’s philosophy.
29. It is, of course, inaccurate to speak of ‘‘parts’’ in this context since Bergson
is at pains to avoid any term suggestive of solid states of immobility, which, in his
eyes, do not exist and are a construct of the human mind. As I will argue in this
chapter, however, this ambiguous terminology is difficult to avoid since it lies at
the heart of Bergson’s philosophy and haunts it from within.
30. Compare to Ernst Mach’s famous formulation: ‘‘Das Ich ist nicht zu retten.’’
31. Georg Lukács’s work is exemplary in this regard as he ranks among the
most severe critics of such philosophical ‘‘irrationalism,’’ which he sees lead-
ing straight Von Nietzsche zu Hitler (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1966). In the few pages
Adorno dedicated to a critique of Bergson in his Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnis-
theorie published in 1956, amore balanced viewof Bergson is palpable, for Adorno
realizes the critical potential inherent in metaphysical intuition that indeed was
directed against the very reification of thought to which it itself inadvertently
fell victim: ‘‘In den Intuitionen besinnt sich die Ratio auf das, was sie vergaß.
. . . Die Intuition ist kein einfacher Gegensatz zur Logik; sie gehört dieser an
und mahnt sie zugleich an das Moment ihrer Unwahrheit. . . . In der unwillkür-
lichen Erinnerung versucht wie immer auch vergeblich der willkürliche Gedanke
etwas von dem zu heilen, was er gleichwohl verüben muß. Das hat Bergson ver-
kannt. Indem er die Intuitionen für die unmittelbare Stimme jenes Lebens ausgab,
das doch nur als vermitteltes noch lebt, hat er sie selber zum abstrakten Prin-
zip verdünnt, das rasch mit der abstrakten Welt sich befreundet, gegen die er es
ersann’’ (53f.). The brilliancy of Adorno’s thought notwithstanding, his critique
of Bergson not only culminates in the, for him, typical charge that those who
seek to escape the restrictions of conceptual thought by (allegedly) avoiding it
altogether end up perpetuating those same restrictions—a critique that strikes
me as rather generic in essence, particularly since Adorno does not present a
thorough textual analysis of Bergson’s works. Moreover, Bergson presents intu-
ition not as the ‘‘voice’’ of life, but as the ‘‘image’’ of life, an important mispercep-
tion on Adorno’s part that betrays his bias regarding the priority of language
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32. Cf.MM, 56, 100, 102, 104. In Creative Evolution, he cautions his readers ‘‘to
not be fooled by a metaphor’’ (CE, 64) because many a scientific explanation ‘‘is
merely verbal,’’ making us ‘‘again the dupes of words’’ (CE, 65), because practical
life often ‘‘suggest[s] to us . . . a way of speaking that deceives us both as to what
happens in things and as to what is present to our thought’’ (CE, 259). Words are
‘‘pseudo-ideas’’ (CE, 308) or mere ‘‘mirages of ideas’’ (Intro, 65) that mean nothing
and are potentially dangerous as they give rise to misconceptions and false ideas
of all kinds. Similarly CE, 20, 203, 233, 299, 305, 317.
33. In his later works, Bergson increasingly acknowledges the relationship be-
tween language and life as central to his entire enterprise: ‘‘Whether it be intellec-
tion or intuition, thought, of course, always utilizes language; and intuition, like
all thought, finally becomes lodged in concepts’’ (Intro, 35). The true challenge
hence consisted in questioning and ultimately overcoming language: ‘‘My inves-
tigation into the true philosophical method began the moment I threw overboard
verbal solutions, having found in the inner life an important field of experiment,’’
concludes Bergson (Intro, 89f.). Once philosophy decides ‘‘to cast aside ready-
made ideas and to make contact with the thing’’ (Intro, 83), theoretical problems
hitherto deemed insoluble will disappear without a trace since they were ‘‘unreal’’
to begin with and owed their existence merely to our tendency to substitutewords
for things, concepts for matter, models for life itself.
34. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, 58–60.
35. ‘‘If metaphysics is possible,’’ Bergson asserts, ‘‘it is through a vision and not
through a dialectic’’ (Intro, 139). See also Deleuze, Bergsonism, 44.
36. ‘‘Poetry never substitutes one thing for another, because poetry strives
feverishly to present the thing itself. . . .—So there are no comparisons? There
are no symbols?—Oh no, there is rather nothing but that, nothing different’’
([N]iemals setzt die Poesie eine Sache für eine andere, denn es ist gerade die Poe-
sie, welche fieberhaft bestrebt ist, die Sache selbst zu setzen. . . .—Es gibt also
keine Vergleiche? Es gibt keine Symbole?—Oh, vielmehr, es gibt nichts als das,
nichts anderes) (‘‘Das Gespräch über Gedichte,’’ in Erzählungen, 498f.).
37. At the end of one of his public lectures entitled ‘‘Der Dichter und diese
Zeit’’ from 1906, Hofmannsthal acknowledges that the quasi-religious experience
he advocates in the form of poetic language presupposes his listener’s belief in the
existence and relevance of art: ‘‘I only address those who want to go with me, but
not him who has promised himself to reject all of this. I can only speak for those
who see that poetry is there. It is because of the existence of these people that poets
are granted a life of their own’’ ([I]ch rede nur für die, die mit mir gehen wollen,
und nicht für den, der sich sein Wort gegeben hat, dies alles von sich abzulehnen.
Ich kann nur für die reden, für die Gedichtetes da ist. Die, durch deren Dasein die
Dichter erst ein Leben bekommen) (‘‘Dichter’’; RA; GW I: 79).
38. The point is made explicit in his lecture on ‘‘Poesie und Leben,’’ where
Hofmannsthal first demands the strict separation of art and life and then con-
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drive life out of poetry. . . . But rest assured that I will give this life back to you’’
(Sie wundern sich über mich. Sie sind enttäuscht und finden, daß ich Ihnen das
Leben aus der Poesie vertreibe. . . . Auch seien Sie unbesorgt: ich werde Ihnen das
Leben wiedergeben) (‘‘Poesie und Leben’’; RA; GW I: 18f.).
39. See his public lecture from 1907 entitled ‘‘Vom Dichterischen Dasein’’ (RA;
GW I: 82–87) in which he explicitly relates the time periods around 1800 and 1900
as poetic, while denouncing the nineteenth century as unpoetic.
40. See also ‘‘Nachlaß’’; RA; GW III: 316, 400.
41. Jacques Derrida, Grammatologie, 30.
42. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Random House, 1967), 544; qtd. in Edward Jones, Reading the Book
of Nature (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 1.
excursus
1. ‘‘Narren, die den Verfall der Kritik beklagen. Denn deren Stunde ist längst
abgelaufen. Die ‘Unbefangenheit,’ der ‘freie Blick’ sind Lüge . . . geworden.’’Walter
Benjamin, ‘‘Einbahnstraße,’’ vol. 4/1 of Gesammelte Schriften, 131.
2. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, ‘‘A Farewell to Interpretation,’’ in Materialities of
Communication, 389–402.
3. Cf. Friedrich A. Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, 70–123.
4. Diane P.Michelfelder andRichard E. Palmer, eds.,Dialogue andDeconstruc-
tion: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, 52–57.
5. See, for example, G. B. Madison, ‘‘Gadamer/Derrida: The Hermeneutics of
Irony and Power,’’ in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 192–98; and John D. Caputo,
‘‘Gadamer’s Closet Essentialism: A Derridian Critique,’’ in Dialogue and Decon-
struction, 258–64.
6. Cf. Manfred Frank, Das Individuelle Allgemeine (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1977).
7. Manfred Frank, Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare. Studien zur deutsch-
französischen Hermeneutik und Texttheorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 20, 334,
and throughout.
8. See Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer, Schrift, 390, as well as ‘‘A Farewell to Interpre-
tation,’’ 396.
9. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘‘Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,’’ in vol. 5 of Ge-
sammelte Schriften (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964), 317–31: 331.
10. Cf. Gadamer, ‘‘Hermeneutics and Logocentrism,’’ in Dialogue and Decon-
struction, 119 and throughout. Similarly Manfred Frank, Die Unhintergehbarkeit
von Individualität—Reflexionen über Subjekt, Person und Individuum aus Anlaß
ihrer ‘Postmodernen’ Toterklärung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986). Individuality, in
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that is not the cause of its own being, but the locus of a ‘‘continuous transforma-
tion of different statuses pertaining to one person at a time.’’ Manfred Frank and
Anselm Haverkamp, eds., Individualität (München: Fink, 1988), 19.
11. Almost the same wording can be found in Jacques Derrida, for whom ‘‘[i]t
deconstructs it-self.’’ Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Letter to a Japanese Friend,’’ in A Derrida
Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991), 274.
12. See his response in RT, 117.
13. In his recent book The End of the Poem, Giorgio Agamben appears among
the most outspoken critics of the ‘‘deconstruction factory’’ he sees at work in lit-
erary criticism, which should not obscure the fact, however, that, in earlier years,
he himself used to be on its board of directors, so to speak. More to the point,
however, is the lack of a viable alternative evident in his critique as well. Charging
deconstruction with a ‘‘theological foundation’’ that focuses on the ‘‘primacy of
the signifier and the letter’’ in poetic works (77), he claims to detect the origins
of modern European lyric poetry in twelfth-century poetry instead: ‘‘The razo,
which lies at the foundation of poetry . . . is therefore neither a biographical nor
a linguistic event. It is instead a zone of indifference, so to speak, between lived
experience and what is poeticized [il poetato], an ‘experience of speech’ as an in-
exhaustible experience of love’’ (79). Although Agamben tries to flesh out this
‘‘zone of indifference’’ in several other essays, I fail to see how it differs from Hei-
degger’s notion of ‘‘aletheia’’ or unconcealment that strongly influenced French
deconstruction.
14. See, for example, Hans Hauge, ‘‘De la Grammatologie und die literarische
Wende,’’ in Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer, Schrift, 319–35.
15. Cf. Robert Holub, Crossing Borders: Reception Theory, Poststructuralism,
Deconstruction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 43. For a more
comprehensive and well-balanced critique of Kittler’s work in general, see the
introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and
Michael Wutz, xi–xli.
16. Clemens Heselhaus, ‘‘Das metaphorische Gedicht von Georg Trakl,’’ in
Deutsche Lyrik der Moderne von Nietzsche bis Ivan Goll (Düsseldorf: Bagel, 1961),
228–57; Walter Killy, Über Georg Trakl (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1967).
17. Cf. Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage,
1970).
18. Cf. Louis Althusser, For Marx, 232. For a more comprehensive account of
Althusser’s notion of ideology, see Louis Althusser, ‘‘Ideology and Ideological
State Apparati: Notes towards an Investigation,’’ in Essays (London: Verso, 1984),
1–60.
19. Cf. Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz, ‘‘Introduction,’’ xvi–xviii.
20. Cf. Wellbery, ‘‘Foreword,’’ 17ff.; David Wellbery, ‘‘The Exteriority of Writ-
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ing vs. Understanding Systems,’’ Cardozo Law Review 13/5, special issue (March
1992): 1505–16.
21. Cf. Gumbrecht, In 1926, 411–20.
22. See Carsten Strathausen, ‘‘Althusser’s Mirror,’’ Studies in Twentieth Century
Literature 24 (Winter 1994): 58–71.
23. For a comprehensive critique of Foucault’s epistemological dilemma, see
Manfred Frank, Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare, 362–426.
24. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer Allgemeinen Theorie
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), 7–15 in particular. For an excellent discussion of the
broader implications of Luhmann’s work, see William Rasch, Niklas Luhmann’s
Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2000).
25. Winthrop-Young and Wutz, ‘‘Introduction,’’ xxxvii.
26. Cf. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 110: ‘‘Was der Spruch des
Parmenides ausspricht, ist eine Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen aus dem
Wesen des Seins selbst’’ (What Parmenides’ saying expresses is a determination
of the human essence on the basis of the essence of Being itself ) (Introduction
to Metaphysics 153); also Einführung in die Metaphysik, 130: ‘‘Das Menschsein be-
stimmt sich aus dem Bezug zum Seienden als solches im Ganzen. Das Menschen-
wesen zeigt sich hier als der Bezug, der dem Menschen erst das Sein eröffnet’’
(Being-human is determined by the relation to beings as such and as a whole.
The human essence shows itself here as the relation that first opens up Being to
humanity) (Introduction to Metaphysics 181).
27. Gianni Vattimo, ‘‘An-denken: Thinking and the Foundation,’’ in The Ad-
venture of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans. Cyprian
Blamires and Thomas Harrison (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993), 110–35: 128.
28. This period concerns Heidegger’s thought after the publication of Sein und
Zeit (1927), during which he increasingly shifted emphasis from the analysis of
Dasein to that of ‘‘Being’’ proper and the ‘‘Seinsvergessenheit’’ of the modern age.
On the notion of the turn in Heidegger’s philosophy, see James Risser, ‘‘Introduc-
tion,’’ in Heidegger toward the Turn, 1–16.
29. Cf. Terry Eagelton, Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism
(London: Verso, 1981), 141; and Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1984), 21ff.
30. For Adorno, Heidegger’s ‘‘Ursprungsphilosophie’’ is directly related to so-
cial domination and the rise of fascism: ‘‘Fascism sought to realize a first philoso-
phy. . . . The identityof fascism and originality amounted to the notion that hewho
had the power should be not merely the first one, but also the original one’’ (Der
Faschismus suchte die Ursprungsphilosophie zu verwirklichen. . . . Die Identität
von Ursprünglichkeit und Herrschaft lief darauf hinaus, daß wer die Macht hat,
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der Erkenntnistheorie, 28). Similar comments are dispersed throughout Adorno’s
work. For a comprehensive discussion of the topic, see Mörchen, 364–90.
31. This is Hermann Mörchen’s central thesis in his study on Adorno und Hei-
degger. Although Mörchen at times overstates the similarity between the two, he
nonetheless provides ample and detailed evidence of Adorno’s often misguided
critique of Heidegger’s work, particularly with regard to their shared views on
language and the movement of philosophical thought. More recently, Rüdiger
Safranski also comments on Adorno’s ‘‘dangerous philosophical affinity with the
person he attacked,’’ Rüdiger Safranski,MartinHeidegger: BetweenGood and Evil.
32. George Lukács, Von Nietzsche zu Hitler oder Der Irrationalismus und die
Deutsche Politik. For a specific critique of Lukács, see Adorno’s essay ‘‘Erpreßte
Versöhnung,’’ in Noten zur Literatur, GS 11: 251–80.
33. See Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and
Critical Theory (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995),
151–52 in particular, as well as Sabine Wilke and Heidi Schlipphacke, ‘‘Construc-
tion of a Gendered Subject: A Feminist Reading of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,’’
in The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. Tom
Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Press, 1997), 287–308.
34. See Richard Wolin, ‘‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism,’’ in The Semblance of
Subjectivity, 93–122.
chapter 3
1. Walter Müller-Seidel, ‘‘Epochenverwandtschaft. Zum Verhältnis von Mo-
derne und Romantik im deutschen Sprachgebiet,’’ in Geschichtlichkeit und Ak-
tualität. Studien zur Literatur seit der Romantik, ed. Klaus-Detlev Müller et al.
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1988), 370–92.
2. Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974); [English
translation: Peter Bürger,Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984)]. See Andreas Huyssen, ‘‘The Search
for Tradition: Avant-Garde and Postmodernism in the 1970s,’’ in After the Great
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1986), 160–77; Richard Murphy, Theorizing the Avant-Garde: Mod-
ernism, Expressionism, and the Problem of Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 26–48. Murphy in particular argues that Bürger’s theory
needs to be revised in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of aesthetic
autonomy and aura at the beginning of the twentieth century.
3. Kittler, Discourse Networks, 217–18.
4. Cf. David E. Wellbery, The Specular Moment: Goethe’s Early Lyric and the
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5. Georg Braungart, Leibhafter Sinn. Der andere Diskurs der Moderne (Tü-
bingen: Niemeyer, 1995).
6. Safranski convincingly argues this point in Martin Heidegger, 225–306. See
also Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology
(London: Verso, 1999), 10–11.
chapter 4
1. About Borchardt: ‘‘It is as a speaking person that he becomes an organ of
language. Rhetoric is concerned with its own conjuration. By imitating speech, his
poetry makes itself resemble the potential of language, so that that potential can
be manifested. . . . To Borchardt, the man who charmed language until it threat-
ened to break into pieces with a clatter, language did not refuse its echo’’ (Notes II:
196, 210) (Als Redender wird er Organon der Sprache. Ihrer eigenen Beschwörung
gilt die Rhetorik. Seine Dichtung macht durch Mimesis an die Rede dem Poten-
tial sich ähnlich, damit es erscheine. . . . Der die Sprache beschwor, bis sie klirrend
zu zerspringen drohte, dem hat sie das Echo nicht versagt) (‘‘Die beschworene
Sprache’’; GS 11: 539, 555). About George: ‘‘In George’s poetry the technical work
. . . in an individual poem is almost always work on language as such at the same
time. . . . For George, labeled as a l’art pout l’art artist, not the individual work, but
language, in and through thework of art, was the highest ideal; hewanted nothing
less than to change language’’ (Notes II: 187) (Stets fast ist die technische Arbeit
der Georgeschen Lyrik . . . im einzelnen Gedicht zugleich die an der Sprache als
solcher. . . . Dem als l’art pour l’art-Künstler Abgestempelten war keineswegs das
einzelne Kunstwerk oberstes Ideal sondern durch es hindurch die Sprache: nicht
weniger wollte er, als sie verändern) (‘‘George’’; GS 11: 531). About Eichendorff:
‘‘The subject turns itself into Rauschen, the rushing, rustling, murmuring sound
of nature: into language, living on only in the process of dying away, like language.
The act in which the human being becomes language, the flesh becomes word,
incorporates the expression of nature into language and transfigures the move-
ment of language so that it becomes life again’’ (Notes I: 68–69) (Zum Rauschen
macht sich das Subjekt selber: zur Sprache, überdauernd bloß im Verhallen wie
diese. DerAkt derVersprachlichung desMenschen, einWortwerden des Fleisches,
bildet der Sprache den Ausdruck von Natur ein und transfiguriert ihre Bewegung
ins Leben noch einmal) (‘‘Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs’’; GS 11: 83–84).
2. In Adorno’s words: ‘‘[L]anguage itself speaks only when it speaks not as
something alien to the subject but as the subject’s own voice’’ (Notes I: 44) ([E]rst
dann redet Sprache selber, wenn sie nicht länger als ein demSubjekt Fremdes redet
sondern als dessen eigene Stimme) (‘‘Rede’’; GS 11: 57).
3. Gianni Vattimo’s discussion of poetry provides an interesting context for
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4. The Lyrical Poems of Hofmannsthal, trans. Charles Wharton Stork (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), 23–24.
5. Adorno: ‘‘Images which express the true impulse of poems such as ‘Früh-
lingswind’ or those about the ice landscapes in [George’s] ‘Jahr der Seele’ are
taboo. . . . What is being misrecognized is nothing less than the formal principles
that govern their own poetry’’ (Tabuisiert sind die Bilder, in denen die wahren
Impulse des Gedichts vom Frühlingswind oder der Eislandschaften des ‘Jahres
der Seele’ sich verwirklichen. . . . Verkannt wird nichts Geringeres als das Form-
gesetz, dem die eigene Dichtung untersteht) (‘‘George und Hofmannsthal,’’ 231).
See also Klaus Weissenberger, ‘‘Rhythmische Grenzziehungen in Hofmannsthal’s
Lyrik,’’ inWir sind aus solchem Zeug wie das zu träumen. . . . Kritische Beiträge zu
Hofmannsthal’s Werk, ed. Joseph P. Strelka (Bern: Lang, 1992), 49–80: 78–80.
6. Blätter für die Kunst, dritte Folge, 3. Bd.
7. Cf. ‘‘Ad me ipsum’’ (1917) as well as ‘‘Ein Brief ’’ (1902) and ‘‘Die Briefe des
Zurückgekehrten’’ (1907). Concerning the poetic function of the Augenblick in
Hofmannsthal’s work, see Karl Pestalozzi, ‘‘Wandlungen des erhöhten Augen-
blicks bei Hofmannsthal,’’ and Wiethölter, 23–46.
8. A recent study, aptly entitled Leiblichkeit der Sprache, Sprachlichkeit des
Leibes, is among the first to explicitly oppose this dualism between verbal and
physical language that allegedly characterizes Hofmannsthal’s oeuvre: ‘‘The par-
ticular quality of Hofmannsthal’s understanding of language, which the second-
ary literature so far has not yet sufficiently acknowledged, lies in his retreat to (or
advancing toward) the psychic-physical origin of language as the place that unites
body and word, world and language’’ (Vielmehr liegt der besondere, bisher von
der Forschung noch kaum in ihrer Tragweite erkannte und gewürdigte Qualität
der Sprachauffassung Hofmannsthals in seinem Rückgang (oder Vorstoß) zum
psychisch-physischen Ausgangs- und Angelpunkt der Sprache als dem Ort einer
Ursprungseinheit von Leib und Wort, und das heißt schließlich von Welt und
Sprache) (Rutsch, 4–5). For a comprehensive overview of the critical literature,
see Rutsch, 13–43.
9. Cf. Braungart, 230–35.
10. For a detailed discussion of Hofmannsthal’s projects, see Oksiloff, 70ff.;
and Elke C. Furthman-Durden, ‘‘HugovonHofmannsthal andAlfredDöblin: The
Confluence of Film and Literature,’’ Monatshefte 78/4 (1986).
11. The similarity between both texts spanning almost two decades further
undermines the traditional view of a rupture in Hofmannsthal’s life and work
allegedly evident in the Chandos Letter. On the contrary, the language-crisis
emerges as a literary theme open to readjustments and modifications over the
time.
12. Cf. Oksiloff, 75–76; Steiner, 171–74.
13. Cf. Oksiloff, 80.
14. Similarly Christian Metz, who reformulates Baudry’s thesis with regard to
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that the image, which is said to be the major constituent of film, vanished behind
the plot it has woven . . . so that the cinema is only in theory the art of images.
. . . The sequence does not string the individual shots; it suppresses them’’ (Film
Language, 45).
15. Rudolf Borchardt’s view is paradigmatic: ‘‘Since Goethe, he [Hofmanns-
thal] . . . is the first poet able to elevate his personal suffering to a status of gen-
eral validity and total aesthetic value . . .’’ (Er [Hofmannsthal] . . . ist seit Goethe
der erste Dichter, der einem selbstdurchlittenen problematischen Zustande durch
den Ernst der Vertiefung, die Gewalt der Vision und die Verbindung mit allem
höheren Dasein seiner Zeit Allgemeingültigkeit und völligen Kunstwert zu ge-
ben gewußt hat) (Borchardt, qtd. in Adorno, ‘‘George und Hofmannsthal,’’ 210).
More skeptical in this regard is Karl Pestalozzi, Sprachskepsis und Sprachmagie,
116–17. For a comprehensive summary of academic perspectives of the postwar
generation up to the 1980s, see Koch, 131–34.
16. Donald G. Daviau, for example, reverses the commonly held belief about
Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘language-crisis’’ and concludes that ‘‘Hofmannsthal’s view of
language remains consistently positive throughout his life and contains no incon-
sistencies. His relationship to language was never negative and was by no means
the problematic issue that the scholarship to date would have us believe’’ (Daviau,
302). Similarly, Jacques le Rider insists on disassociating Hofmannsthal himself
from his fictional hero in ‘‘Ein Brief.’’ He argues that Hofmannsthal’s early work is
characterized not bya ‘‘language-crisis,’’ but by playful reference to normative his-
torical traditions whose validity is continuously being challenged and redefined
within the text. With regard to the ‘‘Chandos Letter,’’ le Rider’s reading is sup-
ported by a personal letter Hofmannsthal wrote to his friend Leopold von An-
drian in 1902, which indicates that Hofmannsthal used the historical framework
in the ‘‘Letter’’ mainly as a way to approach a particular linguistic tradition, while
any personal reference to his own life was of secondary importance. On the basis
of this letter—which contradicts another, more often quoted letter to Andrian
a couple of months earlier, emphasizing the personal character of the ‘‘Chandos
Letter’’—le Rider rejects the commonly held belief that Hofmannsthal’s ‘‘Letter’’
thematizes his own personal language-crisis. See also Riedel, 3.
17. See also Hofmannsthal’s brief essay ‘‘Die Sprache’’ from 1896 (‘‘Nachlaß’’;
RA; GW III: 413f.).
18. In many of Hofmannsthal’s lyrical plays, nature looks back at the beholder.
For example in ‘‘Das kleine Welttheater’’ when the poet contemplates nature:
‘‘Nun setz ich mich am Rand des Waldes hin, / Wo kleine Weiher lange noch den
Glanz / Des Tages halten und mit feuchtem Funkeln / Die offnen Augen dieser
Landschaft scheinen’’ (‘‘Das kleine Welttheater’’; GW I: 373). This gaze possesses
the quality of touch: ‘‘Mit den Augen, den beseelten Fingern / Rührt ers an und
nimmt sich ein Geheimnis . . .’’ (GW I: 382). Under the auspices of this gaze, being
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Bedeuten. Die Seele der Dinge, etwas das aus den Dingen uns mit Liebesblick
anschaut, mit einem Ausdruck über allen Worten’’ (‘‘Nachlaß’’; RA; GW III: 387).
19. Cf. Wunberg, Der Frühe Hofmannsthal, 106–9.
20. That is Georg Braungart’s perspective, 220–21.
21. The same metaphor also appears in other contexts such as ‘‘Die Briefe des
Zurückgekehrten’’ (Gespräche 560–61) and the drama ‘‘Der Turm’’ (Dramen; GW
III: 245).
22. Georg Braungart similarly distinguishes between what he calls the first and
the third phase in Chandos’s life: ‘‘Das Subjekt dieses ersten Zustandes glaubt,
in einem Rausch der Sprachsouveränität sich der Welt bemächtigen zu können,
und scheitert. Das Subjekt des dritten Zustandes, jener unverfügbaren Momente
der Epiphanie und des mythischen Einsseins mit aller Kreatur, gibt sich selbst
auf, geht einfühlend über in die einfachsten, niedrigsten Dinge: eine bei aller
scheinbaren Parallelität genaue Kontrafaktur zu dem Drang des früheren Lords
nach den letzten, höchsten Wahrheiten’’ (Braungart, 221). And Wolfgang Riedel
summarizes his reading as follows: ‘‘Stellte sich ihm [Chandos] damals ‘das Ich
als Universum’ dar, so heute das Universum als Ich. Oder zugespitzt: Legte er
damals das im Selbstbewußtsein, als Geist, gegebene Ich in dieWelt und das Leben
hinaus, so gewahrt er die Welt und das Leben jetzt in sich selbst, freilich nicht
im Bewußtsein, sondern in der Naturalität seines Leibes’’ (Riedel, 37–38). Riedel’s
comment echoes Adorno’s formulation about Aestheticist poetry: ‘‘Anstatt daß
Dinge als Symbole der Subjektivität nachgäben, gibt Subjektivität nach als Sym-
bol der Dinge, bereit, in sich selber schließlich zu dem Ding zu erstarren, zu dem
sie von der Gesellschaft ohnehin gemacht wird’’ (‘‘George und Hofmannsthal,’’
234).
23. Gerhard Austin’s Phänomenologie der Gebärde is typical in this regard.
Austin juxtaposes bodily gestures and verbal forms of expression, claiming that
the former cannot possibly be fully appreciated through language and must be
physically enacted instead. Once he has postulated the ‘‘principle difference be-
tween immediate sensual and verbal experience’’ (47), he prioritizes the authentic
‘‘expression’’ of the former over the latter without recognizing the fundamental
petitio principi of his approach, namely that a gesture expresses nothing at all out-
side its specific operative code, that is, its own ‘‘language.’’
24. Fick, 345–47; Georg Braungart, 219–29; Kittler,Discourse Networks, 217–18.
chapter 5
1. Rainer Maria Rilke, qtd. in Käte Hamburger, 86.
2. All Rilke quotes given in the body of the text refer to the following edition:
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3. Rainer Maria Rilke, Poems from The Book of Hours, trans. Babette Deutsch
(Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1941), 11.
4. Rainer Maria Rilke, The Book of Images: A Bilingual Edition, trans. Edward
Snow (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1991), 5.
5. ‘‘. . . nur für die Arbeit eingerichtet, zwingen sie [Rodins Werkstätten] ihn
[den Besucher], das Schauen als Arbeit auf sich zu nehmen.’’
6. Peter Por’s recent analysis of the New Poems is haunted by the same di-
lemma. In contrast to Judith Ryan, Por argues that although his poems fail to
rescue the real ‘‘outside’’ within the realm of poetic language, they are themselves
conscious of this failure to become what they proclaim to be. Yet, for Por, it is
precisely this failure that guarantees the poem’s success: ‘‘The divine figure of
art, which ultimately is nothing but the new poem itself, realizes and completes
itself in the extreme transcendence of its own nonbeing’’ (Die göttliche Gestalt
der Kunst, gemeint ist letztendlich das neue Gedicht selbst, verwirklicht und voll-
bringt sich in der äußersten Transzendenz ihres eigenen Nicht-Seins) (127). Al-
though an adequate description of Rilke’s poetic ideals, this practice of negative
transcendence hardly warrants the predicate ‘‘realization’’ Por bestows upon it.
For a more comprehensive overview regarding this debate, see Köhnen, 254–60.
7. ‘‘DerWahrheitsgehalt derKunstwerke ist die objektiveAuflösung des Rätsels
eines jeden einzelnen. Indem es die Lösung verlangt, verweist es auf den Wahr-
heitsgehalt. Der ist allein durch philosophische Reflexion zu gewinnen. Das,
nichts anderes rechtfertigt Ästhetik’’ (Ästhetische Theorie 193) (The truth content
of artworks is the objective solution of the enigma posed by each and every one.
By demanding its solution, the enigma points to its truth content. It can only be
achieved by philosophical reflection. This alone is the justification of aesthetics)
(Aesthetic Theory 127f.).
8. This verdict notwithstanding, Adorno, in a typical dialectical move, at times
salvages Rilke’s aesthetic failure for a critique of the sociopolitical reality he claims
responsible for it. Because of its involuntary revelation of the power of commodi-
fication inmodern society, Rilke’s reified poetry is said to ‘‘still stand on the verge’’
between simple irrationalism and the protest against it (‘‘Jargon’’ 469): ‘‘The aes-
thetic weakness of this cult of the thing, its obscurantist demeanor and its blend-
ing of religion with arts and crafts, reveals the real power of reification, which
can no longer be gilded with a lyrical halo and brought back within the sphere
of meaning’’ (Adorno, Notes I, 40) ([D]ie ästhetische Schwäche dieses Dingkults,
der geheimnistuerischeGestus, dieVermischung vonReligion undKunstgewerbe,
verrät zugleich die reale Gewalt derVerdinglichung, die von keiner lyrischen Aura
mehr sich vergolden, in den Sinn einholen läßt) (‘‘Rede’’ 52).
9. ‘‘Ein jedesDing kann der liebeGott sein.Manmuß es ihmnur sagen’’ (Werke
IV: 355).
10. ‘‘. . . daß man leise begann, statt von den Dingen, mit den Dingen zu







































































notes to pages 223–40 : 293
11. Ultimately, Hamburger’s approach yields its own premise as the conclu-
sion: Rilke wrote poetry in lieu of philosophy, and his oeuvre describes—in fact,
it is—phenomenology at work, leading Hamburger to muse how much Husserl
might have ‘‘envied’’ Rilke’s philosophical insights (132) had he only known how
to read poetry (97). Such aberrations aside, her analysis is problematic in several
aspects. First, she implies that Rilke’s poems fully transcend the metaphorical na-
ture of language; at one point, she reads his reference to a tree not as literary image
anymore, but ‘‘as the object itself ’’ (143). Second, her attempt to ‘‘demonstrate’’
the central ideas of Husserl’s philosophy (99) via Rilke leads to the simplifica-
tion of some of Husserl’s key terms such as ‘‘phenomenon,’’ which Hamburger
simply identifies with the perceptual appearance of things. For Husserl, however,
phenomena originally referred to the ‘‘real immanence’’ of mental acts and only
in his later works became identified with the intended object of such acts (the
noema). Moreover, it remains unclear how exactly to envision the ‘‘phenomeno-
logical structure’’ thatHamburger sees realized inRilke’s poetry. ForHusserl, phe-
nomenology served as a basis for modern science. As Hamburger herself notes,
it is characterized and employed as a method, a particular approach toward ex-
amining the structure of human consciousness and its relationship to the tran-
scendental world. Hence, phenomenology itself is anything but a ‘‘structure,’’ and
Hamburger’s entire essay culminates in the coerced effort to equate Rilke’s poetic
form with phenomenology’s very own essence, as if the latter were but yet another
of the many ‘‘things’’ the former seeks to describe. Another example of Ham-
burger’s problematic reading of Husserl is her understanding of ‘‘intentionality,’’
which she sees exemplified in the ‘‘Ich-Du’’ chiasm that structures Rilke’s Stunden-
buch. Husserl, however, did not face the philosophical problem of the ‘‘other’’
until the very end of his career, meaning that intentionality, for him, precisely did
not denote the relationship between two subjects, but rather described the inter-
nal structure of intentional acts taking place in human consciousness. To regard
the polar structure of the Stundenbuch as evidence or even the embodiment of
‘‘the problem of intentionality’’ is as misguided as the entire attempt to find direct
correspondences between Husserl’s philosophy and Rilke’s poetry. This is not to
deny the striking similarities between them, many of which are made evident in
Hamburger’s analysis, but to call for the critical investigation of both Husserl’s
and Rilke’s vision of the world and the different means they sought to express it
linguistically.
chapter 6
1. Blätter für die Kunst, erste Folge, erstes Heft (1892).
2. Georges ‘‘Wille zur Form, dieses neue Formgefühl, das ist nicht Ästhetizis-
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3. Even Thomas Mann characterized George’s poetry as the ‘‘incarnation of
spirit and the spiritualization of flesh’’ (Verleiblichung des Geistes und die Ver-
geistigung des Fleisches) (qtd. in Breuer, 227).
4. Blätter für die Kunst, dritte Folge, viertes Heft (1896); Landmann, 18f.
5. Blätter für die Kunst, dritte Folge, 5. Bd.
6. Numerous critics have echoed this verdict. In the eyes of Gottfried Benn,
George’s poetry is characterized by the ‘‘merciless harshness of formality’’ (uner-
bittliche Härte des Formalen) (Benn, ‘‘Stefan George,’’ 1038), and Gundolf praises
George’s ‘‘infinite control over language’’ (schrankenloseGewalt überdie Sprache)
(Gundolf, 78). This poetic ‘‘control’’ or ‘‘violence,’’ however, cannot but kill the
life it claims to have captured. The world as seen through George’s poetry shrinks
to a faint reflection or a mere shadow of the original ‘‘Urbild’’ it cannot represent.
Benjamin rightly claimed that George’s Aestheticist stance ‘‘removed life itself
from theworld’’ (‘‘Rückblick’’;GS III: 396). Claude David’s reading of George’s in-
augural poem for theHymnen, entitled ‘‘DieWeihe,’’ gives a more explicit account
of this poetic violence: ‘‘Die hier beschriebene Landschaft, . . . wird dermaßen
stilisiert, man möchte sagen inszeniert, daß sie jede Realität verliert. Alle Sinnes-
eindrücke sind abgestumpft oder werden verschwiegen; . . . Statt der freudigen
Fülle eines impressionistischen Bildes, statt der malerischen Wirkung wird nur
noch der Stil verlangt. Nur das Sinnvolle, das Symbolische wird beibehalten’’
(David, 216ff.).
7. See Stefan George im Bildnis, ed. Walther Greischel and Michael Stettler
(Düsseldorf: Küpper, 1976).
8. Cf. Blätter für die Kunst, neunte Folge (1910); Landmann, 52.
9. According to Bertolt Brecht, George was ‘‘openly counterrevolutionary un-
derneath his mask of despising politics, meaning he was not only reactionary, but
was actually working for the counterrevolution’’ (unter der Maske derVerachtung
der Politik ganz offen konterrevolutionär, d.h. nicht nur reaktionär sondern wirk-
end für die Konterrevolution) (qtd. in Kluncker 27). Similarly Georg Lukács,
Schriften zur Literatursoziologie, ed. Peter Christian Lutz (Neuwied: Luchterhand,
1963), 474–75. A comprehensive overview regarding the prewar debate about
George’s relationship to National Socialism can be found in Martin A. Siemoneit,
Politische Interpretationen von Stefan Georges Dichtung (Frankfurt: Lang, 1978),
13–19. Needless to say, the entire debate concerning George’s relationship to Ger-
man history was, and still is, mostly static, resembling a kind of trench warfare
characterized by both sides continuously reiterating their own ideological con-
cerns and personal beliefs without advancing new insights into either George’s
work or the aesthetics of fascism.
10. Volker Kapp, ‘‘Vom Bild als Übergegenwärtigung zum Bild als Simula-
tion und Verrätzelung der Welt,’’ in Bilderwelten als Vergegenwärtigung und Ver-
rätzelung der Welt, ed. Volker Kapp et al. (Berlin: Duncker, 1997), 9–30; Klaus
Schuhmacher, ‘‘Brüder der Schmerzen,’’ in Bilderwelten als Vergegenwärtigung
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11. Heidegger’s description of art is reminiscent of Benjamin’s understanding
of aura since they both discuss the essence of art in a series of paradoxical for-
mulations in which the furthest distance is revealed as the closest proximity. Cf.
Martin Heidegger, ‘‘Andenken,’’ in vol. 4 ofGA, 147. See also McNeill’s The Glance
of the Eye, 292.
12. Similarly in Jargon of Authenticity: ‘‘The jargon is neither able nor willing
to render concrete what it condemns to abstraction. . . . The unsalvageability of
what this kind of thinking aims to rescue is being declared as its most unique
element. It rejects any content against which one could argue at all’’ (Weder ist
der Jargon fähig noch gesonnen, zu konkretisieren, was er zur Abstraktheit ver-
dammt. . . . Die Unrettbarkeit dessen, was dies Denken retten will, wird weltklug
zu dessen eigenem Element gemacht. Es weist jeden Inhalt von sich, gegen den zu
argumentieren wäre) (‘‘Jargon,’’ 475).
13. Cf. Adorno’s critique of the coppola ‘‘ist’’ in Negative Dialektik, 107–11.
14. Borrowing Benjamin’s concept of ‘‘constellation,’’ Adorno emphasizes the
friction of colliding and interconnecting words: ‘‘There remains no other hope for
him [the philosopher] but to arrange the words around the new truth such that
their mere configuration engenders the new truth’’ (Es bleibt ihm [dem Philoso-
phen] keine Hoffnung als die, die Worte so um die neue Wahrheit zu stellen, daß
deren bloße Konfiguration die neue Wahrheit ergibt) (‘‘Thesen,’’ 369). The task
of philosophy consists in ‘‘[liquefying] the reified movement of thought’’ rather
than declaring it authentic or essential to language.
15. Heidegger, in some remarks on Greek philosophy and Hölderlin’s poetry,
indeed speaks of the ‘‘stove of being’’: ‘‘The stove, the place in the home that is
homey [dieHeimstatt desHeimischen], is being itself. In its light and sparkle, glow
and warmth, all beings have always already gathered themselves’’ (Heidegger, qtd.
in Krell, 5).
16. Although Adorno himself cites the exact passage in his essay on George and
Hofmannsthal, he skips over some lines, including this particular sentence, and
then continues the quote right after it. The omission ‘‘almost’’ speaks for itself.
Cf. ‘‘George und Hofmannsthal,’’ 234.
17. For an excellent discussion of Heidegger’s various concepts of vision, see
McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, 1–13.
18. For a comprehensive overview of relevant passages, see Mörchen, 543–60.
19. See Marc Froment-Meurice, That Is to Say: Heidegger’s Poetics (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998), 43–59.
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